Pecos Hous. Fin. Corp., Pleasanton Hous. Fin. Corp., Maverick Hous. Fin. Corp., & La Villa Hous. Fin. Corp. v. City of Arlington (Tex. App. 2025).

Pecos Hous. Fin. Corp., Pleasanton Hous. Fin. Corp., Maverick Hous. Fin. Corp., & La Villa Hous. Fin. Corp. v. City of Arlington (Tex. App. 2025). Book View Copy Cite

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Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, Maverick Housing Finance Corporation, and La Villa Housing Finance Corporation
v.
City of Arlington

15-25-00111-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas.

Jul 1, 2025.

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Published

FILED IN CLERK'S RECORD 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Volume 1 of 1 7/1/2025 9:14:27 AM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk Trial Court Cause No. 348-363561-25 Appellate Cause No.15-25-00111-CV

In the 348th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas Hon. Megan Fahey,Presiding Judge

CITY OF ARLINGTON vs. PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, ET AL

Appealed to the Court of Appeals for the 15th Supreme Judicial District of Texas at Austin , Texas APPEARING FOR THE APPELLANT REICHEK, AMANDA L 1201 MAIN ST STE 1300D STE 300 DALLAS TX 75202- Phone: (214) 382-3041 Fax .. : (214) 292-6564 Email Address: [email protected] SBOT.: 24041762TX Appearing for PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, Appellant Delivered to the Court of Appeals for the 15th Supreme (Court of Appeals) Judicial District of Texas at Austin , Texas, Cause No. on this date of June 26, 2025. Filed in the Court of Appeals for the 15th Supreme Judicial District of Texas, at Austin , Texas, this Thomas A. Wilder, District Clerk _ _ _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Tarrant County, Fort Worth, Texas _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , Clerk By _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , Deputy ELIANA RODRIGUEZ Deputy District Clerk INDEX Front Cover ....................................................................................................................................................1 Index ............................................................................................................................................................2 Caption...........................................................................................................................................................5 Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 4/10/25 ...........................................................................................................................................................6 Temporary Restraining Order 4/11/25 ........................................................................................................42 Rule 11 Agreement – Extending TRO and Temporary Injunction Hearing 4/24/25 ..................................46 Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 4/30/25...............................................................................................................................................48 Temporary Restraining Order 5/1/25 ..........................................................................................................84 Rule 11 Agreement – Extending TRO and Temporary Injunction Hearing 5/1/25 ....................................88 Answer of Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt 5/5/25 ............................................................................................90 Defendant Pecos HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer 5/5/25 ..........................................................................................................................................................96 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 5/7/25 ............................................................................................................................. 106 City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 5/13/25 ........................................................................................................................... 140 Rule 11 Agreement – Extending TRO and Temporary Injunction Hearing 5/14/25 ............................... 160 Temporary Restraining Order 5/21/25 ..................................................................................................... 164 City of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 5/22/25 ...................................................................................... 169 Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Subject Thereto, Original Answer to City of Arlington’s Second of Amended Petition 5/27/25 ........................... 190 Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s Special Exceptions to the City of Arlington’s Second Amended Petition 5/28/25 ......................................................................................................................................... 203 First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer of Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt 5/29/25.................. 214 Defendant La Villa HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer 5/30/25......................................................................................................................................... 221 Defendant Maverick Housing Finance Corporation Special Exceptions to the City of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer 6/2/25 ........ 230 Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation Special Exceptions to the City of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Original Answer 6/2/25 ......... 250 Defendant Pecos HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer 6/2/25 ........................................................................................................................................... 270 Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Third Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 6/2/25............................................................................................................ 283 City of Arlington and City of Fort Worth’s Joint Response to Defendant Bobbitt’s Plea to the Jurisdiction 6/2/25 ..................................................................................................................................... 319 City of Arlington and City of Fort Worth’s Joint Response to Defendant Pecos HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer Venue 6/2/25 ................................................................................... 327 City of Fort Worth’s Seconded Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 6/2/25 ........................................................................................ 333 HFC Defendants’ Joint Brief in Opposition to City of Arlington’s and City of Fort Worth’s Applications for Temporary Injunction 6/2/25 .......................................................................................... 350 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief 6/2/25 ........................................................................................ 376 Response by Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt to Defendant Housing Finance Corporations’ Motions to Transfer Venue 6/2/25.............................................................................................................................. 397 Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and Maverick HFC’s Motion for Joinder in Pecos Housing Finance Corporation and Joe Don Bobbit’s Plea’s to the Jurisdiction 6/2/25................ 402 Defendants Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation’s Motion for Joinder in Pecos Housing Finance Corporation and Joe Don Bobbit’s Pleas to the Jurisdiction 6/2/25 ................................................................................................................ 409 Order Denying Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation’s Plea to the Jurisdiction 6/3/25......... 415 Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction 6/3/25 ..................................... 419 Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction 6/3/25 .................................. 424 Notice of Accelerated Appeal 6/23/25...................................................................................................... 430 Defendant’s Request for Preparation of Clerk’s Record 6/23/25 ............................................................ 436 Notice of Accelerated Appeal 6/23/25...................................................................................................... 443 Defendants’ Request for Preparation of Reporter’s Record 6/23/25 ...................................................... 450 Defendants’ Request for Preparation of the Clerk’s Record 6/23/25 ...................................................... 457 Amended Notice of Accelerated Appeal 6/23/25 ..................................................................................... 466 Amended Notice of Accelerated Appeal 6/24/25 ..................................................................................... 473 Bill of Costs ............................................................................................................................................... 479 Clerk’s Certificate...................................................................................................................................... 480 Back Cover ............................................................................................................................................... 481 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ C A P T I O N

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------------------------------------------------------------------------ THE STATE OF TEXAS

COUNTY OF TARRANT In the 348th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, the Honorable Megan Fahey Presiding, the following proceedings were held and the following instruments and other papers were filed in this cause, to wit: Trial Court Cause No. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON IN THE 348th COURT vs. PECOS HOUSING FINANCE TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS CORPORATION, ET AL FILED TARRANT COUNTY 4/10/2025 3:03 PM 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER No. ________________ DISTRICT CLERK CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § _____ JUDICIAL DISTRICT v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants. §

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PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: In support of its Original Petition and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff City of Arlington (“Arlington”) alleges the following:

I. INTRODUCTION Page 1 a massive tax exemption, the Pecos HFC gets to collect fees and a portion of the development’s profits, and the other city (in this case, Arlington) bears 100% of the downside.

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Page 2 control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

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Page 3 government,” id. § 394.903.

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per month, and a two-bedroom is around $2,000 per month.^[2] And upon information and belief, this complex does not come close to meeting the 90%-low-income-housing threshold needed to receive an exemption under the Act. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.004 (providing that a residential development can receive tax exemption from a HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income”).

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Page 5 hereto as Exhibit 2, at ¶ 5.]

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Page 6 HFC regarding any Arlington-based properties Page 7 2002). “Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion,” and an order granting injunctive relief will be reversed on appeal only if “the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Id.

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(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

Respectfully submitted, By: /s/ Alexander J. Lindvall Galen G. Gatten State Bar No. 24032226 [email protected] Alexander J. Lindvall State Bar No. 24139409 [email protected] Jonathan M. Moss State Bar No. 24084934 [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen State Bar No. 24058021 [email protected] Nena Chima-Tetteh State Bar No. 24113691 [email protected]

City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004 Phone: 817-459-6878 Fax: 817-459-6897

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON Page 9

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EXHIBIT 1 348-363561-25

AFFIDAVIT OF MINDY COCH RA STATE OF T EXAS ) ) ss. TARRA TCO NTY )

I, Mindy Cochran, declare under penalty of perjury that the following statements are based on my personal knowledge and are true and correct.

