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People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 123318 Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. Court: DARREN JOHNSON, Appellee. Docket No. 123318 Filed August 1, 2019 Rehearing denied September 23, 2019 Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County, the Hon. John Hauptman, Judge, presiding. Judgment Appellate court judgment reversed. Circuit court judgment affirmed. Cause remanded with directions. Counsel on Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Appeal Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eric M. Levin, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People. James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defender, and Gilbert C. Lenz, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellee. Justices JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Kilbride, Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Theis dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Neville. Justices Theis and Neville dissented upon denial of rehearing, without opinion. OPINION ¶1 Following a November 2014 jury trial in the Whiteside County circuit court, the defendant, Darren Johnson, was convicted of burglary and sentenced to eight years in prison. The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction on appeal. As a matter of law, it held that the facts did not support the conviction because defendant entered the premises of the store where the alleged crime occurred during business hours and therefore his entry was not “without authority” within the meaning of the burglary statute. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to that court for consideration of the remaining issues that were not reached. ¶2 BACKGROUND ¶3 Defendant was charged by information with one count of burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2014)) and one count of retail theft (id. § 16-25(a)(1)). The burglary count alleged that on July 22, 2014, defendant, “without authority, knowingly entered a building of Wal-Mart, located at 1901 1st Avenue, Rock Falls, Whiteside County, Illinois, with the intent to commit therein a theft.” The retail theft count alleged that defendant stole from Walmart various items of merchandise with a total value of less than $300. ¶4 The evidence presented at trial, including eyewitness testimony and video surveillance footage, showed that defendant and an accomplice entered the Walmart’s vestibule area, placed two backpacks on top of a coin-exchange machine, and then entered the store. Inside, a customer observed the two men walking around with what looked like clothes in their hands and “veer[ing] off” when approached. Eventually, the two men returned to the vestibule area separately, each retrieving one of the backpacks from the top of the coin-exchange machine. They then met near some vending machines outside the building. The customer, who was by this time in the parking lot, saw defendant keeping a lookout as the other man removed items from his shirt and pants and stuffed them into one of the backpacks. ¶5 As the customer called the police, defendant and the other man returned to the vestibule, again placed their backpacks on top of the coin-exchange machine, and then reentered the store. Defendant later returned to the vestibule area alone, retrieved one of the backpacks from the coin-exchange machine, and exited the store. By this time, three police officers had arrived. Two of the officers observed defendant exit the store after retrieving the backpack, and they followed him on foot. The third officer pulled his car alongside defendant and got out to talk to him. The officer asked defendant if he had stolen items from Walmart, and defendant

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admitted that he had. The officers then escorted defendant to the store manager’s office, where defendant removed from his backpack or person 14 purchasable items of girl’s clothing with a total retail value of $76.91. Defendant stated that he had taken the items to give to his daughter. ¶6 The trial judge instructed the jury on the elements of burglary and retail theft. Those instructions included an explanation that a person “commits the offense of burglary when he, without authority, knowingly enters a building with the intent to commit therein the offense of theft.” The jury was also given Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No. 14.07A (4th ed. 2000), which states as follows with respect to the limited authority a person has to enter a building: “The defendant’s entry into a building is ‘without authority’ if, at the time of entry, the defendant has an intent to commit a criminal act within the building regardless of whether the defendant was initially invited in or received consent to enter. However, the defendant’s entry into the building is ‘with authority’ if the defendant enters without criminal intent and was initially invited in or received consent to enter, regardless of what the defendant does after he enters.” The instruction is consistent with this court’s holding in People v. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d 434 (1968), which set forth the limited authority a person has to enter a business building or other building open to the public. In Weaver, this court held, in the context of a charge brought under the same version of the burglary statute at issue in the present case, that “authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open.” Id. at 439. The court further stated that “[a]n entry with intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be within the authority granted patrons.” Id. ¶7 The jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of burglary and not guilty of retail theft. At sentencing, it was determined that burglary is generally a Class 2 felony with a sentencing range of 3 to 7 years (720 ILCS 5/19-1(b) (West 2014); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2014)), but defendant was subject to a Class X sentencing range of 6 to 30 years due to his criminal history (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b) (West 2014); id. § 5-4.5-25(a)). Defendant’s lengthy criminal history included three separate convictions for robbery in 1987, burglary in 1992, separate theft and burglary convictions in 1994, resisting a peace officer in 1998, residential burglary in 1999, possession of cannabis in 2006, a conviction in 2007 for altering a lottery ticket for which he was sentenced to five years in prison in Iowa, convictions for assault and resisting a peace officer in 2009, and another resisting a peace officer conviction in 2012. The prosecutor noted that by his calculations defendant had been sentenced to 36 years in prison in all since 1987, yet he was only 44 years old at the time of sentencing in the present case. The prosecutor argued that defendant had never led a law-abiding life and that he continually commits offenses when he is released from the Department of Corrections. The State therefore recommended a 15-year, extended-term sentence. The trial court considered defendant’s lengthy criminal history and the conduct involved in the instant offense, including its nonviolent nature, and sentenced defendant to eight years in prison. ¶8 On appeal, defendant raised four issues. First, he argued that the evidence presented on the “without authority” element of the burglary count was insufficient to convict. Second, he maintained that the evidence was also insufficient to convict with respect to the element of burglary that requires that the defendant intend to commit a theft or a felony upon entry. Third,

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defendant sought a new trial because the trial judge prohibited jurors from taking notes during trial, contrary to section 115-4(n) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115- 4(n) (West 2014)). And finally, defendant sought to reduce the amounts assessed against him as part of his sentence from $557 to $490, contending that the trial court failed to grant the mandatory $5 per day credit against three of his assessments. ¶9 The appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction outright based on the first issue noted above and found it unnecessary to reach the remaining issues as a result, although in dicta, it briefly addressed the fourth issue regarding jury note taking. 2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶¶ 38- 41. With respect to its reversal based on the first issue, the appellate court refused to apply the “limited authority” doctrine of Weaver to the facts of this case because it felt that (1) Weaver was distinguishable on the facts (id. ¶ 23), (2) the passage of the retail theft statute seven years after Weaver evinced a legislative intent to “occup[y] the field of shoplifting crimes” (id. ¶ 31), and (3) this court’s decision in People v. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶¶ 24-25 (holding that there are two kinds of burglary—(a) entering a building without authority and (b) remaining in a building without authority—and Weaver’s definition of “without authority” for purposes of burglary by entering did not apply to burglary by remaining), “changes the law and effectively overrules” application of Weaver to the facts of the present case (2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶ 28). ¶ 10 As noted above, we granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS ¶ 12 Before this court, the State argues that Weaver cannot be distinguished from the present case and that Bradford clearly did not overrule application of Weaver to cases where the burglary charge is based on an entry into a store with the intent to commit a retail theft inside. Moreover, the State maintains that there is absolutely no basis for the appellate court’s conclusion that by passage of the retail theft statute seven years after Weaver, the legislature somehow intended to change the long-standing application of the limited authority doctrine in burglary cases where a defendant entered a store with the intent to shoplift some item of merchandise. ¶ 13 Defendant in response argues that he never exceeded the scope of his physical authority to be in the store given that he entered during normal business hours and at all times stayed in areas open to the public. He further contends that the Weaver rule is inconsistent with the retail theft statute and that Bradford should be extended to exonerate him in the present situation. He contends that the State therefore failed to prove the “without authority” element of the burglary statute. ¶ 14 The parties agree that the question presented is one of statutory construction, which involves an issue of law that is subject to de novo review by this court. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 15. The primary objective in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best indication of that intent is the statutory language itself, giving it its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Giraud, 2012 IL 113116, ¶ 6. When the legislature chooses not to amend a statute following judicial construction, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court’s construction of the statute and the declaration of legislative intent. People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 27.

