New Mexico Statutes
N.M. Stat. § 61-1-4 (2026)
Notice of contemplated board action; request for hearing;
✓ current as of May 2026
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notice of hearing.
A. When investigating complaints against licensees, applicants or unlicensed
persons, a board may issue civil investigative subpoenas prior to the issuance of a
notice of contemplated action as provided in this section. The authority to issue a
specific civil investigative subpoena under this section may be delegated by the board
to staff.
B. When a board contemplates taking an action of a type specified in Subsection A,
B or C of Section 61-1-3 NMSA 1978, it shall serve upon the applicant a written notice
containing a statement:
(1) that the applicant has failed to satisfy the board of the applicant's
qualifications to be examined or to be issued a license, as the case may be;
(2) indicating in what respects the applicant has failed to satisfy the board;
(3) that the applicant may secure a hearing before the board by depositing in
the mail within twenty days after service of the notice a certified return receipt requested
letter addressed to the board and containing a request for a hearing; and
(4) calling the applicant's attention to the applicant's rights under Section 61-
1-8 NMSA 1978.
C. In a board proceeding to take an action of a type specified in Subsection A, B or
C of Section 61-1-3 NMSA 1978, the burden of satisfying the board of the applicant's
qualifications shall be upon the applicant.
D. When a board contemplates taking an action of a type specified in Subsections D
through N of Section 61-1-3 NMSA 1978 or Section 61-1-3.2 NMSA 1978, it shall serve
upon the licensee, applicant or unlicensed person a written notice containing a
statement:
(1) that the board has sufficient evidence that, if not rebutted or explained,
may justify the board in taking the contemplated action;
(2) indicating the general nature of the evidence and allegations, including
specific laws or rules that are alleged to have been violated;
(3) that unless the licensee, applicant or unlicensed person within twenty days
after service of the notice deposits in the mail a certified return receipt requested letter
addressed to the board and containing a request for a hearing, the board may take the
contemplated action; and
(4) calling the licensee's, applicant's or unlicensed person's attention to the
rights provided in Section 61-1-8 NMSA 1978.
E. Except as provided in Section 61-1-15 NMSA 1978, if the licensee, applicant or
unlicensed person does not mail a request for a hearing within the time and in the
manner required by this section, the board may take the action contemplated in the
notice and such action shall be final and not subject to judicial review as a matter of
right.
F. If the licensee, applicant or unlicensed person does mail a request for a hearing
as required by this section, the board shall, within twenty days of receipt of the request,
notify the licensee, applicant or unlicensed person of the time and place of hearing, the
name of the person who shall conduct the hearing for the board and the statutes and
rules authorizing the board to take the contemplated action. The hearing shall be held
not more than sixty nor less than fifteen days from the date the notice of hearing is
deposited in the mail, certified return receipt requested, or the date of personal service.
G. All fines collected by a board shall be deposited to the credit of the current school
fund as provided in Article 12, Section 4 of the constitution of New Mexico.
History: 1953 Comp., § 67-26-4, enacted by Laws 1957, ch. 247, § 4; 1978 Comp., §
61-1-4; 1993, ch. 295, § 3; 2003, ch. 334, § 2; 2022, ch. 39, § 4; 2023, ch. 190, § 7.
ANNOTATIONS
The 2023 amendment, effective July 1, 2023, clarified that disciplinary action can also
apply to applicants or unlicensed persons in addition to licensees, and struck language
requiring licensees to bear the cost of disciplinary proceedings; in Subsection A, after
"against licensees", added "applicants or unlicensed persons", added "civil" preceding
"investigative subpoenas", and added "The authority to issue a specific civil
investigative subpoena under this section may be delegated by the board to staff."; in
Subsection D, in the introductory clause, after "Section 61-1-3 NMSA 1978", added "or
Section 61-1-3.2 NMSA 1978", and after "serve upon the licensee", added "applicant or
unlicensed person"; in Paragraph D(1), after "explained", deleted "will" and added
"may"; in Paragraph D(2), added "and allegations, including specific laws or rules that
are alleged to have been violated"; in Paragraph D(3), after "licensee", added "applicant
or unlicensed person", and after "the board", deleted "shall" and added "may"; in
Paragraph D(4), after "licensee’s", added "applicant’s or unlicensed person’s"; in
Subsection E, after "applicant", added "or unlicensed person", and after "judicial
review", added "as a matter of right"; in Subsection F, after each occurrence of
"applicant", added "or unlicensed person", and after "notice of hearing", added "is
deposited in the mail, certified return receipt requested, or the date of personal service";
and deleted former Subsection G and redesignated former Subsection H as Subsection
G.
