ILCS » Chapter 745 · Act 65
Illinois Compiled Statutes

745 ILCS 65/2 (2026)

As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:         (a) "Land" includes roads, land, water, watercourses,     private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty, but does not include residential buildings or residential property

✓ current as of May 2026
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(745 ILCS 65/2) (from Ch. 70, par. 32)
    Sec. 2. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
        (a) "Land" includes roads, land, water, watercourses,
    
private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty, but does not include residential buildings or residential property.
        (b) "Owner" includes the possessor of any interest in
    
land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises.
        (c) "Recreational or conservation purpose" means:
            (1) entry onto the land of another to conduct
        
hunting or recreational shooting or a combination thereof or any activity solely related to the aforesaid hunting or recreational shooting; or
            (2) entry by the general public onto the land of
        
another for any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, educational, or outdoor recreational use.
        (d) "Charge" means an admission fee for permission to
    
go upon the land, but does not include: the sharing of game, fish or other products of recreational use; or benefits to or arising from the recreational use; or contributions in kind, services or cash made for the purpose of properly conserving the land.
        (e) "Person" includes any person, regardless of age,
    
maturity, or experience, who enters upon or uses land for recreational purposes.
        (f) "Invites", for the purposes of this Act, means
    
the words or conduct of the owner would lead a reasonable person to believe that the owner desires the particular person to enter the land to the exclusion of the general public. No economic interest on the part of the owner is required.
        (g) "Permits", for the purposes of this Act, means
    
the words or conduct of the owner would lead a reasonable person to believe that the owner is willing to allow the general public to enter the land. The words or conduct of the owner inviting (i) the general public to enter the land or (ii) particular persons to enter the land for a recreational or conservation purpose as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of this Section shall be construed as "permits" for purposes of this Act.
    The changes to this Section made by this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly apply only to causes of action accruing on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly.
(Source: P.A. 98-522, eff. 1-1-14.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases, 1994–2010 · leading case: Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 2003).
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Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 2003). · cites it 4× “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
Snyder v. Olmstead, 634 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). · cites it 4× “Absent consideration of the underlying legislative purpose, the Act’s broad definitions of "land,” "recreational or conservation purpose” and "person” would eviscerate the common law by immunizing all homeowners from all negligence claims of all guests who enter for "exercise,…”
Turgeon v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 630 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). · cites it 3× “32, 33, 36 (now 745 ILCS 65/2, 3, 6 (West 1992)). Thus, if the Recreational Use Act applies to Edison in this case, plaintiff would be required to show that Edison acted in a willful and wanton manner in order to find Edison liable for Bill’s death.”
Vaughn v. Barton, 933 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 8× “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include “the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises” (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Baggio v. Chicago Park Dist., 682 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 2× “745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 1994). The owner of land may, however, be liable for willful and wanton failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.”
Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 646 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). “(745 ILCS 65/2(d) (West 1992).) This does not include incidental charges for refreshments or other services while on the land.”
Vaughn v. Barton (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 7× “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include "the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises" (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Hall v. Henn (Ill. 2003). · cites it 4× “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
Baggio v. Chicago Park Dist. (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 2× “745 ILCS 65/2(a)(West 1994). The owner of land may, however, be liable for willful and wanton failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.”
Hoye v. State, 50 Ill. Ct. Cl. 317 (1997). “” See 745 ILCS 65/2(b) and (d). Claimant initially challenges the applicability of the Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act, citing to defunct precedent which this Court has previously referred to as the Miller doctrine.”
— 745 ILCS 65/2(a) — 6 cases
Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 2003). “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
Snyder v. Olmstead, 634 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “Absent consideration of the underlying legislative purpose, the Act’s broad definitions of "land,” "recreational or conservation purpose” and "person” would eviscerate the common law by immunizing all homeowners from all negligence claims of all guests who enter for "exercise,…”
Turgeon v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 630 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “32, 33, 36 (now 745 ILCS 65/2, 3, 6 (West 1992)). Thus, if the Recreational Use Act applies to Edison in this case, plaintiff would be required to show that Edison acted in a willful and wanton manner in order to find Edison liable for Bill’s death.”
Baggio v. Chicago Park Dist., 682 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). “745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 1994). The owner of land may, however, be liable for willful and wanton failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.”
Hall v. Henn (Ill. 2003). “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
— 745 ILCS 65/2(b) — 6 cases
Turgeon v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 630 N.E.2d 1318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “32, 33, 36 (now 745 ILCS 65/2, 3, 6 (West 1992)). Thus, if the Recreational Use Act applies to Edison in this case, plaintiff would be required to show that Edison acted in a willful and wanton manner in order to find Edison liable for Bill’s death.”
Vaughn v. Barton, 933 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include “the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises” (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Baggio v. Chicago Park Dist., 682 N.E.2d 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). “745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 1994). The owner of land may, however, be liable for willful and wanton failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.”
Vaughn v. Barton (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include "the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises" (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Baggio v. Chicago Park Dist. (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). “745 ILCS 65/2(a)(West 1994). The owner of land may, however, be liable for willful and wanton failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity.”
— 745 ILCS 65/2(c) — 5 cases
Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 2003). “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
Snyder v. Olmstead, 634 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “Absent consideration of the underlying legislative purpose, the Act’s broad definitions of "land,” "recreational or conservation purpose” and "person” would eviscerate the common law by immunizing all homeowners from all negligence claims of all guests who enter for "exercise,…”
Vaughn v. Barton, 933 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include “the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises” (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Vaughn v. Barton (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include "the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises" (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Hall v. Henn (Ill. 2003). “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
— 745 ILCS 65/2(d) — 3 cases
Vaughn v. Barton, 933 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include “the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises” (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 646 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). “(745 ILCS 65/2(d) (West 1992).) This does not include incidental charges for refreshments or other services while on the land.”
Vaughn v. Barton (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “Under the Recreational Use Act, owners, which are defined to include "the possessor of any interest in land, whether it be a tenant, lessee, occupant, the State of Illinois and its political subdivisions, or person in control of the premises" (745 ILCS 65/2(b) (West 2002)), are…”
— 745 ILCS 65/2(e) — 3 cases
Hall v. Henn, 802 N.E.2d 797 (Ill. 2003). “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
Snyder v. Olmstead, 634 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). “Absent consideration of the underlying legislative purpose, the Act’s broad definitions of "land,” "recreational or conservation purpose” and "person” would eviscerate the common law by immunizing all homeowners from all negligence claims of all guests who enter for "exercise,…”
Hall v. Henn (Ill. 2003). “” 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). “Recreational or conservation purpose” means “any activity undertaken for conservation, resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on land owned by another.”
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