Origin of section.

- This paragraph was inserted in the Constitution of 1798, and its necessity was suggested by the Yazoo Act. Savannah v. State ex rel. Green, 4 Ga. 26 (1848); Mayor of Macon v. Hughes, 110 Ga. 795, 36 S.E. 247 (1900).

This paragraph was a reverberation from the shock resulting from passage of an Act that under the caption "for the protection and support of its frontier settlements," a measure disposing of Georgia's western lands, 35,000,000 acres, for $500,000.00, less than two cents per acre, a territory out of which a few years later the States of Alabama and Mississippi were carved. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937).

Paragraph a Georgia contribution to constitutional law.

- This paragraph first appeared in the Constitution of 1798, and before that time no other state had such a provision; it is distinctly a Georgia contribution to constitutional law. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937).

This paragraph is designed for two purposes, first, the prevention of surreptitious legislation typified by the ill-famed "Yazoo Fraud;" and, second, the prevention of "omnibus" bills combining many matters, adverse in their nature, with the view of combining in their favor the advocates of all and thus securing the passage of several measures no one of which could succeed upon its own merits. Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. 35, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972).

This constitutional provision was inspired by the "Yazoo Fraud" and embodied in the Constitution to prevent the "smuggling" of undesirable legislation, and to provide that in the future the people would have notice of the contents of proposed legislation. Briggs v. State, 80 Ga. App. 664, 56 S.E.2d 802 (1949), overruled on other grounds, Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95, 230 S.E.2d 853 (1976).

Purpose of this provision is to protect the people against covert or surprise legislation. Bray v. City of E. Point, 203 Ga. 315, 46 S.E.2d 257 (1948); Nelson v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 147 S.E.2d 424 (1966); Green v. Bryson, 223 Ga. 862, 159 S.E.2d 56 (1968).

This paragraph is mandatory upon legislature and not directory, and Acts in violation thereof are void. McCaffrey v. State, 183 Ga. 827, 189 S.E. 825 (1937); Black v. Jones, 190 Ga. 95, 8 S.E.2d 385 (1940).

This paragraph stands as bar to any legislation which embodies more than one subject matter. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).

Purpose is not to prevent comprehensive legislation.

- The purpose of this paragraph is to prevent the passage of a law which is not indicated in a general way in the title of the Act. Its object, therefore, is not to prevent comprehensive, but surreptitious legislation. Kaigler v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 174 Ga. 849, 164 S.E. 193 (1932).

Construction of paragraph as forbidding comprehensive Acts would be incorrect.

- This paragraph is intended to stop the vicious practice of joining in one Act incongruous and unrelated matters; but any construction of it which would interfere with the very commendable policy or practice of incorporating the entire body of statutory law upon one general subject in a single Act, instead of dividing it into a number of separate Acts, would not only be contrary to its spirit, but also seriously embarrassing to honest legislation. Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 139 S.E.2d 490 (1964); Lord v. State, 235 Ga. 342, 219 S.E.2d 425 (1975).

Act which does not specify all of its consequences and effects in its title does not necessarily violate this paragraph. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

Each proposition submitted to voters should stand or fall upon its own merits, without, on the one hand, receiving any adventitious aid from another and perhaps more popular one, or, on the other hand, having to carry the burden of supporting a less meritorious and popular measure. No voter should be compelled, in order to support a measure which the voter favors, to vote also for a wholly different one which the voter's judgment disapproves, or, in order to vote against the proposition which the voter desires to defeat, to vote also against the one which commends itself to the approval of the voter's judgment. Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978).

Legislature empowered to legislate in one Act upon general subject.

- The General Assembly is empowered under this paragraph to legislate in one Act upon a general subject and to embody therein all elements of the general subject, and such an Act is valid. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).

An Act which attempted to annex land alleged to be within the corporate limits of another municipality, explicitly named in the Act, violated this paragraph. The General Assembly is incompetent to amend, repeal, or modify the charters of two separate and distinct municipal corporations in one Act, and to attempt to do so causes the Act to impermissibly refer to more than one subject matter. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

An Act whose title referred only to one city, but which also attempted to amend, partially repeal, and nullify the charter of another municipality caused the Act to contain matter different from what was expressed in the title in violation of this paragraph. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

This paragraph is not applicable to proposals by legislature to amend constitution. Cooney v. Foote, 142 Ga. 647, 83 S.E. 537 (1916); Goolsby v. Stephens, 155 Ga. 529, 117 S.E. 439 (1923).

Adoption of Code containing Act violating this paragraph waives the defect. Central of Ga. Ry. v. State, 104 Ga. 831, 31 S.E. 531 (1898); Kennedy v. Meara, 127 Ga. 68, 56 S.E. 243 (1906); Davis v. Davison, 160 Ga. 545, 128 S.E. 743 (1925).

Necessity of showing injury from unconstitutional statute.

- An attack upon a statute that it contains matter different from that expressed in the title is of necessity limited to the subject area that affects the attacking party since a party who attacks a statute as being unconstitutional must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature of the statute injures that party and so operates as to deprive the party of rights protected by the Constitution. Lord v. State, 235 Ga. 342, 219 S.E.2d 425 (1975).

Pleading must specify defect.

- An assignment of error must point out the portion of the body of the Act inconsistent with the title, or wherein the Act refers to more than one subject matter. Walthour v. City of Atlanta, 157 Ga. 24, 120 S.E. 613 (1923).

Attack on a statute was not properly raised, and could not be considered by the Supreme Court where the plaintiff in error failed to show wherein the statute violates the constitutional provision. Davis v. State, 204 Ga. 467, 50 S.E.2d 604 (1948).