The 2022 amendment, effective May 18, 2022, clarified that a licensee or applicant that
has received notice of contemplated action and fails to request a hearing as required
may apply to the board to reopen proceedings under certain circumstances, and
provided that all fines collected by the board shall be deposited in the current school
fund; in Subsection E, added "Except as provided in Section 61-1-15 NMSA 1978"; and
added Subsection H.
The 2003 amendment, effective July 1, 2003, in Paragraph D(4), substituted "as
provided in" for "under"; in Subsection F, added "of hearing" at the end.
The 1993 amendment, effective June 18, 1993, added present Subsection A;
redesignated the former first paragraph of Subsection A as present Subsection B;
rewrote the former second paragraph of Subsection A as present Subsection C;
redesignated former Subsections B through D as Subsections D through F; substituted
"D through N" for "D, E or F" in the introductory language of Subsection D; added
Subsection G; and made stylistic changes in Subsections B, D and F.
Guide to assessment of costs. — Rule 1-054 NMRA and Section 61-32-24(F) NMSA
1978 provide guidance to the board when considering a cost assessment, but neither
provision is an exhaustive list of the types of costs that are assessable to a disciplined
licensee and any costs that are not included in either provision are to be reviewed to
determine whether the board acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously; whether
assessment of the cost is supported by substantial evidence; and whether the board
acted in accordance with law. N.M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044,
142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 949.
Assessable costs. — Transcription costs, and if the board is the prevailing party, the
costs of at least one expert witness, are assessable to a disciplined licensee. N.M. Bd.
of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 949.
Non-assessable costs. — The hearing officer’s costs, the cost of a hearing room and
board member’s per diem and mileage costs are not assessable to a disciplined
licensee. N.M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2007-NMSC-044, 142 N.M. 248, 164
P.3d 949.
Probable cause hearing not necessary before revocation proceedings. — A
licensee is not deprived of any due process rights when no probable cause hearing is
conducted prior to the institution of license revocation proceedings. Keney v.
Derbyshire, 718 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1983).
Charging board not disqualified in hearing on charge. — The board of medical
examiners has exclusive jurisdiction regarding the granting and revoking of certificates
admitting physicians and surgeons to practice and, in view of the fact that the statutes
do not provide for disqualification of board members, proceedings before the board may
not be restrained merely by reason of the fact that the board itself initiated the
proceedings against a physician and was, therefore, an interested party. Seidenberg v.
N.M. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 1969-NMSC-028, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469.
Zeal in performing public duty does not disqualify. Seidenberg v. N.M. Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 1969-NMSC-028, 80 N.M. 135, 452 P.2d 469.
Content of notice. — The "evidence" to be set out in the notice of contemplated action
under this statute is the evidence of the ground or grounds to be relied upon in taking
the contemplated action under former Section 61-5-14 NMSA 1978, not the evidence to
be adduced by way of explanation and determination of rehabilitation under the Criminal
Offender Employment Act, Section 28-2-1 NMSA 1978 et seq. Weiss v. N.M. Bd. of
Dentistry, 1990-NMSC-077, 110 N.M. 574, 798 P.2d 175.
Notice of contemplated action sufficient. — The notice of contemplated action in this
case was sufficient to provide the licensee with notice, even though it did not state that
the qualifying party certificate was in jeopardy; the licensee knew the general nature of
the proceedings against him and that is all that notice pleading requires. Further, the
licensee waived the lack of notice issue by appearing at the administrative hearing and
defending on the merits. Oden v. State Regulation & Licensing Dep't, 1996-NMSC-022,
121 N.M. 670, 916 P.2d 1337.
Psychologist was afforded adequate notice that she might be questioned regarding
what means she had used to assess her former patient's needs and potential for
exploitation; the relevant board rules, which were quoted in the notice of contemplated
action, provided that personal relationships with former clients could only be entered
with "caution and deliberateness", which should be reflected by the psychologist
considering issues such as the need for future treatment and the potential for
exploitation of the client. N.M. State Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs v. Land, 2003-NMCA-
034, 62 N.M. 1244, 62 P.3d 1244, cert. denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d 516.
