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2018 Georgia Code 9-3-33.1 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 9-3-33.1 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 9-3-33.1

TITLE 9 CIVIL PRACTICE

Section 3. Limitations of Actions, 9-3-1 through 9-3-115.

ARTICLE 2 SPECIFIC PERIODS OF LIMITATION

9-3-33.1. Actions for childhood sexual abuse.

    1. As used in this subsection, the term "childhood sexual abuse" means any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was under 18 years of age and which would be in violation of:
      1. Rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-1;
      2. Sodomy or aggravated sodomy, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-2;
      3. Statutory rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-3;
      4. Child molestation or aggravated child molestation, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-4;
      5. Enticing a child for indecent purposes, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-5;
      6. Pandering, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-12;
      7. Pandering by compulsion, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-14;
      8. Solicitation of sodomy, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-15;
      9. Incest, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22;
      10. Sexual battery, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22.1; or
      11. Aggravated sexual battery, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22.2.
    2. Notwithstanding Code Section 9-3-33 and except as provided in subsection (d) of this Code section as it existed on June 30, 2017, any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse committed before July 1, 2015, shall be commenced on or before the date the plaintiff attains the age of 23 years.
    1. As used in this subsection, the term "childhood sexual abuse" means any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was under 18 years of age and which would be in violation of:
      1. Trafficking a person for sexual servitude, as prohibited in Code Section 16-5-46;
      2. Rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-1;
      3. Statutory rape, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-3, if the defendant was 21 years of age or older at the time of the act;
      4. Aggravated sodomy, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-2;
      5. Child molestation or aggravated child molestation, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-4, unless the violation would be subject to punishment as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Code Section 16-6-4 or paragraph (2) of subsection (d) of Code Section 16-6-4;
      6. Enticing a child for indecent purposes, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-5, unless the violation would be subject to punishment as provided in subsection (c) of Code Section 16-6-5;
      7. Incest, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22;
      8. Aggravated sexual battery, as prohibited in Code Section 16-6-22.2; or
      9. Part 2 of Article 3 of Chapter 12 of Title 16.
      1. Notwithstanding Code Section 9-3-33, any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse committed on or after July 1, 2015, shall be commenced:
        1. On or before the date the plaintiff attains the age of 23 years; or
        2. Within two years from the date that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of such abuse and that such abuse resulted in injury to the plaintiff as established by competent medical or psychological evidence.
      2. When a plaintiff's civil action is filed after the plaintiff attains the age of 23 years but within two years from the date that the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of such abuse and that such abuse resulted in injury to the plaintiff, the court shall determine from admissible evidence in a pretrial finding when the discovery of the alleged childhood sexual abuse occurred. The pretrial finding required under this subparagraph shall be made within six months of the filing of the civil action.
    1. As used in this subsection, the term:
      1. "Entity" means an institution, agency, firm, business, corporation, or other public or private legal entity.
      2. "Person" means the individual alleged to have committed the act of childhood sexual abuse.
    2. If a civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse is commenced pursuant to division (b)(2)(A)(i) of this Code section and if the person was a volunteer or employee of an entity that owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, or the person and the plaintiff were engaged in some activity over which such entity had control, damages against such entity shall be awarded under this Code section only if by a preponderance of the evidence there is a finding of negligence on the part of such entity.
    3. If a civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse is commenced pursuant to division (b)(2)(A)(ii) of this Code section and if the person was a volunteer or employee of an entity that owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, or the person and the plaintiff were engaged in some activity over which such entity had control, damages against such entity shall be awarded under this Code section only if by a preponderance of the evidence there is a finding that there was gross negligence on the part of such entity, that the entity knew or should have known of the alleged conduct giving rise to the civil action and such entity failed to take remedial action.

(Code 1981, §9-3-33.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2473, § 1; Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 2-2/SB 8; Ga. L. 2015, p. 689, § 2/HB 17; Ga. L. 2018, p. 1112, § 9/SB 365.)

