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ILCSChapter 815Act 710

815 ILCS 710/2 (2026)

Definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1996–2024 19citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 19 opinions since 1996, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (v) (8 cases).

(815 ILCS 710/2) (from Ch. 121 1/2, par. 752)
    Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this Act, the following words shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the following meanings:
    (a) "Motor vehicle", any motor driven vehicle required to be registered under "The Illinois Vehicle Code". Beginning January 1, 2010, the term "motor vehicle" also includes any engine, transmission, or rear axle, regardless of whether it is attached to a vehicle chassis, that is manufactured for installation in any motor-driven vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 16,000 pounds that is required to be registered under the Illinois Vehicle Code.
    (b) "Manufacturer", any person engaged in the business of manufacturing or assembling new and unused motor vehicles. "Manufacturer" includes a factory branch, distributor, and distributor branch.
    (c) "Factory branch", a branch office maintained by a manufacturer which manufactures or assembles motor vehicles for sale to distributors or motor vehicle dealers or which is maintained for directing and supervising the representatives of the manufacturer.
    (d) "Distributor branch", a branch office maintained by a distributor or wholesaler who or which sells or distributes new or used motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers.
    (e) "Factory representative", a representative employed by a manufacturer or employed by a factory branch for the purpose of making or promoting the sale of motor vehicles or for contracting with, supervising, servicing or instructing motor vehicle dealers or prospective motor vehicle dealers.
    (f) "Distributor representative", a representative employed by a distributor branch, distributor or wholesaler.
    (g) "Distributor" or "wholesaler", any person who sells or distributes new or used motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers or who maintains distributor representatives within the State.
    (h) "Motor vehicle dealer", any person who, in the ordinary course of business, is engaged in the business of selling new or used motor vehicles to consumers or other end users.
    (i) "Franchise", an oral or written arrangement for a definite or indefinite period in which a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler grants to a motor vehicle dealer a license to use a trade name, service mark, or related characteristic, and in which there is a community of interest in the marketing of motor vehicles or services related thereto at wholesale, retail, leasing or otherwise.
    (j) "Franchiser", a manufacturer, distributor or wholesaler who grants a franchise to a motor vehicle dealer.
    (k) "Franchisee", a motor vehicle dealer to whom a franchise is offered or granted.
    (l) "Sale", shall include the issuance, transfer, agreement for transfer, exchange, pledge, hypothecation, mortgage in any form, whether by transfer in trust or otherwise, of any motor vehicle or interest therein or of any franchise related thereto; and any option, subscription or other contract or solicitation, looking to a sale, or offer or attempt to sell in any form, whether oral or written. A gift or delivery of any motor vehicle or franchise with respect thereto with or as a bonus on account of the sale of anything shall be deemed a sale of such motor vehicle or franchise.
    (m) "Fraud", shall include, in addition to its normal legal connotation, the following: a misrepresentation in any manner, whether intentionally false or due to reckless disregard for truth or falsity, of a material fact; a promise or representation not made honestly and in good faith; and an intentional failure to disclose a material fact.
    (n) "Person", a natural person, corporation, partnership, trust or other entity, and in case of an entity, it shall include any other entity in which it has a majority interest or which it effectively controls as well as the individual officers, directors and other persons in active control of the activities of each such entity.
    (o) "New motor vehicle", a motor vehicle which has not been previously sold to any person except a distributor or wholesaler or motor vehicle dealer for resale.
    (p) "Market Area", the franchisee's area of primary responsibility as defined in its franchise.
    (q) "Relevant Market Area", the area within a radius of 10 miles from the principal location of a franchise or dealership if said principal location is in a county having a population of more than 300,000 persons; if the principal location of a franchise or dealership is in a county having a population of less than 300,000 persons, then "relevant market area" shall mean the area within a radius of 15 miles from the principal location of said franchise or dealership.
    (r) "Late model vehicle" means a vehicle of the current model year and one, 2, or 3 preceding model years for which the motor vehicle dealer holds an existing franchise from the manufacturer for that same line make.
