Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 7-4-1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 7 BANKING AND FINANCE

Section 4. Interest and Usury, 7-4-1 through 7-4-36.

ARTICLE 1 IN GENERAL

7-4-1. "Usury" defined.

The term "usury" means reserving and taking or contracting to reserve and take, either directly or indirectly, a greater sum for the use of money than the lawful interest.

(Orig. Code 1863, § 2023; Code 1868, § 2024; Code 1882, § 2051; Civil Code 1895, § 2877; Civil Code 1910, § 3427; Code 1933, § 57-102.)

Law reviews.

- For note discussing the reservation of interest at highest lawful rate as constituting usury, see 1 Ga. L. Rev. No. 2 p. 38 (1927). For note discussing whether a holder in due course takes free of claims of violations of the usury laws, see 12 Ga. L. Rev. 814 (1978).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

General Consideration

Policy of state.

- It is the policy of laws of this state to inhibit taking of usury under every and any pretense or contrivance whatsoever. McGehee v. Petree, 165 Ga. 492, 141 S.E. 206 (1928); Public Fin. Corp. v. State, 67 Ga. App. 635, 21 S.E.2d 476 (1942).

Construction and application of section with § 7-4-18. - Former Code 1933, §§ 57-102, 57-117 and 57-9901 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-1 and7-4-18) are to be construed and applied as one law. Wall v. Lewis, 192 Ga. 652, 16 S.E.2d 430 (1941).

"Usury."

- Usury is excess over legal interest charged by lender to borrower for use of lender's money. Sledd v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 326, 183 S.E. 199 (1935).

Four requisites of usurious transactions.

- There are four requisites of every usurious transaction: (1) a loan or forebearance of money, either express or implied; (2) upon understanding that principal shall or may be returned; (3) that for such loan or forebearance a greater profit than is authorized by law shall be paid or is agreed to be paid; and (4) that the contract was made with intent to violate the law. Bailey v. Newberry, 52 Ga. App. 693, 184 S.E. 357 (1935).

Substance of transaction is focus in determining whether transaction is usurious.

- It is duty of court to look, not at form and words, but at substance of transaction. Rushing v. Worsham & Co., 102 Ga. 825, 30 S.E. 541 (1898); Young v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 Ga. App. 58, 95 S.E. 381 (1918).

Usurious original transaction infects renewal.

- Contract for usurious loan not purged of usury by renewal note when original contract continues. Hammond v. Buys, 1 Ga. 416 (1846).

If there was usury in the original loan which was not purged out when renewal was given, they are contaminated just as original contract was, and all payments made in interval are to be treated not as payments of usury, but payments made on original debt. Archer v. McCray, 59 Ga. 546 (1877); McGee v. Long, 83 Ga. 156, 9 S.E. 1107 (1889); Lockwood v. Muhlberg, 124 Ga. 660, 53 S.E. 92 (1906).

When original transaction was usurious, the usury infects any renewal note for the same debt or any part thereof, if the usury was never purged. Hartsfield Co. v. Watkins, 67 Ga. App. 411, 20 S.E.2d 440 (1942).

Usurious contract not cured by compromise and settlement for less.

- Since usury consists not only in reserving and taking but in contracting to reserve and take more than legal rate, fact that agreed excess was compromised and settled for a less amount would not free a transaction from usury. Lankford v. Holton, 187 Ga. 94, 200 S.E. 243 (1938), later appeal, 195 Ga. 317, 24 S.E.2d 292 (1943).

When undisputed pleadings show usurious scheme, judgment on pleadings appropriate.

- When facts show without dispute a device to extract more than legal rate of interest for use of money, such question need not be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, when undisputed pleadings show such a scheme, it is not error for the trial court to grant the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings under provisions of § 12(c) of the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(c)). Cook v. Young, 225 Ga. 26, 165 S.E.2d 727 (1969).

If usury is found, all usurious interest is void. Gilbert v. Cherry, 136 Ga. App. 417, 221 S.E.2d 472 (1975).

Usury laws did not apply to an investment contract.

- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a purchaser in a breach of contract suit against a developer as the award the purchaser obtained, which included interest, was not usurious under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-1 as the developer failed to show that the contract involved was a loan to which the usury laws applied as the record established it as an investment contract. Golden Atlanta Site Dev., Inc. v. Tilson, 299 Ga. App. 646, 683 S.E.2d 166 (2009).

Cited in Scott v. Saffold, 37 Ga. 384 (1867); Shealy v. Toole, 56 Ga. 210 (1876); Easterlin v. Rylander, 59 Ga. 292 (1877); Wofford v. Wyly, 72 Ga. 863 (1884); Neel v. Young, 78 Ga. 342 (1886); Reynolds v. Neal, 91 Ga. 609, 18 S.E. 530 (1893); Cook v. Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 104 Ga. 814, 30 S.E. 911 (1898); Green v. Equitable Mtg. Co., 107 Ga. 536, 33 S.E. 869 (1899); Stewart v. Slocumb, 120 Ga. 762, 48 S.E. 311 (1904); McGehee v. Petree, 165 Ga. 492, 141 S.E. 206 (1928); Graham v. Lynch, 206 Ga. 301, 57 S.E.2d 86 (1950); McConnell v. Shropshire, 80 Ga. App. 677, 57 S.E.2d 293 (1950); Pickens Inv. Co. v. Jones, 82 Ga. App. 850, 62 S.E.2d 753 (1950); M.B. Dale, Inc. v. Dawson County Bank, 112 Ga. App. 560, 145 S.E.2d 619 (1965); Vezzani v. Tallant, 121 Ga. App. 67, 172 S.E.2d 858 (1970); Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 556 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1977); Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Wagnon, 587 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1979); Laminoirs-Trefileries-Cableries de Lens, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Southern Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lyle, 249 Ga. 284, 290 S.E.2d 455 (1982).

Intent

Essential element is intent, at time contract is executed, to take unlawful interest.

- To constitute usury, it is essential that there be, at the time the contract is executed, an intent on the part of the lender to take or charge, for use of money, a higher rate of interest than that allowed by law. Bellerby v. Goodwyn, 112 Ga. 306, 37 S.E. 376 (1900); Loganville Banking Co. v. Forrester, 143 Ga. 302, 84 S.E. 961, 1915D L.R.A. 1195 (1915); Harrison v. Arrendale, 113 Ga. App. 118, 147 S.E.2d 356 (1966), later appeal, 117 Ga. App. 463, 160 S.E.2d 653 (1968); Williams v. First Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 879, 269 S.E.2d 923 (1980); McCrory v. Young, 158 Ga. App. 678, 282 S.E.2d 163 (1981).

Mistake or inadvertence does not make a loan usurious.

- To constitute usury it is essential that there be, at the time the contract is executed, an intent on the part of the lender to take or charge for use of money a higher rate of interest than that allowed by law. If the intent be to take only legal interest, a slight and trifling excess, due to mistake or inadvertence, will not taint the transaction with usury. Cook v. Young, 225 Ga. 26, 165 S.E.2d 727 (1969).

Mistake in calculation or by inadvertence, not shown to be part of a usurious design or otherwise intentional, does not make a loan usurious. Sumner v. Adel Banking Co., 244 Ga. 73, 259 S.E.2d 32 (1979).

If the intent be to take only the legal interest, a slight and trifling excess, due to mistake or inadvertence, will not taint the transaction with usury. Williams v. First Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 879, 269 S.E.2d 923 (1980).

Intent that excess interest be paid.

- Transaction is usurious when lender and borrower mutually intend that excess interest be paid. Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 34 S.E. 217 (1899).

Intent implied when note usurious on note's face.

- Intent to charge usurious rates may be implied if all other essential elements are expressed upon the face of the contract. Harrison v. Arrendale, 113 Ga. App. 118, 147 S.E.2d 356 (1966).

When the note calls for usurious interest on the note's face, usurious intent will be implied, although the lender may negate it. Williams v. First Bank & Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 879, 269 S.E.2d 923 (1980).

Intent to take unlawful interest demands verdict of usury.

- If it appears that the lender intended to take for use of money more than the lawful rate of interest, a verdict of usury is demanded. Simpson v. Charters, 188 Ga. 842, 5 S.E.2d 27 (1939).

