N.M. Stat. § 10-16-3 (2026)

prohibited; penalty.
    A. A legislator or public officer or employee shall treat the legislator's or public
officer's or employee's government position as a public trust. The legislator or public
officer or employee shall use the powers and resources of public office only to advance
the public interest and not to obtain personal benefits or pursue private interests.

   B. Legislators and public officers and employees shall conduct themselves in a
manner that justifies the confidence placed in them by the people, at all times
maintaining the integrity and discharging ethically the high responsibilities of public
service.

    C. Full disclosure of real or potential conflicts of interest shall be a guiding principle
for determining appropriate conduct. At all times, reasonable efforts shall be made to
avoid undue influence and abuse of office in public service.

   D. No legislator or public officer or employee may request or receive, and no person
may offer a legislator or public officer or employee, any money, thing of value or
promise thereof that is conditioned upon or given in exchange for promised
performance of an official act. Any person who knowingly and willfully violates the
provisions of this subsection is guilty of a fourth degree felony and shall be sentenced
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978.

History: 1978 Comp., § 10-16-3, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 46, § 28; 2007, ch. 362, §
2; 2011, ch. 138, § 3.

                                      ANNOTATIONS

Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1993, ch. 46, § 28 repealed former 10-16-3
NMSA 1978, as enacted by Laws 1967, ch. 306, § 3, relating to gifts, and enacted a
new section, effective July 1, 1993.

The 2011 amendment, effective July 1, 2011, in Subsection A, eliminated the
qualification that prohibited personal benefits and private interests must be incompatible
with the public interest.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, made grammatical changes.

Judge's conviction invalid. — The legislature expressly chose to exclude judges from
application of the Governmental Conduct Act. Therefore, a judge could not be convicted
of violating official acts prohibited under 10-16-3(D) NMSA 1978, and violating official
acts prohibited by that section could not be used as the predicate felony to support the
defendant's conviction of criminal sexual penetration during the commission of a felony.
State v. Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933.

The New Mexico legislature intended Subsections A through C of this section be
applied as ethical principles rather than as criminal statutes. — In consolidated
cases, where petitioners were each charged under two or three subsections of the
Governmental Conduct Act, and where the district court dismissed the charges in all
four cases on different grounds, the district courts did not err in dismissing charges
under 10-16-3(A) through 10-16-3(C) NMSA 1978, because the plain language of
Subsections (A) through (C) demonstrate a legislative intent that these subsections be
applied as ethical principles rather than as criminal statutes within the scope of 10-16-
17 NMSA 1978. Each relevant subjection communicates a general goal or proscription
without specifying a wrongful deed or forbidden act. State v. Gutierrez, 2023-NMSC-
002, rev'g 2020-NMCA-045, 472 P.3d 1260.

Legislative intent for willful and knowing violations. — The plain meaning of § 10-
16-3 NMSA 1978 and § 10-16-17 NMSA 1978 indicates a legislative intent to provide for
a misdemeanor penalty for a knowing and willful violation of the provisions of §§ 10-16-
3(A) through § 10-16-3(C) NMSA 1978. State v. Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, cert.
granted.

Void for vagueness analysis of Subsection A. — Section 10-16-3(A) NMSA 1978
mandates the use of the powers and resources of a legislator's, public officer's, or public
employee's public office only for the benefit of the people of New Mexico, and prohibits
legislators, public officers, and public employees from exploiting their powers and
resources for private gain, and to the extent the application of Subsection A requires a
qualitative determination of what constitutes a public versus private interest, as a
general rule, the application of a qualitative standard to real-world conduct does not
render a statute unconstitutionally vague. Subsection A provides a fair opportunity for
persons of ordinary intelligence to determine whether his or her conduct is prohibited,
as well as sufficient guidance for enforcement of the law such that it neither permits nor
encourages subjective or ad hoc application. State v. Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, cert.
granted.