Cited in Morgan v. Lowry, 168 Ga. 723, 149 S.E. 37 (1929); Mobley v. Personius, 172 Ga. 261, 157 S.E. 294 (1931); Georgia Hwy. Express v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 431, 157 S.E. 464 (1931); Johnson Transf. & Freight Lines v. Perry, 47 F.2d 900 (N.D. Ga. 1931); Atlanta Laundries, Inc. v. Harrison, 174 Ga. 448, 162 S.E. 912 (1932); Buie v. Buie, 175 Ga. 27, 165 S.E. 15 (1932); Richardson v. Johnson Furn. Co., 176 Ga. 28, 166 S.E. 662 (1932); State Bd. of Barber Exmrs. v. Blocker, 176 Ga. 125, 167 S.E. 298 (1932); Moseley v. State, 176 Ga. 889, 169 S.E. 97 (1933); Murphy v. Holman, 179 Ga. 329, 176 S.E. 5 (1934); Madronah Sales Co. v. Wilburn, 180 Ga. 837, 181 S.E. 173 (1935); Maner v. State, 181 Ga. 254, 181 S.E. 856 (1935); Harbin v. Holcomb, 181 Ga. 800, 184 S.E. 603 (1936); Chivilis v. West, 182 Ga. 379, 185 S.E. 348 (1936); Gormley v. Shiver, 182 Ga. 750, 187 S.E. 382 (1936); Russell v. Burroughs, 183 Ga. 361, 188 S.E. 451 (1936); Moore v. Bell, 186 Ga. 583, 198 S.E. 711 (1938); National Sur. Corp. v. Gatlin, 192 Ga. 293, 15 S.E.2d 180 (1941); Gernatt v. Huiet, 192 Ga. 729, 16 S.E.2d 587 (1941); Singleton v. State, 196 Ga. 136, 26 S.E.2d 736 (1943); Ragans v. Ragans, 200 Ga. 890, 39 S.E.2d 162 (1946); Morris v. City Council, 201 Ga. 666, 40 S.E.2d 710 (1946); Kirkpatrick v. Candler, 205 Ga. 449, 53 S.E.2d 889 (1949); Houlihan v. Atkinson, 205 Ga. 720, 55 S.E.2d 233 (1949); Glustrom v. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 S.E.2d 534 (1950); City of Atlanta v. Anglin, 209 Ga. 170, 71 S.E.2d 419 (1952); Walker v. McKenzie, 209 Ga. 653, 74 S.E.2d 870 (1953); Ball v. Peavy, 210 Ga. 575, 82 S.E.2d 143 (1954); State v. State Toll Bridge Auth., 210 Ga. 690, 82 S.E.2d 626 (1954); Calhoun v. State, 211 Ga. 112, 84 S.E.2d 198 (1954); Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 86 S.E.2d 511 (1955); Panlos v. Stephenson, 213 Ga. 816, 102 S.E.2d 165 (1958); Crow v. McCallum, 215 Ga. 692, 113 S.E.2d 203 (1960); Russell v. Venable, 216 Ga. 137, 115 S.E.2d 103 (1960); Williams v. State, 217 Ga. 312, 122 S.E.2d 229 (1961); City of Chamblee v. Village of N. Atlanta, 217 Ga. 517, 123 S.E.2d 663 (1962); Sweeney v. Balkcom, 219 Ga. 292, 133 S.E.2d 10 (1963); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Sheppard v. DeKalb County Bd. of Educ., 220 Ga. 219, 138 S.E.2d 271 (1964); Ralston Purina Co. v. Acrey, 220 Ga. 788, 142 S.E.2d 66 (1965); Pye v. State Hwy. Dep't, 226 Ga. 389, 175 S.E.2d 510 (1970); Road Bldrs., Inc. v. Hawes, 228 Ga. 608, 187 S.E.2d 287 (1972); DeKalb County v. Allstate Beer, Inc., 229 Ga. 483, 192 S.E.2d 342 (1972); Stoner v. Fortson, 379 F. Supp. 704 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Granger v. State, 235 Ga. 681, 221 S.E.2d 451 (1975); Orkin v. State, 236 Ga. 176, 223 S.E.2d 61 (1976); Osborne v. Ridge View Assocs., 238 Ga. 377, 233 S.E.2d 342 (1977); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 245 Ga. 558, 266 S.E.2d 175 (1980); Lang v. State, 168 Ga. App. 693, 310 S.E.2d 276 (1983); Porter v. Calhoun County Bd. of Comm'rs, 252 Ga. 446, 314 S.E.2d 649 (1984); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 353 S.E.2d 19 (1987); Hussey v. Chatham County, 268 Ga. 871, 494 S.E.2d 510 (1998); City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014).

Any instrumentality aiding purpose of Act not unconstitutional.

- When it is plain by the Act a certain thing is to be done, any instrumentality authorized by the Act in aid of, to conduce to, to assist, the one great purpose of the Act is not a different subject-matter, but is part of the main subject-matter; it is part of the "substantial unity in the statutable object," and is not unconstitutional. Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938).

Test is whether all parts of Act are germane to single objective.

- The test of whether an Act or a constitutional amendment violates the multiple subject matter rule is whether all of the parts of the Act or of the constitutional amendment are germane to the accomplishment of a single objective. Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978).

Test is whether Act embraces two dissimilar subjects.

- To constitute plurality of subject matter, an Act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any logical connection with or relation to each other. Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 139 S.E.2d 490 (1964); Lord v. State, 235 Ga. 342, 219 S.E.2d 425 (1975); American Booksellers Assoc. v. Webb, 254 Ga. 399, 329 S.E.2d 495 (1985).

Meaning of "subject" of Act.

- The "subject" of an Act, within the meaning of this paragraph, is regarded as the matter or thing forming the groundwork of the Act. Capitol Distrib. Co. v. Redwine, 206 Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950).

To constitute plurality of subject matter, an Act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any logical connection with or relation to each other. Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978).

Meaning of word "subject matter" as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with that of word "provision." Crews v. Cook, 220 Ga. 479, 139 S.E.2d 490 (1964); Lord v. State, 235 Ga. 342, 219 S.E.2d 425 (1975).

No plurality where all parts of Act relate to subject of legislation.

- Where the parts of a statute have a natural connection and reasonably relate, directly or indirectly, to one general and legitimate subject of legislation, the Act is not open to the objection of plurality of subject matter, within the meaning of this paragraph. Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870, 162 S.E. 113 (1931); Millhollan v. State, 221 Ga. 165, 143 S.E.2d 730 (1965).

Paragraph does not mandate separate Acts for branches and segments of general subject matter.

- This paragraph does not mean that every branch and segment of the general subject constitutes a subject matter different from that of the general subject to which it is related, and hence must be treated as a separate and independent Act. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).

