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2018 Georgia Code 50-13-10 | Car Wreck Lawyer

Link to State of Georgia Official Statute 2018 Georgia Code Annotated (sourced from legal.resource.org)
O.C.G.A. 50-13-10 Case Law from Google Scholar Amendments to OCGA 50-13-10

TITLE 50 STATE GOVERNMENT

Section 13. Administrative Procedure, 50-13-1 through 50-13-44.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS

50-13-10. Declaratory judgment on validity of rules; venue for actions.

  1. The validity of any rule, waiver, or variance may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner. A declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule, waiver, or variance in question.
  2. The agency shall be made a party to the action and a copy of the petition shall be served on the Attorney General. The action shall be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County or in the superior court of the county of residence of the petitioner. When the petitioner is a corporation, the action may be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County or in the superior court of the county where the petitioner maintains its principal place of doing business in this state. All actions for declaratory judgment, however, with respect to any rule, waiver, or variance of the Public Service Commission must be brought in the Superior Court of Fulton County.
  3. Actions for declaratory judgment provided for in this Code section shall be in accordance with Chapter 4 of Title 9, relating to declaratory judgments.

(Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 11; Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, § 10; Ga. L. 1975, p. 404, § 4; Ga. L. 1992, p. 6, § 50; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1521, § 3.)

Law reviews.

- For article commenting on the 1997 amendment of this Code section, see 14 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 301 (1997). For article, "Administrative Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 81 (2001). For survey article on administrative law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2007). For note discussing the denial of social security benefits to dependent children pursuant to substitute father provisions as violative of due process, prior to the 1967 amendments to the Georgia Public Assistance Act (O.C.G.A. Art. 1, Ch. 4, T. 49), see 15 J. of Pub. L. 349 (1966).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, § 10 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10) must be construed in conjunction with Ga. L. 1965, p. 283, §§ 2-4 (see O.C.G.A. § 50-13-2). Irvin v. Woodliff, 125 Ga. App. 214, 186 S.E.2d 792 (1971).

Construction with O.C.G.A.

§ 9-4-7(c). - Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed that the "may be determined" language in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10(a) was evidence that the statute was but one of several methods by which to challenge the validity of an agency rule and that O.C.G.A. § 9-4-7(c), as well as case authority, impliedly contemplated the legitimacy of challenges to agency rules outside the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq. Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455 (2006).

Applicability when statute under which rule promulgated attacked.

- When complaint seeking declaratory judgment attacks the constitutionality of the statute under which the challenged rule was promulgated as well as the rule itself, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 is inapplicable. Ledford v. Department of Transp., 253 Ga. 717, 324 S.E.2d 470 (1985).

Hazardous waste rules.

- O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 did not authorize plaintiffs to obtain declaratory judgment as to the validity of rules enacted pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Management Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-8-60 et seq., when the plaintiffs were contending that the Act and rules promulgated thereunder were unconstitutional. George v. Department of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 299 S.E.2d 556 (1983).

Standing to challenge commissioner's rules and regulations.

- Trial court did not err in concluding that the plaintiff had standing to bring the declaratory judgment action as the plaintiff made a sufficient showing that the facts were complete and that its interest was not merely academic, hypothetical, or colorable, but actual because, as a Vidalia onion grower, the plaintiff was an interested party claiming a right to ship onions pursuant to the shipping statute - a right the plaintiff claimed was impeded by a newly enacted regulation; and because, if the plaintiff failed to comply with the new regulation, the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture had that statutory authority to impose civil and criminal penalties. Black v. Bland Farms, LLC, 332 Ga. App. 653, 774 S.E.2d 722 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1669, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 713 (Ga. 2015).

Standing.

- County lacked standing to challenge the state's rules restricting emissions of volatile compounds; while the county presented evidence that the rules might deter some investment in the county, there was no evidence that the rules had actually done so, and whether any economic harm to its own emission sources would be caused by the rules was speculative. Bd. of Natural Res. of Ga. v. Monroe County, 252 Ga. App. 555, 556 S.E.2d 834 (2001).