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¶ 15 Section 19-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides, in part, as follows: “A person commits burglary when without authority he or she knowingly enters or without authority remains within a building, *** or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft.” 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2014). As this court explained in Bradford, the burglary statute provides for two possible ways to commit the crime of burglary: (1) by entering without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft or (2) by remaining without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 13. ¶ 16 In the present case, defendant was charged with and convicted of the first type of burglary—burglary by unauthorized entry. For over 100 years, Illinois case law has recognized that entering a retail store with the intent to commit a theft amounts to the crime of burglary. See People v. Kelley, 274 Ill. 556, 558 (1916) (reversing the conviction for burglary only because there was no evidence that the defendant intended to commit the theft at the time he entered the store); see also People v. Brown, 397 Ill. 529, 530 (1947) (defendant’s burglary conviction upheld where he entered the building of a gasoline filling station open 24 hours to the public with the intent to steal); see also People v. Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶¶ 18, 30 (noting that for over a century the rule in Illinois has been that entering a retail store with intent to commit a theft constitutes burglary). ¶ 17 In Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 439, this court definitively interpreted the portion of the current burglary statute criminalizing burglary by entering. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 21. There, the defendant was convicted of burglary after police observed him standing near a vending machine in a laundromat open to the public and found in his possession $50 worth of coins and keys that could open the vending machine. This court rejected the defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he entered the laundromat without authority where it was open to the public at the time in question and he therefore could have entered as a business invitee. Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 438-39. This court held that the “authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open.” Id. at 439. And “[a]n entry with intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be within the authority granted patrons of a laundromat.” Id. Although the defendant testified that he had entered the laundromat because his companion wanted to use the telephone, other evidence—including the fact that there was an available telephone outside, that neither defendant nor his companion had laundry, and that they were in possession of keys that opened the laundromat’s vending machine—sufficed to establish that the defendant entered the laundromat with the intent to steal and thus entered “without authority.” Id. ¶ 18 In the case at bar, the appellate court found that the limited authority doctrine set forth in Weaver did not apply because the defendant in Weaver “used burglary tools to access nonpublic areas” and, according to the appellate court, this fact “distinguish[ed]” Weaver from the case before it. 2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶ 23. We find that the appellate court’s attempt to distinguish Weaver demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of Weaver’s holding. Weaver’s holding that the evidence supported a burglary conviction did not rest on the defendant’s use of keys to access the vending machine but rather on his possession of the keys, which (in addition to other circumstantial evidence) established that he had “entered [the building] with an intent to commit a theft.” Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 439. And that intent, Weaver held, vitiated any authority that he otherwise had to enter the open business, because “authority to enter a business building, or other building open to the public, extends only to those who

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enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open” and not to those who enter with the intent to commit a theft inside. Id. ¶ 19 The same principle applies here. Just as the evidence in Weaver established that the defendant entered the laundromat with the intent to commit a theft, the evidence here—which showed that defendant and an accomplice placed two backpacks on a coin-exchange machine in the Walmart vestibule, entered the store proper, and a short time later returned to retrieve the backpacks in order to stuff merchandise into them—was arguably sufficient to prove that defendant entered the store with the intent to commit a theft. ^[1] And, if it is in fact the case that defendant had the intent to commit a theft when he entered the Walmart, then, under Weaver, it must necessarily follow that his entry was “without authority” within the meaning of section 19-1(a) of the burglary statute. ¶ 20 In the 50-plus years since Weaver was decided, numerous Illinois decisions have applied Weaver’s holding to cases of burglary involving the unauthorized entry of a retail establishment. Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 19 (collecting cases); see also People v. Burlington, 2018 IL App (4th) 150642, ¶ 21 (citing People v. Gharrett, 2016 IL App (4th) 140315, ¶ 53, as collecting cases that have applied Weaver’s holding). The instant appellate court decision acknowledged this long line of appellate court case law that follows Weaver and holds that one who enters a retail store with the intent to commit a theft enters “without authority.” The appellate court concluded, however, that this court’s decision in Bradford amounted to a change in the law and “effectively overrules” application of Weaver when the situation involves a person who enters a shop intending to commit retail theft. 