Jury question.

- Question of usurious intent and truth of transaction is generally for jury determination, but whe contract is usurious on the contract's face, the intent to violate usury law may be implied. McCrory v. Young, 158 Ga. App. 678, 282 S.E.2d 163 (1981).

Rebuttal of intent by evidence of honest mistake.

- Implication of usurious intent arising from taking or reserving of interest greater than legal rate may be rebutted by evidence that excess was the result of an honest mistake and that usury was not intended. But when evidence is clear, this question can be decided as a matter of law. McCrory v. Young, 158 Ga. App. 678, 282 S.E.2d 163 (1981).

Application

Price never considered usury.

- One may sell one's credit, one's responsibility, one's goods, or one's lands; and if the person deals fairly, the person may take as large a price for either as the person can get, and there can be no usury in the case. Rushing v. Worsham & Co., 102 Ga. 825, 30 S.E. 541 (1898).

Cash price and time price.

- Seller may make a difference in the seller's cash price and the seller's time price for property. Bowen v. Consolidated Mtg. & Inv. Corp., 115 Ga. App. 874, 156 S.E.2d 168 (1967).

Higher time price than cash price for property is not a loan; thus, usury laws are inapplicable. Bowen v. Consolidated Mtg. & Inv. Corp., 115 Ga. App. 874, 156 S.E.2d 168 (1967).

Conditional-sale contract for amount termed time-price is not usurious, even though in a given instance the difference in cash price and term price may exceed eight percent interest. Newkirk v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 93 Ga. App. 1, 90 S.E.2d 618 (1955).

Property received as interest permissible unless value exceeds lawful rate.

- Creditor has right to demand payment of the creditor's debt with legal interest; and if the creditor receives property, the value of which does not exceed the creditor's lawful demand, the creditor has not received any usury, although the creditor may have agreed with the debtor that the property was of greater value than the sum the creditor was lawfully entitled to exact. First Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 135 Ga. 687, 70 S.E. 246, 36 L.R.A. (n.s.) 134 (1911).

Note permitting acceleration of all liabilities not usurious on the note's face.

- Clause in secondary security deed on realty permitting acceleration of all liabilities does not render note usurious on its face. Goodwin v. Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 787, 242 S.E.2d 302 (1978).

Note usurious when acceleration clause allows more than lawful interest.

- Promissory note containing acceleration clause permitting collection of more than allowable interest constitutes usurious contract to reserve and take more than lawful interest. Goodwin v. Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 787, 242 S.E.2d 302 (1978).

Payment of sum exceeding lawful rate under guise of rent usurious.

- When vendee of property is to pay a vendor 10 percent on purchase money until it is settled in full, under name of rent, such contract is usurious on the contract's face. Scofield v. McNaught, 52 Ga. 69 (1874).

Payment of rents from property exceeding lawful rate, as consideration for loan, constitutes usury.

- If money is loaned for purpose of enabling borrower to buy certain shop, upon agreement that for use of money lender shall receive from borrower one half of specified rents from property, which amounts to more than highest legal rate of interest per annum, the transaction will be usurious. Reese v. Bloodsworth, 146 Ga. 355, 91 S.E. 120 (1917).

Paying taxes on bonds, in addition to lawful interest, is usurious.

- Stipulation in bonds to pay, in addition to lawful interest, a percentage of federal income taxes that might be imposed upon the bonds is usurious. Newcomb v. Niskey's Lake, Inc., 190 Ga. 565, 10 S.E.2d 51, answer conformed to, 63 Ga. App. 811, 12 S.E.2d 160 (1940).

Commission, in addition to full rate of lawful interest, usurious.

- Under former Code 1933, § 57-102 (see now O.C.G.A. § 7-4-1), charge by a lender as a commission of $8,000.00, deducted from a loan of $80,000.00 evidenced by bonds of a borrower, which carrying full rate of lawful interest (eight percent per annum) is usury. Newcomb v. Niskey's Lake, Inc., 190 Ga. 565, 10 S.E.2d 51, answer conformed to, 63 Ga. App. 811, 12 S.E.2d 160 (1940).

