N.M. Stat. § 52-1-43 (2026)

A. For disability resulting from an accidental injury to specific body members,
including the loss or loss of use thereof, the worker shall receive the weekly maximum
and minimum compensation for disability as provided in Section 52-1-41 NMSA 1978,
for the following periods:

              Injury                                                               Compensation Benefits
                                                                                          Number of Weeks
       (1)    one arm at or near shoulder, dextrous member                                    200 weeks
       (2)    one arm at elbow, dextrous member                                               160 weeks
       (3)    one arm between wrist at elbow, dextrous member                                 150 weeks
       (4)    one arm at or near shoulder, nondextrous member                                 175 weeks
       (5)    one arm at elbow, nondextrous member                                            155 weeks
       (6)    one arm between wrist and elbow, nondextrous member                             140 weeks
       (7)    one hand, dextrous member                                                       125 weeks
       (8)    one hand, nondextrous member                                                    110 weeks
       (9)    one thumb and the metacarpal bone thereof                                        55 weeks
       (10)   one thumb at the proximal joint                                                  34 weeks
       (11)   one thumb at the second distal joint                                             22 weeks
       (12)   one first finger and the metacarpal bone thereof                                 28 weeks
       (13)   one first finger at the proximal joint                                           22 weeks
       (14)   one first finger at the second joint                                             17 weeks
       (15)   one first finger at the distal joint                                             12 weeks
       (16)   one second finger and the metacarpal bone thereof                                22 weeks
       (17)   one second finger at the proximal joint                                          17 weeks
       (18)   one second finger at the second joint                                            12 weeks
       (19)   one second finger at the distal joint                                            10 weeks
       (20)   one third finger and the metacarpal bone thereof                                 17 weeks
       (21)   one third finger at the proximal joint                                           12 weeks
       (22)   one third finger at the second joint                                             10 weeks
       (23)   one third finger at the distal joint                                             10 weeks
       (24)   one fourth finger and the metacarpal bone thereof                                14 weeks
       (25)   one fourth finger at the proximal joint                                          14 weeks
       (26)   one fourth finger at the second joint                                            10 weeks
       (27)   one fourth finger at the distal joint                                             7 weeks
       (28)   loss of all fingers on one hand where thumb and palm remain                      70 weeks
       (29)   one leg at or near hip joint, so as to preclude the use of an artificial limb   200 weeks
       (30) one leg at or above the knee, where stump remains sufficient to permit         150 weeks
            the use of an artificial limb
       (31) one leg between knee and ankle                                                 130 weeks
       (32) one foot at the ankle                                                          115 weeks
       (33) one great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof                                  35 weeks
       (34) one great toe at the proximal joint                                             17 weeks
       (35) one great toe at the second joint                                               12 weeks
       (36) one toe other than the great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof               14 weeks
       (37) one toe other than the great toe at the proximal joint                          10 weeks
       (38) one toe other than the great toe at second or distal joint                       8 weeks
       (39) loss of all toes on one foot at proximal joint                                  40 weeks
       (40) eye by enucleation                                                             130 weeks
       (41) total blindness of one eye                                                     120 weeks
       (42) total deafness in one ear                                                       40 weeks
       (43) total deafness in both ears                                                    150 weeks.

    B. For a partial loss of use of one of the body members or physical functions listed
in Subsection A of this section, the worker shall receive compensation computed on the
basis of the degree of such partial loss of use, payable for the number of weeks
applicable to total loss or loss of use of that body member or physical function.

    C. In cases of actual amputation of the arm or leg, the workers' compensation judge
in his discretion may award compensation benefits in excess of those provided in
Subsection A of this section if there is substantial evidence to support a finding that,
because of the worker's advanced age, lack of education or lack of training, he has in
fact a partial disability which will disable him longer than the time specified in the
schedule in Subsection A of this section. The additional compensation period may not in
any event exceed twice the time specified in the schedule in Subsection A of this
section for such injury.

    D. In determining the worker's compensation benefits payable to a worker under this
section for a disability resulting from a scheduled injury, the worker is entitled to be
compensated as provided in Subsection A of this section up to the date the worker is
released from regular treatment by his primary treating health care provider, as defined
in Section 52-4-1 NMSA 1978, if he is in fact totally disabled during that time. Any
compensation paid up to that date shall be in addition to the compensation allowed
under Subsection A of this section, but in no event shall any worker be entitled to
compensation for a period in excess of seven hundred weeks.

