N.M. Stat. § 30-16-1 (2026)

   A. Larceny consists of the stealing of anything of value that belongs to another.

     B. Whoever commits larceny when the value of the property stolen is two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) or less is guilty of a petty misdemeanor.

   C. Whoever commits larceny when the value of the property stolen is over two
hundred fifty dollars ($250) but not more than five hundred dollars ($500) is guilty of a
misdemeanor.

    D. Whoever commits larceny when the value of the property stolen is over five
hundred dollars ($500) but not more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) is
guilty of a fourth degree felony.

   E. Whoever commits larceny when the value of the property stolen is over two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) but not more than twenty thousand dollars
($20,000) is guilty of a third degree felony.

   F. Whoever commits larceny when the value of the property stolen is over twenty
thousand dollars ($20,000) is guilty of a second degree felony.

    G. Whoever commits larceny when the property of value stolen is livestock is guilty
of a third degree felony regardless of its value.

    H. Whoever commits larceny when the property of value stolen is a firearm is guilty
of a fourth degree felony when its value is less than two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500).

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-16-1, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 16-1; 1969, ch.
171, § 1; 1979, ch. 118, § 1; 1987, ch. 121, § 1; 2006, ch. 29, § 2.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For sheriff's duty to search for stolen livestock, see 29-1-2 NMSA
1978.

For description of cattle in indictment, see 31-7-1 NMSA 1978.

For provision making disposal of livestock levied upon grand larceny, see 39-6-3 NMSA
1978.

For provision on recovery of lost or stolen property from junk dealers, see 57-7-4 NMSA
1978.

For possession of livestock by person accused of theft without bill of sale being prima
facie evidence of illegal possession, see 77-9-21 NMSA 1978.
For livestock board inspector's duty to search for stolen livestock, see 77-9-33 NMSA
1978.

For failure of person killing cattle or sheep to show hide to inspector as evidence of
larceny or receipt of stolen livestock, see 77-17-14 NMSA 1978.

The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, increased the value of property in
Subsection B from $100 or less to $250 or less; increased the value of property in
Subsection C from more than $100 but less than $250 to more than $250 but less than
$500; and increased the value of property in Subsection D from more than $250 to more
than $500.

The 1987 amendment, effective June 19, 1987, added the third paragraph, substituted
"two hundred fifty dollars ($250)" for "one hundred dollars ($100)" in the fourth
paragraph, and substituted "is over" for "exceeds" and "more than" for "over" in the fifth
paragraph.

                           I.     GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Larceny of livestock category constitutional. — The portion of larceny statute, which
made it a felony to steal livestock regardless of its value, applied to all persons who
steal livestock in the state of New Mexico, and did not constitute special legislation
contrary to N.M. Const., art. IV, § 24, nor did it deny defendant equal protection under
the law. State v. Pacheco, 1969-NMCA-127, 81 N.M. 97, 463 P.2d 521 (decided under
prior law).

Punishment under former law. — The punishment of the crime of stealing mules by
not less than 30 lashes on the bare back was not "cruel and inhuman" under the United
States constitution. Garcia v. Territory, 1869-NMSC-001, 1 N.M. 415 (decided under
prior law).

Restitution does not wipe out crime of larceny and does not deprive state of the
right to prosecute for the crime. State v. Odom, 1974-NMCA-118, 86 N.M. 761, 527
P.2d 802.

Legislature to define crimes. — It cannot be gainsaid that the hide of neat cattle is a
part of the animal and its removal from the carcass without permission of the owner and
subsequent appropriation thereof constitutes theft; under former law the legislature said
it shall constitute the crime of larceny, and it is no part of the duty of the courts to inquire
into the wisdom, the policy or the justness of an act of the legislature. State v.
Thompson, 1953-NMSC-072, 57 N.M. 459, 260 P.2d 370 (decided under prior law).

Owner's consent to taking. — In order for an owner to consent to a theft, more than a
passive assent to the taking is required. State v. Ontiveros, 1990-NMCA-112, 111 N.M.
90, 801 P.2d 672, cert. denied, 111 N.M. 77, 801 P.2d 659.
A person does not consent to his property being taken by purposely leaving it exposed,
or failing to resist the taking, even though he may know that another intends to come
and steal it. State v. Ontiveros, 1990-NMCA-112, 111 N.M. 90, 801 P.2d 672, cert.
denied, 111 N.M. 77, 801 P.2d 659.

Pretended cooperation of an agent of an owner in effecting the theft from the owner is
not consent. State v. Ontiveros, 1990-NMCA-112, 111 N.M. 90, 801 P.2d 672, cert.
denied, 111 N.M. 77, 801 P.2d 659.

An owner's nonconsent to larceny may be established by the facts and circumstances in
evidence. State v. Ontiveros, 1990-NMCA-112, 111 N.M. 90, 801 P.2d 672, cert.
denied, 111 N.M. 77, 801 P.2d 659.

Authorized sentence unassailable. — Where defendant, who pleaded guilty to
larceny of property worth over $2500, a third degree felony, was sentenced to the term
authorized by law for a third degree felony his assertion that codefendants were
sentenced for a fourth degree felony on the basis of "the same identical act" and that
the state had reduced the charge against one codefendant to a fourth degree felony
provided no basis for post-conviction relief. State v. Follis, 1970-NMCA-083, 81 N.M.
690, 472 P.2d 655.

Ownership conclusively determined. — A defendant in a larceny case was, after
conviction, barred from litigating the question of ownership of the stolen property with
owner thereof as charged in the indictment. Supulver v. Gilchrist & Dawson, Inc., 1922-
NMSC-060, 28 N.M. 339, 211 P. 595.

Evidence held sufficient to sustain larceny conviction. State v. Davis, 1982-NMCA-
057, 97 N.M. 745, 643 P.2d 614.

