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Illinois Compiled Statutes

720 ILCS 5/12-7.3 (2026)

Stalking

✓ current as of May 2026
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(720 ILCS 5/12-7.3) (from Ch. 38, par. 12-7.3)
    Sec. 12-7.3. Stalking.
    (a) A person commits stalking when he or she knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to:
        (1) fear for his or her safety or the safety of a
    
third person; or
        (2) suffer other emotional distress.
    (a-3) A person commits stalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, on at least 2 separate occasions follows another person or places the person under surveillance or any combination thereof and:
        (1) at any time transmits a threat of immediate or
    
future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint and the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person; or
        (2) places that person in reasonable apprehension of
    
immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint to or of that person or a family member of that person.
    (a-5) A person commits stalking when he or she has previously been convicted of stalking another person and knowingly and without lawful justification on one occasion:
        (1) follows that same person or places that same
    
person under surveillance; and
        (2) transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily
    
harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint to that person or a family member of that person.
    (a-7) A person commits stalking when he or she knowingly makes threats that are a part of a course of conduct and is aware of the threatening nature of his or her speech.
    (b) Sentence. Stalking is a Class 4 felony; a second or subsequent conviction is a Class 3 felony.
    (c) Definitions. For purposes of this Section:
        (1) "Course of conduct" means 2 or more acts,
    
including but not limited to acts in which a defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other non-consensual contact, or interferes with or damages a person's property or pet. A course of conduct may include contact via electronic communications.
        (2) "Electronic communication" means any transfer of
    
signs, signals, writings, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. "Electronic communication" includes transmissions by a computer through the Internet to another computer.
        (3) "Emotional distress" means significant mental
    
suffering, anxiety or alarm.
        (4) "Family member" means a parent, grandparent,
    
brother, sister, or child, whether by whole blood, half-blood, or adoption and includes a step-grandparent, step-parent, step-brother, step-sister or step-child. "Family member" also means any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior 6 months, regularly resided in the household.
        (5) "Follows another person" means (i) to move in
    
relative proximity to a person as that person moves from place to place or (ii) to remain in relative proximity to a person who is stationary or whose movements are confined to a small area. "Follows another person" does not include a following within the residence of the defendant.
        (6) "Non-consensual contact" means any contact with
    
the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim's consent, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim.
        (7) "Places a person under surveillance" means: (1)
    
remaining present outside the person's school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant; or (2) placing an electronic tracking device on the person or the person's property.
        (8) "Reasonable person" means a person in the
    
victim's situation.
        (9) "Transmits a threat" means a verbal or written
    
threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or written statements or conduct.
    (d) Exemptions.
        (1) This Section does not apply to any individual or
    
organization (i) monitoring or attentive to compliance with public or worker safety laws, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements, or (ii) picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute, including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.
        (2) This Section does not apply to an exercise of the
    
right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful.
        (3) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile
    