    (s) "Factory repurchase vehicle" means a motor vehicle of the current model year or a late model vehicle reacquired by the manufacturer under an existing agreement or otherwise from a fleet, lease or daily rental company or under any State or federal law or program relating to allegedly defective new motor vehicles, and offered for sale and resold by the manufacturer directly or at a factory authorized or sponsored auction.
    (t) "Board" means the Motor Vehicle Review Board created under this Act.
    (u) "Secretary of State" means the Secretary of State of Illinois.
    (v) "Good cause" means facts establishing commercial reasonableness in lawful or privileged competition and business practices as defined at common law.
(Source: P.A. 100-308, eff. 8-24-17.)

    
The 19 cases that cite 815 ILCS 710/2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 12×subsections: (v) 10× (q) 2×cited by 93 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“" 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2004). An existing franchise has 30 days from the receipt of the notice from the manufacturer to file a protest with the Board.”
The case’s holding
Courts defer to an administrative agency's construction of a statute when there is reasonable debate regarding its meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“legislative intent is best determined from the language of the statute itself .” · 6 citing courts
2
GREENGen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 18×subsections: (v) 14× (q) 4×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2000). In May 2003, the hearing officer entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision.”
The case’s holding
Under the Franchise Act, good cause for adding a dealership is a balancing test considering all relevant circumstances, and the statute is constitutional.
3
GREENClark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 4×subsections: (q) 4×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“" 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2006). [3] In the present case, the third contract contained no exclusive sales territory listed for R&R.”
Later courts cite it for
“the franchise act clearly provides that disputes involving section 4 of the franchise act 'may' be submitted to arbitration under section 12(a) or otherwise 'shall' be commenced by the review board under section 12(b).” · 1 citing court
4
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 3×subsections: (b) (h) (v)cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“Coercion In its brief, plaintiff characterizes itself as a “[mjotor vehicle dealer” within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act (815 ILCS 710/ 2(h) (West 2000)) and defendant as a 11 [m]anufacturer” within the meaning of section 2(b) (815 ILCS 710/2(b) (West 2000)). Defendant…”
5
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, 959 N.E.2d 1133.
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (v)cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“” 815 ILCS 710/2(v) (West 2010). ¶ 34 Remedies under the Act are discussed in section 13, which provides that “[a]ny franchisee or motor vehicle dealer who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by a manufacturer *** of an…”
6
GREENiMotorsports, Inc. v. Vanderhall Motor Works, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210785, 224 N.E.3d 221.
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 2×subsections: (q) 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“See 815 ILCS 710/2(q), 4(e)(8) (West 2020). Since the Hickory Hills -4- 2022 IL App (2d) 210785 dealership was “much further” from plaintiff’s facility than the 10-mile area of exclusivity provided for by the Act, the court reasoned, authorizing another Vanderhall dealer 16…”
Later courts cite it for
“in ruling on a section 2-615 motion all well- pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts are accepted as true.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENNissan North Am., Inc. v. Jim M'lady Oldsmobile, Inc., 486 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2007).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (i)cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“See 815 ILCS 710/2(i). But even if oral franchise agreements are unenforceable under Illinois law, that fact is irrelevant to the dispute we have before us, which is whether these parties had a written agreement to arbitrate.”
8
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck v. Sterling Truck, 959 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. 2011).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (v)cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“" 815 ILCS 710/2(v) (West 2010). ¶ 34 Remedies under the Act are discussed in section 13, which provides that "[a]ny franchisee or motor vehicle dealer who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by a manufacturer * * * of an…”
The case’s holding
Circuit courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over good-cause determinations under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, which must first be adjudicated by the Motor Vehicle Review Board.
Later courts cite it for
“to determine the legislature's intent, the court may properly consider not just the statute's language, but also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the goals to be achieved. the intent of the legislature 'can be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENHamilton v. Chrysler Corp., 666 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (h)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“On February 9, 1994, the trial court found that a material issue of fact existed on the question of whether the plaintiff was a "motor vehicle dealer” or a "franchisee” as those terms are defined in the MVFA (see 815 ILCS 710/2(h), (k) (West 1994)). The trial court denied…”
10
GREENGuardino v. Chrysler Corp., 691 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (e)cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“” 815 ILCS 710/2(e) (West 1992). We believe Chrysler Credit falls within this definition, particularly where, as in this case, it is able to stop Chrysler from approving the initial sale from Grim because of a sum due to Chrysler Credit.”
