Illinois Compiled Statutes
720 ILCS 5/16-25 (2026)
Retail theft
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
IL-ILGAilga.gov
JustiaChapter on Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
(720 ILCS 5/16-25)
Sec. 16-25. Retail theft. (a) A person commits retail theft when he or she knowingly:
(1) Takes possession of, carries away, transfers or | causes to be carried away or transferred any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the full retail value of such merchandise; or |
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price | tag, marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid in determining value affixed to any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment and attempts to purchase such merchandise at less than the full retail value with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of such merchandise; or |
(3) Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored | or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from the container in or on which such merchandise is displayed to any other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of such merchandise; or |
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the | merchant of the full retail value of the merchandise; or |
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a | retail mercantile establishment without the consent of the merchant given at the time of such removal with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such cart; or |
(6) Represents to a merchant that he, she, or another | is the lawful owner of property, knowing that such representation is false, and conveys or attempts to convey that property to a merchant who is the owner of the property in exchange for money, merchandise credit or other property of the merchant; or |
(7) Uses or possesses any theft detection shielding | device or theft detection device remover with the intention of using such device to deprive the merchant permanently of the possession, use or benefit of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment without paying the full retail value of such merchandise; or |
(8) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over | property of the owner and thereby intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property when a lessee of the personal property of another fails to return it to the owner, or if the lessee fails to pay the full retail value of such property to the lessor in satisfaction of any contractual provision requiring such, within 10 days after written demand from the owner for its return. A notice in writing, given after the expiration of the leasing agreement, by registered mail, to the lessee at the address given by the lessee and shown on the leasing agreement shall constitute proper demand. |
(b) Theft by emergency exit. A person commits theft by emergency exit when he or she commits a retail theft as defined in subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(8) of this Section and to facilitate the theft he or she leaves the retail mercantile establishment by use of a designated emergency exit. (c) Permissive inference. If any person:
(1) conceals upon his or her person or among his or | her belongings unpurchased merchandise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment; and |
(2) removes that merchandise beyond the last known | station for receiving payments for that merchandise in that retail mercantile establishment, |
then the trier of fact may infer that the person possessed, carried
away or transferred such merchandise with the intention of retaining it
or with the intention of depriving the merchant permanently of the
possession, use or benefit of such merchandise without paying the full
retail value of such merchandise. To "conceal" merchandise means that, although there may be some notice of its presence, that merchandise is not visible through ordinary observation. (d) Venue. Multiple thefts committed by the same person as part of a continuing course of conduct in different jurisdictions that have been aggregated in one jurisdiction may be prosecuted in any jurisdiction in which one or more of the thefts occurred. (e) For the purposes of this Section, "theft detection shielding device" means any laminated or coated bag or device designed and intended to shield merchandise from detection by an electronic or magnetic theft alarm sensor. (f) Sentence. (1) A violation of any of subdivisions (a)(1) through | (a)(6) and (a)(8) of this Section, the full retail value of which does not exceed $300 for property other than motor fuel or $150 for motor fuel, is a Class A misdemeanor. A violation of subdivision (a)(7) of this Section is a Class A misdemeanor for a first offense and a Class 4 felony for a second or subsequent offense. Theft by emergency exit of property, the full retail value of which does not exceed $300, is a Class 4 felony. |
(2) A person who has been convicted of retail theft | of property under any of subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(6) and (a)(8) of this Section, the full retail value of which does not exceed $300 for property other than motor fuel or $150 for motor fuel, and who has been previously convicted of any type of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools, home invasion, unlawful use of a credit card, or forgery is guilty of a Class 4 felony. A person who has been convicted of theft by emergency exit of property, the full retail value of which does not exceed $300, and who has been previously convicted of any type of theft, robbery, armed robbery, burglary, residential burglary, possession of burglary tools, home invasion, unlawful use of a credit card, or forgery is guilty of a Class 3 felony. |
(3) Any retail theft of property under any of | subdivisions (a)(1) through (a)(6) and (a)(8) of this Section, the full retail value of which exceeds $300 for property other than motor fuel or $150 for motor fuel in a single transaction, or in separate transactions committed by the same person as part of a continuing course of conduct from one or more mercantile establishments over a period of one year, is a Class 3 felony. Theft by emergency exit of property, the full retail value of which exceeds $300 in a single transaction, or in separate transactions committed by the same person as part of a continuing course of conduct from one or more mercantile establishments over a period of one year, is a Class 2 felony. When a charge of retail theft of property or theft by emergency exit of property, the full value of which exceeds $300, is brought, the value of the property involved is an element of the offense to be resolved by the trier of fact as either exceeding or not exceeding $300. |
(Source: P.A. 97-597, eff. 1-1-12.) Notes of Decisions
Cited in 62
cases (27 in the last 5 years), 2014–2026 · leading case: People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674 (Ill. 2016).
