N.M. Stat. § 61-1-13 (2026)

A. After a hearing has been completed, the members of the board shall proceed to
consider the case and as soon as practicable shall render their decision, provided that
the decision shall be rendered by a quorum of the board. In cases in which the hearing
is conducted by a hearing officer, all members who were not present throughout the
hearing shall familiarize themselves with the record, including the hearing officer's
report, before participating in the decision. In cases in which the hearing is conducted
by the board, all members who were not present throughout the hearing shall
thoroughly familiarize themselves with the entire record, including all evidence taken at
the hearing, before participating in the decision.

   B. A final decision and order based on the hearing shall be made by a quorum of
the board and signed and executed by the person designated by the board within ninety
days after the hearing is closed by the board.

History: 1953 Comp., § 67-26-13, enacted by Laws 1957, ch. 247, § 13; 1978 Comp., §
61-1-13; 1981, ch. 349, § 12; 1993, ch. 295, § 6; 2023, ch. 190, § 14.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

The 2023 amendment, effective July 1, 2023, clarified certain language in the section,
and revised the deadline by which the board must submit a final decision and order
following a hearing; and in Subsection B, after "A", added "final", after "decision", added
"and order", after "signed", added "and executed", after "by the board within", deleted
"sixty days after the completion of the preparation of the record or submission of a
hearing officer’s report, whichever is later. In any case, the decision must be rendered
and signed within", and after "after the hearing", added "is closed by the board."

The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, in Subsection A, substituted "a quorum
of the board" for "the board at a meeting where a majority of the members are present
and participating in the decision" at the end of the first sentence; and made stylistic
changes in the second and third sentences.

Standard of proof for a hearing under this section is by a preponderance of the
evidence. Foster v. Board of Dentistry, 1986-NMSC-009, 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580.
Section requires that decision be made by majority of the members of the board.
McCaughtry v. N.M. Real Estate Comm'n, 1970-NMSC-143, 82 N.M. 116, 477 P.2d
292.

The board is not required to give deference to a hearing officer’s report. — Where
the hearing officer was appointed to take evidence on a complaint that the dentist
engaged in unprofessional conduct, the hearing officer found that the dentist had not
engaged in unprofessional conduct and recommended that no disciplinary action be
taken; the board reviewed the hearing officer’s report and the evidence, and concluded
that the dentist had engaged in unprofessional conduct; and the Uniform Licensing Act
only permits the hearing officer to make findings, but not to make conclusions of law or
recommendations regarding disciplinary action and requires the board to use its
knowledge and expertise to make its own findings and conclusions, and to determine
what disciplinary action is appropriate, the district court erred by concluding that the
board acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to defer to the hearing officer’s
report. N.M. Bd. of Dental Health Care v. Jaime, 2013-NMCA-040, 296 P.3d 1261.

Effect of failure to timely sign decision. — Failure of the board of dentistry to render
and sign its decision suspending a dentist's license within 90 days after completion of
the hearing made the decision null and void. Foster v. Board of Dentistry, 1986-NMSC-
009, 103 N.M. 776, 714 P.2d 580.

The 90-day time limit imposed by this section is expressly jurisdictional. Where the
board fails to take action within the required 90-day period, its decision is void and must
be reversed. Lopez v. N.M. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 1988-NMSC-039, 107 N.M. 145, 754
P.2d 522.

Authority of secretary of public education to revoke teachers’ licenses. — Article
XII, Section 6 of the New Mexico Constitution, the Uniform Licensing Act, Sections 61-1-
1 et seq. NMSA 1978, the Public Education Department Act, Chapter 9, Article 24
NMSA 1978, the Public School Code, Chapter 22 NMSA 1978, and the School
Personnel Act, Chapter 22, Article 10A NMSA 1978, do not preclude the secretary of
public education from having exclusive authority to make the final decision to revoke a
teacher’s license. Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, 2013-NMCA-034, 298 P.3d
469, cert. granted, 2013-NMCERT-003.

Uniform Licensing Act is not a tax statute, and does not carry with it the presumption
of correctness and burden of persuasion that favors the state in tax matters. Kmart
Props., Inc. v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 2006-NMCA-026, 139 N.M. 177, 131
P.3d 27, aff'd, 2006-NMSC-006, 139 N.M. 172, 131 P.3d 22.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 53 C.J.S. Licenses §§ 43, 60.