2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶ 28. ¶ 21 We find that the appellate court has misread Bradford. Nothing in Bradford prevents application of Weaver’s holding to the type of burglary that involves unauthorized entry, even if that entry is with the intent to commit a retail theft. The question before this court in Bradford was whether the analysis of Weaver should be extended to cover the second type of burglary, burglary by remaining. Bradford did not question Weaver’s holding with respect to burglary by unauthorized entry. Instead, it cited it with approval, without the least bit of suggestion that it would not apply to burglary by unauthorized entry based on the intent to commit a retail theft. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶¶ 21-23. ¶ 22 In Bradford, the defendant was charged with and convicted of burglary for remaining in an open retail store without authority and with the intent to commit a theft. The appellate court in that case agreed with the State that Weaver’s definition of without authority, for purposes of burglary by entering, extended to burglary by remaining. Id. ¶ 24. Citing Weaver, the appellate court held that “ ‘just as a defendant’s entry is “without authority” if it is accompanied by a contemporaneous intent to steal, so too must a defendant’s remaining be “without authority” if it also is accompanied by an intent to steal.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Id. (quoting People v. Bradford, 2014 IL App (4th) 130288, ¶ 28). The appellate court never identified the

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precise moment that the defendant began to unlawfully remain in the store. Id. ¶ 9. On appeal to this court, the defendant in Bradford argued that he never exceeded the scope of his authority to be in the store and that burglary by remaining was never intended to apply to such a situation, which amounted to no more than ordinary shoplifting. The State in turn relied upon the holding of the appellate court and argued that the burglary statute could also apply where a defendant entered the store lawfully (as opposed to unlawfully where he had formed the intent to steal upon entry), then subsequently formed the intent to commit a theft, but then remained in the store longer than necessary to steal the items. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. ¶ 23 This court in Bradford rejected the State’s approach and agreed that the defendant’s interpretation was the only reasonable reading of the statute. Id. ¶ 25. This court rejected the State’s rendering because it “[was] unworkable, [had] the potential to lead to absurdity, and [was] inconsistent with both the retail theft statute and the historical development of the burglary statute.” Id. ¶ 24 We find that none of the concerns expressed in Bradford apply to burglary involving an unauthorized entry based on the intent to commit retail theft. First, Bradford concluded it would be “unworkable” to apply the limited authority doctrine in situations in which a defendant enters an open store with no intent to commit a theft (thus entering with authority) but subsequently develops the intent to commit a theft while in the store. Id. ¶¶ 25-26. Bradford explained that, in such cases, “it is not clear what evidence would be sufficient to establish that a defendant ‘remain[ed]’ within a public place in order to commit a theft” and thereby transform his authorized entry into an unauthorized remaining. Id. ¶ 26. As the court noted, there is simply no way to define “what a defendant must do, or what duration of time he must spend in a place, to remain there without authority.” Id. ¶ 25 By contrast, the question of whether a person entered a store with intent to commit a theft presents no such difficulties. Unlike the amorphous concept of an “act of remaining” (id. ¶ 9), an entry is a discrete event in time. Assessing a person’s intent at the time of entry is a task that is well within a trier of fact’s competency, even if intent must often be proven by circumstantial evidence. People v. Richardson, 104 Ill. 2d 8, 13 (1984); compare Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 439 (concluding that circumstantial evidence established that the defendant entered an open business with the intent to commit a theft), People v. Rudd, 2012 IL App (5th) 100528, ¶¶ 14-16 (circumstantial evidence proved that the defendant and another man had a carefully orchestrated plan to commit retail theft from Walmart and were thus properly convicted of burglary by unauthorized entry), and People v. Smith, 264 Ill. App. 3d 82, 87-88 (1994) (circumstantial evidence of possession of items used to facilitate offense proved the defendant’s intent at the time he entered retail store), with People v. Durham, 252 Ill. App. 3d 88, 92-93 (1993) (concluding that evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant intended to commit theft when entering store). ¶ 26 Bradford also relied upon the related concern that applying the limited authority doctrine, as the appellate court had done, to hold that a person remains without authority as he moves through the store to steal merchandise, would produce absurd results by “arbitrarily distinguish[ing] between a defendant who shoplifts one item in a store and leaves immediately afterward and a defendant who shoplifts more than one item or lingers inside a store before leaving.” Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 26. But applying the limited authority doctrine in cases of burglary based on unauthorized entry does not create any similar arbitrary distinctions.

