Guidelines as to molding decrees.

- Superior court is authorized to have the jury so mold a verdict as to do justice to the parties in the same manner as a decree in equity and the court may mold a decree so as to meet the exigencies of each case. Central R.R. v. First Nat'l Bank, 73 Ga. 383 (1884).

Damage award could not be "molded."

- When a trial judge attempted to amend the jury's verdict, after the jury had dispersed, regarding a matter of substance, the award of damages, this action exceeded the authority vested by law in the trial judge to "mold" the verdict, and thus could not be sustained. Force v. McGeachy, 186 Ga. App. 781, 368 S.E.2d 777 (1988).

After the insured's home was severely damaged by fire, and the insured was awarded a jury verdict against the insurer for the insured's loss, the trial court erred in increasing the amount of damages for the loss of the plaintiff's home, but did not err in refusing to modify the jury's set-off for mortgage payments made by the insurer as this would have been an unauthorized "molding" of the jury's verdict. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Durham, 194 Ga. App. 867, 392 S.E.2d 53 (1990).

In a proper case, the superior court may mold the verdict so as to do justice. However, after the jury's verdict has been received and recorded and the jury has been dispersed, a verdict may not be amended regarding a matter of substance such as an award of damages. Crawford v. Presbyterian Home, Inc., 216 Ga. App. 54, 453 S.E.2d 480 (1995).

Trial court did not err by refusing to enter a judgment molding with a jury's verdict to correct an alleged illegality and inconsistency in the damages award because under O.C.G.A. § 9-12-7 the trial court had no authority to mold the verdict since an increase in damages was a matter of substance, not mere form; a plumbing contractor was not without a potential remedy if the contractor believed that the jury's verdict was incorrect because, after the return of the verdict but before the dispersal of the jury, the plumbing contractor could have argued that the jury's damage award was illegal and internally inconsistent and could have requested the trial court to give additional instructions and permit the jury to consider the matter again, and alternatively, after the jury was dispersed, the plumbing contractor could have asked for a new trial on the issue of damages or to conditionally grant a new trial under the court's power of additur under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-12. Gill Plumbing Co. v. Jimenez, 310 Ga. App. 863, 714 S.E.2d 342 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1826, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 966 (Ga. 2011).

Molding judgment to allow enforcement of right.

- Lower courts can mold their judgments so as to enable the plaintiff to enforce the plaintiff's right. Alvaton Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 156 Ga. 317, 119 S.E. 25 (1923); Alvaton Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Ga. App. 195, 120 S.E. 448 (1923).

City courts can exercise power conferred by this section. Rylee v. Bank of Statham, 7 Ga. App. 489, 67 S.E. 383 (1910); Alvaton Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 156 Ga. 317, 119 S.E. 25 (1923).

Molding of verdict pertaining to land.

- Verdict can be so molded as to compel the defendant to surrender possession of the land, and to place the parties in the same condition in which the parties were before the contract was made. Sizemore v. Pinkston, 51 Ga. 398 (1874).

Although a jury's verdict did not describe the boundary line between two neighbors, the trial court's judgment establishing the boundary line between the parties' respective properties using a plat submitted by the prevailing owner did not substantively change the verdict but simply molded the verdict to do justice to the parties as permitted by O.C.G.A. § 9-12-5. Mathews v. Cloud, 294 Ga. 415, 754 S.E.2d 70 (2014).

Sale of railroad property under execution.

- While all the property of a railroad company was subject to be applied to payment of its just debts, and may be sold for that purpose under a judgment at law, the judgment and the execution founded thereon must be specially molded in compliance with former Civil Code 1910, §§ 5928 and 6025 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 9-12-5 and9-13-4), and a sale under an execution not so molded, about to be made by the sheriff, may be arrested by an affidavit of illegality interposed by the corporation through the corporation's proper officers. Ocilla S.R.R. v. Morton, 17 Ga. App. 703, 87 S.E. 1088 (1916).

Attachment of disputed land to mold verdict.

- When a plat of disputed property is not introduced in evidence, but there is sufficient evidence produced at trial to identify the plat as the disputed tract of land, the trial judge may attach the plat to mold the verdict so as to do full justice to the parties. Mathews v. Penley, 242 Ga. 192, 249 S.E.2d 552 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S. Ct. 1255, 59 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1979).

Continuing nuisance.

- Trial court was entitled to enter an order molding the verdict in a continuing nuisance case pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-12-5 as doing so was necessary to do full justice to the parties; order entered three months after judgment did not modify the judgment in any matter of substance not contemplated by the parties at the time the judgment was entered. City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 552 S.E.2d 536 (2001).

Time for molding verdict.

- When the verdict has been received and published and the jury has dispersed, the judge cannot amend or reform the verdict in any matter of substance. Harlan v. Ellis, 198 Ga. 678, 32 S.E.2d 389 (1944).