Subsection B is unconstitutionally vague. — Although § 10-16-3(B) NMSA 1978
describes behavior to which the listed officials should aspire, it does not follow with a
definition or clarification of the conduct that is required to comply. To the extent the
phrases "conduct themselves in a manner that justifies the confidence placed in them
by the people," "maintaining the integrity," and discharging ethically" were intended to
require or prohibit certain conduct, the court is unable to ascertain with any reasonable
degree of certainty the conduct the legislature intended to prohibit. Subsection B not
only fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence a fair opportunity to determine
whether their conduct is prohibited, but also fails to provide minimum guidance that
would preclude subjective and ad hoc application of the law; Subsection B is vague and
cannot form the basis for criminal charges under § 10-16-17 NMSA 1978. State v.
Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045, cert. granted.

Subsection C is unconstitutionally vague. — Section 10-16-3(C) NMSA 1978 does
not provide adequate guidance as to whom its requirements apply. The lack of any
minimum guidance with regard to the class of persons whose conduct is governed by
Subsection C renders it unconstitutionally vague because it fails to give people of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know whether their conduct is
prohibited because they have no notice as to whether they are a member of the class of
persons contemplated under Subsection C, and it invites subjective and ad hoc
application of the law because law enforcement officials have no guidance as to the
class of persons subject to the requirements of the subsection. State v. Gutierrez,
2020-NMCA-045, cert. granted.

In four separate cases, consolidated for appeal, where each case arose from an
allegation of misconduct by a government official, and where the district court in each
case dismissed the charges against the defendants, finding that violations of §§ 10-16-
3(A) through § 10-16-3(C) NMSA 1978 were not crimes but ethical considerations and
therefore the indictments failed to allege the commission of a criminal offense, or that
even if Subsections A through C provided for criminal offenses, they were nevertheless
void for vagueness, the district courts' dismissals of the counts charging defendants
under Subsection A were improper because the plain meaning of § 10-16-3 NMSA 1978
and § 10-16-17 NMSA 1978 indicates a legislative intent to provide for a misdemeanor
penalty for a knowing and willful violation of Subsection A, but the dismissals of the
counts charging defendants under Subsections B through C were proper because those
subsections fail to provide persons of ordinary intelligence a fair opportunity to
determine whether their conduct is prohibited. State v. Gutierrez, 2020-NMCA-045,
cert. granted.

The Governmental Conduct Act does not prohibit a legislator from sitting on the
board of a nonprofit organization that receives state contracts. — Although a
legislator's unpaid membership on the board of directors of a nonprofit organization is
not a financial interest subject to disclosure or regulation under the Governmental
Conduct Act, a legislator who serves as a volunteer member on the board of directors of
a nonprofit organization that assists victims of sexual assault and advocates on their
behalf may not use the powers and resources of public office to obtain personal benefits
or pursue private interests, must make full disclosure of real or potential conflicts of
interest, may be required to recuse from votes that might impact the nonprofit
organization and, when dealing with state agencies on behalf of the nonprofit
organization, should avoid making reference to the legislator's official status, except as
to matters related to scheduling, avoid communications on legislative stationery, and
avoid threats or implications relating to legislative actions. 2021 Op. Ethics Comm'n No.
2021-02.

State employee who also serves on a local school board must disclose any
conflicts that arise out of the employee's dual roles. — The Governmental Conduct
Act would not prohibit a state employee who has a role in approving certain financial
decisions for a local school board from also serving on that school board, because the
employee does not have a financial interest as a member of the local school board, but
because there appears to be an incompatibility between the two positions under state
law, the individual would need to recuse on matters in their role as a state employee
that affect the school board. Additionally, the individual would need to disclose any
potential conflicts arising out of the individual's dual roles to both their employer and to
the school board on which they serve. 2026 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2026-04.
The Governmental Conduct Act does not prohibit an individual from holding the
dual roles of state board supervisor and secretary of state. — The Governmental
Conduct Act would not prohibit one individual from holding the dual roles of a state
board supervisor and secretary of state, so long as the individual is able to adhere to
the duties of loyalty and care inherent in holding each position as a public trust. Further,
it is unlikely that there is an inconsistency in the functions of the two offices which would
lead to physical or functional incompatibility. 2026 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2026-06.