Agreement to forbear collection of judgment in consideration of usurious interest unlawful.

- If a judgment not tainted with usury is transferred, and the transferee agrees with the defendants to forbear its collection for a term of time, in consideration of usurious interest paid the defendants, such subsequent agreement is usurious. Troutman v. Barnett, 9 Ga. 30 (1850).

Requirement that borrower keep certain sum on deposit makes loan usurious.

- Requirement that borrower shall keep on deposit a certain sum, if made a condition precedent to the loan of money, infects the loan with usury; for reason that the borrower thus pays interest on money which the borrower does not receive or have use of. Bank of Lumpkin v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801, 132 S.E. 221 (1963); Reid v. National Bank, 149 Ga. App. 834, 256 S.E.2d 82 (1979).

Excess interest may be paid for considerations beyond use of money.

- When excess over legal interest is paid for other good and valuable considerations beyond mere use of money, it is not usury. Atlanta Mining & Rolling Mill Co. v. Gwyer, 48 Ga. 9 (1873); Sledd v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 326, 183 S.E. 199 (1935); Simpson v. Charters, 188 Ga. 842, 5 S.E.2d 27 (1939).

Lender's 49 percent economic interest.

- In a class action suit seeking to hold a lender liable for payday loans, the trial court did not err in concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the lender was the true lender of the loans made after May 14, 2004, because evidence was presented sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the lender actually received only a 49 percent economic interest for the lender's services and even if the lender did so, whether the lender nevertheless, by contrivance, device, or scheme, attempted to avoid the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2(a). Ga. Cash Am. v. Greene, 318 Ga. App. 355, 734 S.E.2d 67 (2012).

Premium for insurance required as collateral security for loan not charge for use of money. Sledd v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 326, 183 S.E. 199 (1935).

Interest on overdue interest and attorneys' fees lawful.

- It is lawful to contract for interest on interest overdue and for payment by debtor of reasonable attorneys' fees on sums, both principal and interest, which have to be collected by suit. Merck v. American Freehold Land Mtg. Co., 79 Ga. 213, 7 S.E. 265 (1887); Young v. First Nat'l Bank, 22 Ga. App. 58, 95 S.E. 381 (1918).

Inclusion of past due interest in note not usurious.

- Contention that, because a sum of past due interest was included in the note, the transaction was thereby tainted with usury, on the theory that the interest cannot be collected on interest, was without merit. Walton v. Johnson, 213 Ga. 108, 97 S.E.2d 310 (1957).

Interest recoverable on annual interest installments from time interest become due.

- Upon contract to pay interest annually, interest may be recovered on annual installments of interest from time interest became due. Calhoun v. Marshall, 61 Ga. 275, 34 Am. R. 99 (1878); Ray v. Pease, 97 Ga. 618, 25 S.E. 360 (1895); Haley v. Covington, 19 Ga. App. 782, 92 S.E. 297 (1917).

Loan not usurious if used to pay usurious loan.

- Paying old usurious loan with new, nonusurious loan does not necessarily render new loan usurious. Lott v. Peterson, 23 Ga. App. 458, 98 S.E. 361 (1919).

When lender of money neither charges nor receives more than legal rate of interest, fact that money was, with the lender's knowledge, borrowed for purpose of paying debt infected with usury due by borrower to third person does not make loan usurious. Thompson v. First State Bank, 99 Ga. 651, 26 S.E. 79 (1896); Carter v. Brooks, 144 Ga. 852, 88 S.E. 209 (1916).

Facts warranting finding that transaction is merely device to cover agreement to pay usurious interest.

- See Kennedy v. Baggarley, 15 Ga. App. 811, 84 S.E. 211 (1915).

Parol Evidence

Introduction to show contract was cover for usury.

- Parol evidence may be introduced to show written contract was a cover for usury. McDaniel v. Bank of Bethlehem, 22 Ga. App. 223, 95 S.E. 724 (1918).

Admissible for testing validity of a transaction.

