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O.C.G.A.Title 9Chapter 4

O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7 (2023)

Only parties affected; when municipality made party; when Attorney General served and heard

Edition and currency
O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Code text and O.C.G.A. statutory annotations for this section are from the 2023 print volume of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (Public.Resource.Org; public domain per Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, 2020). Georgia Acts after that are not in this text. The Syfert case-law annotations in Notes of Decisions, below, are current.
Other sources
CURRENTO.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest cited 1984–2025 24citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 24 opinions since 1984, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (5 cases).

(a) No declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.

(b) In any proceeding involving the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality shall be made a party and shall be entitled to be heard as a party.

(c) If an Act of the General Assembly, a statute of the state, any order or regulation of any administrative body of the state, or any franchise granted by the state is alleged in an action for declaratory judgment or as a part of any other action to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the Attorney General of the state shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be heard in defense of said Act, statute, order, regulation, or franchise, which may include appearing as a party as of right as he or she determines is appropriate.

History

Ga. L. 1945, p. 137, § 6; Ga. L. 2022, p. 13, § 1/HB 1361. The 2022 amendment, effective March 4, 2022, substituted the present provisions of subsection (c) for the former provisions, which read: “If a statute of the state, any order or regulation of any administrative body of the state, or any franchise granted by the state is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General

of the state shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be heard.”.

Annotations

Editor’s notes. Ga. L. 2022, p. 13, § 2/HB 1361, not codified by the General Assembly, provides, in part, that the amendment to subsection (c) shall apply to all proceedings filed on and after the effective date. This Act became effective March 4, 2022.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS There is no requirement that notice of service be filed in the record. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 570 (1970). This section relates only to declaratory judgment proceedings. Daniel v. Federal Nat’l Mtg. Ass’n, 231 Ga. 385, 202 S.E.2d 388, 1973 Ga. LEXIS 715 (1973). O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7 is applicable to declaratory judgment proceedings and not to

appeals to the superior courts. Woodes v. Morris, 247 Ga. 771, 279 S.E.2d 704, 1981 Ga. LEXIS 888 (1981). Plaintiff’s challenge to the offer of settlement statute’s, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (d), constitutionality arose from plaintiff’s personal injury action and not from a declaratory judgment action; thus, the trial court erred in denying that challenge based on the plaintiff’s failure to serve the

Attorney General with notice. Buchan v. Hobby, 288 Ga. App. 478, 654 S.E.2d 444, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 1227 (2007). O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c) did not apply to a case because the property owners did not file a declaratory judgment action to have O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 declared unconstitutional. The declaratory judgments sought by the owners and by the utility in the utility’s counterclaim pertained to whether the utility had an easement on the owners’ land, and § 46-3-204 was raised by the utility as a defense, to which the owners then asserted the unconstitutionality of § 46-3-204 as an argument against that defense. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 507 (2011). Necessary or indispensable party is essential to give court jurisdiction of the cause. For without the inclusion of such party, no decree of declaratory relief can be entered in favor of the complainant. Frost v. Gazaway, 122 Ga. App. 244, 176 S.E.2d 476, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 842 (1970). Legal representative of necessary party must be included. - In order to sustain an action for declaratory judgment, the legal representative of a necessary party must be included. Frost v. Gazaway, 122 Ga. App. 244, 176 S.E.2d 476, 1970 Ga. App. LEXIS 842 (1970). Purpose of subsection (b) is to allow municipality to be heard when private parties question the validity of a municipal ordinance, and it does not apply to a situation where the members of the governing body of a municipality are in dispute as to the proper method of passing a valid ordinance under the city charter, and all of the members of the governing body of the municipality are parties. Aliotta v. Gilreath, 226 Ga. 263, 174 S.E.2d 403, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 500 (1970). Purpose of subsection (c) of this section is to give notice to Attorney General of constitutional attack being made on the statute and the opportunity, if the Attorney General desires, to be heard. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 570 (1970); State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1447 (1976).