Tort liability to thief. — The rules of law governing the liability of appellee for shooting
and wounding appellant while stopping a trespass or the theft of watermelons are the
same whether the proceedings be civil or criminal. Brown v. Martinez, 1961-NMSC-040,
68 N.M. 271, 361 P.2d 152.

               II.    MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS OR PUNISHMENTS.

Larceny of firearm punishable as separate offense. — Under the structure of this
section, where the property stolen includes both generic property and a firearm, larceny
of the firearm is punishable as a separate offense. State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2004-NMSC-
030, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699.

Unit of prosecution under livestock larceny statute. — In consolidated appeals,
where the state charged each defendant with one count of livestock larceny per animal
allegedly stolen, resulting in multiple-count criminal informations, and where, prior to
trial, defendants filed motions to merge or dismiss the multiple charges, asserting that
they instead may only be prosecuted for each episode of theft, the district court did not
err in granting the defendants' motions, because in the livestock larceny statute, the
New Mexico legislature did not intend a unit of prosecution based on the number of
animals stolen in an episode of theft. The livestock larceny statute, instead, expresses
an intent to prosecute defendants for each episode of theft. State v. Torres, 2022-
NMSC-024, aff’g on other grounds, 2021-NMCA-045, 495 P.3d 1141 and A-1-CA-
38561, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App., Sept. 30, 2020) (nonprecedential).

Single larceny doctrine. — The single larceny doctrine, also known as the single
criminal intent doctrine, is a canon of construction used when the legislature's intent
regarding multiple punishments is ambiguous. When several articles of property are
stolen by the defendant from the same owner at the same time and at the same place,
only one larceny is committed. State v. Torres, 2021-NMCA-045, cert. granted.

Single larceny doctrine applied to interpret the unit of prosecution for larceny of
livestock. — In consolidated appeals, where defendants, in separate and unrelated
incidents of cattle rustling, were each charged with multiple counts of larceny of
livestock based on one count per head of cattle stolen, and where the district court
dismissed multiple counts against each defendant, concluding that § 30-16-1(G) NMSA
1978, defined the unit of prosecution as a single offense regardless of the number of
animals taken, reasoning that the term "livestock" is used by our legislature to refer to
animals in the aggregate, and that the term "livestock" is plural and, accordingly, it is the
aggregate of the parts such that a single offense exists irrespective of whether one or
ten animals were taken, the district court did not err in dismissing multiple counts of
larceny or in concluding that the unit of prosecution for larceny of livestock is a single
offense regardless of the number of animals taken, because applying the single larceny
doctrine, it clarifies that a taking of multiple head of cattle at the same time and place, or
a series of takings from a single owner with a single criminal intent, constitutes but one
larceny. State v. Torres, 2021-NMCA-045, cert. granted.

Larceny of several articles. — Under the "single larceny doctrine," as a matter of
judicial policy, a taking of two or more articles of property from the same owner at the
same time and place should be prosecuted as only one larceny, even though separate
convictions would not be barred by double jeopardy. State v. Boeglin, 1977-NMCA-004,
90 N.M. 93, 559 P.2d 1220.

Nothing in the statutory language indicates that the legislature intended to create a
separate offense for each taking of property belonging to different persons during a
continuous episode. State v. Brown, 1992-NMCA-028, 113 N.M. 631, 830 P.2d 183,
cert. denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553.

Charge of larceny is necessarily included in charge of robbery. State v. Eckles,
1968-NMSC-079, 79 N.M. 138, 441 P.2d 36.

Grand larceny and armed robbery merged. — Where the act of grand larceny was
necessary to, or incidental to, the crime of armed robbery which the defendant
committed, the offense of grand larceny was merged with the graver offense of armed
robbery, and hence although the defendant was properly convicted of both armed
robbery and grand larceny, he cannot be doubly punished for both of those crimes.
State v. Quintana, 1961-NMSC-108, 69 N.M. 51, 364 P.2d 120; State v. Montano, 1961-
NMSC-174, 69 N.M. 332, 367 P.2d 95.

No merger of larceny and burglary. — There is no merger when an accused is
charged with both burglary and larceny though the charges stem from one transaction
or event. State v. Deats, 1971-NMCA-089, 82 N.M. 711, 487 P.2d 139.

Elements of larceny and burglary differ. — Since stealing is a necessary element of
larceny but is not a necessary element of burglary, larceny is not necessarily involved in
a burglary; hence, these two crimes do not merge, and defendant could be convicted of
and sentenced for both crimes. State v. McAfee, 1967-NMSC-139, 78 N.M. 108, 428
P.2d 647.

Larceny is not a lesser included offense of burglary, since each crime includes an
element not contained in the other. Burglary requires entry into a dwelling, whereas
larceny does not, and larceny requires an actual taking, whereas burglary does not.
Yparrea v. Dorsey, 64 F.3d 577 (10th Cir. 1995).

Assault and larceny separate offenses. — Assault with a deadly weapon, even
though committed in connection with a larceny is a separate criminal act, as
distinguished from a necessary ingredient of the crime of larceny, and, accordingly,
there may be a conviction and punishment for both. State v. Martinez, 1967-NMSC-103,
77 N.M. 745, 427 P.2d 260.

Unlawful taking of motor vehicle not included offense. — Violation of 64-9-4A, 1953
Comp. (now repealed), by unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, is not necessarily included
in offense of larceny, since the criminal intent requisite for the crime of larceny is the
intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently, while a violation of 64-9-4A,
1953 Comp. (now repealed), does not require this intent. State v. Eckles, 1968-NMSC-
079, 79 N.M. 138, 441 P.2d 36 (decided under prior law, statute repealed).