I. I am the Executive Director of the City of Arlington's Housing Department.

2. In my role as Executive Director, I often work with the Arlington Housing Finance Corporation, and I am familiar with Housing Finance Corporations ("HFCs") and Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov't Code§§ 394.001 et seq.

3. It is well-accepted that HFCs are allowed to partake in real estate projects only if the project is within the HFC's local jurisdiction. See Tex. Local Gov' t Code§ 394.903. The Arlington HFC, for instance, does not do business in any jurisdiction except the City of Arlington. It is also well-accep ted that HFCs can bestow tax exemptions only to properties that are primarily used to house low-income individuals. See id. § 394.004. The stated statutory purpose of HFCs is to create affordable housing for low-income individuals, id. § 394.002(a), and the Texas HFC Act specifically states that a residential development can receive an HFC tax exemption only if at least 90% ofthat development --is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons oflow and moderate income," id. § 394.004.

4. The City of Arlington, however, recently learned that an HFC based out of Pecos, Texas, has been giving tax exemptions to large, multifamily housing developments in Arlington without the City's knowledge.

5. Several months ago, for example, the Pecos HFC acquired the Jefferson orth Collins apartment complex (currently doing business as the Zenith apartment complex)- an already-built, upscale apartment complex located near an Arlington golf course at 735 Washington Drive. After acquiring this property, the Pecos HFC applied for and received a full tax exemption for this property. After receiving that exemption and removing the property from the tax rolls, the Pecos HFC then leased the complex to a private landlord and, upon information and belief, the Pecos HFC now collects a portion of that complex's profits. That property was appraised at $86 million- and when it was taken off the tax rolls, that caused the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose $ 1.7 million in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington's share of that lost revenue was approximately $447,000.

6. Upon information and belief, the Pecos HFC also recently acquired tax-exempt status for another Arlington apartment complex: Cedar Point (2020 Cedar Point Drive). Cedar Point is appraised at approximately $27.5 million, and Arlington's share of that lost ad valorem tax revenue amounts to about $165,000 per year.

7. This unlawful tax-exemption scheme has already removed tens of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units' tax rolls and has caused Arlington to lose well over $1 million in annual tax revenue. Upon information and belief, the Pecos HFC currently has several more real estate transactions pending in Arlington. If the Pecos HFC acquires any further Arlington-based EXHIBIT 1 multifamily properties and removes them from the tax rolls, it could decimate Arlington's budget.

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Date: April 10, 2025 Mindy Cochran Executive Director, Housing Department City of Arlington, Texas

* * * *

Subscribed to and sworn to before me on this 1O day of _A_p_ri_l_ __ _ _ _ __ _ 2025.

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EXHIBIT 3 348-363561-25

MAR O5 2025 CAUSE NO. ::u; .. 04~~ _.. Glti.6' WILLIAMSON COUNTY, SIENA § I N T H E ~ ~ C o . , TX MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT N0.1, § and SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY § DISTRICT NO. 2, § Plaintiffs, § § 41fi JUDICIAL DISTRICT V. § § THE CAMERON COUNTY HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, § Defendant. WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

After considering the application for a temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiffs in the above-styled matter, the pleadings, and the evidence, the Court finds that-

1. There is a current controversy over Defendant Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation's ("CCHFC") efforts to seek exemption from ad valorem taxes for properties located in Williamson County, including the following real properties:

a. Lot 1, Siena Section 30, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Document No. 2020037410 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 6531 CR 110, Round Rock, Texas, 78655. That property is a 13.677-acre tract of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as Siena Round Rock Apartments has been built ("Siena Round Rock").

b. Lot 2, Block A, Siena South, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Document No. 20200099820 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 5540 Sofia Place, Round Rock, Texas 78665. That Property is a

Temporary Restraining Order - Page 1 of 3

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this entity- located over 300 miles away- to take advantage of tax and other monetary incentives for a multi-family housing project in Williamson County, all without Williamson County's participation and consent. Through this strategy, CCHFC seeks to benefit from fees and a portion of cash flow from the projects by the developers, while Williamson County receives no such benefits, and instead is left to suffer from the removal of those properties from the tax appraisal rolls.

3. To be sure, creation of affordable housing opportunities is a worthy mission, one that Williamson County has supported and will continue to support (including through its own locally-operating housing finance corporation) . But CCHFC improperly seeks to deprive the elected officials of Williamson Cow1ty- where these projects are located-from engaging in the critical cost-benefit analysis necessary to determine whether the public benefits of these multi-family housing projects are worth the elimination of tax revenues that are otherwise due to the local community.

4. The Act does not authorize CCHFC' s actions. Indeed, on its face, the Act prohibits them. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Act does not permit CCHFC to acquire and remove property in Williamson County, including the two properties at issue, from the tax appraisal rolls, and an injunction prohibiting such actions.

II. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF

5. Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery under the Level 3 discovery rules of Rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and will submit a proposed scheduling

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order with a discovery control plan tailored to the circumstances of the specific suit. Plaintiffs seeks nonmonetary relief in the form of declaratory and injunctive relief.

III. PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Williamson County is a Texas county.

7. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 is a municipal utility district whose boundaries are located within Williamson County.

8. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 is a municipal utility district whose bmmdaries are located within Williamson County.

9. Defendant The Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation is a Texas nonprofit corporation and may be served with citation by serving its registered agent David C. Petruska at 11264 Russwood Circle, Dallas, Texas 75229, or wherever he may be found.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the relief Plaintiffs seek is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court.

11. Venue is proper in Williamson County, Texas pursuant to Section 15.002(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred in W i 11 i ams on County, Texas.

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V. BACKGROUND

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act.

12. This lawsuit involves The Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act in Chapter 394 of the Texas Local Government Code. The Act was created in 1987 for the stated purpose of "provid[1ng] a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments." TEX. LOCAL Gov'T CODE§ 394.002(a). To accomplish that purpose, the Act authorizes cities and counties to create public nonprofit corporations known as housing finance corporations. Id. at§§ 394.002( d), 394.003(8).

13. Housing finance corporations are used to finance the acquisition, development, ownership, and operation of private residential developments. The Act only applies to residential developments at least 90% of which are occupied or intended to be occupied by persons who meet a certain lower income classification. Id. at§ 394.004. It authorizes housing finance corporations to purchase and lease property, and to issue bonds to finance the costs of a residential development. Id. at§§ 394.037, 394.9025.

14. The Act creates a significant tax incentive for these residential developments, providing-

The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public property used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of the state. Id. at§ 394.905.

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acquired by CCHFC in February 2025 and is legally described as Lot 1, Siena Section 30, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Document No. 2020037410 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 6531 CR 110, Round Rock, Texas, 78655. That property is a 13.677-acre h·act of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as Siena Round Rock Apartments has been built ("Siena Round Rock").

20. The other property is legally described as Lot 2, Block A, Siena South, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Document No. 20200099820 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 5540 Sofia Place, Ro1md Rock, Texas 78665. That property is a 15.0496-acre tract of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as The Sommery has been built ("The Sommery"). As of the filing of this petition, record title to 5540 Sofia Place is vested in Sommery Lot 2 LP. Upon information and belief, it is anticipated that The Sommery will be conveyed to CCHFC imminently.