service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.
    (d-5) The incarceration of a person in a penal institution who commits the course of conduct or transmits a threat is not a bar to prosecution under this Section.
    (d-10) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party to violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.
(Source: P.A. 102-547, eff. 1-1-22.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 74 cases (29 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017).
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People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). · cites it 15× “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Ashley, 2020 IL 123989 (Ill. 2020). · cites it 8× “720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3) (West 2010). Section (a-5) also included bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint in defining a subsequent offense of stalking based on similar conduct.”
People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953 (Ill. 1995). · cites it 7× “(720 ILCS 5/12-7.3, 12-7.4 (West 1992).) In cause No.”
People v. Morocho, 2019 IL App (1st) 153232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). · cites it 10× “1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem.”
People v. Taylor, 2019 IL App (1st) 160173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 4× “We see no reason not to follow our reasoning in Sucic because the cyberstalking statute and subsection (a) of the stalking statute both create offenses from a defendant’s course of conduct that he or she knows or should know would cause a reasonable person emotional distress…”
People v. Carpenter, 888 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. 2008). · cites it 2× “en he or she transmits to another person a threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable apprehension of death, bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint, and in furtherance of the threat knowingly does any one or more of the following acts on at least 2…”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 6× “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012). Like subsection (a)(2), criminality under subsection (a)(1) turns entirely on whether the defendant “knows or should know” how a “reasonable person” would react to the defendant’s conduct, without regard to the defendant’s subjective…”
People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). · cites it 4× “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a), (a-3) (West 2010). ¶ 22 The stalking counts stemmed from two alleged incidents between defendant and Jayma on July 19, 2011, and August 23, 2010.”
People v. Strawbridge, 935 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 2× “See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3 (West 2000). The stalking statute defines placing a person under surveillance as "(1) remaining present outside the person's school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant.”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 6× “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (2) (West 2012).”
People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 2× “3(a), (b) (West 2010)) (count IV); (3) stalking where on at least two occasions he followed or placed Stephenson under surveillance and transmitted a threat of bodily harm, Class 4 felonies (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3), (b) (West 2010)) (counts V and VI); (4) aggravated stalking…”
People v. Daniel, 670 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). · cites it 6× “) 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1),(a)(2) (West 1994).”
Show all 74 citing cases →
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a) — 21 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Ashley, 2020 IL 123989 (Ill. 2020). “720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3) (West 2010). Section (a-5) also included bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint in defining a subsequent offense of stalking based on similar conduct.”
People v. Taylor, 2019 IL App (1st) 160173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “We see no reason not to follow our reasoning in Sucic because the cyberstalking statute and subsection (a) of the stalking statute both create offenses from a defendant’s course of conduct that he or she knows or should know would cause a reasonable person emotional distress…”
People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a), (a-3) (West 2010). ¶ 22 The stalking counts stemmed from two alleged incidents between defendant and Jayma on July 19, 2011, and August 23, 2010.”
People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “3(a), (b) (West 2010)) (count IV); (3) stalking where on at least two occasions he followed or placed Stephenson under surveillance and transmitted a threat of bodily harm, Class 4 felonies (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3), (b) (West 2010)) (counts V and VI); (4) aggravated stalking…”
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) — 30 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Ashley, 2020 IL 123989 (Ill. 2020). “720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3) (West 2010). Section (a-5) also included bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint in defining a subsequent offense of stalking based on similar conduct.”
People v. Morocho, 2019 IL App (1st) 153232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem.”
People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a), (a-3) (West 2010). ¶ 22 The stalking counts stemmed from two alleged incidents between defendant and Jayma on July 19, 2011, and August 23, 2010.”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (2) (West 2012).”
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2) — 30 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Ashley, 2020 IL 123989 (Ill. 2020). “720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3) (West 2010). Section (a-5) also included bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint in defining a subsequent offense of stalking based on similar conduct.”
People v. Morocho, 2019 IL App (1st) 153232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem.”
People v. Taylor, 2019 IL App (1st) 160173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “We see no reason not to follow our reasoning in Sucic because the cyberstalking statute and subsection (a) of the stalking statute both create offenses from a defendant’s course of conduct that he or she knows or should know would cause a reasonable person emotional distress…”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012). Like subsection (a)(2), criminality under subsection (a)(1) turns entirely on whether the defendant “knows or should know” how a “reasonable person” would react to the defendant’s conduct, without regard to the defendant’s subjective…”
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(l) — 1 case
Curtis v. Montgomery, 552 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2009).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(b) — 2 cases
People v. Morocho, 2019 IL App (1st) 153232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem.”
People v. Rosado, 2026 IL App (1st) 240115-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c) — 2 cases
People v. McGee, 2015 IL App (1st) 122000 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
People v. McGee, 2015 IL App (1st) 122000 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(1) — 11 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Morocho, 2019 IL App (1st) 153232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem.”
People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (5th) 120155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a), (a-3) (West 2010). ¶ 22 The stalking counts stemmed from two alleged incidents between defendant and Jayma on July 19, 2011, and August 23, 2010.”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012). Like subsection (a)(2), criminality under subsection (a)(1) turns entirely on whether the defendant “knows or should know” how a “reasonable person” would react to the defendant’s conduct, without regard to the defendant’s subjective…”
People v. Gauger, 2018 IL App (2d) 150488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(2) — 1 case
People v. Lincoln, 2022 IL App (4th) 210698-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(3) — 8 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Ashley, 2020 IL 123989 (Ill. 2020). “720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a-3) (West 2010). Section (a-5) also included bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint in defining a subsequent offense of stalking based on similar conduct.”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012). Like subsection (a)(2), criminality under subsection (a)(1) turns entirely on whether the defendant “knows or should know” how a “reasonable person” would react to the defendant’s conduct, without regard to the defendant’s subjective…”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (2) (West 2012).”
People v. Ashley, 2020 IL 123989 (Ill. 2021).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(5) — 1 case
People v. Newbolds, 2020 IL App (1st) 172688-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(6) — 5 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Gauger, 2018 IL App (2d) 150488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
People v. Gauger, 2018 IL App (2d) 150488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2018).
People v. Lincoln, 2022 IL App (4th) 210698-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(7) — 2 cases
People v. Maillet, 2019 IL App (2d) 161114 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
People v. Newbolds, 2020 IL App (1st) 172688-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(8) — 4 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1) (West 2012). Like subsection (a)(2), criminality under subsection (a)(1) turns entirely on whether the defendant “knows or should know” how a “reasonable person” would react to the defendant’s conduct, without regard to the defendant’s subjective…”
People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “” 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (2) (West 2012).”
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2018).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(c)(9) — 1 case
People v. Newbolds, 2020 IL App (1st) 172688-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(d) — 5 cases
People v. Daniel, 670 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “) 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1),(a)(2) (West 1994).”
People v. Strawbridge, 935 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3 (West 2000). The stalking statute defines placing a person under surveillance as "(1) remaining present outside the person's school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant.”
People v. Sucic (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
Pokorny v. DeBolt, 2022 IL App (2d) 210511-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
People v. Curtis (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
— 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(d)(2) — 3 cases
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017). “The new language significantly broadened the types of conduct proscribed under the statute and eliminated the requirement of a threat from subsection (a).”
People v. Morocho, 2019 IL App (1st) 153232 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3); 96th Ill. Gen. Assem.”
People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2018).
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