The Governmental Conduct Act does not prohibit a business significantly owned
by a legislator from applying for and receiving federal CARES relief funds. — The
Governmental Conduct Act does not prohibit a business significantly owned by a
legislator from applying for and receiving federal Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security Act (CARES) relief funds, because a legislator is not directly responsible for the
New Mexico department of finance and administration's and the New Mexico finance
authority's distribution of CARES relief grants; the decision to award grant money to a
business owned by the legislator has no direct connection with an exercise of the
powers and responsibilities of the legislator's public office. 2021 Op. Ethics Comm'n
No. 2021-03.

An oversight agency does not violate the public trust by publicizing concerns
about the operation of a state agency. — The New Mexico state auditor, in releasing
to the public his concerns about the operation of the Martin Luther King, Jr. commission,
does not violate the Governmental Conduct Act, because it is not a violation of the
public trust to publicize the findings of an audit that contained numerous findings of
material weaknesses and material noncompliance. 2021 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2021-
04.

A legislator or public officer does not violate the Governmental Conduct Act by
submitting records requests to other state agencies. — The New Mexico state
treasurer, who is a statutorily designated member of the Martin Luther King, Jr.
commission (MLK commission), did not violate the Governmental Conduct Act in
submitting numerous records requests to the MLK commission pursuant to the
Inspection of Public Records Act, 14-2-1 to 14-2-12 NMSA 1978, given that the New
Mexico legislature has declared that it is the public policy of this state that all persons
are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and
the official acts of public officers and employees, and that to provide persons with such
information is an essential function of a representative government and an integral part
of the routine duties of public officers and employees. 2021 Op. Ethics Comm'n No.
2021-04.

This section does not require recusal on any vote affecting a legislator's
interests. — Under this section, a legislator may not use the powers and resources of
their legislative office to obtain personal benefits or pursue private interests, but this
section does not require recusal on any vote affecting a legislator's interests, and
therefore a legislator who is a respondent in administrative complaints pending in the
state ethics commission is not prohibited by this section from voting on proposed
legislation that affects the state ethics commission. 2021 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2021-
07.

The Governmental Conduct Act does not require a legislator to refrain from
voting on legislation that implicates a conflict of interest. — The Governmental
Conduct Act provision that expressly requires recusal, including voting, on a conflicted
matter does not apply to legislators, and therefore, while a legislator's vote on legislation
in which the legislator has direct, personal or pecuniary interest might constitute a
violation of a rule of procedure of the legislator's respective house, it does not make out
a violation of the Governmental Conduct Act. 2026 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2026-01.

A legislator’s official acts affecting a financial interest are prohibited. — Section
10-16-3(A) NMSA 1978 of the Governmental Conduct Act provides that a legislator may
not use the powers and resources of their legislative office to obtain personal benefits or
pursue private interests, and therefore a newly elected legislator who owns, and was
previously employed by, a corporation that currently provides services to the state
pursuant to contracts and grant agreements would be prohibited from taking any official
act for the purpose of benefitting either the legislator’s ownership or employment
interests in the corporation. A legislator may voluntarily recuse from participation in a
matter that affects, or has the appearance of affecting, their interest. 2023 Op. Ethics
Comm’n No. 2023-01.

Duty to disclose real or potential conflicts of interest. — Section 10-16-3(C) NMSA
1978 of the Governmental Conduct Act requires a legislator to disclose real or potential
conflicts of interest, and therefore a newly elected legislator who owns, and was
previously employed by, a corporation that currently provides services to the state
pursuant to contracts and grant agreements has a duty to disclose the legislator’s
interest in the corporation. If the legislator has disclosed ownership of and employment
by the corporation on an annual financial disclosure statement, that statement would be
sufficient to meet the disclosure required by Section 10-16-3(C) NMSA 1978. 2023 Op.
Ethics Comm’n No. 2023-01.