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Rather, the only relevant distinction that must be made in such cases is between a person who enters with intent to commit a theft and one who does not. See Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 439 (“A criminal intent formulated after a lawful entry will not satisfy the statute.”). Clearly, this distinction is not an arbitrary one, as it would be rational for the legislature to determine that one who enters a store with a preconceived plan to steal merchandise is more culpable than one who, once inside a store, impulsively takes merchandise. See Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 24. ¶ 27 Bradford’s refusal to apply the limited authority doctrine to remaining cases also rested on the recognition that one who innocently enters a store and later commits a theft inside necessarily formed the intent to steal while in the store. To hold a defendant guilty of burglary in such cases would convert nearly all retail theft into burglary, effectively negating the retail theft statute, Bradford reasoned. ¶ 28 In contrast, application of the limited authority doctrine to persons who enter with intent to commit a theft presents no such concerns. The mere fact that a person commits a theft after entering a store will not establish that he intended to commit a theft upon entry. Rather, there would have to be some other evidence—even if circumstantial—supporting a finding that the defendant entered the premises with the required intent. Smith, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 87; compare id. at 87-88 (finding evidence sufficient to support element of entry with intent to commit a theft where the defendant entered clothing store with plastic bag used to hide stolen coat and police found in his car the wire cutters used to remove coat from rack), with Durham, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 92 (reversing burglary conviction of the defendant who stole men’s suit where he carried nothing into store that would indicate an intent to commit a theft and his conduct was that of a normal shopper browsing items). Thus, there is no reason to think that applying the limited authority doctrine to charges of burglary based on unauthorized entry on account of an intent to commit retail theft will transform all (or even a substantial number of) retail thefts into burglaries. ¶ 29 As part of its unfounded concern that allowing an unauthorized-entry burglary conviction when retail theft is involved would effectively negate the retail theft statute, the appellate court surmised that “it is a miniscule percentage of shoplifters who form the intent to steal only after entering the store.” 2018 IL App (3d) 150352, ¶ 33. The appellate court cited no authority for its speculative conclusion. At any rate, the appellate court’s conclusion misses the point because unauthorized-entry burglary requires the concurrent intent to commit a theft or felony. Moore, 2018 IL App (2d) 160277, ¶ 27. Given the difficulty of proving a defendant’s intent at the moment he or she enters a store, it is more probable that the vast majority of suspects will have to be charged only with retail theft because the State has insufficient evidence of intent at entry. Id. We agree with Moore and find that the instant appellate court decision erroneously speculated that the retail theft statute would be rendered a nullity if the long-standing Weaver rule continued to apply. ¶ 30 Bradford’s final reason for refusing to extend the limited authority doctrine to burglary by remaining was that it would be “at odds with the historical development of the burglary statute.” Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 29. Bradford traced the current burglary statute’s “remains within” language to a pre-1961 statutory provision that made it unlawful to be “ ‘found in any building *** with intent to commit *** [a] larceny or other felony.’ ” Id. (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 38, ¶ 86). That provision, this court noted, necessarily implied

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that the building or area where the defendant was found or discovered was closed to the public. Id. ¶ 30. Because the current burglary statute was intended to codify the existing law of burglary, Bradford concluded that the statute’s “remains within” language, like its “ ‘burglar found in building’ ” predecessor, must be limited to those who are “found or discovered in a place where they are not authorized to be.” Id. ¶ 31 The history of the unauthorized-entry portion of the statute does not support a similar conclusion. This court has construed the term “building” in the pre-1961 version of the burglary statute to include any “ ‘structure or edifice, such as a *** shop or the like, designed for *** the shelter of property.’ ” (Emphasis added.) People v. Blair, 52 Ill. 2d 371, 374 (1972) (quoting People v. Gillespie, 344 Ill. 290, 294 (1931)). That definition remains valid today, as the present burglary statute is a codification of the preexisting law in Illinois. Id. Thus, a retail store or shop is clearly a “building” within the meaning of the burglary statute. Moreover, prior to 1961, the burglary statute made it unlawful to “willfully and maliciously, without force **** enter[ ] into any *** building, with intent to commit *** [a] felony or larceny.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 38, ¶ 84. It was of no consequence under the statute whether the entry was with or without authority; the relevant concern instead was whether the evidence showed the requisite intent to commit the theft at the time of the defendant’s entry. See People v. Schneller, 69 Ill. App. 2d 50, 53 (1966). ¶ 32 At any rate, as noted above, Weaver construed the current burglary statute over 50 years ago (and 7 years after it was enacted) as granting a patron of a building open to the public only limited authority to enter the establishment for a “purpose consistent with the reason the building is open.” Weaver, 41 Ill. 2d at 439. And “[a]n entry with intent to commit a theft cannot be said to be within the authority granted patrons.” Id. The appellate court has consistently, and quite correctly, applied this holding to open retail shops. And while the General Assembly has amended the burglary statute a number of times in the half-century since Weaver was decided, it has never acted to reverse Weaver and its progeny’s interpretation of the statute. When the legislature does not address by way of amendment a judicial construction of a statute by this court, it is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in that interpretation (People v. Espinoza, 2015 IL 118218, ¶ 27), and such a construction becomes as much a part of the statute as if plainly written into it (People v. Williams, 235 Ill. 2d 286, 293-94 (2009)). ¶ 33 Finally, we note that defendant makes a broad and vague argument that the legislature did not intend for the limited authority doctrine to apply to an unauthorized-entry burglary involving retail stores following the enactment of the retail theft statute. Defendant asserts that the legislature intended for acts of shoplifting to be prosecuted and punished under the retail theft statute rather than the burglary statute. ¶ 34 While it is true that the legislature intended acts of retail theft to be prosecuted under the retail theft statute, defendant’s argument misses the point. His alleged act of shoplifting was prosecuted under the retail theft statute. He was convicted of burglary, by contrast, for his distinct act of entering a store with the intent to shoplift. The two crimes contain different elements and address distinct harms. Burglary requires an intent to commit a theft upon entry and is complete upon the moment of entry whether or not any theft actually occurs, whereas retail theft requires that the defendant take possession of merchandise with the intent of permanently depriving the merchant of the item without paying full retail value (see People v. Caplinger, 162 Ill. App. 3d 74 (1987)). Defendant’s argument also rests on the mistaken

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premise that the harm caused by shoplifting and the harm caused by entering a store with the intent to shoplift are measured in the same way—by the value of the items a person steals or intends to steal. But, as noted above, a person who enters a store with the intent to steal is at least arguably more culpable than a person who steals after entering innocently. Although defendant may disagree with the assessment of the relative culpability posed by his conduct or the risk presented by it, it is the legislature’s role to declare and define conduct constituting a crime and to determine the nature and extent of the punishment for it. People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319 (1985). ¶ 35 As noted, the limited authority doctrine underlying defendant’s conviction for burglary was well settled by the time the retail theft statute was enacted, and nothing in the retail theft statute indicates a legislative intent to abrogate the doctrine with respect to burglaries motivated by the desire to shoplift. See People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199 (2005) (because the legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of previous judicial decisions, a newly enacted statute will generally not be construed to change settled law unless its terms clearly require such a construction). Aside from there being nothing in the text of the retail theft statute to indicate that it intended to eliminate unauthorized-entry burglary in cases where a defendant enters with an intent to shoplift, we note that we have scoured the