ILCS » Chapter 70 · Act 3605
Illinois Compiled Statutes

70 ILCS 3605/41 (2026)

No civil action shall be commenced in any court against the Authority by any person for any injury to his person unless it is commenced within one year from the date the cause of action accrued

✓ current as of May 2026
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(70 ILCS 3605/41) (from Ch. 111 2/3, par. 341)
    Sec. 41. No civil action shall be commenced in any court against the Authority by any person for any injury to his person unless it is commenced within one year from the date the cause of action accrued.
    The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly apply to causes of action that accrue on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly.
(Source: P.A. 96-12, eff. 6-1-09.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 44 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1993–2023 · leading case: Joseph v. Chicago Transit Auth., 715 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
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Joseph v. Chicago Transit Auth., 715 N.E.2d 733 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 14× “The CTA moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619(9) (West 1996)) arguing that the plaintiff failed to plead and could not prove compliance with the six-month notice requirements of section 41…”
Puszkarska v. Chicago Transit Auth., 748 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 9× “Defendant CTA filed a motion to dismiss under section 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619 (West 1998)), contending that plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (70 ILCS 3605/41…”
Niziolek v. Chicago Transit Auth., 620 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). · cites it 7× “341 (now 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1992))). On appeal, plaintiff contends: (1) that he “substantially complied” with the notice requirement through his communications and correspondence with a CTA claims representative and, therefore, satisfied section 41; (2) that the claims…”
Fields v. Chicago Transit Auth., 745 N.E.2d 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 9× “The trial court dismissed plaintiffs cause of action pursuant to section 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619 (West 1998)) finding plaintiff had failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act…”
Cedeno v. Gumbiner, 806 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 3× “70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998) (section 41).”
Cione v. Chicago Transit Auth., 748 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). · cites it 5× “On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing his complaint based on its determination that his statutory notice pursuant to section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (Transit Act) (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998)) was insufficient.”
Curtis v. Chicago Transit Auth., 793 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 5× “The CTA ultimately moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)), arguing that plaintiff's notice under section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (the Transit Act) (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 2000))…”
Wheatley v. Chicago Transit Auth., 682 N.E.2d 418 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 5× “70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1994). Plaintiff claims on appeal that because his injuries occurred while he was doing construction work, his limitations period was governed by section 13 — 214 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code), which provides a four-year window for bringing claims…”
Huang v. Brenson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123231 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). · cites it 2× “at 171 (citing 70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1998)). This notice requirement was later eliminated.”
Tosado v. Miller, 720 N.E.2d 1075 (Ill. 1999). · cites it 2× “2d 418 (1997), the appellate court found section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1994)) to be more specific than section 8-101 of the Tort Immunity Act because the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act is only applicable to personal injury claims…”
High v. Chicago Transit Auth., 803 N.E.2d 1058 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 5× “JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff Shedrina High appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing her personal injury action against defendant Chicago Transit Authority pursuant to section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (the Act) (70…”
Yokley v. Chicago Transit Auth., 717 N.E.2d 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 3× “The circuit court granted the CTA’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiff’s action for failure to comply with the notice requirements of section 41 of the Metropolitan Transit Authority Act (70 ILCS 3605/41 (West 1996)). On appeal plaintiff argues that his…”
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