The notice of contemplated action was adequate where it cited the statute and the rules
the committee relied upon in contemplating the attachment of the consumer bond,
contained information about the actual bond, and outlined the general nature of the
evidence. Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Hous. Comm., 2003-NMCA-134, 134 N.M. 533, 80
P.3d 470.
The manufacturer was not prejudiced by the omission of the right to subpoena
witnesses in the notice of contemplated action because the hearing was based upon the
judgment and findings of the district court in an Unfair Practices Act action, and the
manufacturer did not have the right to relitigate them. Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Hous.
Comm., 2003-NMCA-134, 134 N.M. 533, 80 P.3d 470.
Rule 1-054 NMRA does not govern the award of costs in an administrative disciplinary
action under the Uniform Licensing Act. N.M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2006-
NMCA-069, 139 N.M. 679, 137 P.3d 619, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 2007-NMSC-044,
142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947.
Assessment of cost of stenographic record to licensee in disciplinary hearing was
not arbitrary or capricious because employing a stenographer, rather than tape
recording the proceedings, was a permissible and logical choice. N.M. Bd. of Veterinary
Med. v. Riegger, 2006-NMCA-069, 139 N.M. 679, 137 P.3d 619, aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 2007-NMSC-044, 142 N.M. 248, 164 P.3d 947.
Assessment of board members' per diem and mileage costs to licensee in
disciplinary hearing was proper. N.M. Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 2006-NMCA-
069, 139 N.M. 679, 137 P.3d 619, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 2007-NMSC-044, 142 N.M.
248, 164 P.3d 947.
Requirement of actual notice to licensee. — The Uniform Licensing Act requires
actual notice to be given to an individual who may lose a license, pursuant to the
hearing requirements contained in the law. In that case, a public policy-making body
which convenes a hearing on a licensing matter and which is subject to the provisions of
the act must follow the act's specific notice tenets. In these cases, mere posting of such
notice is insufficient as it affects the individual licensee. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 90-29.
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 51 Am. Jur. 2d Licenses and Permits §
60.
Rights as to notice and hearing in proceeding to revoke or suspend license to practice
medicine, 10 A.L.R.5th 1.
53 C.J.S. Licenses §§ 43, 55, 56.Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1988–2022 · leading case: New Mexico Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 164 P.3d 947 (N.M. 2007).
New Mexico Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 164 P.3d 947 (N.M. 2007). “” NMSA 1978, § 61-1-4(G) (1993). Riegger appealed several issues to the district court, including the assessment of costs.”
New Mexico Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 137 P.3d 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). “While I concede that for the purpose of Section 61-1-4, they mean the same thing, I think conflating them under the word "cost" is more useful, as I consider it improbable that "fee" in that section of the ULA means the same thing as it does in the VPA.”
Weiss v. New Mexico Bd. of Dentistry, 798 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1990). “Section 61-1-4(B). The NCA served on Weiss fulfilled this function; it advised him of the contemplated action — suspension or revocation of his license — and of the general nature of the evidence to be relied on — the fact of his convictions of making or permitting a false claim…”
Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2008 NMCA 076 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). “Thus, absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court, we will not presume that the inclusion of specific markers in Rule 1-062(D) was intended to supersede the statutory formula.”
Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013 NMCA 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). “, §§ 61-1-2(A)(3), (4), (C), (D); §§ 61-1-4 to -17, -19, -21. A licensee has a right to a hearing before the board that has authority to take revocation action.”
Rex, Inc. v. Manufactured Hous. Comm., 2003 NMCA 134 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003). “See NMSA 1978, § 61-1-4 (1993) (outlining notice requirements for proceedings investigating complaints against licensees).”
Oden v. State, Reg. & Licensing Dept., 916 P.2d 1337 (N.M. 1996). “The body of the NCA tracked the statutory language of Section 61-1-4(D) (setting out notice requirements for NCA), but referred only to the company license and not to the qualifying party certificate.”
