§480-24 Limitation of actions. Any
action to enforce a cause of action arising under this chapter shall be barred
unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues, except as
otherwise provided in section 480-22. For the purpose of this section, a cause
of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the
period of the violation. [L 1961, c 190, §22; Supp, §205A-22; HRS §480-24; am L
1989, c 230, §2; am L 2016, c 7, §2]
Case Notes
Relation back of counterclaim to date of complaint. 473 F.
Supp. 1296.
Plaintiffs may recover for §480-2 violations which occurred
prior to four-year statute of limitations if they can prove fraudulent
concealment; series of fly-drive arrangements constituted alleged continuing
violation; section did not bar claims for fly-drives occurring less than four
years prior to filing of action. 491 F. Supp. 1199.
If State proved a continuing violation, it would be entitled
to seek provable damages for the entire period of the continuing violation;
this could include damages that might have occurred prior to the four years
before suit was filed, if the continuing violation occurred during that
period. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1180.
Plaintiff's claim under §480-2 failed, where the statute of
limitations barred any unlawful business practice claim that occurred prior to
the four-year limitation period and although the additional alleged occurrences
would not be time-barred, plaintiff's asserted damages flowing from the
violation were unrecoverable because they were speculative. 522 F. Supp. 2d
1272.
Fraudulent concealment may toll this section's statute of
limitations. 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (2011).
The court found it inappropriate to decide the date of
accrual and the statute of limitations issue, as it was unclear from the
speculative allegations in the amended complaint which specific acts, other
than those addressed by the court's order, plaintiffs claimed to be unfair or
deceptive acts or practices. 1 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2014).
Court found that plaintiffs', timeshare owners, alleged
injuries arose from the implementation of defendants', timeshare resort
operators, points-based program in 2010, which was allegedly a discrete act and
not a continuing pattern and course of conduct. Therefore, court concluded
that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply and that portions of plaintiffs'
claims arising from their ability to use their floating interests in a
weeks-based program were time-barred because plaintiffs filed their Complaint
more than four years after the implementation of the points-based program. 165
F. Supp. 3d 955 (2016).
Plaintiffs, timeshare owners, argued that because neither
Chapter 481A nor Chapter 514E had a specific statute of limitations, the
six-year limitations period in §657-1 applied in their action against
defendants, timeshare resort operators. However, the court found that the
nature of plaintiffs' claim was a Chapter 480 unfair deceptive acts and
practices claim and, therefore, the four-year limitation period of this section
applied. 165 F. Supp. 3d 955 (2016).
An unfair or deceptive acts or practices claim accrues four
years from the date of the occurrence of the violation, as opposed to plaintiff's
discovery of the violation. 250 F. Supp. 3d 658 (2017).
Pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, plaintiff
could toll the statute of limitations for a claim against defendants, a lender
and loan servicer, under the state's unfair or deceptive acts or practices law,
where it was undisputed that plaintiff was on active duty status in the United
States Army during the specified time. 250 F. Supp. 3d 658 (2017).
Where plaintiff, a servicemember, alleged that defendants, a
lender and loan servicer, sought to conceal a non-judicial foreclosure
proceeding against plaintiff, the court found that plaintiff failed to allege
facts that would justify tolling the statute of limitations under this section
on grounds of fraudulent concealment. Defendants' failure to notify plaintiff
of the non-judicial foreclosure of plaintiff's property did not constitute an
affirmative action of concealment, considering: (1) prior loan servicer sent a
letter to plaintiff's last known address stating that plaintiff was in default
and that mortgage on property would be foreclosed if it did not receive payment
from plaintiff within sixty-five days; and (2) defendants published a notice of
the pending foreclosure. 250 F. Supp. 3d 658 (2017).
In an action to invalidate a mortgage that was the subject of
a pending foreclosure action, despite constructive and actual notice,
plaintiffs-mortgagors failed to bring their unfair and deceptive trade
practices (UDAP) claim based upon the recording of a "forged"
assignment of mortgage within the four-year limitations period. Further,
plaintiffs-mortgagors did not provide plausible allegations suggesting that
equitable tolling may apply to the UDAP claim based upon fraudulent
concealment. 329 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (2018).
Discussed: 792 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (2011); 907 F. Supp.
2d 1165 (2012).
Notes of Decisions
State v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.., 526 P.3d 395 (Haw. 2023).
· cites it 14× “(3) Any cause of action arising under this chapter accrues against any person, there is a criminal action pending which arises out of the same occurrence, the time during which the criminal action is pending shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited 43 *** FOR…”
Rundgren v. Bank of New York Mellon, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Haw. 2011).