General Assembly cannot amend charters of two municipalities in one Act.

- An Act which attempted to annex land alleged to be within the corporate limits of another municipality, explicitly named in the Act, violated this paragraph. The General Assembly is incompetent to amend, repeal, or modify the charters of two separate and distinct municipal corporations in one Act, and to attempt to do so causes the Act to impermissibly refer to more than one subject matter. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

An Act whose title referred only to one city, but which also attempted to amend, partially repeal, and nullify the charter of another municipality caused the Act to contain matter different from what was expressed in the title in violation of this paragraph. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

When different questions on referendum may be consolidated in one law.

- Where several different, unrelated bond issues are submitted to the voters in one referendum, this is something closely akin to coercion and not at all conducive to a free and untrammeled expression of public sentiment as to the merits of either. However, questions are properly consolidated into one law where the initial question was whether something should be done and the additional questions were merely incidental to the accomplishment of it. Wall v. Board of Elections, 242 Ga. 566, 250 S.E.2d 408 (1978).

Provision for penalty not unconstitutional.

- The fact that an Act provides for a penalty upon one coming within the provisions of the Act, and that this penalty may be enforced by civil or criminal procedure, does not render the Act itself obnoxious to this paragraph. Copeland v. Leathers, 206 Ga. 280, 56 S.E.2d 530 (1949).

Acts not containing more than one subject.

- Even though the crime of abandonment involves two distinct elements - bastardy and forsaking of parental duties, the statute creating the offense (O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1) deals with only one subject - the crime of abandonment - and therefore does not violate the constitutional prohibition. Bembry v. State, 250 Ga. 237, 297 S.E.2d 36 (1982).

Legislators not to be misled by title.

- One of the evils this paragraph seeks to prevent is the insertion of clauses in the body of Acts of which the title gives no intimation. Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 60 S.E.2d 763 (1950).

The purpose of this section is protection against surprise or fraudulent matter in the body of an Act, of which the title gives no intimation. Therefore, in considering an attack on a statute pursuant to this section, the question is whether the language of the title gives notice of what the body of the Act contains. Carsello v. State, 220 Ga. 90, 137 S.E.2d 305 (1964).

To prevent fraud and surprise it is important that the members of the General Assembly should be notified at least by the title of the Act of the subject matter about which they are legislating; they should not be misled by the title. Fortson v. Weeks, 232 Ga. 472, 208 S.E.2d 68 (1974).

Act void if title and body do not correspond.

- If both the title and the body of the Act contain separate and distinct subject-matters, the Act will be void in its entirety. Bass v. Lawrence, 124 Ga. 75, 52 S.E. 296 (1905).

When the caption of the Act describes one area or territory, and the body of the Act another area or territory, whether it be larger or smaller, the body of the Act contains a subject matter totally different from that contained in the caption, and is therefore in violation of this paragraph. Adams v. City of Cornelia, 206 Ga. 687, 58 S.E.2d 398 (1950).

Where there is inserted in the body of an Act a completely unrelated provision of which the title gives no intimation, this paragraph is violated. Brown v. Clower, 225 Ga. 165, 166 S.E.2d 363 (1969).

This paragraph does not require that the title should contain a synopsis of the law. The general object of the law is all that need be indicated by the title. Minute details should be omitted. Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929); Green v. Harper, 177 Ga. 680, 170 S.E. 872 (1933); Cade v. State, 207 Ga. 135, 60 S.E.2d 763 (1950).

This paragraph does not require that the title of an Act should contain a synopsis of the law proposed, but that the Act should contain no matter variant from the title. Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 390, 157 S.E. 673 (1931); City of Albany v. Ader, 176 Ga. 391, 168 S.E. 1 (1933); Wright v. State, 53 Ga. App. 371, 186 S.E. 149 (1936).

The title to an Act need not contain a synopsis of all of its provisions. Board of Educ. & Orphanage v. State Bd. of Educ., 186 Ga. 200, 197 S.E. 261 (1938); Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).

Constitution does not require that title of Act should contain a synopsis of the law, but that Act should contain no matter variant from title; if title is descriptive generally of purposes of Act, it is sufficient, and it is not necessary that it should particularize the several provisions contained in the body of the Act. Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981).

Minute details should be omitted. Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 52 S.E. 74 (1905); Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 390, 157 S.E. 673 (1931).

It is not intended that the substance of an Act should be set forth in the caption, nor that every detail stated in the body thereof be mentioned in the title; if what follows after the enacting clause is definitely related to what is expressed in the caption, if it be naturally connected therewith, and related to the main object or subject matter of the legislation and is not in conflict therewith, there is no infringement of this paragraph. State v. Resolute Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 815, 147 S.E.2d 433 (1966); Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966); Ray v. Hand, 225 Ga. 589, 170 S.E.2d 692 (1969); Frazer v. City of Albany, 245 Ga. 399, 265 S.E.2d 581 (1980); Devier v. State, 247 Ga. 635, 277 S.E.2d 729 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981); Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981).

Every detail in the Act need not be set forth in the caption in order to apprise the public and the legislature of the intended legislation. Green v. Bryson, 223 Ga. 862, 159 S.E.2d 56 (1968).

This paragraph does not require the legislature to set forth the entire substance of an Act in its title. Davenport v. Davenport, 243 Ga. 613, 255 S.E.2d 695 (1979).

Titles exceedingly brief, general, and indefinite may be sufficient. Fullington v. Williams, 98 Ga. 807, 27 S.E. 183 (1896); Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S.E. 759 (1898); Nolan v. Central Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga. 201, 67 S.E. 656 (1910); Wright v. Fulton County, 169 Ga. 354, 150 S.E. 262 (1929); Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 390, 157 S.E. 673 (1931).

Title sufficient if germane to subject.

- If what follows after an enacting clause is definitely related to what is expressed in the title, has a natural connection, relates to the main subject of legislation, and is not in conflict therewith, there is no infringement of this paragraph. Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937).