11
NO FLAGGen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 4-04-0735 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Oct. 3, 2005).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 8×subsections: (v) 6× (q) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2000). In May 2003, the hearing officer entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision.”
12
NO FLAGGen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., No. 101585 & 101601 cons. Rel (Ill. Jan. 8, 2007).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 6×subsections: (v) 5× (q)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“” 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2004). An existing franchise has 30 days from the receipt of the notice from the manufacturer to file a protest with the Board.”
13
GREENCrossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., No. 4-02-0931 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. June 30, 2003).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 3×subsections: (b) (h) (v)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“As a "manufacturer," defendant must conform to sections 4(c)(1) and (c)(3) of the Act, which provide: "It shall be deemed a violation for a manufacturer *** to coerce , or attempt to coerce , any motor vehicle dealer: (1) to accept, buy[,] or order any motor vehicle or vehicles,…”
14
NEUTRALScholl's v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 957 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 3×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“" 815 ILCS 710/2 (West 2008). Scholl's asserted that the language "off-highway vehicle" in section 10.”
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 3×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“” 815 ILCS 710/2 (West 2008). Scholl’s asserted that the language “off-highway vehicle” in section 10.”
16
GREENClark Investments v. Airstream, No. 3-09-0260 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. Mar. 23, 2010).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 2×subsections: (q) 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“” 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2006).3 In the present case, the third contract contained no exclusive sales territory listed for R&R.”
17
NEUTRALIllinois Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Off. of the Illinois Sec'y of State, 2024 IL App (1st) 230100, 264 N.E.3d 476.
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (i)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“” 815 ILCS 710/2(i) (West 2022). Then, they make conclusory and insufficient allegations that the written contract between Rivian and Lucid and their respective affiliates creates a franchise, citing no evidence of a contract or, if there is one, what it provides.”
Later courts cite it for
“procedural due process concerns the methods by which an individual's life, liberty, or property interest are denied, and substantive due process imposes limits on the state's power to act, regardless of the procedural protections.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENNissan North Am. v. Jim M'Lady Olds, No. 05-1786 (7th Cir. May 11, 2007).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (i)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“See 815 ILCS 710/2(i). But even if oral franchise agreements are unenforceable under Illinois law, that fact is irrelevant to the dispute we have before us, which is whether these parties had a written agreement to arbitrate.”
19
NO FLAGGuardino v. Chrysler Corp., No. 1-96-3156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Feb. 13, 1998).
cites § 815 ILCS 710/2 1×subsections: (e)cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 815 ILCS 710/2
“" 815 ILCS 710/2(e)(West 1992). We believe Chrysler Credit falls within this definition, particularly where, as in this case, it is able to stop Chrysler from approving the initial sale from Grim because of a sum due to Chrysler Credit.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199620102024

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2007. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ill. App. Ct.13Ill.47th Cir.2
By subsection
(a)2 cases
Scholl's v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 957 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2011).“" 815 ILCS 710/2 (West 2008). Scholl's asserted that the language "off-highway vehicle" in section 10.”
Scholl's 4 Season Motor Sports v. Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., 2011 IL App (1st) 102995.“” 815 ILCS 710/2 (West 2008). Scholl’s asserted that the language “off-highway vehicle” in section 10.”