History: 1978 Comp., § 52-1-31, enacted by Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 18; 1989, ch. 263, §
25; 2003, ch. 259, § 5.

                                    ANNOTATIONS
Repeals and reenactments. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 18 repealed former 52-1-43
NMSA 1978, as reenacted by Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 13, and enacted a new 52-1-43
NMSA 1978, effective June 19, 1987.

Compiler's notes. — Laws 1987, ch. 235, § 54A, effective June 19, 1987, repealed
Laws 1986, ch. 22, § 105 which had formerly repealed this section effective July 1,
1987.

The 2003 amendment, effective June 20, 2003, in Subsection C substituted "of those
provided in Subsection A of this section" for "of the period hereinafter stated" following
"benefits in excess" near the middle of the first sentence, inserted "in Subsection A of
this section" at the end of the first sentence, and inserted "in Subsection A of this
section" near the end of the second sentence.

                          I.      GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

Statutory obfuscation legitimated. — Sections 52-1-41, 52-1-42 and 52-1-43 NMSA
1978 may seem inconsistent and hard to understand to some lay and professional
people, but these provisions are the law in New Mexico. Maschio v. Kaiser Steel Corp.,
1983-NMCA-119, 100 N.M. 455, 672 P.2d 284, cert. denied, 100 N.M. 439, 671 P.2d
1150.

Scheduled injury section limits only benefits payable for "partial disability"; it
does not limit benefits where there is a "total disability." Witcher v. Capitan Drilling Co.,
1972-NMCA-145, 84 N.M. 369, 503 P.2d 652, cert. quashed, 85 N.M. 380, 512 P.2d
953 (1973).

Section does not limit modification. — This section does not limit the amount of time
in which the worker could file a claim for increased benefits under Section 52-1-56
NMSA 1978. Henington v. Technical-Vocational Inst., 2002-NMCA-025, 131 N.M. 655,
41 P.3d 923, cert. denied, 131 N.M. 737, 42 P.3d 842.

Construed in pari materia. — Each of the three sections are part of the same
legislative act and are to be read together so as to give effect to each of the sections.
Witcher v. Capitan Drilling Co., 1972-NMCA-145, 84 N.M. 369, 503 P.2d 652, cert.
quashed, 85 N.M. 380, 512 P.2d 953 (1973).

Proof of impairment not essential. — Proof of an impairment, as defined in Section
52-1-24A NMSA 1978, is not essential for recovery under Section 52-1-43 NMSA 1978.
Lucero v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 1994-NMCA-076, 118 N.M. 35, 878 P.2d 353,
cert. denied, 118 N.M. 90, 879 P.2d 91.

New Mexico license not required. — The words "health care provider, as defined in
Section 52-4-1 NMSA 1978" should be construed to mean those persons licensed (not
necessarily in New Mexico) in one of the occupations listed in Section 52-4-1 NMSA
1978. If the result were otherwise, the person providing health care to a worker residing
out of state would not necessarily be licensed in New Mexico, and thus would never be
able to release the worker from "his primary treating health care provider, as defined in
Section 52-4-1 NMSA 1978" because the worker would have no such treating health
care provider. Coslett v. Third St. Grocery, 1994-NMCA-046, 117 N.M. 727, 876 P.2d
656, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 802, 877 P.2d 1105.

Question whether there is additional bodily injury giving rise to award beyond that
specifically provided for in this section is for the jury to decide. Reck v. Robert E. McKee
Gen. Contractors, 1955-NMSC-074, 59 N.M. 492, 287 P.2d 61 (decided under former
law).

In order to establish that healing period extended beyond number of weeks
specified in Subsection A, claimant was required to show that he was totally disabled
during such extended time. Hedgecock v. Vandiver, 1970-NMCA-117, 82 N.M. 140, 477
P.2d 316.

Strict application of section creates inequities in remedy provided to injured
workmen who are totally disabled and unable to return to gainful employment
because of injuries to a scheduled body member. American Tank & Steel Corp. v.
Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Section does not take into consideration the occupation of the worker and how the
loss of the specific member of the body may affect his or her ability to perform the duties
of his or her job. Hise Constr. v. Candelaria, 1982-NMSC-109, 98 N.M. 759, 652 P.2d
1210.

Shoulder injury is a non-scheduled injury. Carter v. Mountain Bell, 1986-NMCA-103,
105 N.M. 17, 727 P.2d 956.