“Statute” construed. - Statute of the state is any law directly passed by the legislature of a state, and any enactment to which a state gives the force of law. Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791, 1963 Ga. LEXIS 265 (1963). Word “statute” of necessity includes a provision of the state Constitution. Board of Educ. v. Shirley, 226 Ga. 770, 177 S.E.2d 711, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 679 (1970). Construction with O.C.G.A. § 50-1310(a). - Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed that the “may be determined” language in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10(a) was evidence that the statute was but one of several methods by which to challenge the validity of an agency rule and that O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), as well as case authority, impliedly contemplated the legitimacy of challenges to agency rules outside the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq. Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455, 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1254 (2006). Subsection (c) of this section does not make the Attorney General party to the proceeding. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 570 (1970); State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1447 (1976); Pangle v. Gossett, 261 Ga. 307, 404 S.E.2d 561, 1991 Ga. LEXIS 284 (1991). Subsection (c) of this section does not provide how Attorney General is to be served. Pharris v. Mayor of Jefferson, 226 Ga. 489, 175 S.E.2d 845, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 570 (1970). Provision for service on Attorney General does not amount to consent by state to be sued. Musgrove v. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co., 204 Ga. 139, 49 S.E.2d 26, 1948 Ga. LEXIS 563 (1948). Service on Attorney General is mandatory and jurisdictional when declaratory judgment is sought on constitutionality of statutes. Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791, 1963 Ga. LEXIS 265 (1963); Board of Educ. v. Shirley, 226 Ga. 770, 177 S.E.2d 711, 1970 Ga. LEXIS 679 (1970). When service is not made on the Attorney General as required by the declaratory judgments statutes in a case when

there is an attack made upon the constitutionality of a statute enacted by the General Assembly of the state, the court to which the petition is addressed does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the case, the subject matter being whether the statute in question is constitutional. Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 129 S.E.2d 791, 1963 Ga. LEXIS 265 (1963). Trial court is without jurisdiction to render any judgment except one of dismissal when the Attorney General was not served with a copy of the proceeding seeking a declaratory judgment declaring statutes of the state unconstitutional. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. City of Bremen, 225 Ga. 607, 170 S.E.2d 398, 1969 Ga. LEXIS 583 (1969). Jurisdiction existed because the Attorney General of Georgia had notice of the property owners’ challenge to the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 46-3-204 five months before the trial court ruled, but the Attorney General made no attempt to be heard on the matter or in the case on appeal. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that the owners failed to sufficiently comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-7-4 (c), even assuming that the owners were required to do so. Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Mbrshp. Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 711 S.E.2d 709, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 507 (2011). If there is no constitutional attack on any statute, notice to Attorney General is not required under this section. Total Vending Serv., Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 153 Ga. App. 109, 264 S.E.2d 574, 1980 Ga. App. LEXIS 1698 (1980). When the issue was within the Supreme Court’s inherent power to regulate the practice of law, and did not relate to the constitutionality of a statute, notice to the Attorney General was not required. Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group, Inc., 267 Ga. 801, 485 S.E.2d 22. Waiver of sovereign immunity. - In the airport parking company’s action against the city and city officials challenging the city’s threatened use of a city tax ordinance against the company, the trial court did not err by denying the city’s motion to dismiss the company’s declaratory judgment claim against the city and city officials in their individual capacities