(b)2 cases
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003).“Coercion In its brief, plaintiff characterizes itself as a “[mjotor vehicle dealer” within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act (815 ILCS 710/ 2(h) (West 2000)) and defendant as a 11 [m]anufacturer” within the meaning of section 2(b) (815 ILCS 710/2(b) (West 2000)). Defendant…”
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., No. 4-02-0931 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. June 30, 2003).“As a "manufacturer," defendant must conform to sections 4(c)(1) and (c)(3) of the Act, which provide: "It shall be deemed a violation for a manufacturer *** to coerce , or attempt to coerce , any motor vehicle dealer: (1) to accept, buy[,] or order any motor vehicle or vehicles,…”
(e)2 cases
Guardino v. Chrysler Corp., 691 N.E.2d 787 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).“” 815 ILCS 710/2(e) (West 1992). We believe Chrysler Credit falls within this definition, particularly where, as in this case, it is able to stop Chrysler from approving the initial sale from Grim because of a sum due to Chrysler Credit.”
Guardino v. Chrysler Corp., No. 1-96-3156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. Feb. 13, 1998).“" 815 ILCS 710/2(e)(West 1992). We believe Chrysler Credit falls within this definition, particularly where, as in this case, it is able to stop Chrysler from approving the initial sale from Grim because of a sum due to Chrysler Credit.”
(h)3 cases
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003).
Hamilton v. Chrysler Corp., 666 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).“On February 9, 1994, the trial court found that a material issue of fact existed on the question of whether the plaintiff was a "motor vehicle dealer” or a "franchisee” as those terms are defined in the MVFA (see 815 ILCS 710/2(h), (k) (West 1994)). The trial court denied…”
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., No. 4-02-0931 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. June 30, 2003).
(i)3 cases
Nissan North Am., Inc. v. Jim M'lady Oldsmobile, Inc., 486 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2007).“See 815 ILCS 710/2(i). But even if oral franchise agreements are unenforceable under Illinois law, that fact is irrelevant to the dispute we have before us, which is whether these parties had a written agreement to arbitrate.”
Illinois Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Off. of the Illinois Sec'y of State, 2024 IL App (1st) 230100, 264 N.E.3d 476.“” 815 ILCS 710/2(i) (West 2022). Then, they make conclusory and insufficient allegations that the written contract between Rivian and Lucid and their respective affiliates creates a franchise, citing no evidence of a contract or, if there is one, what it provides.”
Nissan North Am. v. Jim M'Lady Olds, No. 05-1786 (7th Cir. May 11, 2007).“See 815 ILCS 710/2(i). But even if oral franchise agreements are unenforceable under Illinois law, that fact is irrelevant to the dispute we have before us, which is whether these parties had a written agreement to arbitrate.”
(q)7 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. State of Illinois Motor Veh. Review Bd., 862 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. 2007).“" 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2004). An existing franchise has 30 days from the receipt of the notice from the manufacturer to file a protest with the Board.”
Clark Investments, Inc. v. Airstream, Inc., 926 N.E.2d 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 2010).“" 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2006). [3] In the present case, the third contract contained no exclusive sales territory listed for R&R.”
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).“815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2000). In May 2003, the hearing officer entered his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision.”
iMotorsports, Inc. v. Vanderhall Motor Works, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 210785, 224 N.E.3d 221.“See 815 ILCS 710/2(q), 4(e)(8) (West 2020). Since the Hickory Hills -4- 2022 IL App (2d) 210785 dealership was “much further” from plaintiff’s facility than the 10-mile area of exclusivity provided for by the Act, the court reasoned, authorizing another Vanderhall dealer 16…”
Clark Investments v. Airstream, No. 3-09-0260 Rel (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. Mar. 23, 2010).“” 815 ILCS 710/2(q) (West 2006).3 In the present case, the third contract contained no exclusive sales territory listed for R&R.”
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(v)8 cases
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Motor Veh. Review Bd., 836 N.E.2d 903 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2005).
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611, 959 N.E.2d 1133.“” 815 ILCS 710/2(v) (West 2010). ¶ 34 Remedies under the Act are discussed in section 13, which provides that “[a]ny franchisee or motor vehicle dealer who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by a manufacturer *** of an…”
Crossroads Ford Truck v. Sterling Truck, 959 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. 2011).“" 815 ILCS 710/2(v) (West 2010). ¶ 34 Remedies under the Act are discussed in section 13, which provides that "[a]ny franchisee or motor vehicle dealer who suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by a manufacturer * * * of an…”
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 792 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.