Illinois Compiled Statutes
725 ILCS 5/103-5 (2026)
Speedy trial
✓ current as of May 2026
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(725 ILCS 5/103-5)
(from Ch. 38, par. 103-5)
Sec. 103-5. Speedy trial.) (a) Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall
be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she
was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an
examination for fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by
a fitness hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a
continuance allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's
determination of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an
interlocutory appeal. Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the
defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for
trial or an oral demand for trial on the record. The provisions of this subsection
(a) do not apply to a person on pretrial release or recognizance for an offense
but who is in custody for a violation of his or her parole, aftercare release, or mandatory
supervised release for another offense.
The 120-day term must be one continuous period of incarceration. In
computing the 120-day term, separate periods of incarceration may not be
combined. If a defendant is taken into custody a second (or subsequent) time
for the same offense, the term will begin again at day zero.
(b) Every person on pretrial release or recognizance shall be tried by the court
having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands
trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant, by an examination for
fitness ordered pursuant to Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness
hearing, by an adjudication of unfitness to stand trial, by a continuance
allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act after a court's determination
of the defendant's physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory
appeal. The defendant's failure to appear for any court date set by the
court operates to waive the defendant's demand for trial made under this
subsection.
For purposes of computing the 160 day period under this subsection (b),
every person who was in custody for an alleged offense and demanded trial
and is subsequently released on pretrial release or recognizance and demands trial,
shall be given credit for time spent in custody following the making of the
demand while in custody. Any demand for trial made under this
subsection (b)
shall be in writing; and in the
case of a defendant not in custody, the
demand for trial shall include the date of any prior demand made under this
provision while the defendant was in custody.
(c) If the court determines that the State has exercised without
success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be
obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on application
of the State for not more than an additional 60 days. If the court
determines that the State has exercised without success due diligence to
obtain results of DNA testing that is material to the case and that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that such results may be obtained at a
later day, the court may continue the cause on application of the State for
not more than an additional 120 days.
(d) Every person not tried in accordance with subsections (a), (b)
and (c) of this Section shall be discharged from custody or released
from the obligations of his pretrial release or recognizance.
(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one
charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands
trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county,
he shall be tried, or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at
least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending
charges of the period prescribed by subsections (a) and (b) of this
Section. Such person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges
thus pending within 160 days from the date on which judgment relative to
the first charge thus prosecuted is rendered pursuant to the Unified Code of
Corrections or, if such trial upon such first charge is terminated
without judgment and there is no subsequent trial of, or adjudication of
guilt after waiver of trial of, such first charge within a reasonable
time, the person shall be tried upon all of the remaining charges thus
pending within 160 days from the date on which such trial is terminated;
if either such period of 160 days expires without the commencement of
trial of, or adjudication of guilt after waiver of trial of, any of such
remaining charges thus pending, such charge or charges shall be
dismissed and barred for want of prosecution unless delay is occasioned
by the defendant, by an examination for fitness ordered pursuant to
Section 104-13 of this Act, by a fitness hearing, by an adjudication
of unfitness for trial, by a continuance allowed pursuant to Section
114-4 of this Act after a court's determination of the defendant's
physical incapacity for trial, or by an interlocutory appeal; provided,
however, that if the court determines that the State has exercised
without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case
and that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may
be obtained at a later day the court may continue the cause on
application of the State for not more than an additional 60 days.
(f) Delay occasioned by the defendant shall temporarily suspend for
the time of the delay the period within which a person shall be tried as
prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section and on the
day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue at the
point at which it was suspended. Where such delay occurs within 21 days
of the end of the period within which a person shall be tried as
prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or (e) of this Section, the court
may continue the cause on application of the State for not more than an
additional 21 days beyond the period prescribed by subsections (a), (b), or
(e). This subsection (f) shall become effective on, and apply to persons
charged with alleged offenses committed on or after, March 1, 1977.
(Source: P.A. 101-652, eff. 1-1-23.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 387
cases (150 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000).
People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000). “The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to death.”
People v. Yankaway, 2025 IL 130207 (Ill. 2025). “Yankaway’s Motion to Dismiss ¶ 36 On September 15, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss Yankaway’s case due to a speedy-trial violation pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020)). Defense counsel argued that Yankaway’s…”
People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850 (Ill. 1998). “Initially, we note that an accused has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill.”
People v. Van Schoyck, 904 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 2009). “See 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2004). Section 103-5(b) mandates that every person on bail or recognizance "shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant.”
People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100 (Ill. 2013). “I, § 8) and statutory (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)) rights to a speedy trial.”