People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674 (Ill. 2016). “720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2012); 79th Ill. Gen.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2021). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). It also applies to a person who “[u]nder-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of the merchandise.”
People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150352 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “The Limited Authority Doctrine ¶ 22 The limited authority doctrine, relied upon by the State, took shape before Illinois passed its retail theft statute in 1975 ( 720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2014) ). In People v.”
People v. McGee, 2020 IL App (2d) 180998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “McGee, was found guilty of retail theft of property worth less than $300 (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2016)) and was sentenced to an extended-term sentence of four years’ imprisonment.”
Jerry Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2014). “He preferred to pay the cost of a bail bond ($150, which was 10 percent of the amount of bail required for him to be released, because his arrest had been for a Class A misdemeanor; see 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(l), (f)(1); Ill. Sup.”
People v. Neal, 2020 IL App (2d) 170356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “OPINION ¶1 At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court of Kane County found the defendant, David Neal, guilty of two counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014)) and two counts of burglary (id.”
People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150352 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “The Limited Authority Doctrine ¶ 22 The limited authority doctrine, relied upon by the State, took shape before Illinois passed its retail theft statute in 1975 (720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2014)). In People v.”
People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “OPINION ¶1 On September 12, 2013, a jury found the defendant, Bernard Thomas, guilty of one count of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2010)). The sole issue raised in this appeal is the constitutional validity of the trial court’s statement to the jury–in response to a…”
People v. Jenkins, 2020 IL App (1st) 172422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “Jenkins was charged with two counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2016)), which alleged he knowingly took eyeglasses from retail establishment VisionWorks without paying full price for the eyeglasses, one of which was valued in excess of $300 and the other not in…”
People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (2d) 190951 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). “OPINION ¶1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Johnny Taylor, was convicted of four counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014)) and one count of burglary (id.”
People v. Wade, 2016 IL App (3d) 150417 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “¶2 FACTS ¶3 Defendant pled guilty to retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2012)). The court sentenced defendant to a term of 5½ years’ imprisonment.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a) — 4 cases
People v. Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
People v. Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
People v. Holt, 2019 IL App (3d) 160504 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
People v. Crayton, 2021 IL App (1st) 191051-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) — 48 cases
People v. McGee, 2020 IL App (2d) 180998 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “McGee, was found guilty of retail theft of property worth less than $300 (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2016)) and was sentenced to an extended-term sentence of four years’ imprisonment.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
People v. Neal, 2020 IL App (2d) 170356 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “OPINION ¶1 At the conclusion of a bench trial, the circuit court of Kane County found the defendant, David Neal, guilty of two counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014)) and two counts of burglary (id.”
People v. Jenkins, 2020 IL App (1st) 172422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “Jenkins was charged with two counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2016)), which alleged he knowingly took eyeglasses from retail establishment VisionWorks without paying full price for the eyeglasses, one of which was valued in excess of $300 and the other not in…”
People v. Taylor, 2022 IL App (2d) 190951 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). “OPINION ¶1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Johnny Taylor, was convicted of four counts of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014)) and one count of burglary (id.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(2) — 1 case
People v. Perkins, 2021 IL App (1st) 200421-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(3) — 1 case
People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (3d) 150352 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “The Limited Authority Doctrine ¶ 22 The limited authority doctrine, relied upon by the State, took shape before Illinois passed its retail theft statute in 1975 ( 720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2014) ). In People v.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(6) — 3 cases
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2021). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). It also applies to a person who “[u]nder-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of the merchandise.”
People v. Glover, 2020 IL App (1st) 181985-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(7) — 2 cases
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2021). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). It also applies to a person who “[u]nder-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of the merchandise.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(8) — 1 case
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(l) — 1 case
Jerry Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2014). “He preferred to pay the cost of a bail bond ($150, which was 10 percent of the amount of bail required for him to be released, because his arrest had been for a Class A misdemeanor; see 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(l), (f)(1); Ill. Sup.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(b) — 2 cases
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2021). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). It also applies to a person who “[u]nder-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of the merchandise.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f) — 1 case
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f)(1) — 6 cases
People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674 (Ill. 2016). “720 ILCS 5/16-25 (West 2012); 79th Ill. Gen.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2019). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). There is no justifiable basis for penalizing a shoplifter as a burglar.”
People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 (Ill. 2021). “See 720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2014). It also applies to a person who “[u]nder-rings with the intention of depriving the merchant of the full retail value of the merchandise.”
People v. Bagby, 2026 IL App (1st) 252636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
People v. Bagby, 2026 IL App (1st) 252636-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f)(2) — 1 case
People v. Greenwood, 2020 IL App (4th) 180528-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/16-25(f)(3) — 2 cases
People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). “OPINION ¶1 On September 12, 2013, a jury found the defendant, Bernard Thomas, guilty of one count of retail theft (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1) (West 2010)). The sole issue raised in this appeal is the constitutional validity of the trial court’s statement to the jury–in response to a…”
People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.
|