Prohibition of application of doctrine of forum non conveniens to nonresidents in FELA actions.

- The privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution prohibits Georgia courts from applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to citizens of other states who are nonresidents of Georgia in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases and declining to exercise jurisdiction of such actions brought by them. Brown v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 229 Ga. 481, 192 S.E.2d 382, answer conformed to, 127 Ga. App. 342, 193 S.E.2d 192 (1972).

Validity of statute denying medical care to nonresidents.

- Absent some relationship to the availability of post-procedure medical care for an aborted patient, the constitutionality of a residence requirement could not be upheld. The privileges and immunities clause protects persons who enter Georgia seeking the medical services that are available there. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973).

Cited in Jollie v. Hughes, 184 Ga. 860, 193 S.E. 769 (1937); Southern Ry. v. Parker, 194 Ga. 94, 21 S.E.2d 94 (1942); Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1942); Mainer v. Plunkett, 216 Ga. 820, 120 S.E.2d 175 (1961); Pahno v. Mathews, 226 Ga. 216, 173 S.E.2d 704 (1970); Johnstone v. Deyton, 233 Ga. 146, 210 S.E.2d 692 (1974); High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1978).

Duty to honor demand of sister state for extradition of fugitive.

- The Constitution imposes a duty upon the executive authority of each state of this Union to honor the demand of another state for the extradition of a fugitive from the demanding state. Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 26 S.E.2d 453 (1943).

It is not by virtue of mere comity that extradition warrant is issued, but in obedience to constitutional mandate. Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 26 S.E.2d 453 (1943).

Extradition based on constitutional mandate, not merely comity.

- The matter of rendering one from an asylum state to another state by extradition proceedings is not founded merely on comity between the states, but is in response to a requirement under U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2. House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745 (1958).

Law governing extradition proceedings.

- The primary law governing extradition proceedings is found in the Constitution of the United States, and the acts of Congress in pursuance thereof. McFarlin v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 794, 76 S.E.2d 1 (1953).

Elements necessary to authorize extradition.

- If a request for extradition is premised on the constitutional provision, one arrested and held on the governor's warrant issued in response to the request is entitled to habeas corpus relief upon establishing that he is not a fugitive from justice. Jenkins v. Garrison, 265 Ga. 42, 453 S.E.2d 698 (1995).

In order to authorize an extradition under the Constitution and laws of the United States, the alleged criminal act must have been committed by an individual who was at the time of its commission personally within the state which demands the individual's surrender, and that such person must have fled from the demanding state to the state where the individual is found, either directly or indirectly. Such a person is defined as a fugitive from justice. Jackson v. Pittard, 211 Ga. 427, 86 S.E.2d 295 (1955).

Convicted felon leaving state before serving full term is fugitive from justice.

- Where a person is convicted of felony committed by the person in one state, and that person goes into another state, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before serving the full term for which that person was sentenced, that person thereby becomes a fugitive from justice. Brown v. Lowry, 185 Ga. 539, 195 S.E. 759 (1937); King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461, 26 S.E.2d 419 (1943); Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 30 S.E.2d 48 (1944); Taylor v. Foster, 205 Ga. 36, 52 S.E.2d 314 (1949); House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745 (1958); Frazier v. Grimes, 221 Ga. 375, 145 S.E.2d 39 (1965); Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 256 S.E.2d 778 (1979).

Parole violator subject to extradition.

- A person who has been convicted of a felony in another state and released on parole by the authorities of that state with permission to go into this state, upon the violation of the terms of parole by the commission of a felony in this state, becomes a fugitive from justice within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2 and the Act of Congress enacted pursuant thereto, 18 U.S.C. § 662, and subject to extradition by the state where the person was convicted, although that person has committed no crime in that state subsequent to parole. Beavers v. Lowry, 186 Ga. 557, 198 S.E. 692 (1938).

A paroled convict who violates the terms of parole may be extradited from one state to another on the ground that the person is a convict whose term has not expired, and therefore is charged with crime under the provision of United States Constitution relating to interstate extradition. Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 30 S.E.2d 48 (1944); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427 (1953); Soviero v. State, 220 Ga. 119, 137 S.E.2d 471 (1964); Frazier v. Grimes, 221 Ga. 375, 145 S.E.2d 39 (1965).