legislative history and debate surrounding the enactment of the retail theft statute and can find nothing that would support defendant’s argument. We have only found that the retail theft statute was enacted for the purpose of combating the growing problem of retail theft in Illinois. Bradford, 2016 IL 118674, ¶ 27. And the legislative debate suggests that the idea behind the law was to give greater tools to merchants and law enforcement to fight the problem, not to help the retail thief. ¶ 36 The dissent states that its review of the legislative debates and history leads to the “opposite conclusion.” Infra ¶ 53. The dissent bases its conclusion, however, on an incomplete reconstruction of the legislative debate. First, it quotes in very limited part a few phrases of some comments of Senator Harris, one of the sponsors who introduced the bill. Senator Harris actually said the following about the bill just before it was voted on and eventually became the retail theft act in 1975: “It is the work product of over a year of evaluation and study to react to the very serious problem of retail theft. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has calculated that the retail loss from retail theft in Illinois is some eight hundred million dollars a year. To the extent that we can pinpoint a more effective response to discourage this kind of loss on a continuing basis, we will achieve a result definitely in the public interest. This bill is supported by the Illinois State’s Attorney Association ***.” 79th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 7, 1975, at 97 (statements of Senator Harris). Obviously this is the exact opposite of the dissent’s conclusion that the legislature intended to override the Weaver holding. It is doubtful that the bill would have been supported by the state’s attorneys of Illinois if that had been the case, nor would the sponsor of the bill have touted the prosecutors’ support of the bill if the intent had been to take away a tool available to prosecutors to fight crime. This is borne out by further comments of Senator Harris when he stated as follows: “I think now we do have a truly effective means to respond to the very serious question of retail theft in Illinois particularly. I think appropriate safeguards are in the bill to

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provide for those persons that might be found to be offenders under the provisions of this new Retail Theft Act. I think the traditional American and Illinois system of jurisprudence is properly maintained here, but a more effective tool will be available to the State’s Attorneys if this becomes law.” Id. at 97-98. ¶ 37 The dissent quotes the short phrase from the above quote from Senator Harris about “ ‘safeguards’ ” in the law to “ ‘provide for *** offenders.’ ” Infra ¶ 54. But the senator was not speaking of anything close to what the dissent implies. The senator was most certainly not speaking about limiting the charges that might be brought against an offender or about abrogating the Weaver rule in cases of burglary committed upon entry “without authority” to an open retail establishment. The “safeguards” the senator was referring to were the normal safeguards a defendant is provided in any criminal case; a quick examination of the act reveals that there are no other kinds of safeguards in the statute. Instead, the senator was simply responding to criticism by those opposed to the bill that it was too tough—for example, because it, among other things, (1) created a presumption of a guilty intent when a person conceals on his person or in his belongings unpurchased merchandise and then proceeds to carry them beyond the last known station for payment, (2) allowed detention by the merchant of a retail theft suspect, (3) created civil liability for the retail thief, as well as his parents or legal guardian if the thief was a minor, and (4) made a subsequent offense, regardless of whether the retail value of the merchandise was less than $150, a Class 4 felony even though the current theft statute at that time did not make a subsequent offense a felony. ¶ 38 Representative Sangmeister, whom the dissent quotes only in very limited fashion, confirms that the purpose of the legislation was to protect the victims of crime: “The purpose of the act has been to combat the growing [amount of] retail theft and I think everyone on the Floor of this House knows that shoplifting has always been a problem here and the rest of the United States and this is Illinois’ effort to do something about it. Shoplifting and employee theft in the State of Illinois now exceeds $3,000,000 per day and is a problem, frankly, that we have to face. Illinois has only had a theft act and not a retail theft act. Because this problem has been recognized it was a bipartisan[ ] [effort] put together between Senator Harris and Senator