A legislator’s duty to disclose potential conflicts of interest and duty to treat
position as a public trust. — Under the Governmental Conduct Act, a legislator may
not use the powers and resources of their legislative office to obtain personal benefits or
pursue private interests, and must disclose any real or potential conflicts of interest, and
therefore a legislator, whose children own and operate a company that has service
contracts with state agencies, which were awarded through a competitive process, and
whose only financial interest in his children’s company is a rental agreement for storage
space, would be prohibited from taking any official act for the purpose of benefitting their
children’s company and would be required to disclose the legislator’s interest in the
storage-rental contract on their annual financial disclosure statement. 2023 Op. Ethics
Comm’n No. 2023-02.

A legislator's duty of loyalty to the public could potentially conflict with a
proposed consulting agreement with a corporation which requires a duty of
loyalty to the corporation. — The Governmental Conduct Act, 10-16-3(A) NMSA
1978, requires a legislator to treat the legislative position as a "public trust," suggesting
that a legislator owes a duty of loyalty to the public and particularly to those members of
the public who the legislator represents in the legislature, and therefore a "conflict of
interest" provision in a proposed consulting agreement that a legislator is considering
entering into with a corporation, which requires the legislator to have a duty of loyalty to
the corporation, could potentially conflict with the legislator's duty of loyalty to the public.
It is not possible to put both the private company's and the public's interest first. 2025
Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2025-08.

Legislators should maintain the unfettered ability to represent the public and act
in its best interests. — A proposed contractual obligation in a consulting agreement
that a legislator is considering entering into with a corporation, which requires the
legislator to seek and obtain the corporation's prior written consent before undertaking a
representation that is directly adverse to the corporation's interests, is inconsistent with
a legislator's statutory duty to take reasonable efforts to avoid undue influence. 2025
Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2025-08.

Self-dealing by non-state-employed council members does not violate the
Governmental Conduct Act. — The Governmental Conduct Act does not prohibit
members of the New Mexico council for purchasing from persons with disabilities
(council) from voting to approve a contract subject to the State Use Act, 13-1C-1 to 13-
1C-7 NMSA 1978, between a state agency or local public body and a council member
or a company in which the council member has a financial interest. Most of the
members of the council do not receive compensation or cost reimbursements from the
state, and therefore are not subject to the Governmental Conduct Act's conflict-of-
interest provisions, and although the Governmental Conduct Act prohibits a state
agency from entering into a contract with a business in which a public officer or
employee has a substantial interest, it is the designated central nonprofit agency that
holds contracts under the State Use Act, not the council itself. 2020 Op. Ethics Comm'n
No. 2020-07.

The Governmental Conduct Act does not limit communications between a
legislator and a lobbyist. — The Governmental Conduct Act, 10-16-1 to 10-16-18
NMSA 1978, regulates the conduct of legislators in limited circumstances, requires
legislators to disclose any conflict of interest, and requires legislators to use the powers
of their legislative office only to advance the public interest, but the Governmental
Conduct Act does not constrain any communications between a legislator and a lobbyist
employed by an entity that contracts with or employs the legislator, nor does it constrain
communications between a legislator and the board members or employees of an entity
that employs or contracts with the legislator. 2022 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2022-06.

The Governmental Conduct Act does not prohibit a district legislative aide from
assisting a legislator in a nonpartisan "get-out-the-vote" campaign. — A district
legislative aide (DLA) is specifically authorized by policy to assist a legislator in activities
that include providing support for correspondence and constituent services at the local
level, and therefore a DLA would be permitted to provide support to a legislator in
sending out mailers informing local constituents how to register to vote and providing
logistical information concerning election day, so long as those mailers do not constitute
electioneering or otherwise violate applicable policies, because such support is clearly
within the scope of 10-16-3(A) NMSA 1978, which provides that a public employee shall
use the "powers and resources of public office only to advance the public interest and
not to obtain personal benefits or pursue private interests". 2024 Op. Ethics Comm’n
No. 2024-05.