No case or controversy.

- Trial court's order granting a declaratory judgment to a developer was reversed because a case or controversy was lacking, surrounding the validity of Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 672-9-.05, as no controversy existed after the rule's adoption and a developer filed an amended petition seeking the same, the rights of the parties accrued, and the parties' positions regarding the constitutionality and the applicability of the Department of Transportation's rule were firmly established. DOT v. Peach Hill Props., 280 Ga. 624, 631 S.E.2d 660 (2006).

Permit requirement.

- Trial court erred in dismissing claim for injunctive relief because the issuance of letters of permission by the Department of Natural Resources or activities that required a permit under the Shore Protection Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-5-237, were subject to challenge under O.C.G.A. § 12-5-245 the center's claim for declaratory relief from letters already issued was properly dismissed because a justiciable controversy no longer existed for which a declaratory judgement would have been appropriate. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res., 319 Ga. App. 205, 734 S.E.2d 206 (2012).

Corporation registration form not "rule."

- An "ST-1 form," which corporations are required by the Department of Revenue to use when applying for a certificate of registration, was not a "rule" within the purview of O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10. Roy E. Davis & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 256 Ga. 709, 353 S.E.2d 195 (1987).

Department manual not "rule."

- Department of Medical Assistance (now Department of Community Health) manual, which contained "the terms and conditions for receipt of medical assistance reimbursement in Georgia," was not a "rule" and therefore could not be reviewed in a declaratory judgment action. Georgia Dep't of Medical Assistance v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 261 Ga. 59, 401 S.E.2d 499 (1991).

Appeal from driver's license suspension dismissed.

- Appeal from a ruling on a declaratory judgment action that was essentially an appeal from an administrative decision to suspend a driver's license was dismissed since the driver was required to proceed by application for discretionary appeal. Miller v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 265 Ga. 62, 453 S.E.2d 725 (1995).

Failure to pursue remedy.

- Plaintiff teachers denied renewable teaching certificates mistakenly failed to pursue the available remedy under O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10 when the teachers instead waited until after the education board's rules had already been declared invalid to bring an action seeking damages as the state had not "consented" to be sued for damages based upon the alleged invalidity or unconstitutionality of the rules and regulations promulgated and implemented by the state's departments and agencies. State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 437 S.E.2d 290 (1993).

Trial court properly denied the defendant's amended motion for a new trial holding that the administration of breath tests pursuant to Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 92-3-.06(12)(b) did not violate the due process clause under both U.S. Const., amend. 5 or Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I given that: (1) the claim was raised for the first time in the new trial motion, and was thus untimely; (2) the defendant had an alternative remedy under the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq., by filing an action for a declaratory judgment; (3) the defendant failed to show that the Division of Forensic Sciences (DFS) eliminated meaningful procedures for conducting breath tests when the division promulgated the rule; and (4) the techniques and methods approved by DFS were sufficient to ensure fair and accurate testing. Palmaka v. State, 280 Ga. App. 761, 634 S.E.2d 883 (2006).

Georgia Industrial Loan Commissioners' authority to investigate.

- Trial court properly dismissed a declaratory judgment action brought by a bank and a cash advance lender, which was operating as an agent for the bank, to stop the Georgia Industrial Loan Commissioner from conducting an investigation of their lending activities because the Commissioner was authorized to conduct an investigation of the two entities' loan activities, in spite of the lender's claim that the bank and the lender were operating under the authority of federal banking law. BankWest, Inc. v. Oxendine, 266 Ga. App. 771, 598 S.E.2d 343 (2004).

Application of sovereign immunity.

- Trial court did not err in finding that the APA governed a declaratory judgment action filed against a state agency, and that sovereign immunity barred any further discovery, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10; hence, as a result, when plaintiff consultant failed to comply with § 50-13-10, the trial court could do no more than grant the agency a protective order, and could not take any action beyond that, including declaring that the department's rules regarding health benefits could not be challenged. Live Oak Consulting, Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 281 Ga. App. 791, 637 S.E.2d 455 (2006).