This paragraph does not mean that the caption must be as detailed as the Act. It is sufficient if the provision of the Act is germane to the subject thereof stated in the caption. Undercofler v. Hospital Auth., 221 Ga. 501, 145 S.E.2d 487 (1965); Hawes v. Cordell Ford Co., 223 Ga. 260, 154 S.E.2d 599 (1967); Sears v. State, 232 Ga. 547, 208 S.E.2d 93 (1974).

Substantial correspondence necessary between title and body.

- The title and body of legislative Acts must correspond, not literally but substantially, and this is to be determined in view of the subject matter to which the legislation relates. Green v. Bryson, 223 Ga. 862, 159 S.E.2d 56 (1968).

Substance of the Act must be related to the title, and the title must give notice of the Act's contents. Davenport v. Davenport, 243 Ga. 613, 255 S.E.2d 695 (1979).

Legislation germane to purpose of Act may be included.

- Any legislation which is germane to the general purpose of an Act as indicated in the title can be properly embraced in the Act, and no matter what may be its details the legislation embraced therein will not render the Act subject to the objection that it contains matter variant from the title, so long as such matter is legitimately within the general scope of the purpose of the Act as indicated in the title. Board of Educ. & Orphanage v. State Bd. of Educ., 186 Ga. 200, 197 S.E. 261 (1938).

Every detail of an Act need not be expressed in the caption and as long as the provisions are germane to the general purpose of the Act they will not be considered different subject matter. Rich v. State, 237 Ga. 291, 227 S.E.2d 761 (1976).

It is only necessary that the subject matter in the body of the Act relate to what is expressed in the title and have a natural connection to the main object of the legislation and not in conflict therewith, so as not to be deceiving upon a casual reading of only the heading of the Act. Lee v. State, 239 Ga. 769, 238 S.E.2d 852 (1977).

Act not unconstitutional when title broader than body.

- An Act is not unconstitutional because language employed in the body of the Act is not as broad as might be warranted by the caption. Plumb v. Christie, 103 Ga. 686, 30 S.E. 759 (1898); Coleman v. Board of Educ., 131 Ga. 643, 63 S.E. 41 (1908).

The mere fact that the title of a statute is broader in terms and scope than the body of the Act does not affect its sufficiency under this paragraph if the variance is not such as to be misleading. Hill v. Perkins, 218 Ga. 354, 127 S.E.2d 909 (1962).

Matter in the body of an Act inconsistent with the title may be omitted if the remainder of the Act sets forth a complete scheme. Barnett v. State, 117 Ga. 298, 43 S.E. 720 (1903); Pearson v. Bass, 132 Ga. 117, 63 S.E. 798 (1909); Jackson v. Beavers, 156 Ga. 71, 118 S.E. 751 (1923).

Inclusion of penalty not mentioned in title not unconstitutional.

- This paragraph is not violated by the inclusion in the body of an Act of a penalty which is not alluded to in the caption of the Act where the penalty affixed is germane to the purpose of the Act. Pitts v. State, 219 Ga. 222, 132 S.E.2d 649 (1963).

Use of words authorizes inclusion of germane provisions.

- The use of the words "and for other purposes" will not authorize legislation upon any subject save one which is germane to the general subject embraced in the title. Board of Pub. Educ. v. Barlow, 49 Ga. 232 (1873); Crawley v. State, 150 Ga. 86, 102 S.E. 898 (1920); Storey v. Town of Summerville, 158 Ga. 182, 123 S.E. 139 (1924).

Provisions germane to the general subject-matter embraced in the title of an Act, and which are designed to carry into effect the purposes for which it is passed, may be constitutionally enacted therein, though not referred to in the title otherwise than by use of the words, "and for other purposes." White v. Donaldson, 170 Ga. 432, 153 S.E. 19 (1930); Morgan v. Shepherd, 171 Ga. 33, 154 S.E. 780 (1930); Inter-City Coach Lines v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 390, 157 S.E. 673 (1931); Hines v. Etheridge, 173 Ga. 870, 162 S.E. 113 (1931); Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937); Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938); Eubanks v. State, 217 Ga. 588, 124 S.E.2d 269 (1962); Campbell v. J.D. Jewell, Inc., 221 Ga. 543, 145 S.E.2d 569 (1965); Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

The phrase "and for other purposes" authorizes the inclusion in the Act of matter germane to the general subject of the Act. Black v. Jones, 190 Ga. 95, 8 S.E.2d 385 (1940).

Where the caption of an Act contains the words "and for other purposes" this language authorizes the incorporation in the body of the Act of any provision that is incidental or germane to the main objective as indicated by the caption. Harris v. State, 191 Ga. 243, 12 S.E.2d 64 (1940).

The clause, "and for other purposes," contained in the caption of an Act of the legislature, will include almost any provision of the Act consistent with the general purpose of the Act as amended. Adams v. City of Cornelia, 206 Ga. 687, 58 S.E.2d 398 (1950).

Use of words "and for other purposes" does not warrant the introduction of new subject matter in the Act. Jackson v. State, 5 Ga. App. 177, 62 S.E. 726 (1908).

Section taxing charge for use of real property unconstitutional when under caption of "personal property."

- Section 3 (C) 1 (b) of Ga. L. 1951, p. 360 ( § 48-8-2(6)(C)) violates this paragraph, for the reason that the title gives notice of its intention to tax leases and rentals of "tangible personal property," but gives no notice of an intention to tax the lease, rental, or other charge for the use of real property. Atlanta Americana Motor Hotel Corp. v. Undercofler, 222 Ga. 295, 149 S.E.2d 691 (1966).

Act fixing qualifications of tax assessors may include disqualification provision.

- Where a portion of the caption indicates that the Act (Ga. L. 1913, p. 125, §§ 48-5-291 through48-5-296) is to fix the "qualifications" of tax assessors it is sufficient to authorize the incorporation in the Act of a provision for their disqualification. Parks v. Ash, 168 Ga. 868, 149 S.E. 207 (1929), overruled on other grounds, Lucas v. Woodward, 240 Ga. 770, 243 S.E.2d 28 (1978).

Only one subject matter, that is, the right to redeem property sold for taxes, is referred to in Ga. L. 1949, p. 1132. Every provision in the body of the Act is specifically expressed in the title, and the statute does not violate this paragraph. Patterson v. Florida Realty & Fin. Corp., 212 Ga. 440, 93 S.E.2d 571 (1956).

