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2018 Georgia Code 9-11-2 | Car Wreck Lawyer

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 11. Civil Practice Act, 9-11-1 through 9-11-133.

ARTICLE 1 SCOPE OF RULES AND FORM OF ACTION

9-11-2. One form of action.

There shall be one form of action, to be known as "civil action."

(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 2.)

Cross references.

- Definition of "civil action" for purposes of title generally, § 9-2-1.

U.S. Code.

- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2, and annotations pertaining thereto, see 28 U.S.C.

Law reviews.

- For article surveying developments in Georgia real property law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 219 (1981). For annual survey of administrative law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 17 (1986). For article, "The Civil Jurisdiction of State and Magistrate Courts," see 24 Ga. St. B.J. 29 (1987).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

This section furnishes a single uniform procedure by which a litigant may present a litigant's claim in an orderly manner to a court empowered to give the litigant whatever relief is appropriate and just; the substantive and remedial principles that applied prior to it are not changed. Burnham v. Lynn, 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975).

Jurisdictional distinctions between law and equity remain. Burnham v. Lynn, 235 Ga. 207, 219 S.E.2d 111 (1975).

Cited in Adler v. Ormond, 117 Ga. App. 600, 161 S.E.2d 435 (1968); Times-Journal, Inc. v. Jonquil Broadcasting Co., 226 Ga. 673, 177 S.E.2d 64 (1970); Owens v. Cobb County, 230 Ga. 707, 198 S.E.2d 846 (1973); Caito v. State, 130 Ga. App. 831, 204 S.E.2d 765 (1974); Sikes v. Sikes, 233 Ga. 97, 209 S.E.2d 641 (1974); McGarvey v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 243 Ga. 714, 256 S.E.2d 781 (1979); Roe v. Doe, 246 Ga. 138, 268 S.E.2d 901 (1980); McNeal v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 249 Ga. 662, 293 S.E.2d 331 (1982); Pack v. Mahan, 294 Ga. 496, 755 S.E.2d 126 (2014).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, §§ 18, 19. 27A Am. Jur. 2d, Equity, § 4. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, Federal Courts, §§ 17, 19, 20.

C.J.S.

- 1A C.J.S., Actions, §§ 1 et seq., 84. 35A C.J.S., Federal Civil Procedure, §§ 34, 35, 40, 41.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-2

Total Results: 14  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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The State v. Sass Grp., LLC (two Cases), 315 Ga. 893 (Ga. 2023).

Cited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2023

...in the constitution. If it is, there is a waiver of sovereign immunity, not for the claim, but for the action.” (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted)), superseded by constitutional amendment as stated in Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 422 (II) (B). See also OCGA §§ 9-11-2 (“There shall be one form of action, to be known as ‘civil action.’”); 9-11-3 (noting that a “civil action” commences with the filing of the 16 complaint and case filing form); 9-2-5 (a) (...
...ants bring all 23 relevant claims related to their case in one action. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 9-11-13 (regarding counter- and cross-claims); 9-11-18 (joinder of claims and remedies); 9-11-19 (joinder of persons); 9-11-22 (interpleader); 9-11-24 (intervention); Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God v....
...ividual capacity in addition to the State. In any event, Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Court should view their amended complaint as one encompassing two separate “actions” that are joined or “consolidated” into one case under OCGA § 9-11-20 is problematic. The relevant permissive joinder provision of OCGA § 9-11-20 provides that “[a]ll persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or s...
...injunction as the question should not have been reached by the trial court, and remand this case with direction that it be dismissed. Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. in the action.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-20 (a)....
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Brannon v. State, 140 Ga. 787 (Ga. 1913).

Cited 23 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 11, 1913 | 80 S.E. 7

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Alvarez v. Sills, 365 S.E.2d 97 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 25, 1988 | 258 Ga. 18

...1 (302 SE2d 542) (1983). Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing the petition. [1] Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents. WELTNER, Justice, concurring. I join in the majority opinion, and offer additional views. 1. OCGA § 9-11-2 provides: "There shall be one form of action, to be known as `civil action.'" In adopting that broad statement, the General Assembly sought to bury (once again) the intricacies of "forms of action" pleading....
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Bloodworth v. State, 118 S.E.2d 374 (Ga. 1961).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 9, 1961 | 216 Ga. 572

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Georgia Dep't of Human Resources v. Joseph Campbell Co., 411 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. 1992).

