Syfert Injury Law Firm

Your Trusted Partner in Personal Injury & Workers' Compensation

Call Now: 904-383-7448

2018 Georgia Code 9-3-99 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 9-3-99 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 9-3-99

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 3. Limitations of Actions, 9-3-1 through 9-3-115.

ARTICLE 5 TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS

9-3-99. Tolling of limitations for tort actions while criminal prosecution is pending.

The running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime committed in this state shall be tolled from the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years, except as otherwise provided in Code Section 9-3-33.1.

(Code 1981, §9-3-99, enacted by Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 2/HB 172; Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 2-4/SB 8; Ga. L. 2015, p. 689, § 4/HB 17.)

The 2015 amendments. The first 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, added ", except as otherwise provided in Code Section 9-3-33.1" at the end of the Code section. The second 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, made identical changes.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2005, p. 88, § 1/HB 172, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005'."

Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 1-1/SB 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Harbor/Rachel's Law Act.'"

Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 1-2/SB 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "(a) The General Assembly finds that arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating victimized children serves to retraumatize children and increases their feelings of low self-esteem, making the process of recovery more difficult. The General Assembly acknowledges that both federal and state laws recognize that sexually exploited children are the victims of crime and should be treated as victims. The General Assembly finds that sexually exploited children deserve the protection of child welfare services, including family support, crisis intervention, counseling, and emergency housing services. The General Assembly finds that it is necessary and appropriate to adopt uniform and reasonable assessments and regulations to help address the deleterious secondary effects, including but not limited to, prostitution and sexual exploitation of children, associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol on premises and that provide to their patrons performances and interaction involving various forms of nudity. The General Assembly finds that a correlation exists between adult live entertainment establishments and the sexual exploitation of children. The General Assembly finds that adult live entertainment establishments present a point of access for children to come into contact with individuals seeking to sexually exploit children. The General Assembly further finds that individuals seeking to exploit children utilize adult live entertainment establishments as a means of locating children for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The General Assembly acknowledges that many local governments in this state and in other states found deleterious secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments are exacerbated by the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol in such establishments.

"(b) The purpose of this Act is to protect a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state. The purpose and intended effect of this Act in imposing assessments and regulations on adult entertainment establishments is not to impose a restriction on the content or reasonable access to any materials or performances protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section I, Paragraph V of the Constitution of this state."

Ga. L. 2015, p. 689, § 1/HB 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Hidden Predator Act.'"

Law reviews.

- For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 43 (2015). For annual survey on torts law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (2017). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 321 (2017). For note, "I Tolled You I Had More Time!: The Future of Tolling Looks Bright for Crime Victims, as the Georgia Court of Appeals Establishes New Meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 557 (2017).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Tolling applied to tort action arising out of crime, not just against alleged perpetrator.

- Valades v. Uslu, 301 Ga. App. 885, 888-89(1), 689 S.E.2d 338 (2009), Columbia Cty. v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 152-53(1), 695 S.E.2d 674 (2010), Mays v. Target Corp., 322 Ga. App. 44, 743 S.E.2d 603 (2013), and Orr v. River Edge Cmty. Serv. Bd., 331 Ga. App. 228, 230(1), 770 S.E.2d 308 (2015) were overruled to the extent those cases required that the tort action be brought against a criminal defendant for tolling under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 to apply. Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).

Contrary to holdings in prior cases that O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 applied only to a crime victim's claims against someone accused of committing the crime that formed the basis for the suit, the plain language tolled the statute for any tort action arising out of the crime; stare decisis did not warrant holding firm to this prior erroneous construction. Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).

Application was not retroactive.

- As a vehicle passenger's claim was only two months old when the tolling provisions of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 became effective, and the passenger had not yet filed suit, § 9-3-99 was applicable to the action and there was no merit to a claim that it was retroactively applied in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. X. Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 285 Ga. 733, 684 S.E.2d 243 (2009).

Fine paid for traffic citation.

- Couple had not shown that the statute of limitation on their personal injury claim against a second driver was tolled under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99; the second driver, who had been cited for making an improper lane change, had paid the fine, and the couple had not provided any citation to the record to support their claim that the second driver remained subject to prosecution. McGhee v. Jones, 287 Ga. App. 345, 652 S.E.2d 163 (2007).