D. CCHFC Seeks Removal of The Properties from the Ad Valorem Tax Rolls.

21. CCHFC is seeking to immediately remove Siena Round Rock and, upon its acquisition, The Sommery, from Williamson County's tax rolls. It is seeking to remove these properties from the tax rolls as quickly as possible, despite the Act's requirement that, in order to take advantage of the Act's tax relief, "[a] residential development covered by this chapter must be located within the local government." Id. at § 394.003. The plain wording of the Act mandates that the residential development must be located "within the local government" that formed the housing finance corporation - in these cases, Cameron County.

Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 6 of 15 4925-0205-085 1, V. 1

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22. CCHFC has provided Williamson County no justification - legal or otherwise-for its actions. Indeed, CCHFC neglected to contact any Williamson County elected officials or staff before seeking to acquire properties located in Williamson County and remove them from the tax rolls.

23. CCFHC' s silence is unsurprising, however, as there can be no justification for its scheme. It would be absurd for the Act to allow a housing finance corporation created by one county to own and lease property in another county because, under such a perverse system, the latter county would lose 100% of the ad valorem tax value from tl1e property, but it would have no ability to weigh that significant financial loss against the potential benefits of the project to the local community. Meanwhile, the "traveling" corp oration would obtain a pure monetary windfall without any in centive for oversight by its own county (whose tax revenues would be unaffected).

24. Siena Round Rock and The Sommery are currently appraised collectively at a total of $101,565,850.00. Through CCHFC' s intended misuse of the Act, Hutto Independent School District ("Hutto ISD") alone would lose at least $1.2 million ammally in ad valorem tax revenue from those properties. Additionally, Williamson County would lose at least $360,000 annually in ad valorem tax revenue, and Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 and Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 would lose at least $580,000 annually. Other local taxing entities would also suffer significant am1ual tax revenue losses.

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E. The scope of CCHFC' s tax-exemption scheme.

25. Siena Round Rock and The Sommery aren't the only properties that CCHFC has sought to eliminate from another county's tax rolls. CCHFC reportedly owns properties in Dallas, Fort Worth, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and Euless, along with a dozen other Texas cities outside of Cameron County. ^[1]

26. Moreover, CCHFC's acquisitions aren't just used for new construction. As discussed above, Siena Round Rock and The Sornmery are private multi-family developments that were constructed and occupied by tenants before CCHFC acquired them. And, CCHFC reportedly has acquired two properties in Irving that were constructed in the 1980s. 2

27. CCHFC' s financial benefits from its misuse of the Act are not limited to the tax exemptions. Reportedly, CCHFC' s lone full-time employee has acknowledged that CCHFC typically collects from a private developer who leases and operates the residential development 15% of what the developer would have otherwise paid in taxes had it owned the property. That translates to roughly 15 cents for every dollar of tax revenue it deprives the local government. ^[3]

28. By way of example, if CCHFC has struck a similar deal for Siena Round Rock, based on the total assessed taxes in 2024 of $869,252.90 for that property, CCHFC would receive $134,437.93. And based on the total assessed taxes in 2024 of $1,476,422.08

1 Housing group made millions getting tax breaks for developers, costing cities and schools even more, CBS News Texas, Dec. ^[22], 2023, available at https://www.cbsnew s .com/texas/news/bo using- grou p-made-rn illi ons-getti ng- tax- breaks-for-developer s-cos ting-cities-and-schoo ls-even- more/. 2 Id. 3 Id.

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for The Sommery, CCHFC would receive $221,463.31. All of that money, from those Williamson County properties and others owned by CCHFC far outside its jurisdiction, flow into CCHFC' scoffers without any monetary benefits to the local governments which are deprived of the significant tax revenues.

VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Declaratory Relief Against CCHFC.

29. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

30. The Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("UDJA") provides that a party "whose rights, stah1s, or other legal relations are affected by a statute .. .may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... stah1te ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE§ 37.004(a).

31. Here, Plaintiffs, as taxing entities that depend on ad valorem taxes on real property within their jurisdictions, have rights that are affected by the Act - and, in this case, Cameron County's misuse of the Act. Indeed, if CCHFC is able to obtain removal of Siena Round Rock and The Somrnery from the WCAD appraisal rolls, Plaintiffs will suffer from significant loss of ad valorem taxes that otherwise would be assessed against those properties.

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EXHIBIT 3 a. The Act prohibits CCHFC from acquiring property outside of Cameron

County; b. The Act prohibits CCHFC from seeking or obtaining tax exemptions for property outside of Cameron County; c. CCHFC is prohibited by the Act from acquiring The Sommery; d. CCHFC is prohibited by the Act from seeking or obtaining tax exemptions for Siena Round Rock and The Sommery; and e. To the extent CCHFC has acquired or does acquire property in Williamson

County (in contravention of the Act), such property, including Siena Round

Rock and The Sommery, is not exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Act. B. • Alternative Claim: Violation of Texas Constitution.

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taxation in the county where it is located. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 11. It further limits counties' ad valorem taxation authority to "property within their respective boundaries." Id. § 1-a. If the Act could be read to empower CCHFC to take properties outside of Cameron County off of the tax rolls, this would violate the Texas Constitutions' limits on the scope of Texas counties' taxing authority.

VII. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

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Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter a tempora1y restraining order, temporary injunction, and, upon final trial, a permanent injunction enjoining CCHFC, and each of its employees, agents, and those acting in concert or participation with them, from the following conduct: (i) acquiring property in Williamson County, including, but not limited to, The Sommery, and (ii) seeking or obtaining tax exemptions for property in Williamson County, including, but not limited to, Siena Round Rock.

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property and Siena Round Rock was Siena MUD No. 2's second highest appraised property. The Sommery is located in Siena MUD No. 1 and Siena Round Rock is located in Siena MUD No. 2. If these properties are removed from the tax rolls, Siena MUD No. 1 will lose approximately $351,813 ammally and Siena MUD No. 2 will lose $231,895 a1mually (based on 2025 valuations).

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Respectfully submitted, /s/ David A. King DAVID A. KING State Bar No. 24083310 [email protected] JEFFREY J. HOBBS State Bar No. 24012837 [email protected] ARMBRUST & BROWN, PLLC 100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1300 Austin, Texas 78701 Telephone (512) 435-2300 Facsimile (512) 435-2360

ATTORNEYS FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY

-and-

/s/R. Mark Dietz R. MARK DIETZ State Bar ID No. 05857200 [email protected] DOUGLAS G. CORNWELL State Bar ID No. 24009024 [email protected] DIETZ & JARRARD, P.C. 106 Fannin Avenue East Round Rock, Texas 78664 (512) 244-9314

ATTORNEYS FOR SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO. 1 AND SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO. 2 EXHIBIT 3 EXHIBIT 3 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Chelsea Coad on behalf of David King BarNo.24083310 ccoad@abaustin .com Envelope ID: 98063219 Filing Code Description: Petition Filing Description: Plaintiffs' Original Petition- Filed and signed by atty David King and R. Mark Dietz- Env# 98063219 Status as of 3/4/2025 4:57 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status David King [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT Jeff Hobbs [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT Martha Adams [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT Chelsea Coad [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT 348-363561-25 Alexander J. Lindvall Assistant City Attorney Arlington City Attorney’s Office Phone: 817-459-5357 [email protected] THE AMERICAN DREAM CITY TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Pecos HFC is allowed to remove further Arlington-based properties from the tax rolls, this will immediately and drastically impact Plaintiffs fiscal budgeting and decrease the ad valorem taxes it otherwise could have collected from these properties.

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5. There is no adequate remedy at law because Plaintiffs losses are continuing in perpetuity, they are not readily calculable, and there is no clear legal mechanism by which Plaintiff could recoup these tax losses in a court of law.

