Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. X and antecedent provisions, relating to alternating of judges in city courts, state courts, and superior courts, are included in the annotations for this paragraph.

This paragraph applies to only constitutional city courts. Paulk v. State, 2 Ga. App. 660, 58 S.E. 1108 (1907) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III).

Purpose of this paragraph is to avoid delay, expense, and inconvenience when the judge of either court is disqualified to perform any duties which the law places upon that person as judge. McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 69 S.E.2d 764 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III).

Paragraph applies only to cases actually pending. Cox v. State, 19 Ga. App. 283, 91 S.E. 422 (1917) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III).

Substitution of judges not restricted as to type of cases.

- There is neither language nor implication in this paragraph that restricts the substitution of judges there provided for to any type of cases, to term matters, or to chambers matters. McCullough v. McCullough, 208 Ga. 776, 69 S.E.2d 764 (1952) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III).

When another judge is to be substituted.

- Whenever a party to any proceeding makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against the party or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceedings. Stevens v. Wakefield, 160 Ga. App. 353, 287 S.E.2d 49 (1981), overruled on other grounds, 249 Ga. 254, 290 S.E.2d 58 (1982).

The term "sentencing judge" in O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34(g) refers to the office and not to the person. Smith v. State, 250 Ga. App. 128, 550 S.E.2d 683 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Lewis v. McDougal, 276 Ga. 861, 583 S.E.2d 859 (2003).

Objection to appointment of magistrate waived.

- Where there was a serious doubt that the purported appointment by a single judge was equivalent to designation "upon the request and with the consent of the judges of that court and of the judge's own court under rules prescribed by law," but there was no objection to the appointment of the magistrate to sit as a superior court judge prior to the commencement of the divorce trial upon which appeal was based, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. Troncone v. Troncone, 261 Ga. 662, 409 S.E.2d 516 (1991).

Judge of superior court cannot attest affidavit to begin prosecution in city court. Edmondson v. State, 123 Ga. 194, 51 S.E. 301 (1905).

Other cases cannot be tried by regular trial judge during time of trial. Butler v. State, 112 Ga. 76, 37 S.E. 119 (1900).

Where superior court judge undertakes to preside in case pending in city court in which the regular judge is not disqualified, the trial is a nullity. Ivey v. State, 112 Ga. 175, 37 S.E. 398 (1900).

State judge disqualifying self.

- Utilization of procedure for reassigning case provided in this paragraph was within discretion of state court judge who disqualified herself; the matter being one of judicial administration, the choice implemented deprived the plaintiffs of nothing to which they were entitled under principles of due process. Stevens v. Wakefield, 163 Ga. App. 40, 292 S.E.2d 516 (1982) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III).

Intra-county judicial assistance.

- Requesting and receiving intra-county judicial assistance was permitted under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III, and did not unconstitutionally create a judgeship as the juvenile court judges who assisted the superior court did not become superior court judges; thus, no judicial position constitutionally required to be filled by election under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. I, or by gubernatorial appointment until election under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. V, Sec. II, Para. VIII, was created by the exercise of O.C.G.A. § 15-1-9.1(b)(2)(C). Earl v. Mills, 278 Ga. 128, 598 S.E.2d 480 (2004).

Valid Act may authorize city court judge to sit in other city courts. Georgia, Fla. & Ala. Ry. v. Sasser, 130 Ga. 394, 60 S.E. 997 (1908).

City court judge empowered to preside for superior court county judge.

- City Court of Camilla being a constitutional city court, its judge was empowered under this paragraph to preside in place of superior court judge of county. Galloway v. Mitchell County Elec. Membership Corp., 190 Ga. 428, 9 S.E.2d 903 (1940) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III).

Superior court judge emeritus without jurisdiction to certify appeal pursuant to Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5 except when authorized.

- Because a superior court judge emeritus had not been granted constitutional or statutory authority to serve as a superior court judge, except when the Governor was authorized to call upon the judge to do so or the judge is selected to serve as such in a civil case under the provisions of former Code 1933, §§ 24-2623-24-2626 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 15-6-13 and15-6-14), it necessarily follows that a superior court judge emeritus not within these exceptions was wholly without jurisdiction or power to certify a bill of exceptions (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-49) in a case tried by a superior court judge. Chambers v. Wynn, 217 Ga. 381, 122 S.E.2d 571 (1961) (decided under Ga. Const. 1945, Art. VI, Sec. XIII, Para. II, relating to emeritus justices and judges.)

Nonelected senior judges.

- Even though the position of senior judge is not an elected one, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. III allows a senior judge to exercise judicial power in the superior courts when the assistance of a senior judge is necessary. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-1-9.2 and47-8-61 are simply the statutory enactments pursuant to this constitutional provision. Smith v. Langford, 271 Ga. 221, 518 S.E.2d 884 (1999).