Illinois Compiled Statutes
725 ILCS 207/35 (2026)
Trial
✓ current as of May 2026
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(725 ILCS 207/35)
Sec. 35.
Trial.
(a) A trial to determine whether the person who is the subject
of a petition under Section 15 of this Act is a sexually violent
person shall commence no later than 120 days after the date of the
probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act.
Delay is considered to be agreed to by the person unless he or she
objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for
trial on the record. Delay occasioned by the person temporarily suspends
for the time of the delay the period within which a person must be tried.
If the delay occurs within 21 days after the end of the period within which a
person
must be tried, the court may continue the cause on application of the State
for not more than an additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed.
The court
may grant a continuance of the trial date for good cause upon its
own motion, the motion of any party or the stipulation of the
parties, provided that any continuance granted shall be subject to Section
103-5 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963.
(b) At the trial on the petition it
shall be competent to introduce evidence of the commission by the respondent of
any number of crimes together with whatever punishments, if any, were imposed.
The petitioner may present expert
testimony from both the Illinois Department of Corrections evaluator and the
Department of Human Services psychologist.
(c) The person who is the subject of the petition, the person's
attorney, the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may request
that a trial under this Section be by a jury. A request for a
jury trial under this subsection shall be made within 10 days
after the probable cause hearing under Section 30 of this Act. If
no request is made, the trial shall be by the court. The person,
the person's attorney or the Attorney General or State's Attorney,
whichever is applicable, may withdraw his or her request for a
jury trial.
(d) (1) At a trial on a petition under this Act, the | petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt. |
(2) If the State alleges that the sexually violent | offense or act that forms the basis for the petition was an act that was sexually motivated as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of Section 5 of this Act, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged sexually violent act was sexually motivated. |
(e) Evidence that the person who is the subject of a petition
under Section 15 of this Act was convicted for or committed
sexually violent offenses before committing the offense or act on
which the petition is based is not sufficient to establish beyond
a reasonable doubt that the person has a mental disorder.
(f) If the court or jury determines that the person who is the
subject of a petition under Section 15 is a sexually violent
person, the court shall enter a judgment on that finding and shall
commit the person as provided under Section 40 of this Act. If
the court or jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
the person is a sexually violent person, the court shall dismiss
the petition and direct that the person be released unless he or
she is under some other lawful restriction.
(g) A judgment entered under subsection (f) of this Section on
the finding that the person who is the subject of a petition under
Section 15 is a sexually violent person is interlocutory to a
commitment order under Section 40 and is reviewable on appeal.
(Source: P.A. 91-875, eff. 6-30-00; 92-415, eff. 8-17-01.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 124
cases (21 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case: In Re Det. of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. 2000).
In Re Det. of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. 2000). “" 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 1998). The Act also mandates the use of criminal rules of evidence.”
In Re Det. of Powell, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (Ill. 2005). “” 725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2000). Section 103 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is known as the speedy-trial statute.”
In Re Det. of Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 2010). “725 ILCS 207/35(d)(l), (e) (West 2006). Although respondent recognizes that section 35 specifically applies only to SVP trials, he contends it should be provided at probable cause hearings as well as one of the many criminal procedure protections available in probable cause…”
People v. Rainey, 758 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). “Defendant’s Due Process Rights Defendant next argues that the State’s failure to properly serve him with summons deprived him of his right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and section 2 of article I of the Illinois…”
In re Commitment of Weekly, 2011 IL App (1st) 102276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2004). The State has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt, and mere evidence that the respondent committed a sexually violent offense prior to the sexually violent offense that is the basis for the petition is…”
In Re Det. of Welsh, 913 N.E.2d 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2004). The State’s first witness, Dr.”
People v. Tiney-Bey, 707 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). “Section 35(b) relates generally to the respondent’s rights at trial (725 ILCS 207/35 (West Supp. 1997)). The Commitment Act contains a specific provision granting a respondent the right to remain silent, which only applies in hearings under the Commitment Act.”
People v. Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “” 725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 1998). 8 In Samuelson, the respondent challenged section 35 on the basis that it denied him his right to waive a jury trial.”
People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072 (Ill. 2011). “725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 2000). The State must prove that the individual is a sexually violent person beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “Section 5(f) of the Act defines a "sexually violent person" as an individual who has "been convicted of a sexually violent offense * * * and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts…”
In Re Det. of Swope, 821 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. 2004). “See 725 ILCS 207/35, 40 (West 2000). The appellate court upheld the adjudication and commitment.”
In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750 (Ill. 2011). “See 725 ILCS 207/35(c) (West 2006). ¶ 120 Because Jonathon is not similarly situated to juveniles subject to EJJ prosecutions or adults facing felony sex offense charges, we need not consider whether there is a rational basis for granting jury trials to minors subject to EJJ…”
— 725 ILCS 207/35(1) — 2 cases
In Re Det. of Anders, 710 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
In re Det. of Dean, 786 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(a) — 21 cases
In Re Det. of Powell, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (Ill. 2005). “” 725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2000). Section 103 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is known as the speedy-trial statute.”
In re Det. of Melcher, 2013 IL App (1st) 123085 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
In re Commitment of Weekly, 2011 IL App (1st) 102276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2004). The State has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt, and mere evidence that the respondent committed a sexually violent offense prior to the sexually violent offense that is the basis for the petition is…”
People v. Steward, 940 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
People v. Tiney-Bey, 707 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). “Section 35(b) relates generally to the respondent’s rights at trial (725 ILCS 207/35 (West Supp. 1997)). The Commitment Act contains a specific provision granting a respondent the right to remain silent, which only applies in hearings under the Commitment Act.”
