New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-18 (2026)

Implied consent or relinquishment.

✓ current as of May 2026
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A. A consent to adoption or relinquishment of parental rights required pursuant to
the provisions of the Adoption Act shall be implied by the court if the parent, without
justifiable cause, has:

        (1)   left the adoptee without provision for the child's identification for a period
of fourteen days; or
      (2)     left the adoptee with others, including the other parent or an agency,
without provisions for support and without communication for a period of:

       (a) three months if the adoptee was under the age of six years at the
commencement of the three-month period; or

       (b) six months if the adoptee was over the age of six years at the
commencement of the six-month period.

    B. A court shall not imply consent or relinquishment under this section unless the
parent whose relinquishment or consent is to be implied has been served with notice
setting forth the time and place of the hearing at which the consent or relinquishment
may be implied. The implication of a consent or relinquishment under this section shall
have the same effect as though the consent or relinquishment had been given
voluntarily.

   C. The court shall render its decision on the implied consent prior to proceeding with
the adjudicatory hearing.

History: 1978 Comp., § 32A-5-18, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 145.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For abandonment of a child, see 30-6-1 NMSA 1978.

Decisions under prior law. — In light of the similarity of the provisions, annotations
decided under former Section 40-7-36 NMSA 1978 have been included in the
annotations to this section.

Effect of implied consent. — Where petitioners filed a petition to adopt respondent’s
child and served respondent with a motion to imply respondent’s consent to the
adoption; the district court held a hearing on the consent issue and entered an order
implying respondent’s consent; respondent requested findings and conclusion, but did
not file either; and respondent indicated that respondent would appeal the order, but no
appeal was filed, the order implying respondent’s consent was a final, appealable order
that terminated respondent’s right to participate further in the adoption proceedings and
that terminated the respondent’s parental rights. Homer F. v. Jeremiah E., 2009-NMCA-
082, 146 N.M. 845, 215 P.3d 783.

Voluntary conduct toward child may forfeit right to consent. — The person whose
consent is otherwise required may forfeit his right to withhold or grant consent upon the
basis of his voluntary conduct toward the child. Since the entire right may be so lost,
there is no reason why a portion of the right, the specification of the persons in whose
favor consent to adoption is given, may not be the subject of voluntary waiver. Barwin v.
Reidy, 1957-NMSC-016, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175.
Abandonment consists of conduct on part of parent which implies a conscious
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of
the parent-child relationship. In re Adoption of Doe, 1976-NMCA-084, 89 N.M. 606, 555
P.2d 906, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d 620.

Two elements of test of abandonment, parent's conduct as evidence of disregard for
parental obligation and that disregard leading to destruction of parent-child relationship,
are interdependent; both must be established if there is to be legal abandonment. In re
Adoption of Doe, 1976-NMCA-084, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8,
558 P.2d 620.

Abandonment is to be determined objectively, taking into account not only the verbal
expressions of the natural parents but their conduct as parents as well. In re Adoption of
Doe, 1976-NMCA-084, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906, cert. denied, 90 N.M. 8, 558 P.2d
620.

Justifiable cause for failure to communicate and support. — Before the court
issues an order granting a decree of adoption and dispensing with a parent's consent to
adoption based upon a conclusion that the parent has impliedly consented to an
adoption because of a failure of the parent to provide for the support and to
communicate or maintain contact with the child during a certain time period, the court
must also determine whether the failure of the parent to support and communicate with
the child during the time period was "without justifiable cause." Such cause was
established in this case since the father lost his job shortly after he separated from the
mother and was unemployed at the time of the filing of the petition for adoption, the
father continued to object to his son's adoption, the father attempted through counsel to
obtain visitation, and the father made a written demand for the return of his son. In re
Adoption of J.J.B., 1993-NMCA-145, 117 N.M. 31, 868 P.2d 1256, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 1995-NMSC-026, 119 N.M. 638, 894 P.2d 994, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 860,
116 S. Ct. 168, 133 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1995).