- Law abhors usury and will search every fact and circumstance and allow introduction of parol evidence to test the validity of the real transaction of parties. Bailey v. Newberry, 52 Ga. App. 693, 184 S.E. 357 (1935).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

"Usury."

- Usury is not the taking of interest from a borrower at an unlawful rate, but rather it is receiving from any source a greater sum for use of money than the lawful interest. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-53.

Where interest plus points or loan discount exceed legal limit, loan usurious.

- When interest rate charged borrower coupled with points or loan discount collected from seller exceed legal limit, such loan is usurious; the standard charges in a loan transaction are not included in this computation if those charges are expended in a bona fide manner. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-53.

Carrying charges limited to legal rate plus actual expenses.

- When no distinction is made between cash price and time price of an article, carrying charges are limited to legal rate of interest, plus any actual expense incurred by vendor incident to the sale, such as fee for recording a security instrument and reasonable protective insurance. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 448.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 44B Am. Jur. 2d, Interest and Usury, §§ 1 et seq., 81 et seq.

14C Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Interest and Usury, § 2.

Proof of Violation of State Usury Consumer Loan Law, 75 POF3d 103.

C.J.S.

- 47 C.J.S., Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit, §§ 1 et seq., 184, 185.

ALR.

- Effect on indebtedness originally valid of usurious forbearance, renewal, or extension, 3 A.L.R. 877.

Waiver of usury by renewal or other executory agreement, 13 A.L.R. 1213; 74 A.L.R. 1184.

Provision in statute or ordinance limiting rate of interest per annum as precluding requirement of payment at maximum rate at intervals of less than a year, 29 A.L.R. 1109.

Validity of agreement to pay interest on interest, 37 A.L.R. 325; 76 A.L.R. 1484.

Usury: expenses or charges (including taxes) incident to loan of money, 53 A.L.R. 743; 63 A.L.R. 823; 105 A.L.R. 795; 52 A.L.R.2d 703.

Noncompliance with conditions prescribed by statute as affecting validity of contract, under usury laws, for payment of premium on loan of building and loan association, 74 A.L.R. 973.

Waiver of usury by renewal or other executory agreements, 74 A.L.R. 1184.

Delay in paying over proceeds of loan to borrower as affecting question of usury, 76 A.L.R. 1467.

Right of a purchaser assuming a mortgage debt, with the authorization of the mortgagor, to set up usury in mortgage as a defense or rely upon it as a ground of relief in equity, 82 A.L.R. 1153.

Parol-evidence rule as affecting extrinsic evidence to show or to negative usury, 82 A.L.R. 1199; 104 A.L.R. 1261.

Taking of usury or excessive interest as subject of criminal conspiracy, 89 A.L.R. 830.

Obligations covering deferred payments of purchase money, or extension thereof, as loan or forbearance within usury laws, 91 A.L.R. 1105.

Usury as predicable on agreement by which lender is to receive something other than money for his loan, 95 A.L.R. 1231.

Validity, construction, and effect of express agreement releasing cause of action or defense based on exaction of usury, 99 A.L.R. 600.

Conflict of laws as to usury, 125 A.L.R. 482.

Note or other obligation payable on demand for an amount in excess of amount actually loaned as usurious, 127 A.L.R. 460.

Finance charge in connection with conditional sale contract as usury, 143 A.L.R. 238.

Transaction in form a sale, but accompanied by an agreement or option for repurchase by the vendor or a third person previously interested, as a loan, as regards usury law, 154 A.L.R. 1063.

Computing interest on basis of 360 days in year, 30 days in month, or the like, as usury, 35 A.L.R.2d 842.

Usury: expenses or charges (including taxes) incident to loan of money, 52 A.L.R.2d 703.

Taking or charging interest in advance as usury, 57 A.L.R.2d 630.

Statute denying defense of usury to corporation, 63 A.L.R.2d 924.

Admissibility, in civil case involving usury issue, of evidence of other assertedly usurious transactions, 67 A.L.R.2d 232.

Usury as affected by repayment of, or borrower's option to repay, loan before maturity, 75 A.L.R.2d 1265.

Payments under (ostensibly) independent contract as usury, 81 A.L.R.2d 1280.