— 725 ILCS 207/35(b) — 27 cases
People v. Rainey, 758 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001). “Defendant’s Due Process Rights Defendant next argues that the State’s failure to properly serve him with summons deprived him of his right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and section 2 of article I of the Illinois…”
In Re Det. of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. 2000). “" 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 1998). The Act also mandates the use of criminal rules of evidence.”
People v. Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “” 725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 1998). 8 In Samuelson, the respondent challenged section 35 on the basis that it denied him his right to waive a jury trial.”
In re Commitment of Weekly, 2011 IL App (1st) 102276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2004). The State has the burden of proving the allegations in the petition beyond a reasonable doubt, and mere evidence that the respondent committed a sexually violent offense prior to the sexually violent offense that is the basis for the petition is…”
People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072 (Ill. 2011). “725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 2000). The State must prove that the individual is a sexually violent person beyond a reasonable doubt.”
— 725 ILCS 207/35(c) — 9 cases
In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750 (Ill. 2011). “See 725 ILCS 207/35(c) (West 2006). ¶ 120 Because Jonathon is not similarly situated to juveniles subject to EJJ prosecutions or adults facing felony sex offense charges, we need not consider whether there is a rational basis for granting jury trials to minors subject to EJJ…”
In Re Jonathon CB, 958 N.E.2d 227 (Ill. 2011).
People v. Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “” 725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 1998). 8 In Samuelson, the respondent challenged section 35 on the basis that it denied him his right to waive a jury trial.”
In Re Det. of Varner, 734 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
People v. Miller, 2014 IL App (1st) 122186 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(d) — 6 cases
People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072 (Ill. 2011). “725 ILCS 207/35(b) (West 2000). The State must prove that the individual is a sexually violent person beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Re Det. of Welsh, 913 N.E.2d 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2004). The State’s first witness, Dr.”
People v. McDougle, 708 N.E.2d 482 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
In re Commitment of Brown, 2012 IL App (2d) 110116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
People v. Masterson, 958 N.E.2d 686 (Ill. 2011).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(d)(1) — 32 cases
In re Commitment of Fields, 2012 IL App (1st) 112191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
In Re Det. of Lieberman, 884 N.E.2d 160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
In Re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “Section 5(f) of the Act defines a "sexually violent person" as an individual who has "been convicted of a sexually violent offense * * * and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts…”
In re Commitment of Butler, 2013 IL App (1st) 113606 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
People v. Tiney-Bey, 707 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). “Section 35(b) relates generally to the respondent’s rights at trial (725 ILCS 207/35 (West Supp. 1997)). The Commitment Act contains a specific provision granting a respondent the right to remain silent, which only applies in hearings under the Commitment Act.”
— 725 ILCS 207/35(d)(2) — 3 cases
In Re Det. of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. 2000). “" 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 1998). The Act also mandates the use of criminal rules of evidence.”
In Re Det. of Welsh, 913 N.E.2d 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “725 ILCS 207/35 (West 2004). The State’s first witness, Dr.”
In re Det. of Samuelson (Ill. 2000).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(d)(l) — 4 cases
In Re Det. of Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 2010). “725 ILCS 207/35(d)(l), (e) (West 2006). Although respondent recognizes that section 35 specifically applies only to SVP trials, he contends it should be provided at probable cause hearings as well as one of the many criminal procedure protections available in probable cause…”
In Re Det. of Erbe, 800 N.E.2d 137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “Section 5(f) of the Act defines a "sexually violent person" as an individual who has "been convicted of a sexually violent offense * * * and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts…”
In Re Commitment of Stevens, 803 N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
In Re Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(e) — 12 cases
In Re Det. of Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 2010). “725 ILCS 207/35(d)(l), (e) (West 2006). Although respondent recognizes that section 35 specifically applies only to SVP trials, he contends it should be provided at probable cause hearings as well as one of the many criminal procedure protections available in probable cause…”
In re The Det. of White, 2016 IL App (1st) 151187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
In re Commitment of Gavin, 2019 IL App (1st) 180881 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
In Re Det. of Hardin, 907 N.E.2d 914 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In re Commitment of Larue, 2021 IL App (1st) 200858-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(f) — 21 cases
In Re Det. of Powell, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (Ill. 2005). “” 725 ILCS 207/35(a) (West 2000). Section 103 — 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is known as the speedy-trial statute.”
In Re Det. of Samuelson, 727 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. 2000). “" 725 ILCS 207/35 (West 1998). The Act also mandates the use of criminal rules of evidence.”
In re Det. of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337 (Ill. 2012).
In re Commitment of Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App (3d) 140359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
In re Det. of New, 2013 IL App (1st) 111556 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 725 ILCS 207/35(g) — 4 cases
In Re Det. of Hardin, 932 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 2010). “725 ILCS 207/35(d)(l), (e) (West 2006). Although respondent recognizes that section 35 specifically applies only to SVP trials, he contends it should be provided at probable cause hearings as well as one of the many criminal procedure protections available in probable cause…”
In Re Commitment of Hernandez, 912 N.E.2d 235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In re Commitment of Winston, 2025 IL App (1st) 232214-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
In re Det. of Hardin (Ill. 2010).
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