Cited 19 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 17, 1992 | 261 Ga. 822, 19 Fulton County D. Rep. 17

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Vaughan v. Vaughan, 317 S.E.2d 201 (Ga. 1984).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 1984 | 253 Ga. 76

...The rules applicable to practice and procedure in ejectment and extraordinary equitable remedies such as quia timet, at first preserved by the Civil Practice Act, Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 81 (j) (m), are no longer preserved. OCGA § 9-11-81. We now have one form of action, OCGA § 9-11-2, whether legal or equitable, OCGA § 9-11-1....
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Irwin v. Askew, 74 Ga. 581 (Ga. 1885).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 17, 1885

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COE & PAYNE Co. v. Foster & Kleiser, Inc., 366 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. 1988).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Apr 7, 1988 | 258 Ga. 161

...etary of State with the same home office address in New Jersey; both corporations had the same agent for service; the same person served as vice-president for both corporations; and both corporations occupy the same local address in Atlanta. 3. OCGA § 9-11-2 provides: "There shall be one form of action, to be known as `civil action.'" OCGA § 9-2-1 provides, in part, as follows: "As used in this title, the term: (1) `Action' means the judicial means of enforcing a right....
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Pack v. Mahan, 294 Ga. 496 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 24, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 126, 2014 Fulton County D. Rep. 272

...le relief, but only that which would have been awarded [him] in a statutory proceeding for partition.” Nixon v. Nixon, 197 Ga. 426, 432 (1) (29 SE2d 613) (1944). Indeed, because the Civil Practice Act provides for “one form of action,” OCGA § 9-11-2, if the petition states a claim for either equitable or statutory partitioning, a court having the requisite jurisdiction and venue is authorized to proceed with a just and prompt determination of the action, regardless of whether the true nature of the partition is equitable or statutory....
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Alstep, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Co., 293 Ga. 311 (Ga. 2013).

Cited 3 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jul 1, 2013 | 745 S.E.2d 613, 2013 Fulton County D. Rep. 2035

...asis to appoint a receiver, because this is a dispossessory action. This argument relies on the incorrect premise that the “litigation” referred to in § 9-8-1 is limited to a “civil action” under the Civil Practice Act (“CPA”), see OCGA § 9-11-2, but the CPA was enacted in 1966, long after the receivership statute....
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Warbler Investments, LLC v. City of Soc. Circle, 321 Ga. 125 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 4, 2025