Bond attorneys. — The provision of the Governmental Conduct Act that limits
contributions to state officers and employees by businesses that provide financial
services does not apply to lawyers who perform bond work for the state. 2007 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 07-04.

Holding a cabinet office and a university position. — The concurrent holding of a
cabinet office and a position with a university regulated, to any degree, by the cabinet
office raises the conflict of interest issues addressed by the Governmental Conduct Act
and may require the cabinet officer to relinquish the officer’s university position. 2007
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 07-06.

Free passes for racing commissioners disallowed. — When the members of the
racing commission distribute free passes which the tracks must honor they are
requesting a benefit for themselves or for those upon whom they wish to confer a
benefit from persons who are directly affected by their official acts, which is the kind of
activity this article is intended to prevent. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-15.

Public employees retirement board members could not accept expense-paid trip.
— Public employees retirement board members could not accept an offer of an
expense-paid trip to Columbus, Ohio to be hosted by public employees benefit services
corporation. 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-21.

District attorney's office may accept unconditional gifts or donations of goods,
services or other in-kind benefits. — Public officers and employees are prohibited
from knowingly requesting or receiving any money or thing of value that is conditioned
upon or given in exchange for the promised performance of an official act, and the rules
of professional conduct for lawyers prohibit a lawyer from accepting compensation from
third parties unless there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment in rendering legal services, and therefore, under these
provisions, a state agency such as a district attorney's office may accept donations of
goods and services for official purposes if the donations are made voluntarily and
unconditionally and do not affect the office's independent and unbiased provision of
prosecutorial and other legal services. Use of Funds and Services Received from Third
Parties (1/14/19), Att'y Gen. Adv. Ltr. 2019-01.

A state employee who also receives a monthly salary from a political campaign
committee does not necessarily violate state ethics laws. — Although the Gift Act,
10-16B-1 to 10-16B-4 NMSA 1978, the Governmental Conduct Act, 10-16-1 to 10-16-18
NMSA 1978, the Financial Disclosure Act, 10-16A-1 to 10-16A-8 NMSA 1978, the
Campaign Reporting Act, 1-19-25 to 1-19-36 NMSA 1978, and the State Ethics
Commission Act, Chapter 10, Article 16G NMSA 1978, impose certain duties on state
employees and regulate certain state employees' conduct, the limited set of facts
presented in this request, that a state employee, while employed and performing regular
public duties, is also receiving a monthly salary from a political campaign committee or
political organization, do not establish a violation of any of the foregoing statutes. 2020
Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2020-01.

Cabinet secretary's teleworking accommodations do not violate the
Governmental Conduct Act. — The Governmental Conduct Act, 10-16-3(A) NMSA
1978, prohibits an out-of-state telework accommodation that either inhibits a state
employee's performance of statutorily defined duties or otherwise obstructs the
advancement of the public interest, but the fact that that the New Mexico secretary of
education has worked from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for several months during the
2020 public health crisis, without any information that the secretary of education's
performance is inhibited in any way, does not establish a violation of the Governmental
Conduct Act. 2020 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2020-06.

Paid leave for a teacher also serving as a legislator does not create an
impermissible conflict of interest. — A school district's provision of compensation,
including paid leave, to a school teacher or administrator serving as a legislator does
not, by itself, create an impermissible conflict of interest. A disqualifying conflict would
exist only if it was established that a school district provided paid leave to a school
employee not as compensation for services, but to influence the employee's decisions
and official actions as a legislator. Provision of Paid Leave to Teacher Serving as
Legislator (5/31/17), Att'y Gen. Adv. Ltr. 2017-05.

A district legislative aide may hold another state job that is not incompatible with
the performance of the legislative aide's duties. — A district legislative aide is
permitted to hold full time employment with another state agency so long as the
legislative aide meets the requirements of each position, discloses the position in
writing, and does not take any official acts in one position that would affect the other.
2025 Op. Ethics Comm'n No. 2025-03.