Notice to parents required. — It is impossible to declare a child to be dependent and
neglected and then place the child for adoption without notice to the parents. 1959 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 59-59.

Law reviews. — For note, "Family Law - A Limitation on Grandparental Rights in New
Mexico: Christian Placement Service v. Gordon," see 17 N.M.L. Rev. 207 (1987).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Natural parent's indigence as precluding
finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to adoption, 71
A.L.R.4th 305.

Comment Note: Natural parent's indigence as precluding finding that failure to support
child waived requirement of consent to adoption - general principles, 82 A.L.R.5th 443.
Natural parent's indigence resulting from unemployment or underemployment as
precluding finding that failure to support child waived requirement of consent to
adoption, 83 A.L.R.5th 375.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1993–2022 · leading case: Homer F. v. Jeremiah E., 2009 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
Homer F. v. Jeremiah E., 2009 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 10× “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
In Re Adoption of Homer F., 215 P.3d 783 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 10× “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
Matter of Adoption of JJB, 894 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995). · cites it 2× “77, § 234(E) (recompiled as amended at NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-18 (Repl.Pamp.1993)), which, in pertinent part, authorizes the court to imply parental consent to adoption under circumstances where the parent, without justifiable cause, has left a child for three months without…”
Matter of Adoption of JJB, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). · cites it 2× “77, § 145 as Section 32A-5-18. [3] In announcing his ruling, the trial judge stated that if he had been the first judge assigned in the case and Father had made "a motion for immediate custody there is no question in my mind that I would have ordered that [the child] be turned…”
Roth v. Bookert, 894 P.2d 994 (N.M. 1995). · cites it 2× “77, § 234(E) (recompiled as amended at NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-18 (Repl.Pamp.1993)), which, in pertinent part, authorizes the court to imply parental consent to adoption under circumstances where the parent, without justifiable cause, has left a child for three months without…”
Roth v. Bookert, 868 P.2d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 2× “77, § 145 as Section 32A-5-18. .In announcing his ruling, the trial judge stated that if he had been the first judge assigned in the case and Father had made "a motion for immediate custody there is no question in my mind that I would have ordered that [the child] be turned back…”
M.M. v. S.M. (N.M. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 4× “Mother speculates adoption is contemplated; points to nothing in the record denying her visitation with Child; and addresses only NMSA 1978, Section 32A-5-18(A) (1993), providing generally for the conditions in which consent will be implied, and ignores Section 32A-5-18(B),…”
— N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-18(A) — 3 cases
Homer F. v. Jeremiah E., 2009 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
In Re Adoption of Homer F., 215 P.3d 783 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
M.M. v. S.M. (N.M. Ct. App. 2022). “Mother speculates adoption is contemplated; points to nothing in the record denying her visitation with Child; and addresses only NMSA 1978, Section 32A-5-18(A) (1993), providing generally for the conditions in which consent will be implied, and ignores Section 32A-5-18(B),…”
— N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-18(B) — 3 cases
Homer F. v. Jeremiah E., 2009 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
In Re Adoption of Homer F., 215 P.3d 783 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
M.M. v. S.M. (N.M. Ct. App. 2022). “Mother speculates adoption is contemplated; points to nothing in the record denying her visitation with Child; and addresses only NMSA 1978, Section 32A-5-18(A) (1993), providing generally for the conditions in which consent will be implied, and ignores Section 32A-5-18(B),…”
— N.M. Stat. § 32A-5-18(C) — 2 cases
Homer F. v. Jeremiah E., 2009 NMCA 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
In Re Adoption of Homer F., 215 P.3d 783 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009). “{3} As a part of the petition for adoption, Grandparents filed a motion requesting the district court to imply the consent of Father, pursuant to Section 32A-5-18. Father, acting pro se, filed a response to the petition and contested the adoption.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.