Trial court did not err in finding that sovereign immunity barred the declaratory action because the court correctly treated the policies of the board of regents regarding non-citizen eligibility for in-state tuition as falling outside the waiver of sovereign immunity found in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10, thus, the students did not meet the students' burden of showing that the policies at issue were agency rules adopted pursuant § 50-13-10's waiver, rather than interpretive rules exempt from § 50-13-10. Olvera v. Univ. Sys. of Georgia's Bd. of Regents, 331 Ga. App. 392, 771 S.E.2d 91 (2015).

Cited in Pope v. Cokinos, 231 Ga. 79, 200 S.E.2d 275 (1973); Caldwell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Ga. 282, 282 S.E.2d 885 (1981); Outdoor Adv. Ass'n v. DOT, 186 Ga. App. 550, 367 S.E.2d 827 (1988); State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 263 Ga. 429, 437 S.E.2d 290 (1993); SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 81 et seq.

24A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Venue, § 1 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 26 C.J.S., Declaratory Judgments, § 34.

U.L.A.

- Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A.) § 3-101 et seq.

Cases Citing O.C.G.A. § 50-13-10

Total Results: 17  |  Sort by: Relevance  |  Newest First

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Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408 (Ga. 2017).

Cited 109 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 19, 2017 | 801 S.E.2d 867

...In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act expressly permits declaratory judgments to determine “[t]he validity of any rule, waiver, or variance ... when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner.” OCGA § 50-13-10 (a)....
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State Bd. of Educ. v. Drury, 437 S.E.2d 290 (Ga. 1993).

Cited 57 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Oct 12, 1993 | 263 Ga. 429

...s threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner. A declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the regulation in question. OCGA § 50-13-10 (a). It is thus clear that the state has prescribed the terms and conditions on which it consents to be sued based upon the alleged invalidity or unconstitutionality of the rules and regulations of its departments and agencies. Pursuant to OCGA § 50-13-10, the state has "consented" to be sued and has waived its sovereign immunity only as to declaratory judgment actions wherein the rules and regulations of its departments and agencies are challenged....
...IX of our Constitution, the judiciary is compelled to hold that the victims of such state rules and regulations have no viable state claim for damages and that they must be relegated to the express remedies which do exist, such as initiation of a declaratory judgment action pursuant to OCGA § 50-13-10....
...In so doing, they may have erroneously determined that the Board was exempt from the procedural requirements of the APA or made other erroneous determinations regarding the ultimate legality of the TPAI as an enforceable basis for determining teacher certification. Pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 or OCGA § 50-13-10, such erroneous determinations would be subject to rectification in a legal challenge to the rules and regulations themselves....
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Sjn Props., LLC. v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793 (Ga. 2015).

Cited 51 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2015 | 770 S.E.2d 832

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Jud. Council of Ga. v. BROWN & GALLO, 702 S.E.2d 894 (Ga. 2010).

Cited 32 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 22, 2010 | 288 Ga. 294, 2010 Fulton County D. Rep. 3799

...[1] We hold that they are part of the judiciary as that term is used in OCGA § 50-13-2(1) and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This appeal arose when Brown & Gallo, an independently-owned court reporting agency, filed an action for declaratory judgment pursuant to OCGA § 50-13-10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that a portion of the code of professional ethics for court reporting adopted by appellant Board of Court Reporting of the Judicial Council of Georgia ("the Board") in 1994 and favorably revie...
...XXII (2009). [6] We granted the petition for a writ of certiorari filed by the Council and the Board to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss filed by the Council and the Board. OCGA § 50-13-10 is part of the Administrative Procedure Act and authorizes the filing of a declaratory judgment action questioning the validity of any rule that allegedly interferes with or impairs legal rights, without the petitioner having first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule....
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George v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 299 S.E.2d 566 (Ga. 1983).