                                    II.    DISABILITY.

Compensation based on disability not physical impairment. — The fact that
compensation is not limited to the scheduled injury section does not, however, mean
that compensation outside the scheduled injury section is to be awarded on the basis of
physical impairment. Compensation, apart from the scheduled injury section, is based
on disability. "Physical impairment" does not automatically equate with "disability."
Willcox v. United Nuclear Homestake Sapin Co., 1971-NMCA-126, 83 N.M. 73, 488
P.2d 123.

Disability separate and distinct from scheduled injury. — In order to obtain partial
disability benefits and not be limited to scheduled injury benefits, plaintiff was required
to establish a separate and distinct impairment to other body parts in addition to the
injury to her knee. Beltran v. Van Ark Care Ctr., 1988-NMCA-043, 107 N.M. 273, 756
P.2d 1.
The separate and distinct injury necessary to remove a plaintiff from the scheduled
injury section must result from or be attributable to the accident or injury to the
scheduled member. The question of whether a separate and distinct impairment exists
is one for the finder of fact to determine. Beltran v. Van Ark Care Ctr., 1988-NMCA-043,
107 N.M. 273, 756 P.2d 1.

Since an injured worker proved separate and distinct impairment to other parts of his
body in addition to his scheduled member injuries, he was entitled to partial disability
benefits under Section 52-1-42 NMSA 1978, and not just to benefits under this section
(specific body members). Harrison v. Animas Valley Auto & Truck Repair, 1988-NMSC-
055, 107 N.M. 373, 758 P.2d 787.

For a worker to receive permanent partial disability benefits under Section 52-1-42
NMSA 1978, rather than scheduled injury benefits under this section, a worker must
show that: (1) she is totally disabled; or (2) she has suffered a separate and distinct
impairment to a nonscheduled body part. Jurado v. Levi Strauss & Co., 1995-NMCA-
129, 120 N.M. 801, 907 P.2d 205, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 715, 905 P.2d 1119.

Impairment and disability contrasted. — If a workman (worker) is able to perform his
usual tasks, despite a defect or infirmity limiting or making useless a member or limb of
the body, the workman (worker) is physically impaired, but not functionally disabled,
because the act is not concerned with a workman's (worker's) physical injury. It is
concerned with capacity to work. Therefore, nondisabling pain does not constitute a
compensable injury. Neither does a psychiatric or mental impairment. Perez v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1981-NMCA-022, 95 N.M. 628, 624 P.2d 1025,
cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186.

When impairment equates with disability. — If a member or limb of a body is
defective or infirm and creates a condition whereby a workman (worker) is wholly or
partially unable to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of
his injury, and is wholly or partially unable to perform any work for which he is fitted,
"physical impairment" equates with total or partial disability. Perez v. International
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1981-NMCA-022, 95 N.M. 628, 624 P.2d 1025, cert. denied,
95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186.

"Physical impairment" does not automatically equate with "disability." "Physical
impairment" denotes a defect or infirmity limiting or making useless a member or limb of
the body. Candelaria v. Hise Constr., 1981-NMCA-145, 98 N.M. 763, 652 P.2d 1214,
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 1982-NMSC-109, 98 N.M. 759, 652 P.2d 1210, overruled on
other grounds by Garcia v. Schneider, Inc., 1986-NMCA-127, 105 N.M. 234, 731 P.2d
377.

Total disability covered by Section 52-1-41 NMSA 1978. — If a worker is totally
disabled due to an injury, then he or she is entitled to disability under Section 52-1-41
NMSA 1978, even if the disability results from the loss of or injury to a scheduled
member that is enumerated under this section. Hise Constr. v. Candelaria, 1982-NMSC-
109, 98 N.M. 759, 652 P.2d 1210.

Court cannot conclude both total disability and scheduled injury. — Where the
court both found and concluded that plaintiff was totally disabled but it also concluded
and entered judgment for a scheduled injury, the judgment was reversed and remanded
for a new judgment which conformed to the finding of total disability. Mendez v.
Southwest Cmty. Health Servs., 1986-NMCA-066, 104 N.M. 608, 725 P.2d 584, cert.
denied, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832.

No deduction of non-schedule benefits from disability received for scheduled
injury. — The number of weeks an injured worker received benefits for the disabilities
caused by injuries to a scheduled body part, his knees, could not be deducted from the
number of weeks he was entitled to receive benefits for the subsequent injury to his
shoulder, a non-scheduled part, which was caused by his original knee injury. Baca v.
Complete Drywall Co., 2002-NMCA-002, 131 N.M. 413, 38 P.3d 181, cert. denied, 131
N.M. 564, 40 P.3d 1008.