Receipt of stolen goods by thief himself. — A thief who holds on to stolen property
cannot be guilty of receiving the stolen property because he cannot receive it from
himself, nor can he violate the statute by retaining the stolen property because larceny
is a continuing offense; the thief's disposition of the property, however, is action
separate from the larceny, and it is neither absurd nor unreasonable to hold that the
thief violates 30-16-11 NMSA 1978 when he disposes of the property that he stole.
State v. Tapia, 1976-NMCA-042, 89 N.M. 221, 549 P.2d 636, cert. denied, 89 N.M. 206,
549 P.2d 284.

Asportation of stolen property. — Larceny was a continuing offense, and if property
was stolen in one county and taken by the thief into another, he was guilty of a new
caption and asportation in the latter county. State v. McKinley, 1924-NMSC-052, 30
N.M. 54, 227 P. 757; State v. Meeks, 25 N.M. 231, 180 P. 295.
Transporting stolen livestock and larceny of livestock. — Defendant's conviction for
transporting stolen livestock, when considered with his conviction for larceny of
livestock, violated his constitutional right to be free of double jeopardy. State v. Clark,
2000-NMCA-052, 129 N.M. 194, 3 P.3d 689, cert. denied, 129 N.M. 207, 4 P.3d 35.

Double jeopardy. — Because defendant's case was a single prosecution case, under
which the single larceny doctrine was implicated, defendant's double jeopardy rights
were violated by defendant's two punishments for violations of two clauses of this
section. State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 2003-NMCA-039, 133 N.M. 404, 62 P.3d 1286, rev'd,
2004-NMSC-030, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1177, 125 S. Ct.
1334, 161 L. Ed. 2d 162 (2005).

Municipal court conviction of larceny is not the same offense for purposes of double
jeopardy as a district court conviction of theft of a credit card. State v. Rodriguez, 2005-
NMSC-019, 138 N.M. 21, 116 P.3d 92.

Theft of credit card. — Larceny is a lesser included offense of theft of a credit card.
State v. Rodriguez, 2005-NMSC-019, 138 N.M. 21, 116 P.3d 92.

                            III.   ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE.

Corpus delicti. — The corpus delicti of larceny is constituted of two elements: that the
property was lost by the owner, and that it was lost by a felonious taking. State v. Paris,
1966-NMSC-039, 76 N.M. 291, 414 P.2d 512; State v. Buchanan, 1966-NMSC-045, 76
N.M. 141, 412 P.2d 565.

Ownership of another. — In cases of larceny and embezzlement, ownership of the
property stolen or embezzled must be established in some person or entity capable of
owning property. State v. Parsons, 1917-NMSC-084, 23 N.M. 520, 169 P. 475.

Ownership issues. — Every larceny included a trespass to possession, which could
not exist unless the property was in possession of person from whom it was charged to
have been stolen. State v. Curry, 1927-NMSC-015, 32 N.M. 219, 252 P. 994.

Particular ownership not essential. — Neither an allegation or proof of ownership in a
particular person is an essential element of the offense of larceny, it being sufficient that
the proof disclosed that property stolen belonged to one other than defendant. State v.
Ford, 1969-NMCA-092, 80 N.M. 649, 459 P.2d 353.

Violence not an element. — Larceny, although an essential element of the offense of
robbery, is distinguished primarily on the basis of the violence which precedes or
accompanies the taking; robbery is a compound or aggravated larceny, composed of
the crime of larceny from the person with the aggravation of force, actual or
constructive, used in the taking. State v. Wingate, 1975-NMCA-035, 87 N.M. 397, 534
P.2d 776.
"Steal" connotes intent. — Under the statute using the term "steal," when that term is
used in the instruction, it carries with it a meaning that the taking must have been with a
felonious intent. State v. Paris, 1966-NMSC-039, 76 N.M. 291, 414 P.2d 512.

Specific intent to permanently deprive requisite. — One of the essential elements of
larceny is that of intent on the part of defendant to permanently deprive the owners of
their property; hence, a taking of property by defendant with the intent of using it
temporarily and then returning it would not constitute larceny. State v. Parker, 1969-
NMCA-056, 80 N.M. 551, 458 P.2d 803, cert. denied, 80 N.M. 607, 458 P.2d 859.

As distinguished from wrongful taking of car. — Larceny includes the concept of
criminal intent, and in addition, the intention to permanently deprive the owner of
possession of his property, such intention to permanently deprive is not an essential
element of 64-9-4A, 1953 Comp., prohibiting intentional taking of a motor vehicle
without consent of the owner. State v. Austin, 1969-NMCA-095, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d
230 (decided under prior law, statute repealed).

Embezzlement. — A legislative intent to include the element of intent to permanently
deprive the owner of his property in crime of embezzlement cannot be ascertained by
comparing the embezzlement statute 30-16-8 NMSA 1978 with this section, because
larceny is defined in terms of stealing and comparable language is not used in the
embezzlement statute. State v. Moss, 1971-NMCA-117, 83 N.M. 42, 487 P.2d 1347.

Value of livestock immaterial. — Under former law, in prosecution for depriving owner
of possession of certain sheep, value of the animals was not material, it did not need to
be alleged and if alleged, did not need to be proved. State v. Anaya, 1922-NMSC-059,
28 N.M. 283, 210 P. 567; see also State v. Jaramillo, 1919-NMSC-013, 25 N.M. 228,
180 P. 286; State v. Lucero, 1913-NMSC-011, 17 N.M. 484, 131 P. 491 (prosecutions
for larceny of cattle).

