"Airports and landing fields."

- Language of O.C.G.A. § 6-3-20, "airports and landing fields," encompasses all property reasonably and uniformly used for public convenience and welfare to facilitate effective operation of the air transportation facility. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. City of Atlanta, 164 Ga. App. 864, 298 S.E.2d 544 (1982).

Territorial jurisdiction conferred upon municipalities.

- Ga. L. 1933, p. 102 vests in each municipality the same general authority, that is, each is given power to condemn land within and without the municipality's boundaries, and accordingly each is by terms of statute vested with jurisdiction over every part of the state, including territory within limits of every other municipality. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).

Grant of power to municipalities to condemn property within and without their geographical limits authorizes one municipality to condemn land within territorial limits of another municipality. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).

Ga. L. 1933, p. 102 authorizes municipalities to condemn land beyond their limits for establishment or expansion of airports and landing fields. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6).

While Ga. L. 1933, p. 102 prima facie empowers one municipality to condemn land within another municipality, it does not follow that a municipality in one part of state would have right to establish airport in a municipality in a distant part of the state. This would manifestly be an abuse of power granted, which would be enjoined by courts. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940) (see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 6).

Effect of condemnation by municipality.

- If condemning municipality acts in good faith within power granted under terms of statute, and there is a reasonable necessity for appropriation of property, fact that other municipality may be deprived of right to tax or police property so taken is merely express result of exercise of power so granted, and does not constitute reason why act should be construed as denying the power. Howard v. City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S.E.2d 190 (1940).

Airports characterized as governmental institutions.

- Law invested airports of the state with the character of governmental institutions. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936).

Airport of City of Savannah was characterized under statutes (both local and general) authorizing its establishment and maintenance as a governmental institution in nature of a park and the city was not liable in damages to party sustaining personal injuries by reason of dangerous defect in pavement of a roadway inside of park, notwithstanding receipt by city of some incidental revenue from lessees or licensees of certain privileges therein, it not appearing that airport was operated primarily as a source of revenue. Mayor of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S.E. 63 (1936).

County's action against an airport authority over FAA application.

- County's action against an airport authority seeking a declaration that the authority lacked the authority to submit an application to the Federal Aviation Administration for an Airport Operating Certificate without the county's consent stated an actual controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act, O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 et seq., and should not have been dismissed. Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017).

Property leased to airline for airport facilities was public use.

- Five parcels of property at a city-owned airport that were leased to an airline and used for hangars, flight kitchens, and air cargo were reasonably and uniformly used for the public convenience and welfare to facilitate the effective operation of the airport, and were therefore exempt from ad valorem taxation under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(B)(i). City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 306 Ga. App. 381, 702 S.E.2d 704 (2010), cert. denied, No. S11C0342, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 222 (Ga. 2011); overruled on other grounds by Gilmer County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Spence, 309 Ga. App. 482, 711 S.E.2d 51 (2011).

Cited in Caroway v. City of Atlanta, 85 Ga. App. 792, 70 S.E.2d 126 (1952); City of Macon v. Powell, 133 Ga. App. 907, 213 S.E.2d 63 (1975).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Aviation, §§ 12 et seq., 82 et seq.

4 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Aviation, §§ 88 et seq., 104 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 2A C.J.S., Aeronautics and Aerospace, §§ 11 et seq., 53 et seq.

ALR.

- Aeroplanes and aeronautics, 99 A.L.R. 173.

Power to establish or maintain public airport, or to create separate public airport authority, 161 A.L.R. 733.

Airport operations or flight of aircraft as nuisance, 79 A.L.R.3d 253.

Air carrier's liability for injury from condition of airport premises, 14 A.L.R.5th 662.