Parole violator committing another felony is fugitive from justice.

- If a person who has been convicted of a felony or other crime in another state, and released on parole by the authorities of that state with permission to go into another state, violates the terms of his parole by the commission of another felony, or a federal offense amounting to a felony, that person becomes a fugitive from justice within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2. Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427 (1953).

Convicted felon involuntarily brought into state from convicting jurisdiction to serve sentence fugitive from justice.

- Petitioner, brought into Georgia after conviction in the state of Massachusetts for the purpose of serving the sentence imposed by the federal court, and consequently not coming into Georgia from Massachusetts voluntarily, was nevertheless a fugitive from justice. Scheinfain v. Aldredge, 191 Ga. 479, 12 S.E.2d 868 (1940).

Violator of conditional pardon still charged with crime.

- A person who is out on a conditional pardon which has been revoked, is nevertheless still a person who is charged with crime within the meaning of U.S. Const., art. IV, sec. II, cl. 2. Deering v. Mount, 194 Ga. 833, 22 S.E.2d 828 (1942).

Felon serving only part of sentence subject to later extradition.

- Where an individual who had been convicted and sentenced for the offense of embezzlement in the state of Louisiana was taken into custody by federal authorities and convicted and sentenced for a federal offense, was then returned to the authorities of Louisiana, and after serving a part of the sentence imposed upon the individual by the court of that state, was reprieved to the United States authorities to permit the individual to serve a federal sentence and after said sentence was served, was then arrested on a warrant issued by the Governor of Georgia on a requisition from the Governor of Louisiana, in order that the individual might be extradited and required to serve out an incomplete sentence in that state, in the circumstances the individual was a fugitive from the justice of Louisiana within the purview of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and was subject to extradition to that state. King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461, 26 S.E.2d 419 (1943).

Extradition not violative of right to fair trial.

- One accused of crime has a right to a full and fair trial according to the law of the government whose sovereignty he is alleged to have offended, but he has no more than that. He should not be permitted to use the machinery of one sovereignty to obstruct his trial in the courts of the other, unless the necessary operation of such machinery prevents his having a fair trial, and he may not complain if one sovereignty waives its strict right to exclusive custody of him for vindication of its laws in order that the other may also subject him to conviction of crime against it. House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745 (1958).

On facts, conditional pardon violator subject to extradition.

- Petitioner, who was granted a conditional pardon on 10-year sentence imposed in Florida, provided that the petitioner leave the state of Florida immediately, and thereafter remain outside the state and lead a sober, peaceable, and law-abiding life, and was later arrested and tried in the federal courts and sentenced to serve ten years, was a fugitive from justice subject to extradition to Florida, when that state revoked the conditional pardon and placed a detainer with the federal authorities. House v. Grimes, 214 Ga. 572, 105 S.E.2d 745 (1958).

Precedence of extradition warrant over bill of exceptions in habeas corpus.

- The filing of a bill of exceptions to the decision of the judge in the hearing of a habeas corpus case, if the petitioner is being detained under an extradition warrant, does not operate as a supersedeas, and, pending the decision on appeal, the petitioner must remain in the condition in which the petitioner is placed by the judgment; in such a case there is no provision in the law of this state for bail. Hames v. Sturdivant, 181 Ga. 472, 182 S.E. 601 (1935).

Laws of demanding state control as to sufficiency of indictment.

- The question as to whether or not the alleged fugitive from the justice of another state is charged with a crime is one of law, and is always open upon the face of the papers to judicial inquiry, but if the indictment which forms the basis of the extradition proceedings substantially charges a crime in conformity to the laws of the demanding state, the prisoner should not be released, however defective such indictment might be either at common law or under the well-known rules of criminal procedure. Scheinfain v. Aldredge, 191 Ga. 479, 12 S.E.2d 868 (1940).

When requisition papers make a case under the Constitution, the Governor without more should honor demand and issue the warrant for extradition. Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 26 S.E.2d 453 (1943).