Theft from employer. — Since the physical control exercised by an employee over
property entrusted to him by his employer is merely custody and not possession, an
employee takes the property from his employer's possession, and thereby commits a
trespass, when he converts it; he is accordingly guilty of larceny, without regard to
whether he entertained such intent at the time he acquired custody, or not. State v.
Robertson, 1977-NMCA-044, 90 N.M. 382, 563 P.2d 1175, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637,
567 P.2d 486.

Aiding and abetting. — To be an aider and abettor in the crime of larceny one must
share the criminal intent of the principal; there must be a community of purpose in the
unlawful undertaking. State v. Duran, 1974-NMCA-088, 86 N.M. 594, 526 P.2d 188,
cert. denied, 86 N.M. 593, 526 P.2d 187.

Effect of intoxication on intent. — Voluntary intoxication alone is not a defense to a
charge of larceny, but if a defendant claims he was so intoxicated as to be unable to
form the necessary intent, the question of intent is a matter for the jury. State v. Lucero,
1962-NMSC-077, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837.

Restitution no bar to conviction. — Fact that defendant turned himself in to owner
and worked to make restitution for theft, that owner told defendant he would have
larceny charges against him dismissed and that this was not done, if true, provided no
legal basis for withdrawal of guilty plea. State v. Odom, 1974-NMCA-118, 86 N.M. 761,
527 P.2d 802.

                       IV.    INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.

Allegation of ownership. — In indictment charging embezzlement it is essential to
aver the felonious conversion of the property of another; unless the rule is modified by
statute, the allegation must be as accurate as in an indictment for larceny, and in case
of an association, facts must be averred to show that the association could own
property in its name. State v. Parsons, 1917-NMSC-084, 23 N.M. 520, 169 P. 475
(decided under prior law).

Laying ownership in representative. — Where owner of stolen mule was dead,
indictment charging larceny was to lay the ownership in his representative and not in his
estate. Territory v. Valles, 1909-NMSC-026, 15 N.M. 228, 103 P. 984.

Deprivation of owner's possession understood. — Where indictment charged that
defendant "then and there, unlawfully and feloniously did take, steal and knowingly drive
away, etc." the animal in question, it was not necessary to further allege that the owner
was thereby deprived of the immediate possession of the animal. State v. Roberts,
1914-NMSC-004, 18 N.M. 480, 138 P. 208.

Describing stolen animal in indictment as a "cow" was sufficient. Wilburn v.
Territory, 1900-NMSC-028, 10 N.M. 402, 62 P. 968.

Word "feloniously" unnecessary. — It was not necessary to use word "feloniously" in
information charging larceny from house or other building, under Laws 1869-1870, ch.
26, §§ 1, 2 (former 40-45-6, 40-45-7, 1953 Comp.), to support sentence of three to five
years. State v. Jones, 1930-NMSC-007, 34 N.M. 499, 285 P. 501.

Allegation of knowledge. — The third crime defined by 79, 1897 C.L. (former 40-4-17,
1953 Comp.), of knowingly killing or otherwise depriving the owners of animals of their
immediate possession, was a purely statutory one; use of word "knowingly" made
knowledge an element of the crime, and an indictment failing to allege it in words of
statute or words of similar import failed to state the offense. Territory v. Cortez, 1909-
NMSC-010, 15 N.M. 92, 103 P. 264 (decided under prior law).

Allegation that defendant "committed crime of larceny" would be sufficient where
the crime constituted both statutory grand larceny and common-law larceny. State v.
Shroyer, 1945-NMSC-014, 49 N.M. 196, 160 P.2d 444 (decided under prior law).
Information adequate. — Information charging grand larceny, particularized by
referring to section relating to grand larceny, was sufficient where crime was covered by
that section. State v. Lucero, 1962-NMSC-077, 70 N.M. 268, 372 P.2d 837.

Particulars specified. — Where amendment of information which charged defendant
with larceny of sheep apprised him of particulars he might have asked for in a bill of
particulars, he suffered no injustice. State v. Shroyer, 1945-NMSC-014, 49 N.M. 196,
160 P.2d 444.

Defendant entitled to more definite specification. — Where charge simply alleged
that defendant did steal and carry away certain articles of personal property of a stated
value and being the property of a named individual, and there was not a single word to
indicate the nature or character of the property, the charge was too vague and indefinite
upon which to deprive defendant of his liberty when he had sought a more definite
specification of what constituted the personal property which he was charged with
stealing. State v. Campos, 1968-NMSC-177, 79 N.M. 611, 447 P.2d 20.

Selection of charges. — Where defendant was alleged to have stolen $400 in quarters
from a change machine by using a rigged bill, he is potentially subject to being charged
with both larceny and the misdemeanor offense of cheating a machine or device, and
the preemption rationale of the general-specific rule did not preclude prosecution under
either or both of the statutes. State v. Davis, 2000-NMCA-105, 129 N.M. 773, 14 P.3d
38, cert. denied, 130 N.M. 17, 16 P.3d 442.

Charging in alternative. — An indictment under Laws 1884, ch. 47, § 15 (former 40-4-
17, 1953 Comp.), relating to larceny, embezzlement or killing of animals, could charge
that accused committed the crime in each of the specified ways, so long as they were
not repugnant. State v. McKinley, 1924-NMSC-052, 30 N.M. 54, 227 P. 757.

Some single offenses were of a nature to be committed by many means, and a count
was not necessarily double which charged several of the means, if they were not
repugnant. Territory v. Harrington, 1912-NMSC-006, 17 N.M. 62, 121 P. 613; see also
Territory v. Eaton, 1905-NMSC-011, 13 N.M. 79, 79 P. 713.