The 2015 amendments. The first 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, rewrote this Code section. The second 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, rewrote this Code section, which formerly read: "(a) As used in this Code section, the term 'childhood sexual abuse' means any act committed by the defendant against the plaintiff which occurred when the plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and which would have been proscribed by Code Section 16-6-1, relating to rape; Code Section 16-6-2, relating to sodomy and aggravated sodomy; Code Section 16-6-3, relating to statutory rape; Code Section 16-6-4, relating to child molestation and aggravated child molestation; Code Section 16-6-5, relating to enticing a child for indecent purposes; Code Section 16-6-12, relating to pandering; Code Section 16-6-14, relating to pandering by compulsion; Code Section 16-6-15, relating to solicitation of sodomy; Code Section 16-6-22, relating to incest; Code Section 16-6-22.1, relating to sexual battery; or Code Section 16-6-22.2, relating to aggravated sexual battery, or any prior laws of this state of similar effect which were in effect at the time the act was committed.

"(b) Any civil action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within five years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority." See the Code Commission note regarding the effect of these amendments.

The 2018 amendment, effective May 8, 2018, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "Code section as it existed on June 30, 2017," for "Code section" near the middle of paragraph (a)(2).

Code Commission notes.

- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2015, the amendment of paragraph (b)(2) of this Code section by Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 2-2/SB 8, was treated as impliedly repealed and superseded by Ga. L. 2015, p. 689, § 2/HB 17, due to irreconcilable conflict.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 1992, p. 2473, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "No action for childhood sexual abuse which, prior to July 1, 1992, has been barred by the provisions of Title 9, relating to actions, shall be revived by this Act."

Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 1-1/SB 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Safe Harbor/Rachel's Law Act.'"

Ga. L. 2015, p. 675, § 1-2/SB 8, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "(a) The General Assembly finds that arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating victimized children serves to retraumatize children and increases their feelings of low self-esteem, making the process of recovery more difficult. The General Assembly acknowledges that both federal and state laws recognize that sexually exploited children are the victims of crime and should be treated as victims. The General Assembly finds that sexually exploited children deserve the protection of child welfare services, including family support, crisis intervention, counseling, and emergency housing services. The General Assembly finds that it is necessary and appropriate to adopt uniform and reasonable assessments and regulations to help address the deleterious secondary effects, including but not limited to, prostitution and sexual exploitation of children, associated with adult entertainment establishments that allow the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol on premises and that provide to their patrons performances and interaction involving various forms of nudity. The General Assembly finds that a correlation exists between adult live entertainment establishments and the sexual exploitation of children. The General Assembly finds that adult live entertainment establishments present a point of access for children to come into contact with individuals seeking to sexually exploit children. The General Assembly further finds that individuals seeking to exploit children utilize adult live entertainment establishments as a means of locating children for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The General Assembly acknowledges that many local governments in this state and in other states found deleterious secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments are exacerbated by the sale, possession, or consumption of alcohol in such establishments.

"(b) The purpose of this Act is to protect a child from further victimization after he or she is discovered to be a sexually exploited child by ensuring that a child protective response is in place in this state. The purpose and intended effect of this Act in imposing assessments and regulations on adult entertainment establishments is not to impose a restriction on the content or reasonable access to any materials or performances protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section I, Paragraph V of the Constitution of this state."

Ga. L. 2015, p. 689, § 1/HB 17, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Hidden Predator Act.'"

Former subsection (d) was repealed on its own terms effective July 1, 2017.

Law reviews.

- For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 43 (2015). For note on 1992 enactment of this Code section, see 9 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 154 (1992). For note, "I Tolled You I Had More Time!: The Future of Tolling Looks Bright for Crime Victims, as the Georgia Court of Appeals Establishes New Meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 557 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

When Clergy Fail Their Flock: Litigating the Clergy Sexual Abuse Case, 91 Am. Jur. Trials 151.

ALR.

- Running of limitations against action for civil damages for sexual abuse of child, 9 A.L.R.5th 321.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1

Total Results: 3  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Dep't of Pub. Saf. v. Ragsdale, 839 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. 2020).