because O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7 constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. City of Hapeville v. Sylvan Airport McF-020 Parking, 359 Ga. App. 448, 858 S.E.2d 538, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 216 (2021). Claim barred due to no waiver of sovereign immunity. - State of Georgia did not violate O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-7 and 151-8 by arresting and incarcerating the plaintiff for contempt after willfully violating a consent order enjoining the unauthorized practice of law because such claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment in that the state had not waived sovereign immunity. Alyshah v. Georgia, No. 1:06-CV-0928-TWT, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66546 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2006), aff’d, 230 Fed. Appx. 949, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18581 (11th Cir. 2007). Shareholder’s interests adequately protected by existing parties. - In a suit by an assignee of a judgment seeking to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the judgment debtor to a corporation, the joinder of the debtors’ brothers, who claimed an ownership interest in the corporation, was not necessary for a just adjudication of the merits because the brothers’ interests were adequately protected by the other defendants. EMM Credit, LLC v. Remington, 343 Ga. App. 710, 808 S.E.2d 96, 2017 Ga. App. LEXIS 557 (2017). Action on denial of land development permit not barred. - In an action arising from the denial of an application for a land development permit to build town homes, the developer’s claim for declaratory judgment was not barred by sovereign immunity. City of Rincon v. Ernest Communities, LLC, 356 Ga. App. 84, 846 S.E.2d 250, 2020 Ga. App. LEXIS 415 (2020). Appeal by Attorney General. - Whene the Attorney General failed to assert a right to become a party litigant in the case pursuant to this section but rather elected to participate in the litigation only as the attorney on behalf of the revenue commissioner, the Attorney General may appeal only in the name and on behalf of the revenue commissioner and not in the capacity of Attorney General. State v. Golia, 235 Ga. 791, 222 S.E.2d 27, 1976 Ga. LEXIS 1447 (1976).

RESEARCH REFERENCES Am. Jur. 2d. 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorney General, §§ 22, 27 et seq. 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, §§ 88 et seq., 90, 203 et seq. C.J.S. 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments, §§ 92 et seq., 143 et seq. U.L.A. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (U.L.A.) § 11. ALR. Declaration of rights or declaratory judgments, 12 A.L.R. 52; 19 A.L.R. 1124; 50 A.L.R. 42; 68 A.L.R. 110; 87 A.L.R. 1205; 114 A.L.R. 1361; 142 A.L.R. 8.

Determination of constitutionality of statute or ordinance, or proposed statute or ordinance, as proper subject of judicial decision under declaratory judgment acts, 114 A.L.R. 1361. Interest necessary to maintenance of declaratory determination of validity of statute or ordinance, 174 A.L.R. 549. Extent to which principles of res judicata are applicable to judgments in actions for declaratory relief, 10 A.L.R.2d 782.

