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Call Now: 904-383-7448The General Assembly shall not authorize any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state, through taxation, contribution, or otherwise, to appropriate money for or to lend its credit to any person or to any nonpublic corporation or association except for purely charitable purposes.
- Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. III.
- Approved investment securities, § 36-80-3.
- For article, "Cities and Towns in Georgia: A Distinction With a Difference?," see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 385 (1963). For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979). For article, "Workers' Compensation in Georgia Municipal Law," see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1980). For survey article on local government law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1982). For annual survey on local government law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 199 (2016).
Worker's compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34), insofar as it applies to municipal corporations, is not unconstitutional as authorizing municipal corporations to appropriate money for an association for noncharitable purposes in violation of this paragraph. City of Atlanta v. Pickens, 176 Ga. 833, 169 S.E. 99 (1933) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Insofar as it imposes liability without fault upon employers, and includes municipal corporations within the classification of employers, the worker's compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, T. 34) is not in conflict with this paragraph. City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Worker's compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 9, Title 34), is not unconstitutional because it requires an appropriation of money for an injured employee without consideration, and is not for any charitable purpose. City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-121. - Former Code 1933, § 114-602 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-121) was not in violation of this paragraph because it required a municipality to appropriate and donate money to a corporation to insure the municipality against loss caused by injury, and also required that a municipal corporation become a stockholder in a mutual insurance association, and to lend its credit to the municipal corporation or insurance association. City of Macon v. Benson, 175 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Ga. L. 1975, p. 107 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 3, Ch. 3, T. 46) is not a violation of this paragraph since the authority is not a county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision of this state. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
- A contract between a municipality and another corporation for a lease, for a term of 35 years, of land owned by the municipality, in consideration of care of the poor of the city by the lessee to the extent of supplying specified medical and surgical treatment in a clinic or hospital existing on such land, is not unlawful as violating any of the provisions of the Constitution. Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., 189 Ga. 126, 5 S.E.2d 356 (1939).
- Contract between State Highway Board (now State Transportation Board) and county commissioners for grading of portion of a state-aid road lying within county is not unconstitutional upon the ground that it involves a loan of the credit of the county to the State Highway Board in violation of this paragraph. Spain v. Hall County, 175 Ga. 600, 165 S.E. 612 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Allowing use of certain properties as partial consideration for promise to provide fire protection is not deemed credit. Smith v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 244 Ga. 133, 259 S.E.2d 74 (1979).
- Trial court did not err by rejecting the claim that the bond issuance violated the Lending Clause of the Georgia Constitution because the bond resolution and the intergovernmental agreement between the county and the airport authority required the county to extend the county's credit for the county's own purposes, namely the benefit of the taxiway expansion, and the agreement between the airport authority and a commercial aviation company did not alter that as, under that agreement, the commercial aviation company was, at best, extending the company's credit to the county. Avery v. State of Ga., 295 Ga. 630, 761 S.E.2d 56 (2014).
Intergovernmental Agreement did not violate the lending clause because the county was not paying, with appropriated funds or credit, for anything to be owned by the baseball parties, the stadium and stadium site would be owned by the Cobb-Marietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall Authority, with the baseball team paying license fees to the Authority, for at least 30 years, at which time the bonds would be fully redeemed. Savage v. State of Ga., 297 Ga. 627, 774 S.E.2d 624 (2015).
- The provision of Ga. L. 1937, p. 697 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 2, Ch. 3, T. 8), which provides that the city shall, out of any money in its treasury not otherwise appropriated, appropriate to the authority an amount of money necessary to cover the administrative expense and overhead during the first year, and Act further declaring that said money so appropriated shall be paid as a donation, is not violative of this paragraph which, among other things, provides that the General Assembly shall not authorize any municipality to appropriate money to any corporation except for purely charitable purposes. Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
- If a city ordinance can be taken and construed as meaning that the owner of any improved or vacant premises of whatever character and size, within the limits of the city, becomes instantly liable for injuries to third persons on account of and from the moment any trash, banana peeling, ice, snow, or what not falls upon the abutting sidewalk, without fault or knowledge on the part of such owner, it would manifestly be a rule so harsh and unconscionable as would render such municipal ordinance unconstitutional and void as violative of Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I). Ellis v. Southern Grocery Stores, Inc., 46 Ga. App. 254, 167 S.E. 324 (1933).