This paragraph is not violated by the General Tax Act of 1890 (Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 35). McGhee v. State, 92 Ga. 21, 17 S.E. 276 (1893).

Title of Act embracing malt beverages cannot extend to all alcoholic beverages.

- Where the title of an Act (Ga. L. 1935, p. 73) embraces "malt beverages" only, and a section (Code 1933, § 58-724, see § 3-3-21) within the body extends to "alcoholic beverages of any kind," and prohibits the sale thereof on any school grounds or college campus or within 100 yards thereof, it contains matter different from that in the title, in violation of this paragraph. McCaffrey v. State, 183 Ga. 827, 189 S.E. 825 (1937).

Act setting tax rate on malt beverage crowns constitutional.

- Ga. L. 1937-38 Ex. Sess., p. 175 (Code 1933, § 58-739), purporting to amend the General Tax Act of 1935 ( § 3-5-60) as related to the tax on auctioneers, and "to provide that the tax paid crowns or lid crown required by law to be attached or affixed to bottles or cans containing malt beverages shall be at the rate of two cents for each can or bottle containing 12 fluid ounces or proportionally thereof, so as to graduate the tax on bottles or cans of various sizes," does not violate this paragraph. Crisp v. Head, 187 Ga. 20, 199 S.E. 219 (1938).

Section limiting state's power to affect interests of owners of Municipal Electric Authority bonds.

- Ga. L. 1975, p. 107 (see now O.C.G.A. § 46-3-146), limiting the power of the state to adversely affect the interests of the owners of the Municipal Electric Authority's bonds and notes, is not in violation of this paragraph. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).

Act fixing venue of suits against electric companies constitutional (Ga. L. 1912, p. 66, § 46-1-2). Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Foster, 143 Ga. 688, 85 S.E. 835 (1915).

Act dealing with municipal taxation of life insurers not unconstitutional because title does not mention county powers.

- Even though there is no reference in the title to the provision in the Act (Ga. L. 1964, p. 122, § 33-8-8) that no county or unincorporated area shall be permitted to impose, levy, or charge any of the taxes and fees mentioned therein, no reference in the title need be specifically made to the fact that no county or unincorporated area thereof could impose such taxes and fees under the Act since the title sufficiently covers this provision by stating that the Act involves the "exercise of the powers of municipal corporations and other political subdivisions." This phrase is sufficient to cover both the granting and the taking of power from the various political subdivisions in the establishment of a uniform policy. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Not unconstitutional because it does not mention effect on business licenses.

- Even though the title does not indicate that the Act (Ga. L. 1964, p. 122) deals with business licenses issued by the county, the words "fees and taxes" as used in the title are sufficient to include those various and specific types which are set out in detail in the body of the Act including business licenses. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Not unconstitutional because it preempts field of imposing taxes on life insurers.

- Even though no reference is made in the title that the purpose of the Act (Ga. L. 1964, p. 122) is to preempt to the state the field of imposing taxes upon life insurance companies, the title does state that the Act is to "provide a uniform policy," and there could be no such uniform policy established in this field unless total authority in this matter is preempted and placed into one policy making body, in this case the General Assembly. The fact that the body of the Act mentions preemption does not violate the Constitution because it is incidental and necessary to carry out the purpose of establishing a uniform policy. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Not unconstitutional because it deals with both county and municipal governments.

- The Act (Ga. L. 1964, p. 122) does not refer to more than one subject matter even though it deals with the powers of both county and municipal governments, since the Act deals with the taxing of insurance company premiums and that alone is the subject matter of the Act. Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966).

Employer's Liability Act constitutional (Ga. L. 1909, p. 160). Georgia C. & P.R.R. v. Hines, 138 Ga. 713, 76 S.E. 60 (1912).

Housing Authorities Act constitutional.

- Neither Ga. L. 1937, p. 210 nor p. 697 (Art. 1, Ch. 3, T. 8) refer to more than one subject-matter, or contain matter different from that expressed in the title contrary to this paragraph. Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938).

Banking Law of 1919 constitutional.

- The Banking Law of 1919 (Ga. L. 1919, p. 135) is not repugnant to this paragraph. Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S.E. 264 (1927).

Nonresident Motorist Act constitutional.

- There is no merit in the contention that the Nonresident Motorist Act (Ga. L. 1937, p. 732) is lacking in the unity of purpose required by this paragraph, because it provides for both a method of serving a nonresident and the venue of suits brought thereunder. Lloyd Adams, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 633, 10 S.E.2d 46 (1940).

Motor vehicle registration law constitutional (Ga. L. 1915, Ex. Sess., p. 107, now repealed). Tarver v. City of Albany, 160 Ga. 251, 127 S.E. 856 (1925).

Motor Vehicle Registration Law (Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 259) does not violate this paragraph insofar as it attempts to deal with or tax public property. Burkett v. State, 198 Ga. 747, 32 S.E.2d 797 (1945).

Uniform Rules of the Road Act constitutional.

- The Uniform Rules of the Road Act, Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, as amended by Ga. L. 1976, p. 977, does not violate this paragraph by containing matter different from what is expressed in the title. Head v. State, 246 Ga. 360, 271 S.E.2d 452 (1980).

Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act constitutional.

- The fact that the title to the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act (Ga. L. 1974, p. 113; O.C.G.A. Ch. 34, T. 33) does not make reference to a penalty provision provided for in the body of that Act does not render it unconstitutional under this paragraph. Atlanta Cas. Co. v. Jones, 247 Ga. 238, 275 S.E.2d 328 (1981).

Resolution authorizing sale of list of motor vehicle owners constitutional.

- The resolution of 1929 (former Ga. L. 1929, p. 1483) authorizing the sale of the list of motor vehicle owners is not unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it has no caption and was not passed in conformity; it being evident from reading the resolution that it was intended as a revenue measure. While the resolution has not a formal caption as precedes an Act, the preamble was in substance a caption and the resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives as required by Ga. Const. 1976, Art. III, Sec. VII, Para. VIII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. II) and as required of all revenue bills. Grizzard v. State Revenue Comm'n, 177 Ga. 845, 171 S.E. 765 (1933).