Primary test for disability is the capacity to perform work. Adams v. Loffland Bros.
Drilling Co., 1970-NMCA-114, 82 N.M. 72, 475 P.2d 466.

Determination of degree of disability is a question of fact for the fact finder and if
there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding, the appellate court is
bound thereby. Adams v. Loffland Bros. Drilling Co., 1970-NMCA-114, 82 N.M. 72, 475
P.2d 466.

Degree of disability is a question of fact for trial court, and the primary test for
disability is plaintiff's capacity to perform work. Trujillo v. Tanuz, 1973-NMCA-048, 85
N.M. 35, 508 P.2d 1332.

More compensation if disability transcends scheduled injury. — Disability
compensation was more than that allowed for a scheduled injury to the left elbow since
there was substantial evidence to support the compensation order to the extent it relied
on the fact that the worker's disability was not limited to a scheduled member or
function. Rodriguez v. McAnally Enters., 1994-NMCA-025, 117 N.M. 250, 871 P.2d 14.

Impairment distinct from schedule immaterial where total disability. — Where in
fact there is a total disability, compensation under the workmen's (workers')
compensation statute is to be paid for the disability without regard to whether the
workman (worker) has a bodily impairment distinct from scheduled injuries. Witcher v.
Capitan Drilling Co., 1972-NMCA-145, 84 N.M. 369, 503 P.2d 652, cert. quashed, 85
N.M. 380, 512 P.2d 953 (1973).

Accidental injuries to the nervous system are compensable when resulting in
disability. Webb v. Hamilton, 1968-NMSC-008, 78 N.M. 647, 436 P.2d 507, overruled
on other grounds by American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90
N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Injury justified award. — A code welder who sustained an accidental injury to his right
thumb, right index finger and the webbing between the thumb and finger, without further
impairment to his body, as a natural and direct result of an accident, with the ability to
use some, but not all, of the tools necessary to perform the usual tasks of a welder, was
equally justified to an award of total and permanent disability under Section 52-1-24
NMSA 1978 (now Section 52-1-25 NMSA 1978) or an award for a scheduled injury
under this section. American Tank & Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90
N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.

Pain as compensable injury. — A severe pain which does disable a workman (worker)
is a compensable injury. A workman (worker) may retain all of the normal bodily
functions of his organs and still be so weak or be in such pain that he would be totally or
partially disabled from retaining or obtaining remunerative employment. Perez v.
International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 1981-NMCA-022, 95 N.M. 628, 624 P.2d 1025,
cert. denied, 95 N.M. 669, 625 P.2d 1186.

Disability benefits for phantom pain and secondary depression. — Since the
record supported the determination of the worker's compensation judge that claimant's
pain and secondary depression were injuries separate and distinct from an amputation
of finger and thumb, claimant was entitled to partial disability benefits on these claims.
Gordon v. Dennisson Doors, Inc., 1992-NMCA-136, 114 N.M. 767, 845 P.2d 861.

                               III.   SCHEDULED INJURY.

Subsection B's relation to Subsection A. — The most sensible construction of this
section is that Subsection A sets forth the benefits for total loss or total loss of use of a
member or function and Subsection B sets forth the benefits for partial loss of use of a
member or function. Twin Mt. Rock v. Ramirez, 1994-NMCA-020, 117 N.M. 367, 871
P.2d 1373, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 802, 877 P.2d 1105.

The "number of weeks" referred to in Subsection B is the number of weeks set forth in
the various paragraphs in Subsection A. It is significant that Subsection B refers to
those numbers as the "number of weeks applicable to total loss or loss of use," thereby
indicating that the provisions in Subsection A relate solely to total loss or loss of use of a
body member or physical function. Twin Mt. Rock v. Ramirez, 1994-NMCA-020, 117
N.M. 367, 871 P.2d 1373, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 802, 877 P.2d 1105.