Additional details surplusage. — Information charging defendant with stealing a
washing machine belonging to a certain company, from the company warehouse, of the
value of $300, which used the term "grand larceny" and referred to the statutory section
defining grand larceny, sufficiently charged defendant of the crime of grand larceny, and
not larceny from a warehouse, as defendant contended; the additional averment that
the machine was stolen from the company's warehouse was surplusage, its effect, if
any, being merely to place an additional burden on the state in proving the case. State
v. Johnson, 1955-NMSC-070, 60 N.M. 57, 287 P.2d 247.

Variance not jurisdictional. — In conviction for burglary and larceny, variance
between indictment and proof regarding name and address of victim was not
jurisdictional and was cured by jury's guilty verdict. State v. Jaramillo, 1973-NMCA-029,
85 N.M. 19, 508 P.2d 1316, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 5, 508 P.2d 1302, and cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1000, 94 S. Ct. 353, 38 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1973).

"Criminal complaint" insufficient to confer jurisdiction. — Order revoking a
suspended sentence given defendant on a plea of guilty to charges of burglary and
grand larceny contained in a "criminal complaint" filed by sheriff must be reversed, as
the defendant's sentence was imposed without jurisdiction in the court, due to lack of a
proper charge against him. State v. Chacon, 1957-NMSC-030, 62 N.M. 291, 309 P.2d
230.

Designation of crime in bond. — A recognizance which described the alleged offense
against the principal as "having sold and thereby deprived the owner thereof of a horse,
the same being the crime of larceny" sufficiently designated the crime to bind the
sureties on the bond or recognizance. Territory v. Minter, 1907-NMSC-002, 14 N.M. 6,
88 P. 1130.

                                   V.     EVIDENCE.

                                 A.     IN GENERAL.

Proof of venue. — Venue, like any other fact in a case, could be proven by
circumstantial evidence. State v. Lott, 1936-NMSC-024, 40 N.M. 147, 56 P.2d 1029;
State v. Mares, 1921-NMSC-048, 27 N.M. 212, 199 P. 111.

Inference of intent to steal. — An intent to steal was an element to be inferred by the
jury from the facts and circumstances established upon the trial. Such an inference
might be drawn from facts showing that property was taken in one county and driven
through several others and kept for 10 or 12 days before it was found and retaken by its
owner. State v. McKinley, 1924-NMSC-052, 30 N.M. 54, 227 P. 757.

Exhibit relevant to intent. — Fifty foot cotton rope with pipe T's on one end taken from
defendant's car, which was identified as device capable of being used in larceny of
signal wire, was relevant and material to preparation and intent of defendant, even
though there was no evidence that in fact the exhibit was so used. State v. Hardison,
1970-NMCA-043, 81 N.M. 430, 467 P.2d 1002.

Extra-judicial statements inadmissible. — In prosecution for larceny of scrap metal,
defendant's out-of-court statements to witness that codefendant had bought some junk
and that he (defendant) was going to haul the junk were properly disallowed as self-
serving, and were not admissible as part of res gestae since proffered testimony of
witness did not show that they were contemporaneous with a shocked condition or were
spontaneous. State v. Hunt, 1972-NMCA-055, 83 N.M. 753, 497 P.2d 755, cert. denied,
83 N.M. 740, 497 P.2d 742.

                          B.     LARCENY OF LIVESTOCK.
Circumstantial evidence. — In prosecution for larceny of cattle, the corpus delicti
could be proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Ortega, 1932-NMSC-003, 36 N.M.
57, 7 P.2d 943.

Direct evidence of nonconsent of the owner to the killing of an animal was not required
as a matter of law, and such nonconsent could be shown by circumstantial evidence.
State v. Parry, 1920-NMSC-096, 26 N.M. 469, 194 P. 864.

Establishing animal's identity. — It was equally as competent to establish the identity
of a stolen animal by a brand as by its color or by any distinguishing mark. Territory v.
Valles, 1909-NMSC-026, 15 N.M. 228, 103 P. 984.

Proof of ownership. — Where indictment alleged that animal unlawfully killed was the
property of copartners, it was necessary to prove the ownership as laid out in the
indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Territory v. Sais, 1909-NMSC-021, 15 N.M. 171,
103 P. 980.

When brand required as evidence. — Only when the evidence of ownership of
animals depended upon a brand was it necessary to introduce a certified copy of the
recorded brand in evidence. State v. Meeks, 1919-NMSC-015, 25 N.M. 231, 180 P.
295.

Brand not conclusive. — In prosecution for larceny of a steer, the brand was but prima
facie evidence of ownership, and did not prevent prosecution from introducing other
evidence of true ownership of animal at time of offense. Chavez v. Territory, 1892-
NMSC-014, 6 N.M. 455, 30 P. 903.

Brand not conclusive proof of ownership. — Proof that calf bore defendant's brand
in prosecution for stealing and branding the animal did not constitute prima facie
evidence that defendants owned the animal, under statute providing that registration in
brand book under seal of the cattle sanitary board (now New Mexico livestock board)
constituted prima facie proof that person owning the recorded brand was owner of
animal branded with such brand. State v. Reed, 1951-NMSC-021, 55 N.M. 231, 230
P.2d 966), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932, 72 S. Ct. 374, 96 L. Ed. 694 (1952).

Disposal of meat as part of res gestae. — In prosecution for larceny of cattle,
evidence as to hogs eating beef at ranch of a defendant was properly admitted as part
of res gestae. Territory v. Leslie, 1910-NMSC-002, 15 N.M. 240, 106 P. 378.

Prima facie case. — In prosecution for larceny of cattle, proof of ownership in alleged
owner, that the cattle were stolen, that shortly thereafter they were found near the ranch
of defendant, bearing his brand, freshly put on, and that he then claimed to own them,
was sufficient prima facie proof of an unlawful taking and asportation, and made a prima
facie case of larceny, although other cattle of the owner grazed in the same locality
where the stolen cattle were found. State v. Liston, 1921-NMSC-104, 27 N.M. 500, 202
P. 696.
In prosecution for larceny of mule, testimony tending to establish identity of mule,
ownership by named person as administrator, and possession of mule by defendant
was enough to make out a prima facie case of guilt. Territory v. Valles, 1909-NMSC-
026, 15 N.M. 228, 103 P. 984.

