§806-31 Indirect allegations. No
indictment or bill of particulars is invalid or insufficient for the reason
merely that it alleges indirectly and by inference instead of directly any
matters, facts, or circumstances connected with or constituting the offense,
provided that the nature and cause of the accusation can be understood by a
person of common understanding. [L 1915, c 215, pt of §2; RL 1925, §4044; RL
1935, §5503; RL 1945, §10805; RL 1955, §258-15; HRS §711-31; ren L 1972, c 9,
pt of §1]
Case Notes
Allegation that accused gave bribe to officer with intent to
influence officer in discharge of duty, alleges by inference that accused had
knowledge of official character of officer and is sufficient. 23 H. 616, 618
(1917); 25 H. 747 (1921).
Leading, conducting, driving a person to place where
prostitution is being carried on. 37 H. 586 (1947).
Nature and cause of accusation could not be understood by
person of common understanding from a reading of the complaint itself, where
generic term "felony" did not, indirectly or by inference, inform
defendant that underlying felony was terroristic threatening in first degree.
78 H. 66, 890 P.2d 303 (1995).
Cited: 23 H. 476 (1916), 484, explained 49 H. 160, 185, 413
P.2d 221 (1966); 23 H. 546 (1916), 549.
Referred to: 43 H. 54 (1958), 58.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
7
cases, 1982–2012 · leading case:
State v. Walker, 273 P.3d 1161 (Haw. 2012).
State v. Walker, 273 P.3d 1161 (Haw. 2012).
· cites it 8× “Therefore, the ICA majority determined that the terms “habitual” and “habitual operator” do not qualify as terms that may be used in a criminal charge under their commonly understood definitions 18 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** as allowed…”
State v. Wheeler, 219 P.3d 1170 (Haw. 2009).
· cites it 2× “”); see also HRS § 806-31 (1993) (providing that in cases charged by indictment, “[n]o indictment .”
State v. Israel, 890 P.2d 303 (Haw. 1995).
· cites it 4× “Nonetheless, relying on HRS § 806-31 (1985), the State argues that Count IWs general allegations sufficiently stated the offense.”
State v. Moore, 921 P.2d 122 (Haw. 1996).
· cites it 2× “HRS § 806-31 (1993). Although the language of the complaint, which, as previously noted, tracked virtually verbatim the language of the statute, is eoncededly awkward, it does set forth with reasonable clarity all of the elements of the offense.”
State v. Walker, 284 P.3d 905 (Haw. App. 2011).
· cites it 8× “3d at 1182 , the court relied in part on HRS § 806-31 which requires that the accusation be comprehensible to a person of “common understanding” Indirect allegations.”
State v. Corder, 220 P.3d 1032 (Haw. 2009).
· cites it 2× “Three counts of violating the EOP were listed in the Complaint, with each of the counts identically worded, except for the specific dates on which the violations occurred.”
State v. Tuua, 649 P.2d 1180 (Haw. App. 1982).
“§806-31 [HRS] Indirect allegations. No indictment or bill of particulars is invalid or insufficient for the reason merely that it alleges indirectly and by inference instead of directly any matters, facts, or circumstances connected with or constituting the offense, provided…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.