6. An ex parte order, without notice to Defendants, is necessary because (i) Plaintiff has shown there is a good reason to believe that, if notice is given, Defendant Pecos HFC will rush to close on these disputed properties before a restraining order is issued; and (ii) there is insufficient time to give notice to Defendants, hold a hearing, and issue a TRO before imminent and irreparable harm occurs. ^[7]. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the COURT ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

a. Defendant Pecos HFC, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title to real property in the City of Arlington, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City

of Arlington, Texas. b. The Clerk shall issue notice to Defendant Pecos HFC that a hearing for Plaintiffs request for a temporary injunction is set for April 25, 2025, at 1:00 p.m., in this Court. The purpose of this hearing shall be to determine whether this TRO should be made into a temporary injunction pending a full trial on the merits. c. Plaintiff is exempt from posting a bond pursuant to § 6.001 of the Texas

Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

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8. This order expires in 14 days or further order, whichever occurs first.

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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

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FILED TARRANT COUNTY 4/24/2025 4:25 PM 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER Alexander J. Lindvall DISTRICT CLERK Assistant City Attorney Arlington City Attorney’s Office Phone: 817-459-5357 [email protected] THE AMERICAN DREAM CITY FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 4/30/2025 2:23 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK No. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants. §

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PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE MEGAN FAHEY: In support of its First Amended Petition and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff City of Arlington (“Arlington”) alleges the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This case concerns a misuse and abuse of the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. Arlington recently learned that the Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”), the Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation (“Pleasanton HFC”), and the La Villa Housing Finance Corporation (“La Villa HFC”) (collectively, “Defendant HFCs”) have been unlawfully removing Arlington-based properties from the tax appraisal rolls in exchange for monetary kickbacks, resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in real property value from the local tax base.

2. The Defendant HFCs’ scheme seems to work like this: a private developer acquires land for a new multifamily development (or acquires an already-existing development) in a city outside the HFC’s local jurisdiction; the private developer then conveys that property to the HFC; the HFC, as the new owner, then applies for and receives a 100% tax exemption, and the property is removed from the tax rolls; the HFC then leases that now-exempt property to a private landlord

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 1 (oftentimes the same developer who originally purchased the property), who then shares the profits with the HFC. The upshot of this scheme is that the developer and landlord get a massive tax exemption, the HFC gets to collect fees and a portion of the development’s profits, and the other city (in this case, Arlington) bears 100% of the downside.

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3. In short, a handful of tiny public corporations, located hundreds of miles away in small towns with no connection to Arlington, have drastically reduced Arlington’s yearly tax revenue by millions of dollars while they rake in undeserved fees and profits from Arlington-based rental properties. Arlington now asks this Court to halt the Defendant HFCs’ unlawful behavior before they do any further irreversible damage to Arlington’s tax base, and to stop the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs for any Arlington-based properties.

II. PARTIES

4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

5. Defendant Pecos HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It may be served with citation through its registered agent, John Salcido, at 2320 Teague Dr., Pecos, Texas 79772, or wherever else he may be located.

6. Defendant Pleasanton HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It may be served with citation through its registered agent, Johnny Huizar, at 108 Second St., Pleasanton, Texas 78064, or wherever else he may be located.

7. Defendant La Villa HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It may be served with citation through its registered agent, Rosa Perez, at 916 South Mike Chapa Dr., La Villa, Texas 78562, or wherever else he may be located.

8. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 9. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff seeks relief within the

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 2 jurisdictional limits of this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 65.001 et seq.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

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10. Venue is proper in Tarrant County because all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant County—and by conducting business in Tarrant County, the Defendant HFCs have purposely availed themselves to this venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1). This suit, moreover, concerns real property located in Tarrant County, making Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case. See id. § 15.011.

11. Arlington intends to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

12. This suit concerns the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. (“the Act”). The Act was passed in 1979 to help facilitate the development of low-income housing. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.002(a) (the Act’s purpose is to “provide a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments”).

13. To help create more low-income housing, the Act empowers local governments to create Housing Finance Corporations, or HFCs—nonprofit organizations, comprised of local officials, that help coordinate and facilitate affordable-housing projects. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.002, 394.011(a), 394.032. And because HFCs are (at least in theory) furthering a public purpose, the Act provides that HFC-owned properties and the income derived from those properties are tax-exempt. Id. § 394.905 (“The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public property used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of this state.”).

14. HFCs are commonly a part of public/private real estate partnerships, in which a private developer acquires land for a new development or acquires an existing multifamily project

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 3 and then conveys it to an HFC, which then acquires tax-exempt status for the property and leases the property to a private landlord who, in turn, pays fees to the HFC and shares the profits generated by the property with the HFC.

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15. But because the Act allows for such an enormous tax benefit, it provides two specific restrictions on what residential developments an HFC can tax-exempt: (1) a residential development can receive tax exemption from an HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income,” as defined by the statute, id. § 394.004; and (2) the residential development “must be located within the local government,” id. § 394.903.

16. An HFC, in other words, can tax-exempt a residential development only if the development is located within the HFC’s local jurisdiction and is actually used to house low- income individuals. See id. §§ 394.004, 394.903.

B. Several faraway HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Arlington that do not house low-income residents. ^[17]. Arlington recently learned that the Defendant HFCs have been ignoring these statutory restrictions and has been giving tax exemptions to large, multifamily housing developments in Arlington without Arlington’s knowledge, input, or approval. [Affidavit of Mindy Cochran, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at ¶¶ 4‒10.]

18. The Defendant HFCs’ unlawful tax-exemption scheme has removed tens of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units’ tax rolls and has caused Arlington to lose millions of dollars in annual tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 10.]

19. To illustrate, several months ago, Defendant Pecos HFC acquired the Zenith North Collins (735 Washington Dr.) apartment complex—an already-built, upscale apartment complex located next to a golf course in Arlington.^[1] [Id. at ¶ 5.] After acquiring this complex, the Pecos HFC applied for and received a full tax exemption for this property. [Id.] And after receiving that exemption, it leased the complex to a private landlord and now collects a share of that complex’s

1 At the time of acquisition, this complex was known as the “Jefferson North Collins” apartment complex.

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 4 profits. [Id.] This property was appraised at $86 million. [Id.] So, when it was removed from the tax rolls, that caused the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose $1.7 million in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that revenue was approximately $447,000. [Id.]

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20. In other words, by exempting just one apartment complex in Arlington, the Pecos HFC caused Arlington to lose roughly $447,000 in annual tax revenue, and there is no clear path for Arlington (or other affected local entities) to recoup that loss. [See id.]

21. To make matters worse, the Zenith North Collins doesn’t even provide low-income housing. With fees and rent, a three-bedroom apartment in this complex costs well over $3,000 per month, and a two-bedroom is around $2,000 per month.^[2] And upon information and belief, this complex does not come close to meeting the 90%-low-income-housing threshold needed to receive an exemption under the Act. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.004 (providing that a residential development can receive tax exemption from a HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income”).

22. This is a widespread problem across the state. The City of Euless, for example, has seen at least a 2% drop in its overall annual revenue after a single apartment complex received tax- exempt status from the Cameron County HFC;3 and Dallas, Fort Worth, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and other north Texas cities have reported millions of dollars in total lost tax revenue.^[4] Worse, these out-of-jurisdiction HFCs are often bestowing tax-exempt status to already-built structures (not new projects), and many of the exempted properties aren’t even affordable-housing projects; they are typical for-profit apartments and condos, usually located in upmarket neighborhoods, that do not offer reduced rent, housing vouchers, or other benefits to low-income applicants.^[5]

2 https://www.zenitharlington.com/floorplans/. 3 Andrea Lucia, Euless Loses 2 Percent of Revenue to Controversial Tax Break Approved in Faraway County, CBS News (Feb. ^[21], 2024). 4 Andrea Lucia, Housing Group Made Millions Getting Tax Breaks for Developers, Costing Cities and Schools Even More, CBS News (Dec. ^[22], 2023). 5 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a “luxurious community” in Irving and that the tenants’ rents went up significantly under the HFC’s ownership).