Offense established. — Evidence of discovery of two calves belonging to others in
weaning pen of ranch on which the defendant was foreman, along with other
circumstances, afforded adequate support for larceny conviction. State v. Compton,
1953-NMSC-036, 57 N.M. 227, 257 P.2d 915.

Conviction justified. — Possession of hide, ears and hoofs of heifer stolen from ranch,
and their concealment, together with other circumstances, justified conviction for the
theft. State v. Lott, 1936-NMSC-024, 40 N.M. 147, 56 P.2d 1029.

                                    C.     VALUE.

Testimony of owner admissible. — An owner's testimony regarding the value of an
item stolen is admissible and sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict
based on lack of evidence of value. State v. Romero, 1975-NMCA-017, 87 N.M. 279,
532 P.2d 208.

Store owner's calculations. — Testimony of store owner in the form of direct evidence
of items taken and their value, based upon his own knowledge and a calculation of the
value of the items stolen by determining how many items were in the bins before the
theft and how many were left, was substantial evidence as to the value of the goods
stolen. State v. Landlee, 1973-NMCA-143, 85 N.M. 726, 516 P.2d 697.

Cost of television set. — Evidence that stolen television set was purchased new in
March or April prior to the December it was stolen, that the purchase price was $750
and that it was "working all right" before it was stolen, was substantial evidence of
value, and further, as defendant elicited this information on cross-examination, he was
not in a position to complain about it. State v. Phillips, 1971-NMCA-114, 83 N.M. 5, 487
P.2d 915.

Value of checks. — Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on fourth degree
larceny as a lesser included offense of third degree larceny on the grounds that the
$3,200 in checks he stole were neither endorsed nor stamped and therefore worthless.
The value of a check, in the absence of proof to show a lesser value, is measured by
what the owner of the check could expect to receive for the check at the time of the
theft, i.e. the check's face value. Gallegos v. State, 1992-NMSC-014, 113 N.M. 339, 825
P.2d 1249.

Market value. — Testimony of expert witnesses that a fair market value of stolen scrap
metal was in excess of $100 constituted substantial evidence to support conviction of
defendants for larceny of property worth over $100. State v. Hunt, 1972-NMCA-055, 83
N.M. 753, 497 P.2d 755, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 740, 497 P.2d 742.
Cost or replacement value distinguished. — In prosecution for larceny of a plow,
where jury was instructed to determine market value thereof, jury was not warranted in
considering its cost or replacement value. State v. Gallegos, 1957-NMSC-052, 63 N.M.
57, 312 P.2d 1067.

Evidence sufficient. — Testimony that part of the item stolen, if it was considered as
scrap, was worth $30, that its replacement cost was $110 and that its market value was
$170 to $180 was sufficient for a conviction under this statute for larceny of an item in
excess of $100 but less than $2500. State v. Landlee, 1973-NMCA-112, 85 N.M. 449,
513 P.2d 186.

                                  D.     SUFFICIENCY.

Identification adequate. — Where victim and witness of robbery perpetrated by two
masked men described, on the night of the robbery, the robber and the clothes he was
wearing, and at trial identified clothes found in defendant's apartment and defendant
himself on basis of his posture, size and stoop, there was sufficient evidence to
establish that defendant was one of the men involved in the robbery. State v. Quintana,
1961-NMSC-108, 69 N.M. 51, 364 P.2d 120; see also State v. Montano, 1961-NMSC-
174, 69 N.M. 332, 367 P.2d 95.

Exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis save guilt. — Circumstantial evidence of
defendant's aiding or abetting larceny was substantial and did not fail to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than defendant's guilt, where he changed positions in car
containing stolen property and helped reload a television set which fell off the roof of the
vehicle, which actions excluded the defense hypothesis that defendant was asleep and
knew nothing about the larceny. State v. Phillips, 1971-NMCA-114, 83 N.M. 5, 487 P.2d
915.

In prosecution for larceny of signal wire, tracks from car belonging to codefendant and
along line of cut wire, which were shown to match those made by defendant's boots,
along with unexplained flight from the scene and removal of some cut wire about 100
feet in the direction of the car excluded every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.
State v. Hardison, 1970-NMCA-043, 81 N.M. 430, 467 P.2d 1002.

"Exclusive" possession. — If the unexplained possession of stolen property found in
defendant's apartment was within his "exclusive" possession, that circumstance coupled
with other culpatory and incriminating circumstances is sufficient to sustain conviction of
larceny. State v. Flores, 1966-NMSC-059, 76 N.M. 134, 412 P.2d 560.

The "exclusive" possession which creates an inference of guilt does not mean that the
possession must be separate from all others provided there is other evidence to
connect the defendant with the offense. State v. Flores, 1966-NMSC-059, 76 N.M. 134,
412 P.2d 560.
Proof of ownership. — In prosecuting larceny, the state need not prove ownership in a
particular person; proof that the property belonged to someone other than the defendant
is sufficient. State v. Brown, 1992-NMCA-028, 113 N.M. 631, 830 P.2d 183, cert.
denied, 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553.

Sale of property. — While something more than possession alone must be shown to
establish corpus delicti of larceny, where ring owned by woman was relinquished by her
to jailer when she was confined in jail in which defendant was a trustee and defendant
had the ring in his possession afterwards and sold it to another, the corpus delicti of
larceny was established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Buchanan, 1966-NMSC-
045, 76 N.M. 141, 412 P.2d 565.