Practice of exacting usury as a nuisance or ground for injunction, 83 A.L.R.2d 848.

Usury: liability for the statutory penalty of persons other than the offending lender in a usurious loan transaction, 4 A.L.R.3d 650.

Usury as affected by mistake in amount or calculation of interest or service charges for loan, 11 A.L.R.3d 1498.

Advance in price for credit sale as compared with cash sale as usury, 14 A.L.R.3d 1065.

Provision for interest after maturity at a rate in excess of legal rate as usurious or otherwise illegal, 28 A.L.R.3d 449.

Reformation of usurious contract, 74 A.L.R.3d 1239.

Contingency as to borrower's receipt of money or other property from which loan is to be repaid as rendering loan usurious, 92 A.L.R.3d 623.

Leaving part of loan on deposit with lender as usury, 92 A.L.R.3d 769.

Application of usury laws to transactions characterized as "leases,", 94 A.L.R.3d 640.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 7-4-1

Total Results: 2  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Fleet Fin., Inc. v. Jones, 430 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 27 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 14, 1993 | 263 Ga. 228, 93 Fulton County D. Rep. 2194

...The appellant, Fleet Finance, Inc. of Georgia (hereinafter "Fleet"), holds promissory notes and security deeds from the three appellees, who filed the present action against Fleet. The appellees contended that Fleet was charging usurious interest rates under OCGA § 7-4-18 and that therefore Fleet should be enjoined from proceeding with threatened foreclosures and should be required to forfeit all interests contracted for under the notes....
...The fees, however, became nonrefundable and nonrebateable at closing. In addition to these fees, Fleet charged yearly interest rates ranging from 18.9 percent per annum to 19.9 percent per annum. In their complaint the appellees based their contention that the loans were usurious on OCGA § 7-4-18, which provides that [a]ny person, company, or corporation who shall reserve, charge, or take for any loan or advance of money ... any rate of interest greater than 5 percent per month ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. [1] Before the trial court, the appellees contended that the use of the phrase "per month" in § 7-4-18 means that interest must be calculated for each individual month of the loan, and that, if the interest received in any one month exceeds five percent, the loan violates the statute....
...Calculating the interest under the appellees' method, the interest for the first month of the appellee's loans greatly exceed five percent. For instance, the interest rate for the first month of the loan of appellee Elizabeth Jones would be *230 23 percent. Fleet responded that under § 7-4-18 the "rate of interest ......
...the loan. Fleet further contended that we adopted this method of calculating interest in Norris v. Sigler Daisy Corp., 260 Ga. 271, 273 (3) (392 SE2d 242) (1990), and that Norris was controlling in this case. Moreover, Fleet responded that, even if § 7-4-18 were interpreted to prohibit interest greater than five percent in any one month of the loan, it should not be construed so as to attribute nonrefundable discount points and origination fees to the first month because they are amortized and paid over the life of the loan. Calculating the interest under Fleet's method, the monthly interest rates for the appellees' loans are 1.57 percent, 1.67 percent, and 1.60 percent, [2] well below 5 percent per month permitted by § 7-4-18....
...opriate method of treating discount points and origination fees was not at issue in Norris and because Sigler Daisy Corp. would have lost the appeal even applying the interest calculation method most favorable to it. The trial court ruled that under § 7-4-18 interest had to be calculated for each individual month of the loan; that if the interest in any one month exceeded five percent, the entire loan was usurious; that the discount points and origination fees had to be attributed to the first...
...For numerous reasons, Fleet contends the trial court's ruling *231 was in error. We first address Fleet's contention that the method of calculation used in Norris is binding in this case. We disagree with Fleet's assertion, because the competing interpretations of § 7-4-18 advanced in this case were not advanced in Norris and because the method we adopted was most favorable to Sigler Daisy Corp....
...te urged in this case. Green v. Equitable Mtg. Co., 107 Ga. 536, 539-540 (33 SE 869) (1899); Clarke v. Havard, 111 Ga. 242, 249 (36 SE 837) (1900); Harvard v. Davis, 145 Ga. 580, 586 (4) (89 SE 740) (1916). 3. We thus turn to Fleet's contention that § 7-4-18 must be interpreted generally to require the consideration of the total interest paid over the entire period of a loan in determining if a loan is usurious. As previously noted, the appellees contend that the statute should be interpreted to mean that a person who charges more than five percent in any given month of a loan is guilty of a misdemeanor. With respect to this issue, we first note that § 7-4-18 is a criminal statute....