Tolling determination within province of jury.

- Trial court erred when the court determined as a matter of law that the limitations period pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 in a personal injury action that arose from a vehicle collision was tolled pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 as the determination of whether a driver's act of following another vehicle too closely under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-49(a) was so extreme that it demonstrated intention or criminal negligence under O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1(b) for purposes of applying the tolling provision was within the province of the jury. Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 285 Ga. 733, 684 S.E.2d 243 (2009).

Cited in DeKalb Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823 (2007).

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99

Total Results: 5  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

Copy

Dep't of Pub. Saf. v. Ragsdale, 839 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2020 | 308 Ga. 210

...Court of Appeals erred in Dept. of Public Safety v. Ragsdale, 347 Ga. App. 827 (821 SE2d 58) (2018), by holding that the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, see OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), is subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, when the tort at issue arises from a crime. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Tort Claims Act’s ante litem notice period is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99. Matthew Ragsdale filed this personal injury action against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) after he was injured during an October 31, 2014 motor vehicle accident that occurred when Ross Singleton, the driver of another vehicle, fled from law enforcement....
...notice had been tolled “from the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated” pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-99....
...ll as for filing suit.” Id. at 830 (footnote omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals necessarily concluded that the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), is subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99....
...and ordinary meaning, viewed in the context in which it appears, and read in its most natural and reasonable way.” Carpenter v. McMann, 304 Ga. 209, 210 (817 SE2d 686) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). Turning to the statutes at issue here, OCGA § 9-3-991 tolls “[t]he running of the period of limitations” with respect to tort actions brought by certain crime victims....
...A limitations period may be understood as “a statutory period after which a lawsuit or prosecution cannot be brought in court.” Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “limitation . . . [a]lso termed limitations period”). 1 OCGA § 9-3-99 provides: The running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the...
...compliance with which is a condition precedent to an action against the State, is not a statute of limitation. As the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period....
...d also on some grounds in the case of the ante litem notice requirement applicable to actions against counties, but it did not do so. Compare OCGA § 36-11-1.5 Ragsdale argues that any interpretation by this Court of OCGA §§ 50-21-26 and 9-3-99 must take into account that the Court of Appeals has “treated ante litem notice provisions as ‘statutes of limitation’ for purpose of tolling statutes[.]” As Ragsdale notes, we presume that statutes are enacted “by the legislature...
...statutes of limitation.” (Emphasis supplied.) 12 In light of the foregoing, we hold that the time for filing an ante litem notice under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1) is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, and that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.9 We acknowledge that in certain circumstances the lack of tolling of the Tort Claims Act’s ante litem notice time requirement may produce inequit...
Copy

Beneke v. Parker, 684 S.E.2d 243 (Ga. 2009).

Cited 20 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2009 | 285 Ga. 733, 2009 Fulton County D. Rep. 3043

...its order and denied summary judgment. In finding that the complaint was timely-filed because the statute of limitation had been tolled until Beneke posted a cash bond disposing of the traffic citation on May 19, 2005, the trial court relied on OCGA § 9-3-99, which provides that [t]he running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of...
...In Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga.App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008), the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment, but vacated the portion of the trial court's order ruling that Beneke had committed a "crime" as a matter of law so as to bring OCGA § 9-3-99 into play, holding that this question must be resolved by a jury. See Beneke, supra at 189-90(1), 667 S.E.2d 97. We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that a "crime" within the context of OCGA § 9-3-99 must be a "crime" that satisfies the definition set forth in OCGA § 16-2-1(a), [1] i.e., one that involves criminal intent or criminal negligence....
...A violation of one of the Uniform Rules of the Road, such as the rule that a driver must not follow another vehicle too closely, is a misdemeanor, OCGA § 40-6-1(a), and a misdemeanor is "any crime other than a felony." (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 16-1-3(9). Thus, the plain language of OCGA § 9-3-99 would encompass a violation of a Uniform Rule of the Road....
...Beneke. However, no factual determination need be made as to whether Beneke acted with criminal intent or criminal negligence, i.e., whether his violation of OCGA § 40-6-49 constituted a crime as defined in OCGA § 16-2-1(a), in order to apply OCGA § 9-3-99 here....
...tuations where a traffic citation is issued. See Beneke, supra, 293 Ga. App. at 191, 667 S.E.2d 97. Nonetheless, we are constrained by the language of the statute to reach this result. If the Legislature had intended to limit the application of OCGA § 9-3-99 to tort actions arising from only certain types of crimes, e.g., felonies or specific intent crimes, it certainly could have done so....
Copy