The 20 cases that cite O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDaniel v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp., 711 S.E.2d 709 (Ga. 2011).
cites § 9-4-7 20×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“2 AEMC cites OCGA § 9-4-7 (c), which is part of Georgia’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, see OCGA §§ 9-4-1 to 9-4-10.”
Later courts cite it for
“the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover his cause of action despite his failure to do so within the statute of limitation.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENEckles v. Atlanta Tech. Grp., Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. 1997).
cites § 9-4-7 4×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 110 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“733, 734 (1) ( 242 SE2d 108 ) (1978); OCGA § 9-4-7 (c). However, in this case, we have not held that OCGA § 15-19-52 is unconstitutional.”
The case’s holding
Only a licensed attorney is authorized to represent a corporation in a proceeding in a court of record.
Later courts cite it for
“in this state, only a licensed attorney is authorized to represent a corporation in a proceeding in a court of record . . . .” · 15 citing courts
3
GREENBaker v. City of Marietta, 518 S.E.2d 879 (Ga. 1999).
cites § 9-4-7 4×cited by 79 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“See OCGA § 9-4-7 (c). The Attorney General’s motion to intervene was granted and the trial court held a hearing for the presentation of oral argument on the constitutionality of the statutes involved.”
The case’s holding
A court must dismiss a declaratory judgment action if the petitioner fails to demonstrate uncertainty regarding an alleged right or a need for judicial guidance.
Later courts cite it for
“where the party seeking declaratory judgment does not show it is in a position of uncertainty as to an alleged right, dismissal of the declaratory judgment action is proper.” · 11 citing courts
4
GREENLive Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 637 S.E.2d 455 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 9-4-7 8×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“Nevertheless, Live Oak argues that the “may be determined” language in OCGA § 50-13-10 (a) is evidence that the statute is but *796 one of several methods by which to challenge the validity of an agency rule and that OCGA§ 9-4-7 (c) of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 10 as well as…”
5
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“The trial court also held in the alternative that the Association failed to serve the Attorney General with a copy of a petition challenging the constitutionality of the statute as required by OCGA § 9-4-7 (c). The Association asserts that the trial court erred in so doing, but…”
The case’s holding
Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary act where the law authorizes but does not require the official to perform it.
Later courts cite it for
“for mandamus to issue, the law must not only authorize the act to be done, but must require its performance.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENR. J. Taylor Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Beck, 631 S.E.2d 684 (Ga. 2006).
cites § 9-4-7 6×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“The court also rejected the hospital’s contention that Beck was required by OCGA § 9-4-7 (c)* 12 3 4567to *662 notify the Attorney General of the constitutional challenge; nevertheless, the court found that Beck did serve a “Notice of Constitutional Challenge” on the Attorney…”
Later courts cite it for
“the burden on appeal is to demonstrate an abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to transfer the case.” · 1 citing court
7
GREENRoberts v. Deal, 723 S.E.2d 901 (Ga. 2012).
cites § 9-4-7 4×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“See OCGA § 9-4-7 5 (former 1945 Code Ann. § 110-1106 (Ga.”
8
GREENSentinel Offender Servs., LLC v. Glover, 766 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 2014).
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“against Sentinel for false arrest and imprisonment in Richmond County Superior Court claiming Sentinel employees wrongfully swore out a warrant for his arrest in order to collect probation supervision fees from him to which Sentinel was not entitled because he had fully paid his…”
The case’s holding
The private probation statutory framework prohibits the tolling of misdemeanor probation sentences and does not authorize the collection of fees under an invalid, unapproved contract.
Later courts cite it for
“even on first amendment grounds and even when seeking only a declaratory judgment, 'only if the law has an adverse impact on that litigant's own rights,' which means that the litigant must establish a threat of 'injury in fact' that is 'actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENWhitfield v. City of Atlanta, 769 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. 2015).
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“See OCGA § 9-4-7 (b) (municipality “shall be made a party” in any proceeding seeking a declaration as to the validity of its ordinances).”
Later courts cite it for
“city and county ordinances must be alleged and proven in order to be considered by the superior and appellate courts of this state.” · 6 citing courts
10
GREENBuchan v. Hobby, 654 S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“Although it is not clear, it appears from paragraph 5 of its order that the trial court based its ruling on OCGA § 9-4-7 (c), which provides: “If a statute of the state, any order or regulation of any administrative body of the state, or any franchise granted by the state is…”
11
GREENAm. Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
cites § 9-4-7 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“The Attorney General of Georgia is not named as a defendant, but he has been served with a copy of the proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), and he has retained a special assistant attorney general, Mr.”
Later courts cite it for
“the court cannot accept plaintiffs' premise that a single standard for all minors necessarily ... 'restricts older minors to reading or reviewing that which is appropriate for the very young or immature child,” · 1 citing court
12
GREENPangle v. Gossett, 404 S.E.2d 561 (Ga. 1991).
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“products liability case, especially the limitation of the recovery in Georgia of one award of punitive damages from a defendant, regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise; the requirement that 75 percent of any such punitive damages award be paid to the State…”
Later courts cite it for
“the inclusion of subsection ocga 9-4-2 (b) makes the georgia declaratory judgment act 'much broader in scope and more comprehensive in its jurisdiction of justiciable controversies' than the declaratory judgment acts of many other states.” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENAtlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. F. F., 761 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“at 215 (1) (trial court erred in ruling on a petition for declaratory relief when appellant and defendant city had failed to show the existence of a justiciable controversy, or that “circumstances exist which require judicial guidance to protect the city from uncertainty…”
14
GREENAm. Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 643 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
cites § 9-4-7 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“The Attorney General of Georgia is not a named defendant, but he was served under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), and he was represented by George Weaver, who was appointed as a special assistant attorney general for this case and who acted as lead counsel at trial.”
The case’s holding
A statute prohibiting the display of material deemed harmful to minors is unconstitutionally overbroad if it reaches a significant portion of protected adult reading material.
Later courts cite it for
“a display statute that applies only to materials inappropriate for minors approaching the age of majority might well survive a constitutional attack.” · 1 citing court
15
GREENCaudell v. City of Toccoa, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001).
cites § 9-4-7 4×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“See O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c) (2001). Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court accelerated resolution of plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, setting the matter for an evi-dentiary hearing on July 12, 2001[3-1], See Fed.”
16
GREENEmm Credit, LLC v. Alexander Remington, 808 S.E.2d 96 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 9-4-7 2×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“7 Relying on OCGA § 9-4-7 (a), which provides that "[n]o declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding," appellees also argue that EMM Credit was precluded as a matter of law from declaring the shares belonging to Gino and Tony invalid.”
17
cites § 9-4-7 8×subsections: (c) 8×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“8 Specifically, the Board asserts that Chestnut Ridge failed to serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding pursuant to OCGA § 9-4-7(c). In response, Chestnut Ridge argues that this service requirement applies only to declaratory judgment actions and does not apply…”
18
GREENCity of Rincon v. Ernest Communities, LLC, 846 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 9-4-7 6×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“We conclude that the claim for declaratory judgment is not barred by sovereign immunity, pursuant to OCGA § 9-4-7 (b), but that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity as to the claim for injunctive relief.”
19
NEUTRALCity of Hapeville v. Sylvan Airport Parking, LLC, 858 S.E.2d 538 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021).
cites § 9-4-7 5×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“84 , 86 (1) ( 846 SE2d 250 ) (2020), we held that, under OCGA § 9-4-7 (b), “a municipality is subject to a declaratory judgment action where, as here, the validity of its ordinance is challenged.”
20
GREENJohn Joseph Hildebrand, III v. City of Warner Robins, 840 S.E.2d 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020).
cites § 9-4-7 4×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 9-4-7
“Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed Hildebrand’s complaint, finding that the City was not a proper party to the action pursuant to OCGA § 9-4-7 (b); Mayor Toms did not have a clear legal duty to carry out the requested relief; and Hildebrand…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198420042025