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 5

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23. Upon information and belief, the Pecos HFC also recently bestowed tax-exempt status to another apartment complex in Arlington called Cedar Point (2020 Cedar Point Dr.). [Exhibit 1 at ¶ 6.] That property is appraised at approximately $27.5 million, and Arlington’s lost ad valorem tax revenue because of this tax exemption amounts to about $165,000 per year. [Id.] That complex, similarly, does not offer affordable housing as contemplated by the Act.

24. Arlington, moreover, has good reason to believe the Pecos HFC plans to close on several more Arlington-based properties in the coming months, and that it is on the verge of closing on one of those properties in the coming days. [Id. at ¶ 10; Affidavit of Molly Shortall, attached hereto as Exhibit 2, at ¶ 5.]

25. Arlington also recently learned that the Pleasanton HFC and the La Villa HFC have been engaging in the same sort of unlawful tax-exemption scheme in Arlington. [Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 4, 8‒9.]

26. The Pleasanton HFC has acquired at least two properties in Arlington: The Washington apartment complex (707 Washington Dr.) and Cedars and River Legacy Park (903 Ashford Ln.). [Id. at ¶ 8.] Upon information and belief, the Pleasanton HFC has applied for, but has not yet received, tax exemptions for these properties. [Id.]

27. The Washington is appraised at approximately $34.5 million; if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $754,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $207,000 per year. [Id. at ¶ 8a.] Cedars and River Legacy Park is appraised at approximately $32.5 million; if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $710,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $195,000 per year. [Id. at ¶ 8b.]

28. In other words, if the Pleasanton HFC receives tax exemptions for these properties, it will likely cause Arlington to lose over $400,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 8.] 29. Arlington also recently learned that the La Villa HFC has acquired at least one

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 6 property in Arlington: The Carmin apartment complex (711 Brentford Pl.). [Id. at ¶ 9.] Upon information and belief, the La Villa HFC has applied for, but has not received, a tax exemption for this property. [Id.] The Carmin is appraised at $23.9 million; if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $522,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $143,000 per year. [Id.] In other words, if the La Villa HFC receive a tax exemption for this property, it will likely cause Arlington to lose about $143,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id.]

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30. Because of the widespread nature of this practice (see ¶ 22 supra), there has been a strong legislative push to (even more) explicitly outlaw this sort of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21 (link). Upon information and belief, because this sort of scheme is about to become indisputably illegal, HFCs have been scrambling to close their out-of-jurisdiction projects and apply for undeserved tax exemptions.

V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

31. Texas’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) allows trial courts to “declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.003. The UDJA further provides that “[a] person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. § 37.004(a). The Legislature intended the UDJA to be “remedial” and “liberally construed,” and “its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” Id. § 37.002(b).

32. In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

33. Arlington asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow the Defendant HFCs to bestow tax exemptions to Arlington-based properties.

VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION 34. To stop the Defendant HFCs from unlawfully removing any more Arlington-based

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 7 properties from the tax rolls, Arlington asks this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that prohibits the Defendant HFCs from (a) closing on any Arlington-based properties or (b) requesting, obtaining, or receiving any tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.

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35. Arlington further requests a TRO that prohibits Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Arlington-based properties

36. Arlington requests the Court to issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

37. Arlington has seen a surge in out-of-jurisdiction HFC activity, with many moving to close on properties and apply for tax exemptions at breakneck speed; and at least one of the Defendant HFCs has averred to the Arlington City Attorney that it is on the verge of closing on at least one Arlington-based property in the coming days [Exhibit 2 at ¶ 5], and Arlington believes these HFCs will rush to close on deals and seek exemptions if they are made aware of this TRO application.

38. The Pleasanton HFC and the La Villa HFC, moreover, have recently closed on Arlington properties and, upon information and belief, plan to request undeserved tax exemptions for these properties. [Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 8‒9.] If these HFCs receive these requested exemptions, Arlington will irrevocably lose about $545,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id.]

39. Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Arlington believes the Defendant HFCs are already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the short-term. ^[40]. Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 8 granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 3.]

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41. This Court should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents the Defendant HFCs from overstepping their jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Arlington-based properties. And out of an abundance of caution, this Court should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Arlington-based properties.

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Page 9

(A) To issue a TRO against the Defendant HFCs and Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt that

(i) prevents the Defendant HFCs from requesting tax exemptions for any Arlington- based properties, and (ii) prevents Mr. Bobbitt from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Arlington-based properties. A proposed TRO was filed contemporaneously herewith.

(B) After the expiration of this TRO, and after a hearing, to issue a temporary injunction against the same Defendants that enjoins the same unlawful conduct pending trial.

(C) After the expiration of this temporary injunction, and after a final trial on the merits, to issue (i) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Texas Housing Finance

Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq., does not allow the Defendants HFCs to bestow tax-exempt status to properties located in Arlington; and (ii) a permanent injunction that prevents the Defendant HFCs from requesting tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.

(D) To award Plaintiff its attorney’s fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 10

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Phone: 817-459-6878 Fax: 817-459-6897

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON Page 11

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9. Arlingto n also recently learned that the La Villa HFC has acquired at least one property in Arlington: The Carmin apartment complex (711 Brentford PL). Upon informa tion and belief, the La Villa HFC has applied for, but has not received , a tax exemption for this property. The Carmin is appraised at $23.9 million; if taken offthe tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $522.000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. and Arlingto n's share of that lost revenue would be approximately $143,000 per year. In other words, if the La Villa HFC receives a tax exempti on for this property, it will likely cause Arlington to irrevocably lose about $143,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue.

I 0. This unlawful tax-exemption scheme has already removed tens of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units' tax rolls and has caused Arlington to lose hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars in annual tax revenue. Upon information and belief, these HfCs currently have several more pending real estate deals and have requested tax exemptions regarding Arlington- based properties. If these HFCs acquire any further Arlington-based multifamily properti es and remove them from the tax rolls, they could decimate Arlingto n's budget.

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348-363561-25

MAR O5 2025 CAUSE NO. ;LJ; ... 04~~ ... l-42-6' WILLIAMSON COUNTY, SIENA § IN THEr:j~Iti iU~Co., TX MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO.1, § and SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY § DISTRICT NO. 2, § Plaintiffs, § § JUDICIAL DISTRICT V. § § THE CAMERON COUNTY HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, § Defendant. WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

After considering the application for a temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiffs in the above-styled matter, the pleadings, and the evidence, the Court finds that-

1. There is a current controversy over Defendant Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation's (" CCHFC") efforts to seek exemption from ad valorem taxes for properties located in Williamson County, including the following real properties:

Temporary Restraining Order - Page 1 of 3 15.0496-acre h·act of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as The Sommery has been built ("The Sommery").

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2. As alleged in the Plaintiffs' petition and supporting verification, CCHFC currently owns Sienna Round Rock, and intends to acquire The Sommery, and seeks to remove both properties from the Williamson Central Appraisal District ad valorem tax rolls, purportedly under Section 394.905 of the Texas Local Government Code.

3. Imminent harm and irreparable harm will result if CCHFC is permitted to acquire The Sommery and seek and obtain exemptions of Sienna Round Rock and The Sommery from the William Central Appraisal District ad valorem tax rolls. Specifically, if a temporary restraining order is not granted, imminent and irreparable harm will result to Plaintiffs since those properties within their jurisdictions will be removed from the tax rolls, which will immediately impact their fiscal budgeting and decrease the ad valorem taxes they otherwise could collect for these properties.