Molina v. McQuinn, 758 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1988). “NMSA 1978 § 61-1-4(D) (Repl.Pamp.1986). The Board did not comply with either of these requirements and now states that none of these issues were raised in the district court.”
Weber v. Dep't of Motor Vehs., 818 P.2d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “The revocation hearing was to be held within sixty days pursuant to Section 61-1-4(D). Notwithstanding that limit, Section 61-1-9(A) allowed the agency, without qualification, to “direct a continuance of any case.”
Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 185 P.3d 1091 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). “Thus, absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court, we will not presume that the inclusion of specific markers in Rule 1-062(D) was intended to supersede the statutory formula.”
Barth v. NM Sec'y of Educ. (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). “12 See NMSA 1978, § 61-1-4 (2003). Plaintiff simply failed to do so.”
Hilley v. Cadigan (N.M. Ct. App. 2020). “Proceedings before the Dental Board are administrative proceedings in which licensees 7Plaintiff also argues, on appeal, that Defendants ought to have requested a hearing from the Board under NMSA 1978, Section 61-1-4(D), (E) (2003), but she did not raise this argument below.”
— N.M. Stat. § 61-1-4(B) — 1 case
Weiss v. New Mexico Bd. of Dentistry, 798 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1990). “Section 61-1-4(B). The NCA served on Weiss fulfilled this function; it advised him of the contemplated action — suspension or revocation of his license — and of the general nature of the evidence to be relied on — the fact of his convictions of making or permitting a false claim…”
— N.M. Stat. § 61-1-4(D) — 5 cases
Oden v. State, Reg. & Licensing Dept., 916 P.2d 1337 (N.M. 1996). “The body of the NCA tracked the statutory language of Section 61-1-4(D) (setting out notice requirements for NCA), but referred only to the company license and not to the qualifying party certificate.”
Molina v. McQuinn, 758 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1988). “NMSA 1978 § 61-1-4(D) (Repl.Pamp.1986). The Board did not comply with either of these requirements and now states that none of these issues were raised in the district court.”
Weber v. Dep't of Motor Vehs., 818 P.2d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). “The revocation hearing was to be held within sixty days pursuant to Section 61-1-4(D). Notwithstanding that limit, Section 61-1-9(A) allowed the agency, without qualification, to “direct a continuance of any case.”
Hilley v. Cadigan (N.M. Ct. App. 2020). “Proceedings before the Dental Board are administrative proceedings in which licensees 7Plaintiff also argues, on appeal, that Defendants ought to have requested a hearing from the Board under NMSA 1978, Section 61-1-4(D), (E) (2003), but she did not raise this argument below.”
Avalos v. NM Counseling (N.M. Ct. App. 2012).
— N.M. Stat. § 61-1-4(E) — 2 cases
Gardner v. N.M. Bd. of Dental Health Care (N.M. Ct. App. 2022).
Barth v. NM Sec'y of Educ. (N.M. Ct. App. 2010). “12 See NMSA 1978, § 61-1-4 (2003). Plaintiff simply failed to do so.”
— N.M. Stat. § 61-1-4(F) — 2 cases
Skowronski v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013 NMCA 34 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). “, §§ 61-1-2(A)(3), (4), (C), (D); §§ 61-1-4 to -17, -19, -21. A licensee has a right to a hearing before the board that has authority to take revocation action.”
Skowronski v. New Mexico Pub. Educ. Dep't, 2013 NMCA 034 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013).
— N.M. Stat. § 61-1-4(G) — 4 cases
New Mexico Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 164 P.3d 947 (N.M. 2007). “” NMSA 1978, § 61-1-4(G) (1993). Riegger appealed several issues to the district court, including the assessment of costs.”
New Mexico Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger, 137 P.3d 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). “While I concede that for the purpose of Section 61-1-4, they mean the same thing, I think conflating them under the word "cost" is more useful, as I consider it improbable that "fee" in that section of the ULA means the same thing as it does in the VPA.”
Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 2008 NMCA 076 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). “Thus, absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court, we will not presume that the inclusion of specific markers in Rule 1-062(D) was intended to supersede the statutory formula.”
Grassie v. Roswell Hosp. Corp., 185 P.3d 1091 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). “Thus, absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court, we will not presume that the inclusion of specific markers in Rule 1-062(D) was intended to supersede the statutory formula.”
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