New York Consolidated Laws
N.Y. Penal Law § 165.71 (2026)
Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree
✓ current as of May 2026
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§ 165.71 Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree. A person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree when, with the intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods. Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1994–2023 · leading case: People v. Niang, 160 Misc. 2d 500 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1994).
People v. Niang, 160 Misc. 2d 500 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1994). “453) and with trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.71). * In substance, it is alleged that at around midday on two separate dates (Aug.”
People v. Kabre, 29 Misc. 3d 307 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2010). “Background In 2002, 2003, and 2004, petitioner, a citizen of Burkina Faso, was arrested and charged with trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.71). Each case was ultimately resolved by petitioner pleading guilty to the charge and being sentenced as…”
People v. Cisse, 171 Misc. 2d 185 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1996). “Defendants move to dismiss the information charging the defendants with trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.71), failure to disclose the origin of a recording in the second degree (Penal Law § 275.”
People v. Rivera, 45 Misc. 3d 386 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2014). “35 (count one), trademark counterfeiting in the third degree, in violation of Penal Law § 165.71 (count two), unlicensed general vendor, in violation of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 20-453 (count three) and failure to display a vendor’s license, in violation of…”
People v. Ensley, 183 Misc. 2d 141 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1999). “*142 Defendant is charged with a single count of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.71). He moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that it is facially insufficient.”
People v. Wu Cheng, 4 Misc. 3d 377 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2004). “*378 Defendant is charged with the sole count of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.71). He moves for an order dismissing the charge for facial insufficiency.”
People v. Guo Zhang, 14 Misc. 3d 82 (N.Y. App. Term. 2007). “We find unavailing defendant’s challenge to the facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument charging trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (see Penal Law § 165.71). The information — comprising the misdemeanor complaint and supporting depositions of the arresting…”
People v. Santiago, 9 Misc. 3d 197 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2005). “A charge of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree (Penal Law § 165.71), contained in the superseded complaint, was dismissed on the motion of the People on February 10, 2005.”
People v. Thiam, 189 Misc. 2d 810 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2001). “Defendant Mbaye Thiam is charged with trademark counter *811 feiting in the third degree under Penal Law § 165.71. He moves to dismiss the accusatory instrument on the ground that it is facially insufficient because it fails to describe the trademarks, fails to allege that the…”
People v. Chen Lu, 25 Misc. 3d 299 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 2009). “71, trademark counterfeiting in the third degree, on June 8, 2008, for selling counterfeit DVDs; (2) the DVDs were contained in plastic sleeves rather than hardshell cases; (3) the cover art was low grade color copies on rough and inferior quality paper; and (4) based on the…”
People v. Johns (Ronnie) (N.Y. App. Term. 2016). “So viewed, the accusatory instrument - comprising the misdemeanor complaint and supporting depositions of a representative of the trademark owner - was jurisdictionally valid, since it described facts of an evidentiary nature establishing reasonable cause to believe that…”
People v. Diallo (Cheickna) (N.Y. App. Term. 2019). “These factual allegations, "given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" ( People v Casey , 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]), were sufficient for pleading purposes to establish reasonable cause to believe and a prima facie case that defendant was guilty of trademark…”
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