Section applicable when impairment does not create disability. — If one suffers a
scheduled injury which causes a physical impairment but does not create disability, this
section will apply. When the impairment amounts to a disability, Sections 52-1-41
NMSA 1978 and 52-1-42 NMSA 1978 are properly invoked. American Tank & Steel
Corp. v. Thompson, 1977-NMSC-052, 90 N.M. 513, 565 P.2d 1030.
Work-related injury and preexisting impairment. — Where worker sustained a work-
related injury to the left knee; worker had a preexisting impairment in the right knee
which was not a consequence of the work-related accident; and there was no evidence
that worker's preexisting right knee impairment became worse as a result of the
accident, the workers' compensation judge did not err in finding that the preexisting right
knee injury did not combine with the left knee injury to result in additional disability.
Jojola v. Fresenius Med. Clinic, 2010-NMCA-101, 149 N.M. 51, 243 P.3d 755.

Enhanced disability concept (preexiting injury rule), under which the present extent
of impairment covered as a scheduled injury is to be compensated without factoring out
previous causes of impairment, is an integral part of the Workers’ Compensation Act
and applies to the scheduled injuries section under the Act where there is no temporary
or permanent disability. Smith v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co., 2003-NMCA-097, 134 N.M.
202, 75 P.3d 418, cert. denied, 2003-NMCERT-008, 134 N.M. 171, 74 P.3d 600.

Where a worker suffered a 59% loss of hearing, which was the result of a work-related
injury combined with the worker’s preexisting condition, the worker was entitled to
compensation for his total impairment, notwithstanding the employer’s argument that
only 5% of the loss was due to the work-related injury. Smith v. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co.,
2003-NMCA-097, 134 N.M. 202, 75 P.3d 418, cert. denied, 2003-NMCERT-008, 134
N.M. 171, 74 P.3d 600.

Benefits are allowed for total disability when the total disability results from the loss
of, or injury to, a scheduled member. Mendez v. Southwest Cmty. Health Servs., 1986-
NMCA-066, 104 N.M. 608, 725 P.2d 584, cert. denied, 104 N.M. 632, 725 P.2d 832.

Where an injury to a scheduled member results in total disability, the scheduled
member section does not prohibit compensation based on such total disability.
Archuleta v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 1986-NMCA-092, 104 N.M. 769, 727 P.2d 77.

An injury to the hip is an injury to the body as a whole, even if it results in pain,
impairment, etc., to a member, i.e., the leg. Nelson v. Nelson Chem. Corp., 1987-
NMCA-024, 105 N.M. 493, 734 P.2d 273.

Disability to knee. — A plaintiff whose sole injury is a 50% disability to one knee has a
recovery which is limited to the scheduled injury provision in this section. Maschio v.
Kaiser Steel Corp., 1983-NMCA-119, 100 N.M. 455, 672 P.2d 284, cert. denied, 100
N.M. 439, 671 P.2d 1150.

Term "one foot at the ankle" construed. — Where worker appealed from an order of
a workers' compensation judge (WCJ) awarding her 115 weeks of benefits for a
scheduled injury to "one foot at the ankle," pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 52-1-43(A)(32),
and where worker claimed that an injury to the upper part of the ankle is not an injury to
"one foot at the ankle," but should be considered an injury to her "leg between knee and
the ankle" that the plain language of the Workers' Compensation Act supported her
claim that the legislature used the phrase "at the joint" in the list of scheduled injuries to
include only injuries to the body member named up to the named joint, and not injuries
to the joint itself, and that she was therefore entitled to compensation for 130 weeks for
an injury to her leg between the knee and the ankle and an additional 115 weeks of
compensation for a separate injury to her foot, the WCJ did not err in determining that
an ankle injury is a scheduled injury to the "foot at the ankle," compensable under 52-1-
43(A)(32) NMSA 1978. Separating an injury to a single ankle into two injuries, one to
the foot and the other to the leg as worker suggests, is not consistent with the obvious
purpose of the scheduled injury section and would lead to an absurd result. Jaramillo v.
N.M. Tax'n & Revenue Dep't, 2024-NMCA-028, cert. denied.

Total blindness in one eye. — Where claimant lost 98% of vision in her left eye while
at home and made no claim for benefits and later lost 80% of vision in her right eye as a
result of a hemorrhage suffered at work, she was entitled to benefits for total blindness
of one eye, not for total disability. Crane v. San Juan Cnty., 1983-NMCA-133, 100 N.M.
600, 673 P.2d 1333, cert. denied, 100 N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 421.

Lost eye compensated under this section following recovery from "separate and
distinct" disability. — Plaintiff who was legally blind in his injured eye had "lost his
eye" and, upon recovery from traumatic neurosis, no longer suffering from impairment
"separate and distinct" from loss of that eye, should be compensated under this section.
Ranville v. J.T.S. Enters., Inc., 1984-NMCA-100, 101 N.M. 803, 689 P.2d 1274.