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 2006. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ga.12Ga. Ct. App.9N.D. Ga.3
By subsection
(c)5 cases
Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Grp., Inc., 485 S.E.2d 22 (Ga. 1997).“733, 734 (1) ( 242 SE2d 108 ) (1978); OCGA § 9-4-7 (c). However, in this case, we have not held that OCGA § 15-19-52 is unconstitutional.”
Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1984).“The Attorney General of Georgia is not named as a defendant, but he has been served with a copy of the proceeding pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), and he has retained a special assistant attorney general, Mr.”
Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 643 F. Supp. 1546 (N.D. Ga. 1986).“The Attorney General of Georgia is not a named defendant, but he was served under O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), and he was represented by George Weaver, who was appointed as a special assistant attorney general for this case and who acted as lead counsel at trial.”
Caudell v. City of Toccoa, 153 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001).“See O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c) (2001). Pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this court accelerated resolution of plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, setting the matter for an evi-dentiary hearing on July 12, 2001[3-1], See Fed.”
Chestnut Ridge, LLC v. Hall Cnty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 924 S.E.2d 331 (Ga. 2025).“8 Specifically, the Board asserts that Chestnut Ridge failed to serve the Attorney General with a copy of the proceeding pursuant to OCGA § 9-4-7(c). In response, Chestnut Ridge argues that this service requirement applies only to declaratory judgment actions and does not apply…”

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: O.C.G.A. 2023 print volume: Georgia laws through the 2023 session at the latest. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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