Cited 31 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 25, 1983 | 250 Ga. 491, 19 ERC (BNA) 1703

...Folsom, supra, has been followed since the 1959 amendment to our declaratory judgment law. Ga. L. 1959, p. 236. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487 (3) (117 SE2d 336) (1960). Hence, OCGA § 9-4-2 (Code Ann. § 110-1101) does not entitle plaintiffs to relief. Plaintiffs urge that OCGA § 50-13-10 (Code Ann. § 3A-111) authorizes them to obtain declaratory judgment as to the validity of the rules enacted pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Management Act, supra. OCGA § 50-13-10 (Code Ann....
...romulgated thereunder are unconstitutional. The case of Pope v. Cokinos, 231 Ga. 79 (2) (200 SE2d 275) (1973), relied upon by plaintiffs, is therefore inapplicable here because Cokinos attacked only the rules of the Department of Public Safety. OCGA § 50-13-10 (Code Ann....
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Olvera v. Univ. Sys. of Georgia's Bd. of Regents, 298 Ga. 425 (Ga. 2016).

Cited 28 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 1, 2016 | 782 S.E.2d 436

...Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 262 Ga. 413, 414 (3) (419 SE2d 916) (1992). Therefore, absent some exception, the Board is immune from the declaratory judgment action brought by the students. The students argue that the Board’s sovereign immunity is waived under OCGA § 50-13-10 (a) of the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, which provides: The validity of any rule, waiver, or variance may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or varian...
...Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 262 Ga. 208 (417 SE2d 153) (1992). 4 was merely the agency's interpretation of [an internal manual], not an independently promulgated agency rule, and did not bring plaintiff within the scope of OCGA § 50-13-10.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Georgia Oilmen’s Ass’n v. Dept. of Revenue, 261 Ga. App. 393, 400 (582 SE2d 549) (2003). As such, the residency requirements challenged by the students is not a “rule” within the purview of § 50-13-10....
...Therefore, the [residency requirements constitute] an “interpretive rule” [that falls within an exception to the procedural requirements of the APA pursuant to OCGA §§ 50-13-3 and 50-13- 4,] not a “rule” [subject to the APA] within the meaning of § 50-13-10.” Roy E. Davis & Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 256 Ga. 709, 711 (353 SE2d 195) (1987). See also, Georgia Oilmen’s Ass’n, supra. Therefore, the students’ contention that their declaratory judgment action is authorized by OCGA § 50-13-10 fails, and the students have pointed to no other source of law containing an explicit waiver of the Board’s sovereign immunity in this matter.3 Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the students’ declaratory 3...
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S. Lng, Inc. v. Macginnitie, 294 Ga. 657 (Ga. 2014).

Cited 18 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 3, 2014 | 755 S.E.2d 683

...barred by sovereign immunity was not addressed by the trial court, I reiterate my opinion that “the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars appellant’s declaratory judgment action since it does not fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity found in OCGA § 50-13-10.” Southern I, supra, 290 Ga.at 206. defendant can provide Southern the relief it seeks....
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State Health Plan. Agency v. Coastal Empire Rehab. Hosp., 412 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. 1992).

Cited 16 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 4, 1992 | 261 Ga. 832, 34 Fulton County D. Rep. 17

...Judicial review of an administrative decision, confined to the administrative record, is provided by the Administrative Procedure Act. OCGA § 50-13-19. The APA also provides that an action for declaratory judgment seeking determination of the validity of an administrative rule may be filed and tried in superior court. OCGA § 50-13-10; § 9-4-1 et seq....
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S. LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 290 Ga. 204 (Ga. 2011).

Cited 14 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 29, 2011 | 719 S.E.2d 473, 2011 Fulton County D. Rep. 3849

...Judgment reversed. Ml the Justices concur, except Nahmias, J., who concurs in judgment only, and Benham, J., who dissents. Indeed, declaratory actions and similar actions against the State have long been recognized in other contexts. See, e.g., OCGA § 50-13-10 (authorizing declaratory action to determine the validity of any administrative rule, waiver, or variance “when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner”); State Bd....
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Ga. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 819 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 2018).

