Constitutionality of disenfranchisement.

- Disenfranchisement of persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude does not violate U.S. Const., amend. 14, sec. 1, because U.S. Const., amend. 14, sec. 2, specifically qualifies equal protection guarantees by recognizing the right of a state to disenfranchise persons "for participation in rebellion or other crime." Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

No standing to challenge constitutionality.

- Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 2006 Photo-ID Act at the time the complaint was filed, and thus the determination that the act violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. I, Paras. II and III had to be vacated; the plaintiff could have voted in person under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 without a photo identification, as the plaintiff did not contend that the plaintiff lacked any of the forms of non-photo identification allowed to be shown by first-time voters. Perdue v. Lake, 282 Ga. 348, 647 S.E.2d 6 (2007).

Action in federal court for injunction against state violated eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution.

- In an action in which voting rights organizations, as well as individuals, sought an injunction to restrain the state from attempting to enforce the photo ID requirement imposed by HB 244, the State of Georgia was the real party in interest, and the plaintiffs' claim that HB 244 violated two sections of the Georgia Constitution clearly was a cause of action against a state for alleged violations of state law, and was barred by the eleventh amendment. Common Cause/GA v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Compelling state interest.

- A state may constitutionally disenfranchise otherwise qualified voters because they have been convicted of a felony, since the state has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

State may prohibit idiots and insane persons, as well as those convicted of certain offenses, from participating in elections. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971).

No conviction when verdict set aside or subject to being set aside.

- If a jury's verdict of guilty has been set aside or is under review and thus subject to being set aside either by motion for new trial, bill of exceptions or other appropriate procedure, there is no conviction within the meaning of this paragraph. Summerour v. Cartrett, 220 Ga. 31, 136 S.E.2d 724 (1964).

State may disenfranchise habitual DUI offenders.

- Conviction under the habitual DUI offender provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c)(2) is a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. I. Jarrard v. Clayton County Bd. of Registrars, 262 Ga. 759, 425 S.E.2d 874 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Cook v. Board of Registrars, 291 Ga. 67, 727 S.E.2d 478 (2012).

Transportation and possession of non-tax-paid liquor is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Hutto v. Rowland, 226 Ga. 889, 178 S.E.2d 180 (1970).

Unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors is not a crime involving moral turpitude. Hutto v. Rowland, 226 Ga. 889, 178 S.E.2d 180 (1970).

Photo identification requirement.

- In an action by a political party challenging the 2006 Photo ID Act, amending O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417, no voter was disenfranchised by the Act and, therefore, the Act did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. I, Para. III. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 288 Ga. 720, 707 S.E.2d 67 (2011).

Necessity of final adjudication of guilt.

- The word "conviction," for purposes of this paragraph, refers to an adjudication of guilt which is final. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-26.

Persons awaiting trial are eligible to register and to vote; those who are incarcerated cannot be denied these rights by virtue of their incarceration. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 74-137.

Effect of conviction outside state.

- An individual convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, in a jurisdiction outside the State of Georgia, is not entitled to vote in Georgia, so long as such crime is punishable in Georgia by imprisonment. 1976 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-92.

Youth committing crime punishable by imprisonment disqualified.

- Where a youth has not been imprisoned in a penitentiary but has been committed to the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (now Department of Corrections), if the crime committed is punishable by imprisonment, the disqualification of the right to vote attaches. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-17.

Elector who is convicted of crime of abandonment and receives felony punishment would be disfranchised. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 124.

Conviction of a misdemeanor does not deprive a person of voting rights.

- A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude shall not be prevented from exercising voting rights regardless of whether the sentence has been completed. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-43.

One can lose one's right to vote and hold public office only upon conviction for a felony involving moral turpitude and can no longer lose these rights by conviction for a misdemeanor. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-33.

A conviction resulting from a nolo contendere plea cannot be used to impose any disability including disqualification from voting, holding public office, and jury service. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-33.

Persons entitled to restoration of rights.

- On July 1, 1983, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. I, Para. III shall serve to restore the voting rights of persons who meet the requirements of the provision regardless of when the crime was committed, the person was convicted, or the sentence was completed. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-43.

Restoration of civil rights is not necessary to enable one who has completed one's sentence to register to vote. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-33.

Judicial determination of mental incompetence.

- A judge of probate court may, in the course of a proceeding for the appointment of a guardian for an incapacitated adult, judicially determine a person to be mentally incompetent and thereby remove the person's right to vote. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-48.

A separate judicial determination must be made that a person is "mentally incompetent" prior to the removal of a person's right to vote. 1995 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 95-27.

Violations of statutes expressing moral judgment of community.

- Any crime constituting intentional violation of statute expressing moral judgment of the community against prohibited conduct would involve moral turpitude. 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-352.

Murder as involving moral turpitude.

- Murder involves vileness and depravity, for it is the result of an abandoned and malignant heart, and is a crime involving moral turpitude. 1948-49 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 291.

Offenses committed by juveniles.

- Person convicted of crime before reaching age of 17 loses that person's right to vote if convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude even though the person is committed to the State Department of Human Resources, rather than sentenced to the Board of Corrections. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-17.

All felonies considered as involving moral turpitude.

- It is recommended that, for purposes of granting clemency and restoring civil rights, the Board of Pardons and Paroles consider all felonies as involving moral turpitude. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-33.

Drug-related offense.

- Generally, a drug-related offense classified as a felony is a felony involving moral turpitude which will remove a person's right to vote, but the right to vote may not be withheld until a conviction becomes final. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-15.

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, opinions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. II, Sec. II, Para. I and antecedent provisions, relating to the continued disenfranchisement of felony convicts until the granting of a pardon, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. Ga. Const. 1983, Art. II, Sec. I, Para. III now provides for continued disenfranchisement of a felony convict until completion of the sentence.

Serving sentence, by itself, does not restore person's right to vote, but the grant of a pardon will restore a person's right to vote. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-374.

Word "pardoned" as contained in this paragraph must be given no stricter meaning than that traditionally required by law, namely, an act of executive clemency. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 136.

Grant of certificate of good conduct in other state does not restore Georgia right to vote.

- One convicted of a felony in another state is deprived of one's right to register and vote in Georgia, and the grant of a certificate of good conduct to end disability under the other state's law would not restore one's right to vote in this state; in order to have one's disabilities removed it would be necessary to obtain a pardon from the pardoning power of the other state. 1950-51 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 298.

Order of restoration of civil rights allows voting and holding office.

- The order of restoration of civil rights is no different from a pardon and the order restoring civil rights is sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph authorizing persons previously disenfranchised to be allowed to again vote and hold office. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 136.