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ILCSChapter 740Act 160

740 ILCS 160/2 (2026)

As used in this Act:     (a) "Affiliate" means:         (1) a person who directly or indirectly owns,     controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities,             (A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole         discretionary power to vote the securities; or             (B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has         not exercised the power to vote;         (2) a corporation with 20% or more outstanding voting     securities which are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities,             (A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to         vote the securities; or             (B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has         not in fact exercised the power to vote;             (3) a person whose business is operated by the         debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or         (4) a person who operates the debtor's business under     a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1993–2024 60citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 60 opinions since 1993, 9 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (15 cases).

(740 ILCS 160/2) (from Ch. 59, par. 102)
    Sec. 2. As used in this Act:
    (a) "Affiliate" means:
        (1) a person who directly or indirectly owns,
    
controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities,
            (A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole
        
discretionary power to vote the securities; or
            (B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
        
not exercised the power to vote;
        (2) a corporation with 20% or more outstanding voting
    
securities which are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities,
            (A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to
        
vote the securities; or
            (B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has
        
not in fact exercised the power to vote;
            (3) a person whose business is operated by the
        
debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
        (4) a person who operates the debtor's business under
    
a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
    (b) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
        (1) property to the extent it is encumbered by a
    
valid lien;
        (2) property to the extent it is generally exempt
    
under laws of this State; or
        (3) an interest in property held in tenancy by the
    
entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
    (c) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
    (d) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim, including a claim for past-due child support.
    (e) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
    (f) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
    (g) "Insider" includes:
        (1) if the debtor is an individual,
            (A) a relative of the debtor or of a general
        
partner of the debtor;
            (B) a partnership in which the debtor is a
        
general partner;
            (C) a general partner in a partnership described
        
in clause (B); or
            (D) a corporation of which the debtor is a
        
director, officer, or person in control;
        (2) if the debtor is a corporation,
            (A) a director of the debtor;
            (B) an officer of the debtor;
            (C) a person in control of the debtor;
            (D) a partnership in which the debtor is a
        
general partner;
            (E) a general partner in a partnership described
        
in clause (D); or
            (F) a relative of a general partner, director,
        
officer, or person in control of the debtor;
        (3) if the debtor is a partnership,
            (A) a general partner in the debtor;
            (B) a relative of a general partner in, a general
        
partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
            (C) another partnership in which the debtor is a
        
general partner;
            (D) a general partner in a partnership described
        
in clause (C); or
            (E) a person in control of the debtor;
        (4) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if
    
the affiliate were the debtor; and
        (5) a managing agent of the debtor.
    (h) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
    (i) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
    (j) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
    (k) "Relative" means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
    (l) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
    (m) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
(Source: P.A. 90-18, eff. 7-1-97.)

