Legal representative of necessary party must be included.

- In order to sustain an action for declaratory judgment, the legal representative of a necessary party must be included. Frost v. Gazaway, 122 Ga. App. 244, 176 S.E.2d 476 (1970).

Purpose of subsection (b) is to allow municipality to be heard when private parties question the validity of a municipal ordinance, and it does not apply to a situation where the members of the governing body of a municipality are in dispute as to the proper method of passing a valid ordinance under the city charter, and all of the members of the governing body of the municipality are parties. Aliotta v. Gilreath, 226 Ga. 263, 174 S.E.2d 403 (1970).

Contention that the city is not a party to a mandamus action challenging a zoning ordinance is not cause for dismissal when the case is not a declaratory judgment action between private parties. Addis v. Smith, 226 Ga. 894, 178 S.E.2d 191 (1970).

Purpose of subsection (c) of this section is to give notice to Attorney General of constitutional attack being made on the statute and the opportunity, if the Attorney General desires, to be heard. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845 (1970); State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).

"Statute" construed.

- Statute of the state is any law directly passed by the legislature of a state, and any enactment to which a state gives the force of law. Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791 (1963).

Word "statute" of necessity includes a provision of the state Constitution. Board of Educ. v. Shirley, 226 Ga. 770, 177 S.E.2d 711 (1970).

Construction with O.C.G.A.

§ 50-13-10(a). - Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed that the "may be determined" language in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10(a) was evidence that the statute was but one of several methods by which to challenge the validity of an agency rule and that O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), as well as case authority, impliedly contemplated the legitimacy of challenges to agency rules outside the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 13, T. 50. Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455 (2006).

Subsection (c) of this section does not make the Attorney General party to the proceeding. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845 (1970); State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976); Pangle v. Gossett, 261 Ga. 307, 404 S.E.2d 561 (1991).

Subsection (c) of this section does not provide how Attorney General is to be served. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845 (1970).

Provision for service on Attorney General does not amount to consent by state to be sued. Musgrove v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E.2d 26 (1948), appeal dismissed, 335 U.S. 900, 69 S. Ct. 407, 93 L. Ed. 435 (1949).

Service on Attorney General is mandatory and jurisdictional when declaratory judgment is sought on constitutionality of statutes. Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791 (1963); Board of Educ. v. Shirley, 226 Ga. 770, 177 S.E.2d 711 (1970).

When service is not made on the Attorney General as required by the declaratory judgments statutes in a case when there is an attack made upon the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the General Assembly of the state, the court to which the petition is addressed does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case, the subject matter being whether the statute in question is constitutional. Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791 (1963).

Trial court is without jurisdiction to render any judgment except one of dismissal when the Attorney General was not served with a copy of the proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment declaring statutes of the state unconstitutional. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 225 Ga. 607, 170 S.E.2d 398 (1969).

Jurisdiction existed because the Attorney General of Georgia had notice of the property owners' challenge to the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 five months before the trial court ruled, but the Attorney General made no attempt to be heard on the matter or in the case on appeal. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that the owners failed to sufficiently comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-7-4 (c), even assuming that the owners were required to do so. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709 (2011).

If there is no constitutional attack on any statute, notice to Attorney General is not required under this section. Total Vending Serv., Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 153 Ga. App. 109, 264 S.E.2d 574 (1980).

When the issue was within the Supreme Court's inherent power to regulate the practice of law, and did not relate to the constitutionality of a statute, notice to the Attorney General was not required. Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22 (1997).

Claim barred due to no waiver of sovereign immunity.

- State of Georgia did not violate O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-7 and15-1-8 by arresting and incarcerating the plaintiff for contempt after willfully violating a consent order enjoining the unauthorized practice of law because such claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment in that the state had not waived sovereign immunity. Alyshah v. Georgia, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2006), aff'd, 230 Fed. Appx. 949 (11th Cir. Ga. 2007).

Shareholder's interests adequately protected by existing parties.

- In a suit by an assignee of a judgment seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the judgment debtor to a corporation, the joinder of the debtors' brothers, who claimed an ownership interest in the corporation, was not necessary for a just adjudication of the merits because the brothers' interests were adequately protected by the other defendants. EMM Credit, LLC v. Remington, 343 Ga. App. 710, 808 S.E.2d 96 (2017).

Appeal by Attorney General.

- Whene the Attorney General failed to assert a right to become a party litigant in the case pursuant to this section but rather elected to participate in the litigation only as the attorney on behalf of the revenue commissioner, the Attorney General may appeal only in the name and on behalf of the revenue commissioner and not in the capacity of Attorney General. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27 (1976).

Cited in Shippen v. Folsom, 200 Ga. 58, 35 S.E.2d 915 (1945); Mayor of Savannah v. Bay Realty Co., 90 Ga. App. 261, 82 S.E.2d 710 (1954); United States Epperson Underwriting Co. v. Jessup, 22 F.R.D. 336 (M.D. Ga. 1958); Henderson v. Alverson, 217 Ga. 541, 123 S.E.2d 721 (1962); Village of N. Atlanta v. Cook, 219 Ga. 316, 133 S.E.2d 585 (1963); Board of Comm'rs v. Allgood, 234 Ga. 9, 214 S.E.2d 522 (1975); Davis v. National Indem. Co., 135 Ga. App. 793, 219 S.E.2d 32 (1975); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014); Ga. Ass'n of Prof'l Process Servers v. Jackson, 302 Ga. 309, 806 S.E.2d 550 (2017).

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorney General, §§ 22, 27 et seq. 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, §§ 72, 78, 99.

C.J.S.

- 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments, § 123 et seq.

U.L.A.

- Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (U.L.A.) § 11.

ALR.

- Declaration of rights or declaratory judgments, 12 A.L.R. 52; 19 A.L.R. 1124; 50 A.L.R. 42; 68 A.L.R. 110; 87 A.L.R. 1205; 114 A.L.R. 1361; 142 A.L.R. 8.

Determination of constitutionality of statute or ordinance, or proposed statute or ordinance, as proper subject of judicial decision under declaratory judgment acts, 114 A.L.R. 1361.

Interest necessary to maintenance of declaratory determination of validity of statute or ordinance, 174 A.L.R. 549.

Extent to which principles of res judicata are applicable to judgments in actions for declaratory relief, 10 A.L.R.2d 782.