- The authority of county governments to expend public funds is enumerated in Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. V, Para. II (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. IV, Para. II). Expenditure of county funds to procure passage or defeat of constitutional amendments is not specifically permitted. Further, the Supreme Court has decided that an advertising campaign to influence vote approval of a constitutional amendment is not authorized as a facet of administration of county government. McKinney v. Brown, 242 Ga. 456, 249 S.E.2d 247 (1978).
Purpose of this paragraph is to prevent extravagant outlays, making resort to taxing power necessary. Mayor of Athens v. Camak, 75 Ga. 429 (1885) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Compensating citizens who have paid money over to a corporation falls within purview of this paragraph. Town of Adel v. Woodall, 122 Ga. 535, 50 S.E. 481 (1905) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Contract to secure a right of way for a railroad falls within the purview of this paragraph. Covington & M.R.R. v. Mayor of Athens, 85 Ga. 367, 11 S.E. 663 (1890) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
This paragraph does not forbid assignment by a contractor of a future city debt. Mayor of Albany v. Cameron & Barkley Co., 121 Ga. 794, 49 S.E. 798 (1905) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Extension of territorial limits of a city is not prohibited by this paragraph. White v. City of Atlanta, 134 Ga. 532, 68 S.E. 103 (1910) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Costs of street improvements may be assessed in installments. City of Valdosta v. Harris, 156 Ga. 490, 119 S.E. 625 (1923).
Unless there is something in the charter of a municipal corporation which forbids building school houses, the city may do so. Mayor of Cartersville v. Baker, 73 Ga. 686 (1884).
- A city has the right, under this provision, to expand its funds for purpose of purchasing rights of way within city limits for the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation), if the purpose of the project is for improvement of the streets of the city, and thereby to procure work done on its street without any expense to it except in providing for the rights of way; it is immaterial whether the title to the rights of way is taken in the name of the city or in the State Highway Department. Jackson v. City of Rome, 182 Ga. 848, 187 S.E. 386 (1936) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
- A local amendment to Art. VII, Sec. IV, Para. II of the 1945 Georgia Constitution, authorizing a county to levy a tax for water and sewerage purposes, was valid despite any conflict with the provision prohibiting gratuities on the part of counties. Copeland v. State, 268 Ga. 375, 490 S.E.2d 68 (1997).
Hospital authority is not a "county, municipal corporation or political division of this state." Bradfield v. Hospital Auth., 226 Ga. 575, 176 S.E.2d 92 (1970).
- There was no merit in a resident's arguments that the provision in a contract in which a county agreed to reimburse a private enterprise for a percentage of uncollected fees for garbage collection services prior to the county's recovery of those fees from residents by means provided by O.C.G.A. § 12-8-39.3 violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII, prohibiting legislation to authorize any county to lend its credit to any person or nonpublic corporation. Strykr v. Long County Bd. of Comm'rs, 277 Ga. 624, 593 S.E.2d 348 (2004).
- Because a county was authorized to provide solid waste collection services, and to enter into contracts with private parties to do so, paying consideration to the contractors for that service before the associated fees were collected did not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII. Mesteller v. Gwinnett County, 292 Ga. 675, 740 S.E.2d 605 (2013).
Allocation of a portion of the fines and forfeitures collected in this state to the Peace Officers' Annuity and Benefit Fund is not an appropriation in violation of this paragraph. Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
- City's pledge of its taxing power to make up any deficit in the rents it is obligated to pay under a valid intergovernmental contract is permissible under the intergovernmental contracts clause and does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 256 Ga. 158, 345 S.E.2d 581 (1986).
- Lease provision whereby a city-lessor agreed to guarantee the bond payments of a development authority-lessee did not come within the intergovernmental contracts clause in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. III, Para. I and, therefore, was barred by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII. Nations v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 255 Ga. 324, 338 S.E.2d 240 (1985).
