O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

O.C.G.A. § 6-3-20 (2019)

Acquisition, construction, maintenance, and control of airports and landing fields by local governments authorized

✓ O.C.G.A. — 2019 edition (Public.Resource.Org Release 73)
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations on this page reflect the 2019 Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org Release 73, 2019-08-21; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
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(a) Counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions are authorized, separately or jointly, to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease, control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate, and police airports and landing fields for the use of aircraft, either within or without the geographical limits of such counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions, and may use for such purpose or purposes any available property that is owned or controlled by such counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions. Counties and municipalities may enter into cooperative agreements with community improvement districts for the improvement of airports and landing fields within such community improvement districts, and community improvement districts may enter into such cooperative agreements with counties and municipalities for such purposes, in accordance with Article IX, Section VII of the Constitution. (b) All counties in the State of Georgia which are located on the boundary line between the State of Georgia and any other state, as well as all municipalities and other political subdivisions which are located in such boundary counties, are authorized, separately, jointly with each other, or jointly with any county, municipality, or political subdivision of any such border state, to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease, control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate, and police airports and landing fields for the use of aircraft, either within or without the geographical limits of such border counties and the municipalities and other political subdivisions therein contained in the State of Georgia or within the geographical limits of any county, municipality, or political subdivision of any such border state other than the State of Georgia.

History

(Ga. L. 1933, p. 102, § 1; Code 1933, § 11-201; Ga. L. 1941, p. 380, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1342, § 1/SB 371.)

Annotations

Cross references. - Regulation and taxation of sale and storage of alcoholic beverages at county and municipal airports, § 3-8-1. Sale of distilled spirits, malt beverages, and wine by airline passenger carriers, §§ 3-9-1, 3-9-2.

Law reviews. - For article discussing extraterritorial condemnation of property by municipalities, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1977). For comment on Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940), see 3 Ga. B.J. 57 (1940).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS ‘‘Airports and landing fields.’’ - Language of O.C.G.A. § 6-3-20, ‘‘airports and landing fields,’’ encompasses all property reasonably and uniformly used for public convenience and welfare to facilitate effective operation of the air transportation facility. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982). Territorial jurisdiction conferred upon municipalities. - Ga. L. 1933, p. 102 vests in each municipality the same general authority, that is, each is given power to condemn land within and without the municipality’s boundaries, and accordingly each is by terms of statute vested with jurisdiction over every part of the state, including territory within limits of every other municipality. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940). Grant of power to municipalities to condemn property within and without their geographical limits authorizes one municipality to condemn land within territorial limits of another municipality. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940). Ga. L. 1933, p. 102 authorizes municipalities to condemn land beyond their limits for establishment or expansion of airports and landing fields. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6). While Ga. L. 1933, p. 102 prima facie empowers one municipality to condemn land within another municipality, it does not follow that a municipality in one part of state would have right to establish airport in a municipality in a distant part of the state. This would manifestly be an abuse of power granted, which would be

enjoined by courts. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6). Effect of condemnation by municipality. - If condemning municipality acts in good faith within power granted under terms of statute, and there is a reasonable necessity for appropriation of property, fact that other municipality may be deprived of right to tax or police property so taken is merely express result of exercise of power so granted, and does not constitute reason why act should be construed as denying the power. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940). Airports characterized as governmental institutions. - Law invested airports of the state with the character of governmental institutions. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936). Airport of City of Savannah was characterized under statutes (both local and general) authorizing its establishment and maintenance as a governmental institution in nature of a park and the city was not liable in damages to party sustaining personal injuries by reason of dangerous defect in pavement of a roadway inside of park, notwithstanding receipt by city of some incidental revenue from lessees or licensees of certain privileges therein, it not appearing that airport was operated primarily as a source of revenue. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936). Property leased to airline for airport facilities was public use. - Five parcels of property at a city-owned airport that were leased to an airline and used for hangars, flight kitchens, and air cargo were reasonably and uniformly used for

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the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the effective operation of the airport, and were therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(B)(i). City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. App. 381, 702 S.E.2d 704 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0342, 2011 Ga. LEXIS

222 (Ga. 2011); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011). Cited in Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952); City of Macon v. Powell, 133 Ga. App. 907, 213 S.E.2d 63 (1975).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. - 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation, §§ 12 et seq., 82 et seq. Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms. - 4 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Aviation, §§ 88 et seq., 104 et seq. C.J.S. - 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace, §§ 11 et seq., 53 et seq. ALR. - Aeroplanes and aeronautics, 99 ALR 173.