Armstrong v. Cuffie, 860 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 8 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 21, 2021 | 311 Ga. 791

...hen it could no longer seek UM coverage. Thus, the four-year limitation period applicable to legal malpractice claims expired in 2015. . . . Armstrong responded, arguing that the time period to file the UM claim tolled under OCGA § 9-3-99[6] until two years from the completion of Gibson’s criminal trial, and the limitation period for her malpractice suit did not begin to run until the expiration of that two-year period [in November 2013]....
...Relevant to the issue before us, the Court of Appeals held that Armstrong’s legal malpractice claim by law upon the insurance company issuing the policy as though the insurance company were actually named as a party defendant. ... 6 OCGA § 9-3-99 provides: The running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the...
...malpractice accrued in January 2010 when the Cuffie Firm first knew or should have known that a potential claim for UM coverage existed against State Farm. See id. at 474-475 (1). The Court of Appeals also determined that the four-year statute of limitation was not tolled by OCGA § 9-3-99 because Armstrong’s malpractice suit was a contract action, and the tolling provision applies only to tort actions....
...been timely served upon State Farm. Generally, actions for wrongful death and personal injury must be brought within two years after the right of an action accrues. See OCGA § 9-3-33. However, this limitation period may be tolled by OCGA § 9-3-99, which relates to active criminal prosecutions....
...cumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime within six years, with certain exceptions not applicable here. See id.; see also Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733, 733 (684 SE2d 243) (2009). In this case, the parties agree that OCGA § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitation applicable to Armstrong’s tort case until Gibson’s criminal matter was terminated on November 2, 2011. 10 Thus, the statute of limitation for the underlying tort cas...
...oning. 10 Indeed, with at least “reasonable diligence,” service might have been lawfully effected even after that date. See Van Omen v. Lopresti, 357 Ga. App. 9, 9 (849 SE2d 758) (2020). 11 We express no opinion as to whether OCGA § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitation applicable to the malpractice claim. Rather, we hold only that OCGA § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitation and related service provisions applicable to Armstrong’s underlying tort action against Gibson and any other named defendants....
Copy

Mendez v. Moats, 852 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 28, 2020 | 310 Ga. 114

...App. at 149-151. The Court of Appeals’ analysis focused almost entirely on whether the 12- month presentment period had been tolled; the court ultimately concluded that it had not. See id. at 151-154.2 2 Branton’s holding about how OCGA § 9-3-99 tolls a statute of limitation has since been overruled....
Copy

Dates v. City of Atlanta, 321 Ga. 696 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2025

...App. 824, 825 (1) (903 SE2d 289) (2024). In Ragsdale, this Court concluded that “[a]s the ante litem notice requirement of [the Georgia Tort Claims Act,] OCGA § 50-21-26[,] is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.” 308 Ga....
...notice statute. Ragsdale is instructive on how to resolve this textual question. In Ragsdale, we considered whether the time for filing an ante litem notice under the Georgia Tort Claims Act, OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1), was subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99, which provides for tolling of “[t]he running of the period of limitations” when the tort arises from a crime....
...And we rejected Ragsdale’s argument that the General Assembly acquiesced in a long line of Court of Appeals cases holding that the tolling statutes apply to ante litem notice requirements. Id. at 215. Ultimately, we concluded that because OCGA § 9-3-99, by its own terms, only applied to toll statutes of limitation, “the time for filing an ante litem notice under OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (1) is not subject to tolling under OCGA § 9-3-99.” Id....
...now-overruled Court of Appeals decisions. A similar argument was made and 11 the ante litem notice requirement of OCGA § 50-21-26 is not a statute of limitation, the Code’s statutory tolling provisions, such as OCGA § 9-3-99, do not apply to the Tort Claims Act’s 12-month ante litem notice period.”)....