Evidence insufficient to show petitioner not person named in extradition proceeding.

- In habeas corpus proceedings against sheriff who was holding petitioner in custody under warrant of Governor, evidence that at a hearing held by a secretary of the Governor proof was offered showing that the petitioner was not the person named in the extradition proceeding, afforded no ground for discharging the petitioner from custody; and there being no evidence on the habeas corpus trial showing that the petitioner was not in fact the person described in the extradition proceeding, and there being an identity of names, it was not error to remand the petitioner to the custody of the sheriff. Hart v. Mount, 196 Ga. 452, 26 S.E.2d 453 (1943).

Authority of state to postpone service of remainder of term pending service of federal sentence.

- After convict had served a part of the sentence imposed by the court of Louisiana, the authorities of the state could waive immediate service of the remainder and postpone such service until after service of a federal sentence, and in so doing they did not waive or release jurisdiction of Louisiana to demand the extradition of such convict. King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461, 26 S.E.2d 419 (1943).

Burden on petitioner to show insufficiency of executive extradition warrant.

- If, in the trial of a habeas corpus case, it appears that the respondent holds the petitioner in custody under an executive warrant based upon an extradition proceeding and the warrant is regular on its face, the burden is cast upon the petitioner to show some valid and sufficient reason why the warrant should not be executed. The presumption is that the Governor has complied with the Constitution and the law, and this presumption continues until the contrary appears. King v. Mount, 196 Ga. 461, 26 S.E.2d 419 (1943); Ellis v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 51, 30 S.E.2d 921 (1944); Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427 (1953); McFarlin v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 794, 76 S.E.2d 1 (1953); Baldwin v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 390, 116 S.E.2d 207 (1960).

Refusal to discharge alleged parole violator not error.

- Refusal on the hearing of a writ of habeas corpus to discharge applicant, held under an extradition warrant as a fugitive from justice for allegedly violating parole, was not error. Broyles v. Mount, 197 Ga. 659, 30 S.E.2d 48 (1944).

Question of law as to substantiality of crime charged against person goes to indictment.

- In cases involving extradition, it is a question of law open to judicial inquiry on habeas corpus as to whether the person demanded is substantially charged with a crime against the laws of the demanding state; but this rule applies to the sufficiency of the indictment or affidavit as a pleading, and not to extraneous evidence as to actual guilt. Ellis v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 51, 30 S.E.2d 921 (1944).

Courts of asylum state cannot, upon writ of habeas corpus, inquire into guilt or innocence of accused. Ellis v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 51, 30 S.E.2d 921 (1944).

Evidence insufficient to show applicant not in state at time of offense.

- Although in a habeas proceeding the applicant, being held under an executive warrant based on an extradition proceeding, could urge, as a ground for release, that as a matter of fact the applicant was not within the state in question at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, the evidence authorized, even if it did not demand, the finding against the applicant upon such issue. Ellis v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 51, 30 S.E.2d 921 (1944).

Question of law as to sufficiency of indictment or affidavit charging crime.

- Whether or not alleged fugitive from the justice of another state is charged with a crime, is a question of law, which is always open upon the face of the papers to judicial inquiry; but as to this question, the law requires only that the crime be substantially charged in an indictment found or in an affidavit made before a magistrate, as a matter of pleading. Ellis v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 51, 30 S.E.2d 921 (1944).

Closer scrutiny of sufficiency of charge of crime by affidavit rather than indictment.

- Although in passing upon the legal question as to whether a crime against the laws of the demanding state is sufficiently charged, there may be need for closer scrutiny if the requisition is based upon an affidavit instead of an indictment, yet if the charge as pleaded is in law sufficient for the purpose of extradition, the same presumptions and incidents will follow, upon grant by the Governor of the extradition, as if the demand had been based upon an indictment. Ellis v. Grimes, 198 Ga. 51, 30 S.E.2d 921 (1944).