Registration section of Motor Common Carriers Act constitutional.

- Section 18 (former O.C.G.A. § 46-7-15) of the former Motor Common Carriers Act (Ga. L. 1931, p. 199) was not unconstitutional on the grounds that the statute referred to more than one subject matter or contained matter different from what was expressed in the statute's title. City of Albany v. Ader, 176 Ga. 391, 168 S.E. 1 (1933); Mayor of Savannah v. V.C. Ellington Co., 177 Ga. 149, 170 S.E. 38 (1933).

Housing Authority Law of 1937 constitutional.

- The "Housing Authority Law" of 1937 (Ga. L. 1937, p. 210, § 8-3-1 et seq.), and the Act of 1939 amending this law (Ga. L. 1939, p. 121), is not in contravention of this paragraph, as referring to more than one subject matter, or as containing matter different from what is expressed in the title; and is not in contravention of the uniformity clause contained in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV), a special law as to matters covered by general laws. Barber v. Housing Auth., 189 Ga. 155, 5 S.E.2d 425 (1939).

Section relating to divorce procedure constitutional.

- The legislation enacting § 19-6-1 (Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253) meets the single subject matter requirement of this paragraph, because its provisions all relate to changes in divorce and alimony procedure necessitated by the advent of "no fault" divorce, and because the lien provision has a natural connection with the main object of the legislation. Davenport v. Davenport, 243 Ga. 613, 255 S.E.2d 695 (1979).

Act providing for liens upon estates relating to alimony constitutional.

- The statement in the caption of Ga. L. 1977, p. 1253 that it amended former Code 1933, § 30-201 (see now O.C.G.A. § 19-6-1), relating to permanent and temporary alimony "to provide for liens upon estates," gave sufficient notice of the provisions of the Act to meet the requirement of this paragraph. Davenport v. Davenport, 243 Ga. 613, 255 S.E.2d 695 (1979).

The Child Abuse and Prevention Act refers to only one subject matter and that is the implementation relating to a State Children's Trust Fund. Collins v. Woodham, 257 Ga. 643, 362 S.E.2d 61 (1987).

State Bar Act not unconstitutional on grounds that it violates this paragraph (Art. 2, Ch. 19, T. 15). Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969), commented on in 21 Mercer L. Rev. 355 (1969).

Act regulating dental hygienists constitutional.

- The Act regulating the occupation of dental hygienists, approved February 25, 1949, Ga. L. 1949, p. 1192 (now repealed) is not unconstitutional, because it violates the due-process and equal-protection clauses of U.S. Const., amend. 14 and the Georgia Constitution, or because it violates this paragraph. Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949).

Paragraph not violated by Act proscribing practice of dentistry without a license. Wrzesinski v. State, 271 Ga. 659, 522 S.E.2d 461 (1999).

Failure to mention penalty of injunction in caption of roadhouse licensing Act not unconstitutional.

- The fact that no particular reference is made in the title of the Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 326) to the penalty of injunction provided for in Ga. L. 1945, p. 326, § 17A (see now O.C.G.A. § 43-21-57) does not render this provision of the Act repugnant to this paragraph. Copeland v. Leathers, 206 Ga. 280, 56 S.E.2d 530 (1949).

Act requiring contractor to give bond in public works contracts constitutional (Ga. L. 1916, p. 94; see O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 82, T. 36). Ty Ty Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Colquitt Lumber Co., 153 Ga. 426, 112 S.E. 561 (1922).

Land Registration Act constitutional (Ga. L. 1917, p. 108; see O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 2, T. 44). Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S.E. 791 (1921).

Legislation germane to purpose of Act.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 which insulates architects, engineers, contractors, and all other parties participating in the design, planning, supervision, or construction of an improvement to real property from liability for injuries to persons or property occurring more than eight years after substantial completion of such improvement and resulting from negligent designing, planning, supervision, or construction of such an improvement does not violate this paragraph. Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs., 250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982).

Building Authority Act not violative of paragraph.

- Because the entire County Building Authority Act dealt with the creation and operation of county building authorities, the Act did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III by allegedly covering two distinct subject matters: (1) the creation, functions, and powers of county building authorities; and (2) the specific grant of power to other governmental entities to deal with the building authority. Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Definition of "burglary" in

§ 16-7-1 does not violate this paragraph. - Definition of "burglary" in O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 relates to main object of legislation, contains "no matter variant from the title," and bears "a natural connection" to the matter contained in the enacting clause, and does not violate this paragraph. Ladson v. State, 248 Ga. 470, 285 S.E.2d 508 (1981).

Notice of repeal of tax deduction.

- Where an Act's title, which refers to Ga. L. 1969, p. 115 and relates the amendment to "adjustments to federal taxable income to be made by corporations," it gives adequate notice of the repeal of the deduction for corporate long-term capital gains as the title puts the reader on notice that subsection (b) affecting corporate adjustments is being amended, and as the long-term capital gains deduction is one of the corporate adjustments in the referenced section and is naturally connected with and germane to the main object of the legislation as stated in the title; that subsection (b)(6) is on page 117, Ga. L. 1969, rather than on page 115, Ga. L. 1969, is not fatal. Mead Corp. v. Collins, 258 Ga. 239, 367 S.E.2d 790 (1988).

Tort Reform Act.

- O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) is unconstitutional as containing matter different from that expressed in the title of the Tort Reform Act and containing subject matter different from other subject matter in the body of the Act. McBride v. GMC, 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).

Punitive damages law.

- Because the trial court erroneously concluded that the purpose of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 is revenue raising, it erred in holding that the statute violates Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III, providing that no bill shall contain subject matter different from that expressed in the title. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 436 S.E.2d 635 (1993); State v. Moseley, 263 Ga. 680, 436 S.E.2d 632 (1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1107, 114 S. Ct. 2101, 128 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1994).

Guardianship for veterans.

- Former O.C.G.A. § 29-6-11(c), prohibiting a guardian appointed to allow a ward to receive Department of Veterans Affairs benefits from receiving a bequest under the ward's will, did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III, prohibiting the passage of a bill containing matter different from the bill's title, because one of the bill's stated purposes was to provide for a comprehensive change in the guardianship of beneficiaries of the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, and the statute was sufficiently related to this purpose. Cross v. Stokes, 275 Ga. 872, 572 S.E.2d 538 (2002).