Loss of use of injured eye judged on basis of uncorrected vision. Ranville v. J.T.S.
Enters., Inc., 1984-NMCA-100, 101 N.M. 803, 689 P.2d 1274.

Without correction, impairment to the plaintiff's left eye is 100%; if sight to this eye is
corrected to potential, the impairment may be reduced to 90-95%. However,
compensation is not based on corrected vision. Fierro v. Stanley's Hardware, 1985-
NMCA-085, 104 N.M. 401, 722 P.2d 652, rev'd on other grounds, 1986-NMSC-022, 104
N.M. 50, 716 P.2d 241.

Where eye cannot be corrected by glasses as well. — If plaintiff was injured in the
course of his employment, and as a result one eye cannot be corrected by glasses as
well after the injury as before, he is entitled to compensation whether or not there is a
change in his vision without glasses. Sessing v. Yates Drilling Co., 1964-NMSC-225, 74
N.M. 550, 395 P.2d 824.

Partial loss of vision. — Where the disability is not total blindness in one eye, but only
partial loss of vision, the section requires that the compensation shall be measured by
the extent of the disability. Webb v. Forrest Currell Lumber Co., 1961-NMSC-029, 68
N.M. 187, 360 P.2d 380.

Claimant receiving scheduled injury benefits based on 60% loss of use of
nondexterous hand not barred from seeking additional compensation for
psychiatric injury by insurer's payment of maximum benefits for 60% of required period
rather than, as required by statute, payment of 60% of maximum benefits for required
period. Paternoster v. La Cuesta Cabinets, Inc., 1984-NMCA-097, 101 N.M. 773, 689
P.2d 289.

Evidence. — Although evidence based on American Medical Association (AMA) guides
or publications would be helpful to an understanding of the percentage loss of use of a
specific member, evidence of that character is not required under this section as it
currently exists. Lucero v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 1994-NMCA-076, 118 N.M. 35,
878 P.2d 353, cert. denied, 118 N.M. 90, 879 P.2d 91.

Judge's award of scheduled injury benefits based on both the AMA Guides and reliance
on the worker's and doctors' testimonies was supported by substantial evidence. Valdez
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1998-NMCA-030, 124 N.M. 655, 954 P.2d 87, cert. denied,
124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087.

Finding supported by substantial evidence prevails over conflicting opinion. —
The trial court's finding of 15 to 20% loss of use of the left leg, supported by medical
testimony, prevails over a conflicting judgment of the district court ordering payment of
100% of the amount of the compensation rate for loss of a leg. When a finding
supported by substantial evidence conflicts with an opinion, the finding prevails. Roybal
v. Chavez Concrete & Excavation Contractors, Inc., 1985-NMCA-020, 102 N.M. 428,
696 P.2d 1021.

Finding of injury to arm not supported by evidence. — Although the medical expert
testified that, in his opinion, the purpose an arm serves is to position a hand in space
and give the hand strength to do things and without a functioning hand the arm
becomes useless, nothing more than a "paperweight," the record did not reveal any
evidence to support the opinion that worker's left arm was useless. Because the medical
expert's opinion would essentially render meaningless those portions of the scheduled
injury section dealing with hand injuries and an interpretation of the scheduled injury
section that renders part of it meaningless cannot be condoned, the trial judge erred in
finding a scheduled injury to worker's left arm instead of her left hand. Murphy v. Duke
City Pizza, Inc., 1994-NMCA-085, 118 N.M. 346, 881 P.2d 706, cert. denied, 118 N.M.
430, 882 P.2d 21.

Law reviews. — For comment, "Witnesses - Privileged Communications - Physician-
Patient Privilege in Workmen's Compensation Cases," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 442
(1967).

For note, "Workmen's Compensation in New Mexico: Preexisting Conditions and the
Subsequent Injury Act," see 7 Nat. Resources J. 632 (1967).

For article, "Survey on New Mexico Law, 1982-83: Workmen's Compensation," see 14
N.M.L. Rev. 211 (1984).

For survey of workers' compensation law in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 579
(1988).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation
§§ 380, 385, 386, 400 to 405, 434.

Workers' compensation: recovery for carpal tunnel syndrome, 14 A.L.R.5th 1.

99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 306 to 317.