4. There is no adequate remedy at law because such damages or harm to Plaintiffs cannot be calculated.

5. An ex parte order, without notice to CCHFC, is necessary because there is not enough time to give notice to CCHFC, hold a hearing, and issue a restraining order before the imminent and irreparable injury, loss or damage occurs.

6. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that-

a. CCHFC, as well as its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with

CCHFC, are prohibited from (i) acquiring real property in Temporary Restraining Order - Page 2 of 3 Williamson County, including The Sommery; (ii) seeking or obtaining exemptions from ad valorem taxes for real property in Williamson County, including Siena Round Rock and The Sommery. b. The clerk shall issue notice to CCHFC that the hearing on Plaintiffs'

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request for temporary injunction is set for »lar'-k. r1 2025 at '1~ DV @ .m. The purpose of the hearing shall be to determine whether this temporary restraining order should be made a temporary injunction pending a full trial on the merits. c. Plaintiffs are exempt from posting a bond pursuant to Section 6.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Section 49.066(£) of the Texas Water Code.

7. This order expires o n ~ \ L\:. q 2025 at _ _:oo _ _ _t1:__.m.

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Filed: 3/4/2025 4:47 PM Lisa David, District Clerk Williamson County, Texas Jennifer Sims this entity- located over 300 miles away- to take advantage of tax and other monetary incentives for a multi-family housing project in Williamson County, all without Williamson County's participation and consent. Through this strategy, CCHFC seeks to benefit from fees and a portion of cash flow from the projects by the developers, while Williamson County receives no such benefits, and instead is left to suffer from the removal of those properties from the tax appraisal rolls.

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II. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF

5. Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery under the Level 3 discovery rules of Rule 190 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and will submit a proposed scheduling order with a discovery control plan tailored to the circumstances of the specific suit. Plaintiffs seeks nonmonetary relief in the form of declaratory and injunctive relief.

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III. PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Williamson County is a Texas county.

7. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 is a municipal utility district whose boundaries are located within Williamson County.

8. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 is a municipal utility district whose bmmdaries are located within Williamson County.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the relief Plaintiffs seek is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court.

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V. BACKGROUND

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act.

14. The Act creates a significant tax incentive for these residential developments, providing-

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15. As a common-sense geographic requirement for these projects, the Act further requires that" [a] residential development covered by this chapter must be located within the local government." Id. at§ 394.003 (emphasis added).

16. Housing finance corporations are commonly a component of a public/ private partnership in which a private developer acquires land for development or an existing multifamily project, and conveys it to a housing finance corporation, which will then lease it to a private entity or a subsidiary of the housing finance corporation. The housing finance corporation will often receive fees paid by the developer or project owner and a portion of cash flow generated by the project. The common feahue of this struchue is the ability to claim a 100% exemption from local and state taxation.

B. The Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation.

17. Pursuant to the Act, The Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation ("CCHFC") was incorporated in 1979 and approved by the Cameron County Commissioners Court. According to its website, CCHFC' s "housing initiatives are aimed at helping low-income families and other underrepresented groups in Cam eron County who lack suitable homes through traditional financial avenues." (emphasis added.)

18. The website also states that "[CCHFC' s] goal is to provide just the right amount of incentives to meet the needs of businesses looking to locate in Cameron County promoting job creation for our residents within our county while still adding to our tax base to support the governmental functions of our county." (emphasis added.)

C. The Williamson County Properties At Issue.

19. This case involves two properties located in Williamson County. One was

Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 5 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1 acquired by CCHFC in February 2025 and is legally described as Lot 1, Siena Section 30, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Document No. 2020037410 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 6531 CR 110, Round Rock, Texas, 78655. That property is a 13.677-acre h·act of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as Siena Round Rock Apartments has been built ("Siena Round Rock").

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D. CCHFC Seeks Removal of The Properties from the Ad Valorem Tax Rolls.

Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 6 of 15 4925-0205-085 1, V. 1 22. CCHFC has provided Williamson County no justification - legal or otherwise-for its actions. Indeed, CCHFC neglected to contact any Williamson County elected officials or staff before seeking to acquire properties located in Williamson County and remove them from the tax rolls.

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E. The scope of CCHFC' s tax-exemption scheme.

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VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Declaratory Relief Against CCHFC.

29. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

32. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief from the Court pursuant to the UDJA declaring that: a. The Act prohibits CCHFC from acquiring property outside of Cameron

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County (in contravention of the Act), such property, including Siena Round

Rock and The Sommery, is not exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Act. B. • Alternative Claim: Violation of Texas Constitution.

33. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

34. To the extent CCHFC takes the position that, conh·ary to its plain language, the Act does not prohibit it from acquiring and seeking tax exemptions for properties in Williamson County, and to the extent CCHFC prevails in such interpretation of the Act, Plaintiffs alternatively request a declaration from the Court that, as applied by CCHFC, the Act violates the Texas Constitution's rules against exh·a-jurisdictional taxation by seeking to impose a system of taxation on properties located outside of the boundaries of Cameron County.

35. The Texas Constitution requires that all property shall be assessed for Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 10 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1 taxation in the county where it is located. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 11. It further limits counties' ad valorem taxation authority to "property within their respective boundaries." Id. § 1-a. If the Act could be read to empower CCHFC to take properties outside of Cameron County off of the tax rolls, this would violate the Texas Constitutions' limits on the scope of Texas counties' taxing authority.

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VII. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

36. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

37. CCHFC is prohibited by the Act itself from acquiring and seeking tax exemptions on residential projects outside of Cameron County, and injunctive relief is therefore necessary here to compel CCHFC' s compliance with the Act.

38. To obtain injunctive relief, an applicant must show it has a cause of action, that it has a probable right to relief, and that it is faced with imminent irreparable harm. Butnaru v . Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). An applicant has a probable right to relief if it has a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 577-78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) . Among other grounds, "[a] trial court may . . . grant injunctive relief .. .when a dispute involves real property." Shor v. Pelican Oil & Gas Mgmt., LLC, 405 S.W.3d 737, 750 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

39. As detailed above, Plaintiffs have well-supported causes of action against CCHFC to establish and protect their rights in accordance with the Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter a tempora1y restraining order, temporary injunction, and, upon final trial, a permanent injunction enjoining CCHFC, and each of its employees, agents, and those acting in concert or participation with them, from the following conduct: (i) acquiring property in Williamson County, including, but not limited to, The Sommery, and (ii) seeking or obtaining tax exemptions for property in Williamson County, including, but not limited to, Siena Round Rock.

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40. In the absence of such relief, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury for which no remedy at law exists without the protections of a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. CCHFC is rushing to acquire properties in Williamson County (and elsewhere) in a nefarious attempt to remove as many properties from Williamson County's tax roles as possible before its misuse of the Act is stopped. ^[4] If its tactics are permitted with respect to the two subject properties identified in this Petition, Plaintiffs- along with Hutto ISD and other local governmental units - will face the dire consequence of losing millions of dollars in ad valorem tax revenue. The removal of these properties from the tax rolls would immediately affect Plaintiffs' budgeting, thereby necessarily preventing Plaintiffs from allocating that lost revenue to be used for public services.