Body of penal statute cannot be narrowed to conform to title.

- The body of a penal statute, when broader in its terms than the title warrants, cannot be so narrowed by constructions as to make the statute good for what is embraced within the title, unless the result thus arrived at will correspond with the real legislative intention. McCaffrey v. State, 183 Ga. 827, 189 S.E. 825 (1937).

Act imposing death penalty constitutional.

- The Act providing for the imposition of the death penalty (Ga. L. 1973, p. 159; see O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30) deals with only one subject and is not violative of the Georgia Constitution. McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369, 211 S.E.2d 577 (1974).

Act amending sections on bail in criminal cases constitutional.

- Ga. L. 1943, p. 282, while amending provisions which deal with the subject of bail in criminal cases by providing for service of the forfeiture proceeding and for relief of the surety after final judgment, does not contain more than one subject matter in violation of this paragraph. Fields v. Arnall, 199 Ga. 491, 34 S.E.2d 692 (1945).

Act making it felony to defraud laborers and materialmen constitutional.

- The Act of 1941, Ga. L. 1941, p. 480 (now repealed), which declares that it shall be a felony for any person, with the intent to defraud, to use the proceeds of any payment made to the person for the purpose of improving real property, otherwise than for the payment of labor and material cost, if there be any obligations outstanding, and providing that the failure to pay such labor and material cost would be prima-facie evidence of intent to defraud, is not violative of this paragraph, or in violation of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XX (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII), which prohibits an imprisonment for debt; or in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of U.S. Const., amend. 14. Collins v. State, 206 Ga. 95, 55 S.E.2d 599 (1949).

Void check law constitutional.

- Act (Ga. L. 1919, p. 135, Art. 20, § 34) prohibiting utterance of void checks constitutional. Corenblum v. State, 153 Ga. 596, 113 S.E. 159 (1922).

Prohibition law constitutional (Ga. L. 1907, p. 81; former Code 1910, §§ 426 through 433). Whitley v. State, 134 Ga. 758, 68 S.E. 716 (1910).

Local Act providing penalty for illegal voting constitutional (Ga. L. 1914, p. 1172). Holland v. State, 155 Ga. 795, 118 S.E. 203 (1923).

Local Act regulating sale of liquor constitutional (Ga. L. 1906, p. 430). Glover v. State, 126 Ga. 594, 55 S.E. 592 (1906).

Insertion of matter not mentioned in title violates paragraph.

- When the caption of an amendatory Act specifically limits the matters to be included in the amendment, and there is inserted in the body of the Act a completely unrelated provision of which the title gives no intimation, this paragraph is violated. Nelson v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 221 Ga. 804, 147 S.E.2d 424 (1966).

Radical change in Act not unconstitutional.

- Though amendatory Act may radically change provisions of Act which it amends, this does not render it obnoxious to this paragraph. Sayer v. Brown, 119 Ga. 539, 46 S.E. 649 (1904).

Retention of all features in original Act by revising Act constitutional.

- If, in revising an old law, the revising Act embraces two features, both of which were embraced in the law revised, the retention of both features in the revising Act does not make the body of the Act contain or refer to matters not expressed in its title. White v. Donaldson, 170 Ga. 432, 153 S.E. 19 (1930).

Provision in caption designating amended Act permits inclusion of consistent material.

- A provision in the caption of an Act of the legislature, simply describing the Act as one to amend a designated Act, is sufficient to permit any provision in the Act not inconsistent with the original Act to be amended. Adams v. City of Cornelia, 206 Ga. 687, 58 S.E.2d 398 (1950).

Amendment to Workers' Compensation Act constitutional (Ga. L. 1922, p. 185, amending Ga. L. 1920, p. 167; see O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34). Athens Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Kinney, 160 Ga. 1, 127 S.E. 290 (1925).

Amendment to

§ 34-9-13(e) of Workers' Compensation Act unconstitutional. - 1989 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-13(e) is unconstitutional since the alteration greatly limited availability of workers' compensation benefits to surviving spouses and was enacted in legislation that had the object and title reflecting a purpose of correcting only grammatical errors and to modernize language in various statutes-all non-substantive alterations; 1989 amendment to § 34-9-13(e), which greatly limited the availability of benefits to surviving spouses, was a substantive alteration made in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III. Sherman Concrete Pipe Co. v. Chinn, 283 Ga. 468, 660 S.E.2d 368 (2008).

The 1990 Act amending O.C.G.A. § 16-6.5.1(b) to include a person "who is enrolled in a school" to the class of victims did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III. Randolph v. State, 269 Ga. 147, 496 S.E.2d 258 (1998).

Title authorizes inclusion of all matter germane to general subject.

- Where title of an Act was: "An Act to amend the several Acts relating to and incorporating the Mayor and Aldermen of The City of Savannah, to extend the corporate limits of the City of Savannah and for other purposes," any legislation could constitutionally be embodied in the Act which was germane to the general subject of amending the charter of the city. Parker v. Mayor of Savannah, 216 Ga. 210, 115 S.E.2d 555 (1960).

General Assembly cannot amend charters of two municipalities in one Act.

- An Act which attempted to annex land alleged to be within the corporate limits of another municipality, explicitly named in the Act, violated this paragraph. The General Assembly is incompetent to amend, repeal, or modify the charters of two separate and distinct municipal corporations in one Act, and to attempt to do so causes the Act to impermissibly refer to more than one subject matter. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

An Act whose title referred only to one city, but which also attempted to amend, partially repeal, and nullify the charter of another municipality caused the Act to contain matter different from what was expressed in the title in violation of this paragraph. Schneider v. City of Folkston, 207 Ga. 434, 62 S.E.2d 177 (1950).

An Act which attempted to annex additional territory within the corporate limits of another municipality violated this paragraph even though it made no explicit mention of the latter, but merely described the territory; the Act improperly purported to amend the charters of two municipalities by subtraction and addition of property. City of Chamblee v. Village of N. Atlanta, 217 Ga. 517, 123 S.E.2d 663 (1962).