Cited 22 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 28, 2020 | 308 Ga. 210

...eged crime or the act giving rise to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does not exceed six years, except as otherwise provided in Code Section 9-3-33.1. 3 Statutes setting forth limitation periods are generally referred to as “statutes of limitation.” A statute of limitation has as its purpose the limiting of the time peri...
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Harvey v. Merchan, 860 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 2021).

Cited 17 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 21, 2021 | 311 Ga. 811

311 Ga. 811 FINAL COPY S21A0143. HARVEY et al. v. MERCHAN. PETERSON, Justice. For a brief time period, OCGA § 9-3-33.1 allowed time-barred civil claims for childhood sexual abuse to be revived....
...childhood sexual abuse that occurred decades prior to the filing of the action, principally in Quebec, Canada. The Harveys filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Merchan’s claims were time-barred and could not be revived under OCGA § 9-3-33.1....
...retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court largely denied the Harveys’ motions,1 and we granted interlocutory review to decide whether Georgia or Quebec law applies to Merchan’s claims, whether OCGA § 9-3-33.1 can revive a cause of action for acts that did not occur in Georgia, and whether Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions would bar Merch...
...would still watch her take a shower and make comments about her 3 body.2 Merchan raised claims of negligence, sexual battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and asserted that her action was timely under OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) (2015),3 which, as discussed in more detail below, revived otherwise time-barred claims for childhood sexual abuse. The Harveys filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Merchan’s claims were time-barred and could not be...
...the 2015 version; that is the only version at issue in this case. 4 33.1 (d) (1), because her common-law tort claims did not meet the definition of “childhood sexual abuse” as that term is used in OCGA § 9-3-33.1....
...Specifically, the Harveys argued that Merchan’s common law tort claims were not among the criminal acts listed in the definition of childhood sexual abuse and that some of the acts were alleged to have occurred after Merchan turned 18 years old. The Harveys also challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1), arguing that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, as well as the Georgia Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws....
...5 The trial court concluded that a civil action could be revived, even if the alleged conduct occurred out-of-state, as long as a defendant met the mens rea and actus rea elements required by one of the crimes listed in OCGA § 9-3-33.1. The court concluded that some of the torts alleged would constitute violations of the criminal statutes listed in OCGA § 9-3-33.1 and, therefore, could be revived under the statute, but concluded that the negligence claim should be dismissed because negligent acts are not intentional and thus could not be in violation of the criminal statutes listed in OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (a)....
...ys’ application for interlocutory review.4 2. Does Georgia or Quebec law apply to Merchan’s claims? 4 The trial court’s orders on the motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were based entirely on an interpretation of OCGA § 9-3-33.1....
...denial of summary judgment. But that argument, which we address below in footnote 11, flows primarily from their reading of the statute. 6 Before addressing the Harveys’ constitutional challenges to OCGA § 9-3-33.1, we must first decide whether that statute even governs Merchan’s cause of action, as the acts underlying her complaint occurred mostly in Canada....
...(b) The trial court must determine what statute of limitations period applies to Merchan’s claims. Having established what substantive law applies, there remains a question about whether the statute of limitations period provided by OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) applies to all of Merchan’s claims....
...rst instance. If abuse that occurred in Quebec would be barred by Quebec’s prescriptive period, then those causes of action would have been extinguished upon the expiration of the prescription period, and former paragraph (d) (1) of OCGA § 9-3-33.1 cannot revive those causes of action....
...o file such actions against the individual alleged to have committed such abuse before July 1, 2017, thereby reviving those civil actions which had lapsed or technically expired under the law in effect on June 30, 2015. OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) (2015).8 8 Subsection (d) was repealed effective July 1, 2017. OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (3) (2015). For actions that accrued after June 30, 2015, a separate subsection of OCGA § 9-3-33.1 applies. See OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (b) (2) (A) (governing actions for childhood sexual abuse committed on or after July 1, 2015)....