41 . Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 and Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 would be particularly and severely impacted by the removal of these properties from the tax rolls. In 2024, The Sommery was Siena MUD No. 1' s highest appraised

4 \/Vhy Are Distant Texas Agencies Tn;ing to Take San Antonio Apartments Of!Tax Rolls?, San Antonio Express News, Feb. ^[17], 2025 ("Most of the local d eals have occurred in the past few months as developers and corporations rush to execute transactions before the Legislature cracks down, which some lawmakers have vowed to do this session."), available at https://www .expressnews.com/bus iness/real- es tate/ article/ san-antonio-hill-country-housing-tax-breaks-?00??805.ph p. Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 12 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1 property and Siena Round Rock was Siena MUD No. 2's second highest appraised property. The Sommery is located in Siena MUD No. 1 and Siena Round Rock is located in Siena MUD No. 2. If these properties are removed from the tax rolls, Siena MUD No. 1 will lose approximately $351,813 ammally and Siena MUD No. 2 will lose $231,895 a1mually (based on 2025 valuations).

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ATTORNEYS FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY

-and-

ATTORNEYS FOR SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO. 1 AND SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO. 2 CAUSE NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ __ WILLIAMSON COUNTY, SIENA § IN THE DISTRICT COURT MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO. 1, § and SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY § DISTRICT NO. 2, § Plaintiffs, § § _ _ _ JUDICIAL DISTRICT V. § § THE CAMERON COUNTY HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION and ALVIN § LANKFORD, IN HIS OFFICIAL § CAP ACITY AS CHIEF APPRAISER OF § WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS WILLIAMSON CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Defendants.

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VERIFICATION

1. 19_/_19_6_8_ _ _ _~ and My name is Russ Boles. My date of birth is __l_/_ my address is 3001 Joe DiMaggio Boulevard, Unit 1300, Round Rock, TX 78665.

2. I have read Plaintiffs' Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, the factual statements contained in paragraphs 16-28 and 40-42 are within my personal knowledge based on information provided and made available to me as an elected official of Williamson County, and the factual statements contained therein are true and correct.

3. Pursuant to Section 132.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is h·ue and correct.

Executed in Williamson County, Texas, on March 4, 2025.

7<@s gotes Russ Bo les (Mar 4, 2025 16:29 CST) The Honorable Russ Boles

[*81][*82]

CAUSE NO. 348-362839-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, Plaintiff, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § V. § TARRANTCOUNTY,TEXAS § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Comes now, Alexander Lindvall , attorney of record for Plaintiff in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and pursuant to Tarrant County Local Rule 3.30(c) states as follows (check applicable box[es]):

[ ] "The party against whom ex parte relief is sought is represented by _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ___. Said counsel has been notified of the application and has stated that he/she does/does not wish to be heard."

[ ] "The party against whom ex parte relief is sought is represented by _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _. Diligent attempts to notify the counsel have been unsuccessful, and the circumstances do not permit any additional efforts to give notice because "

[ ] "Diligent attempts to notify counsel for the party against whom ex parte relief is sought have been unsuccessful, and the circumstances do not permit additional efforts to give notice."

[] "To the best of my knowledge, the party against whom ex parte relief is sought is not represented by counsel in the matter made the basis of the relief sought and I have notified him/her of the application for ex parte relief and he/she does/does not wish to be heard."

[x] "To the best of my knowledge, the party against whom ex parte relief is sought is not represented by counsel in the matter made the basis of the relief sought, but I believe they should not be informed of this application for ex parte relief until after it is heard by the court because: I have notified Defendant Bobbitt of this action. He understands the nature of this action a nd did not express a desire to be heard; he simply asked that I forward him a copy of the TRO if granted. I have not notified Defendant Pleasanton HFC or Defendant La Villa HFC of this action. As explained in Arlington's petition, Arlington hils good reason to believe these HFCs will rush to close on properties and acquire irreversible tax exemptions if they are made aware of this potential TRO. Dated: Apcil 30, 2025 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 5/1/2025 10:17 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK No. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants. §

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TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

After considering Plaintiff’s application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), the pleadings, and the evidence presented, and with good cause appearing, the Court finds that —

1. There is a current, live cause of action against Defendants Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”), Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation (“Pleasanton HFC”), La Villa Housing Finance Corporation (“La Villa HFC”) (collectively “Defendant HFCs”), and Joe Don Bobbitt regarding Defendant HFCs’ alleged efforts to bestow unlawful tax exemptions to properties located in the City of Arlington. Specifically, Plaintiff has brought an action against Defendants seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief based on Defendant HFCs’ alleged violations of the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq.

2. Based on the petition, application, allegations, affidavits, and other evidence, it appears that Plaintiff has a probable right to the relief sought in that action.

3. As alleged in Plaintiff’s petition, and as supported by affidavits, Plaintiff has good reason to believe Defendant HFCs are about to close on at least one, perhaps several, multifamily dwellings in Arlington in the coming days or weeks, and at least two of Defendant HFCs have applied for tax exemptions and intend to remove that property from the tax rolls.

4. Plaintiff will suffer imminent and irreparable harm if Defendant HFCs are allowed to remove any further Arlington-based properties from the local tax rolls. Specifically, if a TRO is not entered, Plaintiff will suffering imminent and irreparable harm because, if Defendant HFCs are allowed to remove further Arlington-based properties from the tax rolls, this will immediately and drastically impact Plaintiff’s fiscal budgeting and decrease or eliminate the ad valorem taxes it otherwise could have collected from these properties.

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5. There is no adequate remedy at law because Plaintiff’s losses are continuing in perpetuity, they are not readily calculable, and there is no clear legal mechanism by which Plaintiff could recoup these tax losses in a court of law.

6. An ex parte order, without notice to Defendants, is necessary because (i) Plaintiff has shown there is a good reason to believe that, if notice is given, Defendant HFCs will rush to close on the disputed properties before a restraining order is issued; and (ii) there is insufficient time to give notice to Defendants, hold a hearing, and issue a TRO before imminent and irreparable harm occurs.

7. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the COURT ORDERS THE FOLLOWING:

a. Defendant Pleasanton HFC, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title to real

property in the City of Arlington, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Arlington, Texas.

b. Defendant La Villa HFC, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title to real

property in the City of Arlington, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Arlington, Texas. c. The Clerk shall issue notice to Defendant Pleasanton HFC and Defendant La Villa HFC and that a hearing for Plaintiff’s request for a temporary injunction is set for May 15, 2025, at 1:30 p.m., in this Court. The purpose of this hearing shall be to determine whether this TRO should be made into a temporary injunction pending a full trial on the merits. d. Plaintiff is exempt from posting a bond pursuant to § 6.001 of the Texas

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Civil Practices and Remedies Code.

8. This order in 14 days of further order, whichever occurs first.

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FILED TARRANT COUNTY 5/1/2025 12:52 PM 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK Alexander J. Lindvall Assistant City Attorney Arlington City Attorney’s Office Phone: 817-459-5357 [email protected] THE AMERICAN DREAM CITY FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 5/5/2025 7:28 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

[*89]

No. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § 348th JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit corporation; § JOE DON BOBBITT, in his official capacity as § Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT

NOW COMES Defendant, Joe Don Bobbitt, and files this answer to the Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition. This Defendant would show the Court the following:

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

Plaintiff’s decision to bring this case under the Declaratory Judgments Act rather than the administrative provisions of the Texas Property Tax Code means that this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Mr. Bobbitt, and this case should be dismissed as to Mr. Bobbitt. Because of the pervasive regulatory scheme contained in the Texas Property Tax Code that provides the exclusive means for parties to resolve disputes in connection with the Texas Property Tax Code, there is no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. See Tex. Tax Code 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding). Plaintiff’s claims fit within the statutory framework of the Property Tax Code; the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the Tax Code. Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

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Additionally, Mr. Bobbitt, as Chief Appraiser for the Tarrant Appraisal District, is immune from the present action under the Declaratory Judgments Act (“DJA”) because governmental immunity bars DJA actions against the state and its political divisions, and its employees, absent a legislative waiver. See TEX. TAX CODE § 6.01(c); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. 2009); Stiefer v. Moers, No. 14-14-00617-CV, 2015 WL 6950104, at *3 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist. Nov. ^[10], 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). (“In sum, we conclude that the Moerses’ declaratory judgment action does not state a waiver of governmental immunity.”)