Cited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2018 | 304 Ga. 425

...titution itself specifically waives that immunity. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 424-425, 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017). The plaintiffs contend that the waiver required for their suit is provided by OCGA § 50-13-10, which establishes a cause of action for declaratory judgment to challenge the validity of an agency rule and requires that the pertinent agency be made a party to the action.6 This Court has held, however, that OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in cases where a plaintiff's "contention is that [a statute] is unconstitutional and hence the rules promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional." George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 493, 299 S.E.2d 556 (1983). See also Ledford v. Dept. of Transp., 253 Ga. 717, 717, 324 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (" OCGA § 50-13-10 is inapplicable here, as in George, because in their complaint the plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the [agency] rule was promulgated, as well as the rule itself."). As in George and Ledford, the plaintiffs here argue only that the rules **431implementing the Registry statutes are unconstitutional because the Registry statutes themselves are unconstitutional, so § 50-13-10 does not apply....
...Under OCGA § 9-11-25 (d) (1), Cagle's successor is automatically substituted as party in the suit against him in his official capacity, but, as explained in Division 2 below, this claim should have been dismissed by the trial court based on sovereign immunity. OCGA § 50-13-10 says, with emphasis added: (a) The validity of any rule, waiver, or variance may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner....
...munity conferred by Article I, Section II, Paragraph IX (d) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. See Lathrop, 301 Ga. at 443-444, 801 S.E.2d 867 (explaining that official immunity "does not limit the availability of prospective relief"). Although OCGA § 50-13-10 (a) says that "[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule, waiver, or variance in question," it does not give the plaintiffs a way around the exhaustion requirement because, as explained in Division 2 above, § 50-13-10 does not apply in this case....
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Miller v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Saf., 265 Ga. 62 (Ga. 1995).

Cited 11 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 27, 1995 | 453 S.E.2d 725

... 40-5-67.1. Following his administrative hearing under § 40-5-67.1 (g), Miller filed one complaint in superior court that contained both an appeal of the DPS decision, pursuant to § 40-5-67.1 (h), and a request for declaratory judgment under OCGA § 50-13-10....
...Davis & Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 256 Ga. 709, 711-712 (353 SE2d 195) (1987). In that case, following an agency decision, the appellant filed both an administrative appeal in superior court under OCGA § 50-13-19 and a declaratory judgment action under § 50-13-10 attacking the validity of an agency form. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue, and the appellant filed a direct appeal in this Court. We dismissed, holding that the agency form was not an agency rule within the meaning of § 50-13-10, that the appellant therefore did not have the right to file a claim for declaratory judgment, and that the declaratory judgment action thus did not provide a basis for the appellant to file *64 a direct appeal. Roy E. Davis & Co., 256 Ga. at 711-712. We left open the question whether a direct appeal from a ruling on a § 50-13-10 claim for a declaratory judgment can under some circumstances be characterized, for the purposes of § 5-6-35, as essentially an appeal from an agency decision....
...ior court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency. Miller was therefore required to follow the application procedures of § 5-6-35. As he did not do so, his appeal must be dismissed. Appeal dismissed. All the Justices concur. NOTES [1] OCGA § 50-13-10 permits an action for declaratory judgment in accordance with OCGA Title 9, Ch....
...ct, an advisory opinion," State Health Planning Agency, 261 Ga. at 833. Accord George, 250 Ga. at 492). See also George, 250 Ga. at 493; Ledford v. Dept. of Transp., 253 Ga. 717 (324 SE2d 470) (1985) (holding that a declaratory judgment action under § 50-13-10 is unavailable when the plaintiff contends that a statute pursuant to which an agency rule was promulgated is unconstitutional and hence that the agency rule is unconstitutional).
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Roy E. Davis & Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 353 S.E.2d 195 (Ga. 1986).