Subtracting from verdict's finding.

- After dispersal of the jury, the judge has no power either to add to or take from the jury's finding, and has no power, by amendment or reformation, to supply substantial omissions or make substantial changes in the verdict as rendered by the jury. Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862 (1952).

Decree substantially modifying findings of jury.

- Judge cannot accomplish the same result as amending a verdict in a matter of substance by entering a decree different from the jury verdict, thereby eliminating certain substantial findings of the verdict, and substantially modifying or changing other findings of the jury. Fried v. Fried, 208 Ga. 861, 69 S.E.2d 862 (1952).

Disregarding surplusage in verdict held proper.

- When, upon the trial of a suit to enjoin a city from enforcing a fieri facias for back taxes, a verdict is returned in favor of the city, but added to the verdict is a recommendation that the past taxes be waived, the recommendation is surplusage without legal meaning or effect; and the court properly disregarded such recommendation and entered judgment in accord with the actual verdict refusing an injunction. Morrison v. Smith, 208 Ga. 521, 67 S.E.2d 577 (1951).

Judge held to have erred in striking jury's findings.

- When the jury found for plaintiff punitive damages and attorney's fees, but no actual damages, the judge erred in granting the defendants' motion to strike the jury's findings as surplusage and in entering a judgment for the defendants since a verdict may not be set aside or substantially changed except upon a motion for new trial, or its equivalent. Parrish Bakeries of Ga., Inc. v. Wiseman Baking Co., 104 Ga. App. 573, 122 S.E.2d 260 (1961).

Stipulation by parties as to jury's award.

- Ordinarily, jury or court may not award relief to persons not parties to the litigation, but when parties stipulated that the jury might award the interest of either party in certain property to the other for life, with a remainder over upon death, neither can be heard to complain of the verdict. McGill v. McGill, 247 Ga. 428, 276 S.E.2d 587 (1981).

Verdict in the singular construed to include all defendants.

- Verdicts are not to be set aside for indefiniteness if the verdicts are capable of being reduced to a reasonable certainty by application of the ordinary canons of construction. Under the common canons of construction, the singular and the plural each includes the other, unless the contrary plainly appears from the context. Thus, a verdict involving the defendant will be construed as a finding involving all the defendants when the suit is against two or more persons. Neda Constr. Co. v. Jenkins, 137 Ga. App. 344, 223 S.E.2d 732 (1976).

Creation of trust for child support intended by verdict.

- When, in a divorce case, the jury clearly intended to create a trust for the purpose of providing support for a minor child during the minor's minority and the jury also intended that there be monthly payments from the trust for the use of the child, but the husband failed to take any substantive steps to set up the trust, there was no error in the trial court naming a trustee and providing the necessary provisions to effectuate the trust for the purpose of providing monthly child support, such as requiring the husband to make the payments necessary to keep current on his obligations for his share of the debts, encumbrances, and maintenance of the trust property. Aycock v. Aycock, 251 Ga. 104, 303 S.E.2d 456 (1983).

Cited in Ottauquechee Sav. Bank v. Elliott, 172 Ga. 656, 158 S.E. 316 (1931); Jarecky v. Arnold, 51 Ga. App. 954, 182 S.E. 66 (1935); Sawyer Coal & Ice Co. v. Kinnett-Odom Co., 192 Ga. 166, 14 S.E.2d 879 (1941); Moon v. Moon, 222 Ga. 650, 151 S.E.2d 714 (1966); Bradley v. Bradley, 233 Ga. 83, 210 S.E.2d 1 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 224 S.E.2d 168 (1976); Swicord v. Hester, 240 Ga. 484, 241 S.E.2d 242 (1978); Solomon v. Solomon, 241 Ga. 188, 244 S.E.2d 2 (1978); Rental Equip. Group, LLC v. Maci, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 155, 587 S.E.2d 364 (2003).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 75B Am. Jur. 2d, Trial, § 1612 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 89 C.J.S., Trial, §§ 1074 et seq., 1166 et seq.

ALR.

- Constitutionality, construction, and application of statutes empowering court to require judgment debtor to make payment out of income or by installments, 111 A.L.R. 392.

Power of trial court or appellate court to correct former's misinterpretation of jury's verdict, 160 A.L.R. 457.

Power of appellate court to remit portion of verdict or judgment covering period barred by statute of limitations, 26 A.L.R.2d 956.

Verdict for money judgment which finds for party for ambiguous or no amount, 49 A.L.R.2d 1328.

Court's power to increase amount of verdict or judgment over either party's refusal or failure to consent to addition, 56 A.L.R.2d 213.

Validity of verdict awarding medical expenses to personal injury plaintiff, but failing to award damages for pain and suffering, 55 A.L.R.4th 186.