Local laws not violative of this paragraph are Section 7 of Ga. L. 1920, pp. 741, 744, which provides for issuing executions to enforce assessments for paving sidewalks against abutting lots or owners thereof in the city of Bainbridge, the levy of such executions, and sales thereunder, as in cases of sales for city taxes, does not violate this paragraph. Bower v. City of Bainbridge, 168 Ga. 616, 148 S.E. 517 (1929) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
- Since under the provisions of Ga. L. 1901, p. 620, creating a dispensary neither the city of Rome nor the county of Floyd can incur any debt or liability, hence the law does not violate this paragraph or Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV). Chamlee v. Davis, 115 Ga. 266, 41 S.E. 691 (1902).
Ga. L. 1913, p. 145, to create a municipal court for the city of Atlanta, did not violate this paragraph. McWilliams v. Smith, 142 Ga. 209, 82 S.E. 569 (1914) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Cited in Burns v. Decatur County, 178 Ga. 275, 173 S.E. 127 (1934); McGinty v. Keith, 182 Ga. 869, 187 S.E. 79 (1936); West v. Trotzier, 185 Ga. 794, 196 S.E. 902 (1938); Miller v. Head, 186 Ga. 694, 198 S.E. 680 (1938); McCook v. Long, 193 Ga. 299, 18 S.E.2d 488 (1942); DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942); Cole v. Foster, 207 Ga. 416, 61 S.E.2d 814 (1950); McCallum v. Moore, 215 Ga. 705, 113 S.E.2d 202 (1960); Henson v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 220 Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965).
Paragraph implicitly empowers General Assembly to authorize county to appropriate money for institution for purely charitable purposes. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-43 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
Paragraph cannot be construed as self-executing authorization to counties and municipal corporations to make contributions, or to form corporations for purely charitable purposes. Rather, this section permits the General Assembly to authorize counties and municipal corporations to take such action. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U80-25 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
General Assembly may not authorize a municipal corporation to provide a group insurance plan to its employees free of charge, as such would be an illegal use of public revenue. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 496.
County hospital authority, established and operated pursuant to Ga. L. 1964, p. 499 (see now O.C.G.A. Art. 4, Ch. 7, T. 31), would come within the definition of an operation for "purely charitable purposes." 1968 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 68-280.
- Municipal bond money cannot be legally spent on improvement or conversion of existing building located on private property for construction of public fall-out shelters. 1962 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 332.
City has no authority to appropriate public moneys to its Chamber of Commerce. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-32.
County may not, absent legislative authority, make a contribution to an entity organized for purely charitable purposes. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U77-24.
- While a county may not legally donate funds to assist a city in constructing a swimming pool, the county and city may jointly provide, establish, maintain, and conduct such a system. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 289.
Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 33-14-67), membership in mutuals, cannot be construed to alter or change restrictions imposed by this paragraph. 1960-61 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 383.(see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. II, Para. VIII).
- A private ambulance service which collects fees from its patients in addition to a monthly subsidy it receives and makes the resulting profits available for distribution as income or personal gain to its owners is not "a charitable purpose" under the requirements of the Georgia Constitution. 1967 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 67-434.
- Unless a provision in the city charter allows such an expenditure, a city may not contribute to a day care center. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-14.
- 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions, § 517 et seq.
- Constitutionality of statutory provisions as to political corporations or divisions which shall bear cost of establishing or maintaining highways, 2 A.L.R. 746; 123 A.L.R. 1462.
Power of municipality to extend aid to improvement district organized within its own limits, 50 A.L.R. 1208.
Income as "property" within constitutional limitation on taxation, 70 A.L.R. 468; 97 A.L.R. 1488.
Debts incurred for school purposes as part of municipal indebtedness, for purposes of debt limitation, 111 A.L.R. 544.
Donations, by state or municipal subdivision, to community chest or other nongovernmental charity, 142 A.L.R. 1076.
Constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting municipalities or other subdivisions of the state from subscribing to, or acquiring stock of, private corporation, 152 A.L.R. 495.
Meaning of term "assessment" or "assessed valuation" when used as basis of tax or debt limit, 156 A.L.R. 594.
Constitutional prohibition of municipal corporation lending its credit or making donation as applicable to sale or leasing of its property, 161 A.L.R. 518.