Evidence that defendant employee took property belonging to corporate owner from the
business where it had been repaired, sold the property to a third person and retained
the proceeds of the sale, and that defendant had no authority either to obtain
possession of the property or to sell it, was evidence of an unlawful taking with the
requisite intent. State v. Robertson, 1977-NMCA-044, 90 N.M. 382, 563 P.2d 1175, cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486.

Taking money from lounge constituted larceny even where the person defendant
took the money from was employed at the lounge, had custody of the money, and
consented to the taking of the money, since the money belonged to the owner, not the
employee and even if the employee had turned the money over to the defendant
willingly, she had no authority to do so. State v. Rhea, 1974-NMCA-030, 86 N.M. 291,
523 P.2d 26, cert. denied, 86 N.M. 281, 523 P.2d 16.

Sufficient evidence to support conviction, despite failure to preserve fingerprints or
trace ownership of weapon. State v. Peterson, 1985-NMCA-109, 103 N.M. 638, 711
P.2d 915, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1052, 106 S. Ct. 1279, 89 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1986).

Sufficient evidence to support conviction for larceny over $20,000. — Where
defendant was convicted of larceny over $20,000 and burglary in connection with
money stolen from a home improvement store in Farmington, New Mexico, where
defendant formerly worked as a department manager, and where, at trial, the state
presented video surveillance of the incident that showed an individual wearing "all
black" using a key to enter the store through the front doors, disable the alarm system,
enter the office, unlock a code-protected safe, take cash from the safe, and leave the
store in a little over two minutes, and where defendant claimed that there was
insufficient evidence to support his larceny conviction because witnesses could not
agree on the exact amount that had been taken and that the amount taken was not
established by documentary evidence, there was sufficient evidence to support
defendant's conviction for larceny over $20,000 where the state presented testimony
from a security officer and the investigating officer regarding the amount that was
stolen. Although the two witnesses did not agree on the exact amount that had been
taken, both witnesses testified that over $20,000 had been stolen from the home
improvement store. State v. Stalter, 2023-NMCA-054, cert. denied.
Sufficient evidence to support retrial for larceny. — When reviewing whether
sufficient evidence exists to support retrial, an appellate court includes in its review any
erroneously admitted evidence, and if all the evidence, including the wrongfully admitted
evidence, is sufficient, then retrial following appeal is not barred. State v. Winters, 2015-
NMCA-050, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-004.

Following reversal of defendant’s conviction for larceny over $2,500, the court of
appeals held that the evidence that defendant’s truck was found at the scene with the
stolen property in the bed of the truck, combined with the erroneously admitted arresting
officer’s opinion that shoe prints found at the scene matched shoe prints found at
defendant’s residence, was sufficient to permit the jury to reasonably infer that
defendant was at the scene and committed the theft; defendant is subject to retrial on
remand. State v. Winters, 2015-NMCA-050, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-004.

Evidence insufficient. — Evidence that smooth soled tracks were found between area
where wire was being larcenously cut and car belonging to one defendant, and that
woman within the car was wearing smooth soled moccasins, where no attempt to match
moccasins to tracks was made, was insufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other than her guilt. State v. Hardison, 1970-NMCA-043, 81 N.M. 430, 467 P.2d 1002.

Where proof relied upon to establish defendant's guilt of breaking and entering and
larceny was purely circumstantial and not incompatible with innocence on any rational
theory, or incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis, it was error for the
court not to have directed a verdict of acquittal at the close of the state's case. State v.
Campos, 1968-NMSC-177, 79 N.M. 611, 447 P.2d 20.

Insufficient evidence that value of stolen property over $2,500. State v. Seward,
1986-NMCA-062, 104 N.M. 548, 724 P.2d 756, cert. denied, 104 N.M. 522, 724 P.2d
231.

Insufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive owner of stolen items. —
Where defendant was convicted of larceny based on DNA evidence found in a
burglarized house, there was insufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to find the
essential facts to establish each element of the crime of larceny beyond a reasonable
doubt, because although there was evidence that defendant had entered the property
without authorization, the state, without presenting any evidence linking defendant to
the stolen items, failed to establish, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that
defendant took or carried away the stolen items with the specific intent to permanently
deprive the owner of those items. State v. Ledbetter, 2020-NMCA-046.

                                  VI.    INSTRUCTIONS.

Intent. — Where on appeal it was contended an error occurred for the district court to
give a general intent instruction without instructing the jury that it did not apply to a
specific intent crime, because the instruction substantially followed the applicable law,
there was no fundamental error. State v. Gee, 2004-NMCA-042, 135 N.M. 408, 89 P.3d
80, cert. denied, 2004-NMCERT-003, 135 N.M. 321, 88 P.3d 261.

Error in time period charged harmless. — Where crime of grand larceny was
charged as having been committed on February 15, 1953, the information charging theft
of a washing machine over the value of $20.00 was filed January 4, 1954, and
meanwhile the statute defining the crime was amended on June 12, 1953, by
substituting $50.00 in lieu of $20.00, fact that the court's instructions permitted jury to
find that the offense had occurred on February 18, 1953, or at any time within the three
years next preceding the date the information was filed was harmless, as the evidence
conclusively showed that the offense had occurred prior to the effective date of the
amendment, and moreover, the error was waived. State v. Johnson, 1955-NMSC-070,
60 N.M. 57, 287 P.2d 247.

Incorrect identification of victim not fundamental error. — Instructions to which
defendant in prosecution for burglary and larceny made no objection, incorrectly setting
forth the name and address of the victim, did not constitute fundamental error. State v.
Jaramillo, 1973-NMCA-029, 85 N.M. 19, 508 P.2d 1316, cert. denied, 85 N.M. 5, 508
P.2d 1302, and cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1000, 94 S. Ct. 353, 38 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1973).