    
The 20 cases that cite 740 ILCS 160/2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENApollo Real Est. Inv. Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 935 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 5×subsections: (c) 2× (d) (g)(2) (g)(4)cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“” 740 ILCS 160/2(d), (f) (West 2000). A claim is “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
The case’s holding
A final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction remains binding and may only be challenged through direct appeal or statutory procedure.
Later courts cite it for
“under the collateral attack doctrine, a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction may only be challenged through direct appeal or procedure allowed by statute and remains binding on the parties until it is reversed through such a proceeding.” · 7 citing courts
2
GREENGierum v. Glick (In re Glick), 568 B.R. 634 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 3×subsections: (b)cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“Under the IUFTA, the state fraudulent transfer law applicable here, a fraudulent transfer must involve a “transfer,” 740 ILCS 160/5(a) (2014), and the transfer must be of an “asset or an interest in an asset,” 740 ILCS 160/2(Z) (2014), meaning “property of a debtor” or an…”
Later courts cite it for
“whether the trustee is suing under section 548(a) or under section 544(b) and the illinois ufta, the trustee can only recover 'the property transferred or, if the court so orders, the value of the property.” · 1 citing court
3
GREENAps Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2002).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 3×subsections: (g)(2) 2× (f)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“Although AW Sports is the most logical party to be designated as a debtor, see 740 ILCS 160/8, it is not a defendant in this lawsuit because of the automatic stay imposed under the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, since none of the individual defendants in this case was a party to…”
4
GREENKermit J. Bressner v. Shirlee Ambroziak, 379 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2004).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 3×subsections: (b) (j)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“” 740 ILCS 160/2(2). The UFTA defines an asset as “property of a debt- or.”
5
GREENGrochocinski v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler), 320 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (g)(1)(A) (k)cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“740 ILCS 160/2(g)(1)(A). A relative has been defined in part as “an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law.”
The case’s holding
A transfer is constructively fraudulent if the debtor receives no reasonably equivalent value and is insolvent at the time of the transfer or becomes insolvent as a result.
Later courts cite it for
“courts have recognized that a defense under 9 of the ufta consists of two elements: good faith and reasonably equivalent value.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENBank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551, 33 N.E.3d 696.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 4×subsections: (l) 2× (b) (g)(2)(C)cited by 9 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“740 ILCS 160/2(b) (West 2006). "Transfer" is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien…”
7
RED1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700, 2017 IL App (1st) 153300, 91 N.E.3d 444.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 4×subsections: (b) (b)(1) (f) (j)cited by 4 casesunpublished
Reversed by 1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700 (2019): the Illinois Supreme Court's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“¶ 54 Under section 5(a) of the Fraudulent Transfer Act: "A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or…”
8
GREENA.P. Props., Inc. v. Goshinsky, 714 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. 1999).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 65 cases
The case’s holding
A tax sale purchaser does not have a debtor-creditor relationship with a property owner under the Property Tax Code.
Later courts cite it for
“goes to great lengths to ensure that no such relationship exists between the landowner and the purchaser.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENAPS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2002).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 3×subsections: (g)(2) 2× (f)cited by 96 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“Although AW Sports is the most logical party to be designated as a debtor, see 740 ILCS 160/8, it is not a defendant in this lawsuit because of the automatic stay imposed under the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, since none of the individual defendants in this case was a party to…”
The case’s holding
Illinois law does not recognize a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as an independent tort except in the narrow context of insurance settlements.
Later courts cite it for
“it is not this court's responsibility to research and construct the parties' arguments, and conclusory analysis will be construed as waiver.” · 26 citing courts
10
GREENWachovia Sec., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc., 674 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 1×subsections: (i)cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“Banco argues that badge (4) does not apply because Loop’s assets were not transferred; as just noted, appellants argue that Loop remained the owner of the assets before and after the transaction.”