...ment may be cured by dropping or adding parties to the action, thus avoiding dismissal. For the reasons set out below, we conclude that it may: nothing in Paragraph V prevents the parties or the court from using the procedure established by our Civil Practice Act, OCGA § 9-11-21, to drop or add parties and thereby cure a failure to comply with Paragraph V’s naming requirement. 1....
...the Mayor and City Council Members as parties.” Warbler con- tended that its claims against the City could then proceed because Paragraph V (b) (1) waived the City’s sovereign immunity for those claims. As promised, Warbler moved under OCGA § 9-11-21 for leave to amend its complaint by dropping the individual defendants from the suit.2 The defendants consented to the amendment, and the trial court accordingly granted Warbler’s motion....
...Warbler then filed an amended complaint naming only the City. While Warbler’s amended complaint against the City was still pending, however, this Court issued its decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, 315 Ga. 893 (885 SE2d 761) (2023). There, we held that 2 OCGA § 9-11-21 provides in relevant part that “[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party ....
...if that procedural defect may be cured by dropping from the com- plaint the defendants who should not have been named.3 3. To answer this question, we start with the provision of the Civil Practice Act that Warbler relied on to amend its complaint. That provision, OCGA § 9-11-21, explains that “[m]isjoinder of par- ties is not ground for dismissal of an action.” And it provides a pro- cedural mechanism for dropping or adding parties: “Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any...
...s” prescribe procedures in express conflict with the Act. OCGA §§ 9-11- 1; 9-11-81.4 Moreover, we presume that our laws are enacted (or in the case of a constitutional amendment, ratified) with full knowledge of existing laws, including OCGA § 9-11-21’s established procedure for dropping or adding parties in any civil action....
...a failure to comply with Par- agraph V’s naming requirement. After all, Paragraph V waives sov- ereign immunity for actions for declaratory relief (and later, injunc- tive relief): civil actions to which the Civil Practice Act, including OCGA § 9-11-21, applies. See OCGA §§ 9-11-1 (“This chapter gov- erns . . . in all actions of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity.”); 9-11-2 (providing that the only form of action is a “civil action”)....
...the complaint was too. (b) The other arguments that Paragraph V prevents adding or dropping parties to cure a failure to comply with its naming require- ment are arguments that Paragraph V’s language conflicts with and thus displaces OCGA § 9-11-21’s procedure that would allow such a 6 South River Watershed Alliance v....
...This language tells us exactly nothing about whether a failure to comply with the naming requirement in an initial complaint can be cured by adding or dropping parties in a later amended com- plaint. And if this language does not conflict with or displace OCGA § 9-11-21’s procedure for adding or dropping parties, it remains available for that purpose....
...To the extent that the aim of that naming re- quirement is to prevent individuals from being named as defendants in actions brought pursuant to Paragraph V, see SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 894, the dis- sent’s construction would appear to frustrate that aim entirely. 17 places OCGA § 9-11-21’s established procedure for adding or drop- ping parties starts with subparagraph (b) (2)’s statement that an “[a]ction[ ] filed pursuant to” Paragraph V that does not meet the naming requirement “shall be dismissed.” If naming the wrong par- ties counts as a kind of “misjoinder,” then that dismissal language appears to conflict with OCGA § 9-11-21’s statement that “[m]isjoin- der of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action.” Id. (emphasis added). But even assuming that the dismissal language of subpara- graph (b) (2) conflicts with that sentence of OCGA § 9-11-21 and thus repeals it by implication as applied to actions filed pursuant to Par- agraph V, that conflict does not bleed into OCGA § 9-11-21’s proce- dure for adding or dropping parties.8 Repeals by implication are “not favored under Georgia law,” GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc....
...United States, 550 U.S. 429, 435 (III) (127 SCt 1763, 167 LE2d 729) (2007) (“Where provisions . . . are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal.” (cleaned up) (emphasis added)). Within OCGA § 9-11-21, the procedure for drop- ping or adding parties is set out in a separate sentence after the one that precludes dismissal for misjoinder. See OCGA § 9-11-21 (“Par- ties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.”)....
...a sensible and intelligent effect to each part, as it is not presumed that the drafters intended that any part would be without meaning.” (cleaned up)). So even if it were possible to read the dismissal lan- guage of subparagraph (b) (2) to conflict with OCGA § 9-11-21’s pro- cedure for adding or dropping parties, our canons of construction cut against that reading in the face of a reasonable alternative reading: that dismissal is a consequence of failing to comply with the naming requirement of subparagraph (b) (2), but that OCGA § 9-11-21’s pro- cedure may be used to cure such a defect....
...Put simply, if “an action filed pursuant to” Paragraph V does not comply with its naming re- quirement, dismissal is required, but such a defect may be cured, and dismissal avoided, by way of the established procedure for drop- ping or adding parties that is set out in OCGA § 9-11-21. The City contends that our decision in SASS Group, 315 Ga. 893, supports the contrary view that an action that does not comply 20 with Paragraph V’s naming requirement must be dismissed....
...(emphasis supplied). (b) The majority opinion challenges this reading of Paragraph V (b) (2) with two arguments. First, it argues that a party who files an action naming an unauthorized defendant may cure this defect by moving to drop the party under OCGA § 9-11-21. Second, the majority argues that I have incorrectly read a timing requirement into Paragraph V (b) (2)’s text....
...I address each argument in turn. (i) First, the majority opinion argues that a party who files an action pursuant to Paragraph V that was not “brought exclusively” against an authorized defendant may avoid dismissal by moving under OCGA § 9-11-21 for a court order permitting the litigant to file an amended pleading that drops the unauthorized defendants. This argument begins with the premise that dismissal is only required for “[a]ctions filed pursuant to this Paragraph naming...
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Pogue v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 267 Ga. 332 (Ga. 1996).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 4, 1996 | 477 S.E.2d 107, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3893

Chestnut Ridge, LLC v. Hall Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors (Ga. 2025).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Dec 9, 2025 | 477 S.E.2d 107, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3893

...hether there is a claim for declaratory judgment. The question then is what it means to be “a part of any other action.” “Action” is broadly defined under OCGA § 9-2-1 as “the judicial means of enforcing a right.” See also OCGA § 9-11-2 (“There shall be one form of action, to be known as ‘civil action.’”)....

The State v. Sass Grp., LLC (two Cases) (Ga. 2023).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 15, 2023 | 477 S.E.2d 107, 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 3893

...So, the task is to determine if the claim asserted here is of the type described in the constitution. If it is, 16 there is a waiver of sovereign immunity, not for the claim, but for the action.” (emphasis supplied; footnote omitted)). See also OCGA §§ 9-11-2 (“There shall be one form of action, to be known as ‘civil action.’”); 9-11-3 (noting that a “civil action” commences with the filing of the complaint and case filing form); 9-2-5 (a) (“No plaintiff may prosecute two action...
...doctrines generally demonstrate a preference that litigants bring all relevant claims related to their case in one action. See, e.g., OCGA §§ 9-11-13 (regarding counter- and cross-claims); 9-11-18 (joinder of claims and remedies); 9-11-19 (joinder of persons); 9-11-22 (interpleader); 9-11-24 (intervention); Body of Christ Overcoming Church of God, Inc....
...All the Justices concur. in addition to the State. In any event, Plaintiffs’ suggestion that the Court should view their amended complaint as one encompassing two separate “actions” that are joined or “consolidated” into one case under OCGA § 9-11-20 is problematic. The relevant permissive joinder provision of OCGA § 9-11-20 provides that “[a]ll persons may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action.” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 9-11-20 (a)....