...194 (200 SE 309) (1938), [3] the appellees contend that the phrase "rate of interest ... per month" requires an interest calculation for each individual month of the loan and that if the interest actually paid in any given month exceeds five percent, the entire loan is usurious. The appellees would thus interpret § 7-4-18 to read "rate of interest greater than 5 percent in any one month." However, "per month" is defined as "by the month," see Black's Law Dictionary, p....
...ust as easily be read to require the lender to charge more than five percent for each and every month of the loan, instead of for any one month of the loan, in order for the loan to be usurious. Another consideration is that the construction of OCGA § 7-4-18 that is urged by Fleet is supported by § 7-4-1, which we have held must be construed with § 7-4-18; Wall v. Lewis, 192 Ga. 652 (16 SE2d 430) (1941). Section 7-4-1 provides that the "term `usury' means reserving and taking or contracting to reserve and take ......
...a greater sum for the use of money than the lawful interest." On a fixed-term loan, the "sum for the use of money" would appear to mean the total interest extracted over the life of the loan. Moreover, "lawful interest" would appear to mean the five percent per month specified in § 7-4-18. Thus, § 7-4-1 would appear to contemplate that a loan is not usurious under § 7-4-18 unless the total interest exceeded five percent per month....
...nder to make the loan for the entire loan period and not for any one month or year, because the borrower has the use of the amount loaned for the entire loan period, and because the usury penalty applies to the interest for the entire contract, OCGA § 7-4-10; Norris, supra, 260 Ga....
...West End Park North, 246 A2d 591, 595-597 (Md. 1968); Collins v. Union Fed. Sav. &c. Assn., 662 P2d 610, 616 (Nev. 1983); French v. *233 Mtg. Guarantee Co., 104 P2d 655, 657-659 (Cal. 1940). [4] The appellees advance several other contentions to support their "in any month" construction of § 7-4-18. They contend that Fleet's interpretation of § 7-4-18 will lead to the absurd result of permitting Fleet to charge as much as 200 points at closing and 19.9 percent interest per year without violating § 7-4-18. This contention, however, reflects displeasure not so much with spreading points and origination fees but with the fact that § 7-4-18 does not regulate points and permits 60 percent interest a year, as Fleet could simply extract the same amount of interest as that posed by the appellees' hypothetical by charging interest of 60 percent per year....
...The appellees' displeasure with this result is a matter better expressed to the General Assembly. Moreover, the hypothetical posed by the appellees is offset by the equally troubling hypotheticals posed by Fleet if we were to adopt the appellees' position. The appellees also contend that Fleet's construction of § 7-4-18 should not be adopted because it is possible that, if a borrower took out a loan with high nonrebateable front-end interest charges and made an early prepayment of the loan, the payoff of the loan would include interest in excess of five percent per month....
...However, it is well-established that usury cannot be based upon speculation of such a contingent event. See 47 CJS 255, Interest & Usury; Consumer Credit, §§ 139 & 140. [5] Having evaluated the foregoing reasons advanced in support of the conflicting interpretations of § 7-4-18, we conclude that Fleet's construction of the statute is at least as reasonable, if not more so, than the construction advanced by the appellees. Because § 7-4-18 is a criminal statute, we must adopt the interpretation urged by Fleet. We thus now expressly approve the method of calculating usury for purposes of § 7-4-18 employed in Norris....
...To the extent that Fulwiler, supra, 59 Ga. App. 194, and Crowe v. State, 44 Ga. App. 719 (162 SE 849) (1931), are inconsistent with this opinion, they are overruled. 4. Furthermore, even adopting the appellees' interpretation that interest must be calculated under § 7-4-18 based on the interest received *234 in any given month, we conclude that § 7-4-18 cannot be construed so as to attribute nonrefundable points and origination fees to the first month of a loan when those items are actually paid over the life of the loan. The purpose of construing § 7-4-18 to prohibit lenders from charging more than five percent interest in any one month would be to permit borrowers to know the status of their principal and interest payments on a monthly basis and to prevent lenders from assessing a high interest charge in any one month....