The case’s holding
Piercing the corporate veil requires a unity of interest and ownership such that adhering to the corporate fiction would sanction a fraud or promote injustice.
Later courts cite it for
“inadequate capitalization; failing to issue stock; failing to observe corporate formalities; failing to pay dividends; corporate insolvency; nonfunctioning corporate officers; missing corporate records; commingling funds; diverting assets to an owner or other entity to creditor detriment; failing to maintain an arm's-length relationship among related entities; and whether the corporation is a mere façade for a dominant owner.” · 7 citing courts
11
GREENMcGinley Partners, LLC v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200390, 185 N.E.3d 722.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (g)(1)(D) (l)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“” 740 ILCS 160/2(g)(1)(D) (West 2018). 31 Nos.”
12
GREENIn re Marriage of Del Giudice, 678 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“" 740 ILCS 160/2( l ) (West 1994). We find that the Del Giudices' retitling of their property satisfies this definition.”
The case’s holding
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act applies to transactions that satisfy the statutory definition of a transfer, including the retitling of marital property from joint tenancy to tenancy by the entirety.
Later courts cite it for
“invalidate otherwise sanctioned transactions made with a fraudulent intent.” · 10 citing courts
13
GREENBank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 4×subsections: (l) 2× (b) (g)(2)(C)cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“740 ILCS 160/2(b) (West 2006). “Transfer” is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien…”
The case’s holding
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the debtor and donee of a transfer bear the burden of dispelling an implication of fraud.
Later courts cite it for
“debtor and donee of the transfer have the burden of dispelling an implication of fraud.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENWorkforce Solutions v. Urban Servs. of Am., Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 111410.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 1×subsections: (b)cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“See 740 ILCS 160/2(b) (West 2008). ¶ 28 c. The Court’s Ruling on the Turnover Motion ¶ 29 The court heard oral argument on Workforce’s turnover motion.”
The case’s holding
Claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act may be brought within supplementary proceedings, and a corporate asset purchaser is generally not liable for the seller's debts.
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of successor corporate nonliability provides that when a corporation purchases the assets of another corporation, the purchaser is generally not liable for the debts or liabilities of the seller.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENPluciennik v. Vandenberg, 2018 IL App (3d) 160726, 121 N.E.3d 462.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (b)(1) (m)cited by 4 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“" 740 ILCS 160/2(b)(1) (West 2016). Under the plain meaning of that language, the value of the property in excess of a valid lien encumbering the property is an asset.”
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 1×subsections: (g)(2)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“See 740 ILCS 160/2(g)(2) (2002). The record here establishes that Howard was an original CLC shareholder, and that each of the original shareholders was effectively a CLC director.”
Later courts cite it for
“the court can take judicial notice of its own docket entries.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENNw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“740 ILCS 160/2(c), (d) (West 2008). The test to determine whether a transfer is valid under the Act is whether the transfer “directly tended to or did impair the rights of creditors.”
The case’s holding
A court is not required to consider every statutory factor to determine fraudulent intent under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
Later courts cite it for
“are entitled to have the issues clearly defined, and to be cited pertinent authorities.” · 5 citing courts
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“” 740 ILCS 160/2(Z). Accordingly, all rent payments discussed here were “transfers.”
The case’s holding
A guaranty and related security agreements are voidable as fraudulent transfers if the debtor is insolvent and receives no reasonably equivalent value in exchange.
Later courts cite it for
“the company and the provider intend and agree that the contribution agreement provides for bona fide contributions and a full and complete transfer of ownership by the provider to the company of all receivables.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENNw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008, 22 N.E.3d 1217.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 6 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“alue in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (B) intended to incur, or…”
20
GREENVillaverde v. IP Acquisition VIII, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 143187, 39 N.E.3d 144.
cites § 740 ILCS 160/2 2×subsections: (b)(1) (g)(2)cited by 6 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 740 ILCS 160/2
“" 740 ILCS 160/2(b)(1) (West 2010). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on count I of Villaverde's complaint.”