...ute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact, and “[w]here the facts are in doubt or dispute, this question is one of fact to be determined by the trier of fact, but where the 23 3. If OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) would provide a shorter limitation period than Quebec’s prescriptive period, the trial court did not err in determining that the Georgia statute applies to acts that occurred in Quebec. The Harveys argue that the trial...
... the plaintiff which act occurred when the plaintiff was under 18 years of age and which act would be in violation of” several enumerated crimes as prohibited by Georgia statutes, including rape, child molestation, incest, sexual battery, and aggravated sexual battery. See OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (a) (1), (2).10 The Harveys argue that only acts that were committed in Georgia would be in violation of Georgia statutes, so acts committed in Quebec do not fall within the meaning of childhood sexual abuse for purposes of former par...
...645, 649 (2) (807 SE2d 324) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). In construing a statute, the text must be given its “plain and ordinary meaning” according to “the context in which it appears,” and reading it “in its 10 To the extent OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) applies to Merchan’s claims, that paragraph revives only claims of childhood sexual abuse, so any acts that occurred after Merchan turned 18 years of age are time-barred and cannot be revived....
...at 463 (“If it had been affirmatively shown that the law of the foreign jurisdiction in which the injury was done, was similar to that of our own as to the alleged cause of action, then it would have presented a different question.”). The statute at issue here is unlike the statute in Selma. Applying OCGA § 9-3-33.1 to acts that occurred in Quebec would not create a substantive cause of action unrecognized under Quebec law, at least as represented to us thus far....
...une 30, 2015, former paragraph (d) (1) cannot revive those claims, because the cause of action would have been permanently extinguished by the expiration of the Quebec limitations period. 4. The Harveys’ constitutional challenges to OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) fail. The Harveys argue that by reviving all claims that had expired prior to enactment of the statute, former paragraph (d) (1) violates both the Georgia Constitution’s prohibition against ex post facto laws and their due process rights under the federal and state 11 Because we reject the defendants’ argument that OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) applies only to acts that occurred in Georgia, there is no merit to the defendants’ argument that they are entitled to summary judgment based on Merchan’s purported admission that all of the tortious acts occurred in Quebec....
...30 constitutions. The Harveys also argue that former paragraph (d) (1) violates their equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. We disagree. (a) The revival of claims provided by OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) does not violate the Georgia Constitution’s prohibition against retroactive laws. The Harveys concede that our precedent forecloses their argument that former paragraph (d) (1) violates Georgia’s constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws....
...179, 195-209 (III) (B), (C) (824 SE2d 265) (2019) (adhering to our construction of Georgia’s constitutional self-incrimination provision, even though it was broader in scope than many other jurisdictions because there was no showing that the construction was wrong). (b) OCGA § 9-3-33.1 does not violate the Harveys’ equal protection rights under either the United States or Georgia Constitution. 34 We also reject the Harveys’ argument that OCGA § 9-3-33.1 violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.13 In analyzing an equal protection challenge, the first step is deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to the statute....
... because it impaired their vested right of defense. The Harveys again rely on Waller for this point, but as we concluded above, Waller does not control Georgia law. Georgia law is clear that a defendant has no vested right in a statute of limitations period. OCGA § 9-3-33.1 (d) (1) therefore does not implicate a fundamental right, and we therefore apply the rational basis test. Under that test, the Harveys bear the burden of establishing that they are treated differently than “similarly situated...
...party challenging the law must negate every conceivable basis that might support it. See id. at 320-321. The Harveys have not carried their burden in showing that the statute violates equal protection. 36 The Harveys argue that OCGA § 9-3-33.1 treats defendants alleged to have committed acts of childhood sexual abuse differently depending on when the offense occurred....
...But strict scrutiny review does not apply here, and the Harveys’ equal protection claim fails. Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur. 38 Decided June 21, 2021. OCGA § 9-3-33.1; constitutional question....
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Dates v. City of Atlanta, 321 Ga. 696 (Ga. 2025).

Cited 1 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 10, 2025