Partee and really is their Bill. This Bill has received a good working over in both judiciary houses, in the Senate and the House. Both of which had it in a subcommittee. The contents of the Bill without going into a lot of detail on it is, of course, it spells out and defines a crime. It establishes certain presumptions and it provides for detention in certain circumstances by the shopkeeper. It inserts civil liability which is under the Parental Responsibility Law. And the penalty is the same as it was under the theft statute for a first offense under a $150 Class A misdemeanor; a second offense a Class 4 penalty. I really think it is high time that Illinois passes such legislation. I’m sure you’ve heard from a lot of your retailers in your district concerning it. It is a good Bill.” 79th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 11, 1975, at 113 (statements of Representative Sangmeister). ¶ 39 Consistent with the legislative debate we have quoted above, the General Assembly placed a legislative declaration at the beginning of the retail theft act. This legislative declaration states that “[i]t is the public policy of this State that the substantial burden placed upon the economy of this State resulting from the rising incidence of retail theft is a matter of grave concern to

- 11 - the people of this State who have a right to be protected in their health, safety and welfare from the effects of this crime.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, ¶ 16A-1. ¶ 40 Despite the overwhelming evidence noted above that the intent of the act was to combat the growing problem of retail theft—not to help the retail thief by abrogating the Weaver rule— the dissent essentially concludes that nothing in the legislative history regarding the retail theft statute suggests that the legislature meant for the burglary statute to be used as an alternative means of prosecuting shoplifters. See infra ¶ 59. We disagree with the dissent’s conclusion on many levels. ¶ 41 First of all, in this case, as in all cases of burglary based on unauthorized entry, the burglary statute is not being used as an alternative means of prosecuting shoplifters. Here, the crime of burglary was complete upon entry to the building, provided it can be established that defendant had the requisite intent to commit a felony or a theft at entry. As noted above, burglary has different elements than theft and is not dependent on an actual theft. ¶ 42 Second, the observation that there is nothing in the retail theft debate about burglary completely reverses the correct legal inquiry that should be undertaken by this court. When the legislature acts to pass a statute, such as the retail theft statute, it is presumed to act with full knowledge of all existing and prior statutory and case law. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 70; Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 218 (1983). The fact that the legislative debate does not mention the Weaver rule or burglary is unremarkable if we assume, as we must, that the General Assembly already knew the law and meant no change to it with respect to other statutes and their interpretation by the courts. As noted above, this court’s judicial construction in 1968 in Weaver of the “without authority” language of the burglary statute had become as much a part of that statute as if it was written into it by the time of the 1975 enactment of the retail theft statute. Thus, if the legislature meant to change the law by the enactment of the retail theft statute, so that the burglary statute would no longer apply when the business open to the public was part of a special subset of businesses that sells retail merchandise, then it would have been incumbent upon the legislature to make an amendment to the already existing law. Repeal by implication is not favored. Lily Lake Road Defenders v. County of McHenry, 156 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1993). And if the legislature meant to change the existing law, it had to indicate a clear intent to do so. And even if there was an alleged conflict between the burglary statute and the retail theft statute, which there is not, given the differing elements, this court would simply be required to construe both statutes so as to give both effect. Id. ¶ 43 We also note that the legislature that enacted the retail theft statute did not also amend the burglary statute to exclude shop-lifting motivated entries into open retail stores. And we further note that the legislature did not amend the burglary statute by carving out an exception for retail-theft motivated entries, even though it most certainly knew how to carve out such an exception if it had wanted to. ^[2] This indicates a legislative intent to enforce both the burglary statute as interpreted in Weaver and the more recently enacted retail theft statute in order to