Show all 60 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199320082024

One bar per year. Tallest: 8 cases in 2015. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ill. App. Ct.30N.D. Ill.10Bankr. N.D. Ill.97th Cir.6C.D. Ill.2Ill.2Bankr. C.D. Ill.1
By subsection
(b)11 cases
Gierum v. Glick (In re Glick), 568 B.R. 634 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).“Under the IUFTA, the state fraudulent transfer law applicable here, a fraudulent transfer must involve a “transfer,” 740 ILCS 160/5(a) (2014), and the transfer must be of an “asset or an interest in an asset,” 740 ILCS 160/2(Z) (2014), meaning “property of a debtor” or an…”
Workforce Solutions v. Urban Servs. of Am., Inc., 2012 IL App (1st) 111410.“See 740 ILCS 160/2(b) (West 2008). ¶ 28 c. The Court’s Ruling on the Turnover Motion ¶ 29 The court heard oral argument on Workforce’s turnover motion.”
Kermit J. Bressner v. Shirlee Ambroziak, 379 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2004).“” 740 ILCS 160/2(2). The UFTA defines an asset as “property of a debt- or.”
Bank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551, 33 N.E.3d 696.“740 ILCS 160/2(b) (West 2006). "Transfer" is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien…”
1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700, 2017 IL App (1st) 153300, 91 N.E.3d 444.“¶ 54 Under section 5(a) of the Fraudulent Transfer Act: "A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or…”
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(b)(1)8 cases
1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700, 2017 IL App (1st) 153300, 91 N.E.3d 444.
Pluciennik v. Vandenberg, 2018 IL App (3d) 160726, 121 N.E.3d 462.“" 740 ILCS 160/2(b)(1) (West 2016). Under the plain meaning of that language, the value of the property in excess of a valid lien encumbering the property is an asset.”
Villaverde v. IP Acquisition VIII, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 143187, 39 N.E.3d 144.“" 740 ILCS 160/2(b)(1) (West 2010). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on count I of Villaverde's complaint.”
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(b)(2)2 cases
Barber v. Dunbar (In re Dunbar), 313 B.R. 430 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004).
Voiland v. Kimmell (In re Kimmell), 480 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
(c)15 cases
Apollo Real Est. Inv. Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 935 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).“” 740 ILCS 160/2(d), (f) (West 2000). A claim is “a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”
A.P. Props., Inc. v. Goshinsky, 714 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. 1999).
Nw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008.“740 ILCS 160/2(c), (d) (West 2008). The test to determine whether a transfer is valid under the Act is whether the transfer “directly tended to or did impair the rights of creditors.”
Nw. Mem'l Hosp. v. Sharif, 2014 IL App (1st) 133008, 22 N.E.3d 1217.“alue in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (B) intended to incur, or…”
Levy v. Markal Sales Corp., 724 N.E.2d 1008 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2000).
Showing the top 5 of 15. More in the list view →
(d)6 cases
Apollo Real Est. Inv. Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 935 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).
Harris Bank, N.A. v. Werner (In re Werner), 386 B.R. 684 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
In re Est. of Cappetta, 733 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2000).
A.P. Props., Inc. v. Goshinsky, 699 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1998).
Apollo Real Est. Inv. Fund v. Gelber, No. 1-09-1989 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Feb. 11, 2010).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(f)6 cases
Aps Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2002).“Although AW Sports is the most logical party to be designated as a debtor, see 740 ILCS 160/8, it is not a defendant in this lawsuit because of the automatic stay imposed under the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, since none of the individual defendants in this case was a party to…”
APS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2002).“Although AW Sports is the most logical party to be designated as a debtor, see 740 ILCS 160/8, it is not a defendant in this lawsuit because of the automatic stay imposed under the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, since none of the individual defendants in this case was a party to…”
1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700, 2017 IL App (1st) 153300, 91 N.E.3d 444.
Caterpillar Inc. v. Jerryco Footwear, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 578 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(g)3 cases
Grochocinski v. Schlossberg, 402 B.R. 825 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
Damian v. Courtright, No. 1:21-cv-01694, 2021 WL 3144447 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2021).
Damian v. Pepperdine Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02371 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2022).
(g)(1)(A)2 cases
Grochocinski v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler), 320 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).“740 ILCS 160/2(g)(1)(A). A relative has been defined in part as “an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law.”
Wildcat Enter., LLC v. Weber, 322 F.R.D. 306 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
(g)(1)(D)2 cases
McGinley Partners, LLC v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200390, 185 N.E.3d 722.“” 740 ILCS 160/2(g)(1)(D) (West 2018). 31 Nos.”
McGinley Partners, LLC v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200390, 185 N.E.3d 722.
(g)(2)9 cases
Apollo Real Est. Inv. Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 935 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).
CLC Creditors' Grantor Trust v. Howard Sav. Bank (In re Com. Loan Corp.), 396 B.R. 730 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).“See 740 ILCS 160/2(g)(2) (2002). The record here establishes that Howard was an original CLC shareholder, and that each of the original shareholders was effectively a CLC director.”
Villaverde v. IP Acquisition VIII, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 143187, 39 N.E.3d 144.
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(g)(2)(C)2 cases
Bank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551, 33 N.E.3d 696.
Bank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551.“740 ILCS 160/2(b) (West 2006). “Transfer” is defined as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien…”
(g)(4)4 cases
Apollo Real Est. Inv. Fund, IV, L.P. v. Gelber, 935 N.E.2d 963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2010).
A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc. v. Burnham Partners, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 122538, 29 N.E.3d 579.
Apollo Real Est. Inv. Fund v. Gelber, No. 1-09-1989 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Feb. 11, 2010).
(h)2 cases
Manago v. Cnty. of Cook, 2016 IL App (1st) 121365, 57 N.E.3d 701.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. MB Fin. Bank N.A., 2020 IL App (1st) 190767-U.
(i)2 cases
Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Banco Panamericano, Inc., 674 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012).“Banco argues that badge (4) does not apply because Loop’s assets were not transferred; as just noted, appellants argue that Loop remained the owner of the assets before and after the transaction.”
(j)4 cases
Kermit J. Bressner v. Shirlee Ambroziak, 379 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2004).
1550 MP Road LLC v. Teamsters Local Union No. 700, 2017 IL App (1st) 153300, 91 N.E.3d 444.
Bressner, Kermit J. v. Ambroziak, Shrilee, No. 03-2768 (7th Cir. Aug. 13, 2004).
(k)1 case
Grochocinski v. Zeigler (In re Zeigler), 320 B.R. 362 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005).
(l)10 cases
Bank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551, 33 N.E.3d 696.
McGinley Partners, LLC v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200390, 185 N.E.3d 722.
Bank of Am. v. WS Mgmt., Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132551.
McGinley Partners, LLC v. Royalty Props., LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200390, 185 N.E.3d 722.
U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., No. 3:15-cv-03195 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2021).
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(m)4 cases
Pluciennik v. Vandenberg, 2018 IL App (3d) 160726, 121 N.E.3d 462.
Pluciennik v. Vandenberg, 2018 IL App (3d) 160726.
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. MB Fin. Bank N.A., 2020 IL App (1st) 190767-U.
White v. Funeral Fin. Sys., Ltd, 2022 IL App (1st) 201385-U.

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