Charge on circumstantial evidence proper. — Instruction on circumstantial evidence
concerning the stealing and unlawful branding of a bull calf was not erroneous because
of inclusion of statement "that before you would be authorized to find a verdict of guilty
against the defendant where the evidence is circumstantial, the facts and circumstances
shown in the evidence must be incompatible upon any reasonable hypothesis with the
innocence of the defendant and incapable of explanation upon any reasonable
hypothesis other than that of the guilt of the defendant." State v. Reed, 1951-NMSC-
021, 55 N.M. 231, 230 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932, 72 S. Ct. 374, 96 L. Ed.
694 (1952).

Cumulative instruction. — The court was not required to give instruction on
circumstantial evidence which was cumulative. State v. Reed, 1951-NMSC-021, 55
N.M. 231, 230 P.2d 966, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 932, 72 S. Ct. 374, 96 L. Ed. 694
(1952).

Instruction on larceny by employee incorrect. — Defendant's requested instruction
which told the jury that if the defendant was an employee of the corporate owner and as
such had the right to have the possession of the equipment in question, then even
though he sold said equipment without authority, he was not guilty of larceny, was an
incorrect statement of the law because it failed to recognize that defendant's physical
control of the equipment was no more than custody on behalf of an employer who
retained possession. State v. Robertson, 1977-NMCA-044, 90 N.M. 382, 563 P.2d
1175, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 637, 567 P.2d 486.

Larceny as included offense. — Because robbery is an aggravated larceny, so that
larceny is necessarily included within the offense of robbery, defendant had the right to
have instructions on larceny submitted to the jury, since there was evidence from
several defense witnesses which tended to establish that offense. State v. Wingate,
1975-NMCA-035, 87 N.M. 397, 534 P.2d 776.

Law reviews. — For article, "The Confusing Law of Criminal Intent in New Mexico," see
5 N.M.L. Rev. 63 (1974).

For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to criminal law, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 229
(1982).

For annual survey of New Mexico Criminal Law, see 20 N.M.L. Rev. 265 (1990).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny § 1 et seq.

Should ownership of property be laid in the husband or the wife in an indictment for
larceny, 2 A.L.R. 352.

Intent to convert property to one's own use or to the use of third person as element of
larceny, 12 A.L.R. 804.

"Asportation" which will support charge of larceny, 19 A.L.R. 724, 144 A.L.R. 1383.

Appropriation of property after obtaining possession by fraud as larceny, 26 A.L.R. 381.

Assisting in transportation or disposal of property known to have been stolen as
rendering one guilty of larceny, 29 A.L.R. 1031.

Individual criminal responsibility of officer or employee for larceny, through corporate
act, of property of third person, 33 A.L.R. 787.

Larceny or embezzlement by one spouse of other's property, 55 A.L.R. 558.

"Larceny" within fidelity bond, 56 A.L.R. 967.

Sufficiency of verdict on conviction, which fails to state value of property, 79 A.L.R.
1180.

Dog as subject of larceny, 92 A.L.R. 212.

Larceny of gas, 113 A.L.R. 1282.

Distinction between larceny and embezzlement, 146 A.L.R. 532.

Gambling or lottery paraphernalia as subject of larceny, 51 A.L.R.2d 1396.
Relative rights, as between purchaser of chattel from one who previously bought it with
stolen money, and victim of the theft, 62 A.L.R.2d 537.

Law as to cats, 73 A.L.R.2d 1032, 8 A.L.R.4th 1287, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080, 68 A.L.R.4th
823.

Carcass: stealing carcass as within statute making it larceny to steal cattle or livestock,
78 A.L.R.2d 1100.

Taking, and pledging or pawning, another's property as larceny, 82 A.L.R.2d 863.

Stolen money or property as subject of larceny, 89 A.L.R.2d 1435.

Entrapment or consent, 10 A.L.R.3d 1121.

Cotenant taking cotenancy property, 17 A.L.R.3d 1394.

Single or separate larceny predicated upon stealing property from different owners at
same time, 37 A.L.R.3d 1407.

Rented vehicles: criminal liability in connection with rental of motor vehicles, 38
A.L.R.3d 949.

Purse snatching as robbery or theft, 42 A.L.R.3d 1381.

Price tags: changing of price tags by patron of self-service store as criminal offense, 60
A.L.R.3d 1293.

Gambling: retaking of money lost at gambling as robbery or larceny, 71 A.L.R.3d 1156.

What constitutes larceny "from a person," 74 A.L.R.3d 271.

Criminal liability for wrongfully obtaining unemployment benefits, 80 A.L.R.3d 1280.

Instruction allowing presumption or inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen
property as violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 88 A.L.R.3d
1178.

Applicability of best evidence rule to proof of ownership of allegedly stolen personal
property in prosecution for theft, 94 A.L.R.3d 824.

Coercion, compulsion, or duress as defense to charge of robbery, larceny, or related
crime, 1 A.L.R.4th 481.

Criminal liability under state laws in connection with application for, or receipt of, public
welfare payments, 22 A.L.R.4th 534.
Bank officer's or employee's misapplication of funds as state criminal offense, 34
A.L.R.4th 547.

Criminal liability for theft of, interference with, or unauthorized use of computer
programs, files, or systems, 51 A.L.R.4th 971.

Cat as subject of larceny, 55 A.L.R.4th 1080.

Consideration of sales tax in determining value of stolen property or amount of theft, 63
A.L.R.5th 417.

What constitutes violation of 15 USCS § 714m(c), proscribing larceny or conversion of
property owned by or pledged to commodity credit corporation, 109 A.L.R. Fed. 871.

52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 1 to 29.