Cited 10 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Nov 5, 1986 | 256 Ga. 709

...Milsteen, Staff Assistant Attorney General, for appellees. PER CURIAM. We previously dismissed appellant's direct appeal for failure to file a discretionary application. Appellant has moved for reconsideration, arguing that it has a right of direct appeal under OCGA § 50-13-10, because the proceedings in Fulton Superior Court involved a claim for a declaratory judgment to review the appellee's refusal to issue appellant a certificate of registration and sales and use tax registration number....
...ing was dismissed by DOR. Appellant then filed a complaint in Fulton Superior Court, in two counts. The first count was an appeal of the agency decision pursuant to OCGA § 50-13-19. The second count was a claim for a declaratory judgment under OCGA § 50-13-10, which allows an action for declaratory judgment in accordance with OCGA Title 9, Ch....
...One of the issues facing the Court of Appeals was whether venue was proper in DeKalb; venue would have been proper in DeKalb if the action was for a declaratory judgment on an agency rule. The Court of Appeals held, however, that jurisdiction was not proper under former Code Ann. § 3A-111 (now OCGA § 50-13-10), because the legal opinion of the Board's counsel fell within the class of "interpretive rules" mentioned by former Code Ann....
...GA §§ 50-13-3 and 50-13-4, and was not an "agency rule" within the meaning of Code Ann. § 3A-111. Bd. of Dental Examiners, supra, 137 Ga. App. at 708-709. Similarly, in the instant case we find that Form ST-1 is not a "rule" within the purview of § 50-13-10....
...ST-1 form as the form which an applicant for a certificate of registration must complete. However, Form ST-1 has never been enacted as a DOR rule pursuant to the APA. Therefore, the form is an "interpretive rule," not a "rule" within the meaning of § 50-13-10, and the DOR's authority to require disclosure of the data requested by ST-1 may not be reviewed in a declaratory judgment action pursuant to § 50-13-10. It follows that § 50-13-10 was not a proper basis to invoke the jurisdiction of the *712 Fulton Superior Court, and does not provide a means for the appellant to directly appeal the judgment of the superior court....
...The motion for reconsideration is denied. Motion for Reconsideration denied. All the Justices concur, except Gregory, Weltner and Hunt, JJ., who concur in the judgment only. NOTES [1] We do not reach the question whether a direct appeal from a ruling on a § 50-13-10 claim for a declaratory judgment can under some circumstances be characterized, for the purposes of § 5-6-35, as essentially an appeal from an agency decision.
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Ledford v. Dep't of Transp., 324 S.E.2d 470 (Ga. 1985).

Cited 9 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jan 9, 1985 | 253 Ga. 717

...raised on appeal from the administrative decision. We hold that the administrative hearing came to be "in progress" within the meaning of George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, supra, when the plaintiffs were served with a notice of the hearing. OCGA § 50-13-10 is inapplicable here, as in George, because in their complaint the plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the DOT rule was promulgated, as well as the rule itself....
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Georgia Dep't of Med. Assistance v. Beverly Enter., Inc., 401 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1991).

Cited 7 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Feb 21, 1991 | 261 Ga. 59

...seq.) of an administrative decision rendered by DMA. Dept. of Medical Assistance v. Beverly Enterprises, 195 Ga.App. 753, 395 S.E.2d 15 (1990). 1. Beverly's administrative appeal pursuant to the APA contained a request for declaratory judgment (OCGA § 50-13-10(a)), as well as a petition for judicial review of the administrative decision (OCGA § 50-13-19). We initially granted certiorari to consider whether OCGA § 50-13-10 was applicable to DMA in light of OCGA § 49-4-153(c)....
...Upon consideration of the entire record, we conclude that the issue of the applicability of the APA to DMA need not be determined to resolve the merits of the appeal: whether it was error to compel DMA to respond to discovery requests made pursuant to the action for declaratory judgment. 2. OCGA § 50-13-10(a), under which Beverly proceeded in its action for declaratory judgment, permits an action in which the validity of any "rule" may be determined....
...nditions relate to "benefits by the state or of an agency," they are specifically excluded from the statutory definition of "rule" contained in OCGA § 50-13-2(6). Therefore, the manual may not be reviewed in a declaratory judgment action under OCGA § 50-13-10. See Roy E. Davis & Co. v. Dept. of Revenue, 256 Ga. 709, 353 S.E.2d 195 (1987). Thus, compelling DMA to respond to discovery pursuant to a declaratory judgment action under § 50-13-10 was error....
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Dep't of Transp. v. Peach Hill Props., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 660 (Ga. 2006).