Courts of asylum state cannot, upon writ of habeas corpus, inquire into guilt or innocence of accused. No such jurisdiction is given them by law, and it would be a manifestly unwise provision if authority to investigate such a question was conferred on a tribunal that had no power to compel the attendance of witnesses who resided in another state, and whose testimony would be necessary to throw light on the issue. Mathews v. Foster, 209 Ga. 699, 75 S.E.2d 427 (1953).

Petitioner illegally restrained if extradition warrant not based on valid requisition.

- In habeas corpus proceedings, although the evidence offered by the petitioner could not be held, as a matter of law, to be sufficient to overcome the presumption that the Governor had complied with the Constitution and the laws, because the respondent tendered in evidence, over proper objections of the petitioner, the requisition of the Governor of the state of South Carolina without a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3182 the respondent in effect contradicted the prima facie showing made by the warrant alone and thus showed that the petitioner was being illegally restrained, in that the warrant was not based on a valid requisition, and the trial court erred in remanding the petitioner to the respondent. McFarlin v. Shirley, 209 Ga. 794, 76 S.E.2d 1 (1953).

Probation violator subject to extradition without proof of commission of additional crime.

- A probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited from one state to another on the ground that the probationer is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is charged with crime within the meaning of the United States Constitution; there is no constitutional requirement that a fugitive be shown to have committed an additional crime while a fugitive; a showing of the probationer's status as a fugitive is sufficient to support extradition proceedings. Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 256 S.E.2d 778 (1979).

Extradition proceedings are of summary nature only.

- Once a habeas corpus court has found the extradition papers to be legally sufficient, a further inquiry into a petitioner's statutory and constitutional defenses violates the clear intention that an extradition proceeding be of a summary nature. Defenses that the statute of limitations has run on the offense for which the petitioner is being extradited, that the petitioner has been denied a speedy trial, and all other due process questions are issues to be properly decided by courts in the demanding state, not by courts in any asylum state. Hutson v. Stoner, 244 Ga. 52, 257 S.E.2d 539, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 455, 62 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1979).

Lack of presence in demanding state at time of commission of alleged crime is no longer a defense that is cognizable in an extradition proceeding. Once the Governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (1) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (2) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (3) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (4) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. Hutson v. Stoner, 244 Ga. 52, 257 S.E.2d 539, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 455, 62 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1979).

ALR.

- Constitutionality of discrimination as regards degree of penalty or punishment for violation of Sunday law, 8 A.L.R. 566.

Permitting prisoner under sentence in federal court to be taken for trial before state court, 22 A.L.R. 886; 62 A.L.R. 279.

One charged with desertion or failure to support wife or child as fugitive from justice, subject to extradition, 32 A.L.R. 1167; 54 A.L.R. 281.

Validity of license statute or ordinance which discriminates against nonresidents, 61 A.L.R. 337; 112 A.L.R. 63.

Extradition of escaped or paroled convict, or one at liberty on bail, 78 A.L.R. 419.

Sufficiency of recitals in rendition warrant in extradition as regards copy of indictment or affidavit, 89 A.L.R. 595.

Constitutionality, construction, and application of statute authorizing extradition of one who commits an act within the state or a third state resulting in a crime in the demanding state, 151 A.L.R. 239.

Validity of municipal ordinance imposing income tax or license upon nonresident in taxing jurisdiction (commuter tax), 48 A.L.R.3d 343.

Necessity that demanding state show probable cause to arrest fugitive in extradition proceedings, 90 A.L.R.3d 1085.

Modern status of rule relating to jurisdiction of state court to try criminal defendant brought within jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake, 25 A.L.R.4th 157.

Court-authorized permanent or temporary removal of child by parent to foreign country, 30 A.L.R.4th 548.

"Guilty but mentally ill" statutes: validity and construction, 71 A.L.R.4th 702.

Right of extraditee to bail after issuance of governor's warrant and pending final disposition of habeas corpus claim. 13 A.L.R.5th 118.

State statutes or ordinances requiring persons previously convicted of crime to register with authorities, 36 A.L.R.5th 161.

Jurisdiction of federal court to try criminal defendant who alleges that he was brought within United States jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake, 28 A.L.R. Fed. 685.