People v. Wigman, 2012 IL App (2d) 100736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “¶7 Defendant’s attorney was granted leave to file a motion to reconsider the denial of defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss, and the matter was continued to December 23, 2008. -3- ¶8 On December 5, 2008, defendant’s attorney filed a “Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant’s…”
People v. Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092 (Ill. 2023). “The order stated, “[i]n the case of criminal proceedings, any delay resulting from this emergency continuance order shall not be attributable to either the State or the defendant for purposes of section 103-5 of the [Code] (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2018)).” Id. ¶8 On April 3, this…”
People v. Williams, 788 N.E.2d 1126 (Ill. 2003). “I also believe that the State's failure to perfect its impeachment of defendant by calling Everage as a witness to testify about defendant's bribery scheme was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore did not amount to plain error.”
People v. Gooden, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2000). “See 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1996). Under section 103-5(a), every person in custody in this state for an alleged offense shall be tried within 120 days from the date the accused was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the accused.”
People v. Gonzalez, 2019 IL App (1st) 152760 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “I, § 8) and statutory rights to a speedy trial (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2012)). People v. Gooden, 189 Ill.”
People v. McGee, 2015 IL App (1st) 130367 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “At the time of his arrest, defendant asserted his rights under the Speedy Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)), demanding trial during his first appearance at bond court.”
People v. Hartfield, 2020 IL App (4th) 170787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “When the State moved for the continuances at issue, defendant objected but not in the manner required by section 103-5(a) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2016)), that is, by demanding a trial.”
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(2) — 2 cases
People v. Woodrum, 821 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
People v. Woodrum (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) — 225 cases
People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000). “The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to death.”
People v. Yankaway, 2025 IL 130207 (Ill. 2025). “Yankaway’s Motion to Dismiss ¶ 36 On September 15, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss Yankaway’s case due to a speedy-trial violation pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020)). Defense counsel argued that Yankaway’s…”
People v. Staake, 2017 IL 121755 (Ill. 2017).
People v. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st) 151307 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
People v. Hartfield, 2020 IL App (4th) 170787 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “When the State moved for the continuances at issue, defendant objected but not in the manner required by section 103-5(a) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2016)), that is, by demanding a trial.”
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) — 83 cases
People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100 (Ill. 2013). “I, § 8) and statutory (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)) rights to a speedy trial.”
People v. Wigman, 2012 IL App (2d) 100736 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “¶7 Defendant’s attorney was granted leave to file a motion to reconsider the denial of defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss, and the matter was continued to December 23, 2008. -3- ¶8 On December 5, 2008, defendant’s attorney filed a “Motion to Reconsider Ruling on Defendant’s…”
People v. Van Schoyck, 904 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 2009). “See 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2004). Section 103-5(b) mandates that every person on bail or recognizance "shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant.”
People v. Sandoval, 886 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
People v. Bauman, 2012 IL App (2d) 110544 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) — 59 cases
People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729 (Ill. 2022).
People v. Johnson, 751 N.E.2d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
People v. Workman, 858 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
People v. Gates, 2023 IL App (1st) 211422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
People v. Pettis, 2017 IL App (4th) 151006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(d) — 61 cases
People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000). “The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to death.”
People v. Gonzalez, 2019 IL App (1st) 152760 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). “I, § 8) and statutory rights to a speedy trial (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2012)). People v. Gooden, 189 Ill.”
People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100 (Ill. 2013). “I, § 8) and statutory (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)) rights to a speedy trial.”
People v. Exson, 896 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
People v. Lilly, 2016 IL App (3d) 140286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(e) — 21 cases
People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850 (Ill. 1998). “Initially, we note that an accused has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill.”
People v. Yankaway, 2025 IL 130207 (Ill. 2025). “Yankaway’s Motion to Dismiss ¶ 36 On September 15, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss Yankaway’s case due to a speedy-trial violation pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020)). Defense counsel argued that Yankaway’s…”
People v. Sandoval, 886 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
People v. Gooden, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2000). “See 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1996). Under section 103-5(a), every person in custody in this state for an alleged offense shall be tried within 120 days from the date the accused was taken into custody unless delay is occasioned by the accused.”
People v. Gay, 2011 IL App (4th) 100009 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
— 725 ILCS 5/103-5(f) — 27 cases
People v. Hall, 743 N.E.2d 521 (Ill. 2000). “The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to death.”
People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850 (Ill. 1998). “Initially, we note that an accused has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill.”
People v. Yankaway, 2025 IL 130207 (Ill. 2025). “Yankaway’s Motion to Dismiss ¶ 36 On September 15, 2022, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss Yankaway’s case due to a speedy-trial violation pursuant to section 103-5(a) of the speedy-trial statute (725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2020)). Defense counsel argued that Yankaway’s…”
People v. Lilly, 2016 IL App (3d) 140286 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
People v. Minor, 2011 IL App (1st) 101097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
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