Cited 4 times | Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Jun 12, 2006 | 280 Ga. 624, 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 1818

...This jurisdictional issue "is properly before us notwithstanding [DOT]'s failure to raise it below. [Cit.]" Department of Medical Assistance of Ga. v. Beverly Enterprises, 195 Ga.App. 753, 754(1), 395 S.E.2d 15 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 59, 401 S.E.2d 499 (1991). OCGA § 50-13-10 governs declaratory judgment regarding the validity of administrative rules....
...However, other principles which ordinarily apply to declaratory judgment actions are not eliminated by the statute. "Actions for declaratory judgment provided for in this Code section shall be in accordance with Chapter 4 of Title 9, relating to declaratory judgments." OCGA § 50-13-10(c). Thus, the requirement remains that there must be a justiciable controversy between the parties. Put another way, § 50-13-10 does not allow advisory opinions; it simply permits the State to be sued in an otherwise proper declaratory judgment action involving the validity of an agency rule....
...Likewise, Peach Hill's reasons for failing to exhaust its administrative remedies, including the alleged impossibility of completing, or the futility of filing, an application for exemption under the new rule, are irrelevant, since administrative exhaustion is neither required under OCGA § 50-13-10 nor pertinent to the existence vel non of a justiciable controversy....
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Georgia Dep't of Human Servs. v. Addison, 304 Ga. 425 (Ga. 2018).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Sep 10, 2018

...tution itself specifically waives that immunity. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX (e); Lathrop v. Deal, 301 Ga. 408, 424-425 (801 SE2d 867) (2017). The plaintiffs contend that the waiver required for their suit is provided by OCGA § 50-13-10, which establishes a cause of action for declaratory judgment to challenge the validity of an agency rule and requires that the pertinent agency be made a party to the action.6 6 OCGA § 50-13-10 says, with emphasis supplied: (a) The validity of any rule, waiver, or variance may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment when it is alleged that the rule, waiver, or variance or its threatened application interferes with or impairs the legal rights of the petitioner....
...Superior Court of Fulton County or in the superior court of the county where the petitioner maintains its principal place of doing business in this state. All actions for 9 This Court has held, however, that OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in cases where a plaintiff’s “contention is that [a statute] is unconstitutional and hence the rules promulgated thereunder are unconstitutional.” George v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 250 Ga. 491, 493 (299 SE2d 556) (1983). See also Ledford v. Dept. of Transp., 253 Ga. 717, 717 (324 SE2d 470) (1985) (“OCGA § 50-13-10 is inapplicable here, as in George, because in their complaint the plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of the statute pursuant to which the [agency] rule was promulgated, as well as the rule itself.”). As in George and Ledford, the plaintiffs here argue only that the rules implementing the Registry statutes are unconstitutional because the Registry statutes themselves are unconstitutional, so OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply....
...See United Cerebral Palsy, 298 Ga. at 786-787.8 4. The only claims left for our consideration are the plaintiffs’ facial constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes as enforced by Crittenden and 8 Although OCGA § 50-13-10 (a) says that “[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule, waiver, or variance in question[,]” it does not give the plaintiffs a way around the exhaustion requirement because, as explained in Division 2 above, OCGA § 50-13-10 does not apply in this case....

Sjn Props., LLC. v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors (Ga. 2015).

Published | Supreme Court of Georgia | Mar 27, 2015

...Under the rationale of Sustainable Coast, it appears that, absent a statutory provision affording claimants an express right to seek declaratory relief against the State, sovereign immunity would bar such claims. See Gold, 318 Ga. App. at 637 (noting that OCGA § 50-13-10 provides for specific waiver of sovereign immunity for declaratory judgment actions challenging state agency administrative rules). 17 Because this significant legal issue has received little att...