It is not necessary that title of local Act be specific, but where title of such is definite, it is therefore necessarily limited, and to permit other and totally different matter to be incorporated would be to let in the very mischief intended to be prevented by this provision. Bray v. City of E. Point, 203 Ga. 315, 46 S.E.2d 257 (1948).

Act amending Act creating new city charter violates this paragraph, insofar as it purports to create a joint board of tax appeals. Toole v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 814, 171 S.E. 714 (1933).

Act regulating fees of officers of city court invalid as conflicting with this paragraph. Christie v. Miller, 128 Ga. 412, 57 S.E. 697 (1907).

Act authorizing city to acquire fee-simple title by condemnation void, as it could be construed to include two distinct powers of condemnation. O'Dowd's Sons & Co. v. City Council, 141 Ga. 748, 82 S.E. 148 (1914).

Act allowing mayor to succeed to position in office unconstitutional in part as violating this paragraph. Griffith v. Merrit, 223 Ga. 562, 157 S.E.2d 23 (1967), commented on in 19 Mercer L. Rev. 436 (1968).

Creation of municipality constitutional. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 40 S.E. 857 (1902); Mayor of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 40 S.E. 1004 (1920); Tison v. City of Doerun, 155 Ga. 367, 116 S.E. 615 (1923); Storey v. Town of Summerville, 158 Ga. 182, 123 S.E. 139 (1924).

Act creating new city charter constitutional. Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 130 S.E. 69 (1925).

Act granting commission form of government constitutional. City of Cartersville v. McGinnis, 142 Ga. 71, 82 S.E. 487 (1914); Davis v. Warde, 155 Ga. 748, 118 S.E. 378, appeal dismissed, 263 U.S. 725, 44 S. Ct. 3, 68 L. Ed. 527 (1923); Cady v. Jardine, 185 Ga. 9, 193 S.E. 869 (1937).

Act creating city court constitutional. Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 40 S.E. 857 (1902); Fountain v. Ragan-Malone Co., 141 Ga. 58, 80 S.E. 306 (1913).

Act changing terms of court constitutional. Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307, 67 S.E. 857 (1910).

Acts to raise money for school purposes valid. Smith v. Bohler, 72 Ga. 546 (1884); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Hutchinson, 125 Ga. 762, 54 S.E. 725 (1906); Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 147 Ga. 776, 95 S.E. 684 (1918).

Act creating municipal court and permitting oral charges to jury is not unconstitutional because in conflict with this paragraph. Robinson v. Odom, 168 Ga. 81, 147 S.E. 569 (1929).

Act changing county lines constitutional. Manson v. City of College Park, 131 Ga. 429, 62 S.E. 278 (1908).

Annexation Acts generally.

- Annexation Acts do not refer to more than one subject matter because they both annex property into city school district and remove property from county school district. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

Shifting of school district boundaries is merely one of several consequences of annexation, not a "subject matter" contained in annexation Acts. For example, one effect of annexation is to render the annexed territory subject to taxation by city. An Act which provides for annexation but does not provide for taxation of annexed territory does not contain matter different from what is expressed in the title within the meaning of this paragraph. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

Act annexing contiguous territory to city constitutional. Mayor of Macon v. Hughes, 110 Ga. 795, 36 S.E. 247 (1900); Richardson v. Mayor of Macon, 132 Ga. 122, 63 S.E. 790 (1909); White v. City of Atlanta, 134 Ga. 532, 68 S.E. 103 (1910); Davidson v. Town of Kirkwood, 152 Ga. 357, 110 S.E. 154 (1921).

Act for creation of metropolitan rapid transit system constitutional.

- Legislation which has many provisions that are made for the creation and development of a rapid transit system for a metropolitan, multicounty area does not violate this section. Camp v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 229 Ga. 35, 189 S.E.2d 56 (1972).

Local Act which changes method of compensating two county officials does not violate this paragraph.

- This paragraph does not require a general revision of the method of compensating all the public officials of the county in order to deal in one Act with the method of compensating more than one of such public officials. Gainer v. Ellis, 226 Ga. 79, 172 S.E.2d 608 (1970).

Act amending incorporation law of school is not unconstitutional under this paragraph. English v. Smith, 162 Ga. 195, 133 S.E. 847 (1926).

Caption broad enough to allow appropriation in Act.

- Caption of Act creating county board of education was sufficiently broad to allow inclusion in Act of appropriation of funds to carry out purpose of Act. Board of Educ. & Orphanage v. State Bd. of Educ., 186 Ga. 200, 197 S.E. 261 (1938).

Charter regulating occupation tax.

- Because a second city provided by local ordinance for the levy, assessment, and collection of an occupation tax on businesses and practitioners operating within that city's limits, the second city had the general authority to collect such a tax under O.C.G.A. § 48-13-6(b), and only the second city was authorized to levy, assess, and collect an occupation tax from businesses and practitioners at the airport that were located within the second city's limits to the extent consistent with Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. I, O.C.G.A. § 48-13-6(b), other applicable statutes, and that city's own charter, ordinances, and regulations; Atlanta, Ga., Charter, § 7-105(f) is ineffective to the extent it purports to divest College Park, Georgia of the authority to levy, assess, and collect an occupation tax on those businesses and practitioners operating at the airport and within the city limits of College Park. City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 311 Ga. App. 62, 715 S.E.2d 158 (2011).

Act relating to ethics code for Board of Human Resources may be unconstitutional.

- Courts could rule the Act, (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 45-10-3,45-10-4 and45-10-5), which imposes a general code of ethics on members of the Board of Human Resources and takes away the rule making authority of all boards, commissions, and authorities of state government, constitutionally defective under this paragraph. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-43.1 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III).

Acts placing city courts under Employees' Retirement System of Georgia do not affect jurisdiction.

- Titles to Acts placing city courts under Employees' Retirement System of Georgia (Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 305, § 47-2-293 and Ga. L. 1962, p. 54, § 47-2-290) do not mention any relation to jurisdiction of such courts, and so those sections cannot be construed as affecting jurisdiction. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-93.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, § 53 et seq.

ALR.

- Sufficiency of title of act licensing or otherwise regulating dealers in securities or other interests or obligations of third persons, 153 A.L.R. 874.