· cites it 25× “*1230 The parties do not cite, and the court could not find, any cases specifically addressing whether the equitable principle of fraudulent concealment applies to HRS § 480-24. The court is not limited, however, to Hawaii cases interpreting § 480-24 — instead, the court looks…”
Lowther v. U.S. Bank N.A., 971 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D. Haw. 2013).
· cites it 15× ““real issues” in the instant case, which Plaintiff argues are: (1) if a false or deceptive or unfair act occurs as part of an overall plan to acquire the plaintiffs property, when does the claim accrue? (2) Given that actual injury is an element of a [UDAP *997 claim], can the…”
Flynn v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 955 (D. Haw. 2016).
· cites it 9× “Thus, this Court concluded that, “[i]n light of the four-year limitations period under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24 (a), [Lowther’s UDAP claim] is time-barred unless the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a finding of a ‘continuing violation,’ or some reason that the…”
Heejoon Chung v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 250 F. Supp. 3d 658 (D. Haw. 2017).
· cites it 4× “1 Under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24 , “Any action to enforce a cause of action arising under [Chapter 480] shall be time barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues .”
Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Haw. 1980).
· cites it 7× “Haw.Rev.Stat. § 480-24 reads: *1228 Any action to enforce a cause of action arising under this chapter shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues For the purpose of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to…”
Anzai v. Chevron Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D. Haw. 2001).
· cites it 28× “For the purposes of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the period of the violation, (emphasis added) At times, the Court in this order will refer to the emphasized phrase as “the key language.”
McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (D. Haw. 2007).
· cites it 6× “For the purpose of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the period of the violation.”
Kapunakea Partners v. Equilon Enter. LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Haw. 2009).
· cites it 4× “In addition, with respect to Count I, the applicable statute of limitations for an unfair competition claim is set forth in HRS § 480-24, which provides that: “Any action to enforce a cause of action arising under [HRS ch.”
Swartz v. City Mortg., Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 916 (D. Haw. 2012).
· cites it 5× “Count XI — UDAP The Moving Defendants argue that any alleged UDAP violations associated with the origination of Plaintiffs’ loan are time-barred because Haw.Rev.Stat. § 480-24 sets forth a four-year statute of limitations period.”
Amina v. WMC Fin. Co., 329 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (D. Haw. 2018).
· cites it 2× “See HRS § 480-24 ("any action to enforce a cause of action arising under this chapter shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues").”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24(a) — 17 cases
State v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.., 526 P.3d 395 (Haw. 2023).
“(3) Any cause of action arising under this chapter accrues against any person, there is a criminal action pending which arises out of the same occurrence, the time during which the criminal action is pending shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited 43 *** FOR…”
Lowther v. U.S. Bank N.A., 971 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D. Haw. 2013).
““real issues” in the instant case, which Plaintiff argues are: (1) if a false or deceptive or unfair act occurs as part of an overall plan to acquire the plaintiffs property, when does the claim accrue? (2) Given that actual injury is an element of a [UDAP *997 claim], can the…”
Anzai v. Chevron Corp., 168 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (D. Haw. 2001).
“For the purposes of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the period of the violation, (emphasis added) At times, the Court in this order will refer to the emphasized phrase as “the key language.”
Flynn v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 955 (D. Haw. 2016).
“Thus, this Court concluded that, “[i]n light of the four-year limitations period under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24 (a), [Lowther’s UDAP claim] is time-barred unless the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a finding of a ‘continuing violation,’ or some reason that the…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24(b) — 6 cases
State v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.., 526 P.3d 395 (Haw. 2023).
“(3) Any cause of action arising under this chapter accrues against any person, there is a criminal action pending which arises out of the same occurrence, the time during which the criminal action is pending shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited 43 *** FOR…”
Rundgren v. Bank of New York Mellon, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1224 (D. Haw. 2011).
“*1230 The parties do not cite, and the court could not find, any cases specifically addressing whether the equitable principle of fraudulent concealment applies to HRS § 480-24. The court is not limited, however, to Hawaii cases interpreting § 480-24 — instead, the court looks…”
Kapunakea Partners v. Equilon Enter. LLC, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (D. Haw. 2009).
“In addition, with respect to Count I, the applicable statute of limitations for an unfair competition claim is set forth in HRS § 480-24, which provides that: “Any action to enforce a cause of action arising under [HRS ch.”
Flynn v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 955 (D. Haw. 2016).
“Thus, this Court concluded that, “[i]n light of the four-year limitations period under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24 (a), [Lowther’s UDAP claim] is time-barred unless the Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a finding of a ‘continuing violation,’ or some reason that the…”
— Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-24(b)(2) — 1 case
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