Power to establish or maintain public airport, or to create separate public airport authority, 161 ALR 733. Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 ALR3d 253. Air carrier’s liability for injury from condition of airport premises, 14 ALR5th 662.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1987–2023 · leading case: City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 608 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
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City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 608 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). · cites it 36× “Further, even though all the amendments and current Code section contain the reference to OCGA § 6-3-20, this reference is intended to differentiate lands acquired for airports from lands acquired for other purposes and not to mean that the leases should be examined to ascertain…”
Roberts v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 585 (Ga. 1987). · cites it 8× “Any lands acquired, owned, leased, controlled or occupied by counties, municipalities, or other political subdivisions for the purpose or purposes enumerated in Code Section 6-3-20 *274 shall be and are declared to be acquired, owned, leased, controlled, or occupied for public,…”
Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 815 S.E.2d 870 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “Prior to its 2014 amendment, OCGA § 6-3-21 (1985) provided that where a municipality owned land outside its territorial limits for the purpose of maintaining an airport, as set forth in OCGA § 6-3-20, and leased the land to private parties, the interests created in such private…”
Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors v. Aldeasa Atlanta Jt. Venture, 304 Ga. 15 (Ga. 2018). · cites it 2× “Prior to its 2014 amendment, OCGA § 6-3-21 (1985) provided that where a municipality owned land outside its territorial limits for the purpose of maintaining an airport, as set forth in OCGA § 6-3-20, and leased the land to private parties, the interests created in such private…”
Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 648 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “At issue here is the public or governmental purpose provided by OCGA § 6-3-20 (a), which provides that [c]ounties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions are authorized, separately or jointly, to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease, control, equip,…”
Avery v. Paulding Cnty. Airport Auth., 808 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “See OCGA § 6-3-20 (a) (The legislature has empowered counties, municipalities, and other political subdivisions, "separately or jointly , to acquire, establish, construct, expand, own, lease, control, equip, improve, maintain, operate, regulate, and police airports.”
City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 645 S.E.2d 42 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 2× “See also OCGA § 6-3-20 (a). This purpose has been defined to “encompass[ ] all property reasonably and uniformly used for the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the effective operation of the air transportation facility.”
Savage v. Thomaston-Upson Cnty. Off. Bldg. Auth., 422 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2× “OCGA §§ 6-3-20; 6-3-21; 6-3-22. The delegation of that authority by the City of Thomaston and Up-son County to the Office Building Authority was authorized here.”
City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 702 S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 6× “The mail sorting and transfer facility at issue there was not used for the purpose of “airports and landing fields for the use of aircraft” as required by OCGA § 6-3-20. By contrast in the case sub judice, the parcels contain hangars and maintenance facilities for servicing…”
Dekalb Cnty. v. City of Chamblee (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 6× “]” See also OCGA § 6-3-20 (a). In our statutory interpretation, if the statute is “clear and unambiguous, our interpretive task begins and ends with the text itself.”
Silver Comet Terminal Partners, LLC v. Paulding Cnty., Georgia (Ga. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “the Part 139 application purportedly filed on its behalf; that the county notified the FAA of the withdrawal but the FAA considers the application still pending and is awaiting a final resolution of the various actions before acting on the application; and that the PCAA claims…”
— 6-3-20(a) — 1 case
City of Atlanta v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 608 S.E.2d 710 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). “Further, even though all the amendments and current Code section contain the reference to OCGA § 6-3-20, this reference is intended to differentiate lands acquired for airports from lands acquired for other purposes and not to mean that the leases should be examined to ascertain…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.