...similarly face no threat of default through high interest charges in any given month, as it is undisputed that the appellees pay a set amount of interest every month that is well under the five percent permitted by law. For this reason, and because § 7-4-18 is a criminal statute that must be strictly construed, we conclude that even if § 7-4-18 prohibited a lender from charging in excess of five percent in any one month, the front-end interest charges could not be attributed to the first month of the loan....
...Although Norris *235 mentions spreading as a method to determine the interest rate charged, that was not the issue before the court. Rather, the issue before the court was whether origination fees, points and other charges should be considered as interest under the criminal usury statute, OCGA § 7-4-18....
...60 (122 SE 724) (1924)), which Norris neither cited nor disavowed or overruled. Therefore, the use of spreading should be considered only as illustrative of a point and should not be considered as instructive as to the method of computing interest. 2. The majority opinion bases its decision in part on the fact that OCGA § 7-4-18 is a criminal, rather than a civil, statute that is "subject to multiple reasonable interpretations." In Div. 3, the majority states as follows: With respect to this issue, we first note that § 7-4-18 is a criminal statute....
...he one most favorable to Fleet. I agree with the majority that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and that the same rule applies even when the issue arises in a civil proceeding; however, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that OCGA § 7-4-18 is ambiguous and thus in need of judicial construction. The pertinent language of OCGA § 7-4-18 is as follows: (a) Any person, company, or corporation who shall reserve, charge, or take for any loan or advance of money, or forbearance to enforce the collection of any sum of money, any rate of interest greater than 5 percent per month,...
...guilty of a misdemeanor; ... (b) This Code section shall not be construed as repealing or impairing the usury laws now existing but shall be construed as being cumulative thereof. Focusing on the phrase "per month," the majority concludes that OCGA § 7-4-18 is ambiguous....
...[The statute] makes the unit of time for the computation of interest 3 1/2 per cent per month. No other unit of time for the computation of interest is mentioned in said section. [Emphasis supplied.] [Id. at 195.] In Crowe v. State, supra, the court affirmed an appeal from a criminal *237 conviction for violating § 7-4-18's predecessor....
...The statute specifically states that it prohibits "any rate of interest greater than 5 percent per month." The only reference is to monthly interest. Where no ambiguity exists, there is no need to construe a statute. I am fearful that the language in the majority opinion indicating that OCGA § 7-4-18 is subject to multiple reasonable interpretations will open the flood gates for challenges to be made to a host of other criminal statutes which are equally as specific as this one....
...which is written in a clear and unequivocal manner. 3. I also take issue with the majority's ultimate conclusion that appellant's collection of nonrefundable, non-rebatable interest charges at closing does not constitute conduct made illegal by OCGA § 7-4-18: the reserving, charging, or taking for any loan or advance of money an interest rate that exceeds five percent per month....
...The parties stipulated that these prepaid finance charges were fully earned at closing. The majority endorses amortization of the prepaid interest charges over the life of the loan and can then conclude that the loans involved herein are not usurious under § 7-4-18....
...ir dealings, and heighten the level of professionalism in the financial community. NOTES [1] In Norris v. Sigler Daisy Corp., 260 Ga. 271 (392 SE2d 242) (1990), we held that discount points and loan origination fees must be treated as interest under § 7-4-18, Norris at 272-273 (2), and that borrowers may rely on our criminal usury statute to seek civil penalties such as the forfeiture of interest, id....
...th $208.69 Divided by principal $13,245.00 ___________ Monthly interest rate 1.57% [3] Fulwiler interpreted the Small Loan Act of 1920, which prohibited a rate of interest greater than 3 1/2 percent per month, consistently with the interpretation of § 7-4-18 that is advanced by the appellees....
Copy

Oconee Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Thomas, 282 Ga. 422 (Ga. 2007).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 24, 2007 | 651 S.E.2d 45, 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 2919