The DJA, in pertinent part, allows a person whose rights are affected by a statute to “have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the [statute] and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.004(a). As the courts have recognized, the DJA does not contain a general waiver of immunity, it only provides a limited waiver for challenges to the validity of an ordinance or statute. Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 552–53 (Tex. 2019) (emphasis added.). The DJA does not waive sovereign immunity when the plaintiff seeks a declaration of rights under a statute or other law. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011).

Plaintiff is not challenging the validity of any statute; rather, Plaintiff seeks to use the DJA to prohibit Mr. Bobbit and his employer, the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting exemptions Plaintiff disagrees with. However, Plaintiff’s remedies lie not in the DJA but in the exclusive remedies contained in the Property Tax Code. Specifically, as a taxing unit, the City’s remedy is to bring a taxing-unit challenge under Texas Tax Code section 41.03. Such a remedy is part of the pervasive scheme known as the Property Tax Code. See, In re ExxonMobil Corp.at 617. (“Our review of the entire Tax Code leads us to conclude it is no less comprehensive with respect to the rights and duties of taxing units than those of property owners[.]” The City of Arlington has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. To properly invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit for judicial review. City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). Its failure deprives this Court of jurisdiction.

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DEFENDANT’S GENERAL DENIAL

Defendant denies each and every, all and singular, the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition and demand strict proof thereof.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays that 1) this Court dismiss all claims against Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, 2) Plaintiff take nothing by this action, 3) all costs be taxed against the Plaintiff, and 4) the Defendant have such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

Respectfully submitted, Low Swinney Evans & James, PLLC 4425 South Mopac Expressway Building 3, Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78735 (512) 379-5800 (512) 476-6685 (fax) [email protected]

By: /s/ James R. Evans, Jr James R. Evans, Jr. State Bar No. 06721500 [email protected] Eric Ruiz State Bar No. 24125845 [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on the following counsel of record on this 5th day of May, 2025. Mr. Alexander J. Lindvall City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. James Evans, Jr. on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 100415620 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Answer and Plea to the Jurisdiction of Defendant Bobbitt Status as of 5/5/2025 8:17 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 5/5/2025 7:28:22 AM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 5/5/2025 7:28:22 AM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 5/5/2025 7:28:22 AM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 5/5/2025 7:28:22 AM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 5/5/2025 7:28:22 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. James Evans, Jr. on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 100415620 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Answer and Plea to the Jurisdiction of Defendant Bobbitt Status as of 5/5/2025 8:17 AM CST Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 5/5/2025 7:28:22 AM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 5/5/2025 10:12 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

[*92][*93][*94][*95]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas Nonprofit § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser § of the Tarrant Appraisal District § § Defendants. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS over Plaintiff’s claim. See Tex. Tax Code 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding).

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4. Plaintiff’s claims related to any properties “removed” from the tax rolls plainly fall within the statutory framework of the Tax Code. As a result, the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the Tax Code. Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

5. Section 41.01 of the Tax Code sets out the duties of the appraisal review board, which, as relevant here, include the duties to determine protests initiated by property owners, determine challenges initiated by taxing units and “take any other action or make any other determination that this title specifically authorizes or requires.” Tex. Tax Code § 41.41. Taxing units are entitled to bring challenges of designated actions before the appraisal review board, among them, challenges to the level of appraisals of any category of property in the district and challenges to an exclusion of property from the appraisal records. Id. § 41.03.

6. Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege that it has exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing this suit because Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Pecos HFC. To properly invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit for judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).

7. For these reasons, Pecos HFC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case in full.

PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 2 OF 8

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MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

8. Pecos HFC respectfully requests that the Court transfer this action to Reeves County, pursuant to Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86.

9. A motion to transfer venue is proper if (1) the County where the action is pending is not a proper county or (2) mandatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by one or more specific statutory provisions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 86.

10. Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “the court, on motion filed and served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if […] the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county as provided by [Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.063(1). “In all venue hearings, no factual proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue” and “[t]he court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.” Id. § 15.064(a).

11. Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief. Id. § 65.023(a) (“[A] writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”); In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“The statute placing venue for injunction suits in the county of the defendant’s domicile is mandatory.”).

12. Section 65.023(a) is operative when a plaintiff’s pleading in the underlying suit establishes the relief sought is “purely or primarily injunctive.” Cont’l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at

PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 3 OF 8 736; Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959) (orig. proceeding) (holding same regarding Section 65.023(a)’s predecessor statute); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1957) (holding that the injunction statute controlled venue, not the location of the real property at issue, in a dispute where an airport owner sought an injunction ordering removal of a television antenna allegedly interfering with an airport runway).

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13. Plaintiff’s goal here is clear: “a permanent injunction that prevents [Pecos HFC] from requesting tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.” 1st Am. Pet at Prayer ¶ C. Plaintiff’s declaratory relief is functionally identical, asking the Court to declare Pecos HFC cannot “bestow tax exemptions to Arlington-based properties.” 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 33.

14. Courts in nearly identical contexts have consistently held that transfer is required, emphasizing that when the plaintiff is “seeking to stop [a defendant] from taking actions,” then “the primary purpose of the lawsuit is injunctive.” In re FPWP GP LLC, No. 05-16-01145-CV, 2017 WL 461355, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.); see also In re Daniel, 12–06–00232–CV, 2006 WL 2361350, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. ^[16], 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

15. There can be no doubt that Section 65.023(a) applies, and this matter should be transferred to Pecos HFC’s domicile: Reeves County, Texas. Plaintiff’s Petition indisputably reflects that Pecos HFC is not at home in Tarrant County, acknowledging it is at home “hundreds of miles away” from the City of Arlington in Reeves County, Texas. 1st Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 3, 5.

16. Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in Tarrant County because (1) “all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant

PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 4 OF 8 County,:” (2) Pecos HFC “purposely availed [itself] to this venue,” and (3) the suit “concerns real property located in Tarrant County,” making Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.011. 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 10. None of these allegations are sufficient to overcome the mandatory venue provision encompassed within Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

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17. Section 15.002(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this subchapter or Subchapter B or C, all lawsuits shall be brought […] (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; [or] (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a) (emphasis added).

18. Section 15.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, codified within Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” Id. § 15.016 (emphasis added); see also id. § 15.001 (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue[.]”).

19. Because Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief, it controls over the venue selection provisions encompassed within Section 15.002. See id. § 65.023(a).

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20. In addition, Plaintiff’s attempted invocation of Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unavailing. Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that only “[a]ctions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.” Id. § 65.023(a). Plaintiff has not pled any of the causes of action enumerated in section 15.011 and, therefore, this Court need not engage in an analysis of conflicting mandatory venue provisions under Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

GENERAL DENIAL

21. Pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Pecos HFC generally denies the allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Petition and demands strict proof thereof.

AFFRIMATIVE DEFENSES

22. Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

23. Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, by the doctrine of mootness/ripeness.

24. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because by estoppel, laches, and/or waiver.

25. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of justification.

26. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claims it asserts.

PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 6 OF 8

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PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant Pecos HFC respectfully requests (i) dismiss all claims against Defendant Pecos HFC; or in the alternative, (ii) that this Court grant its Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer this suit to Reeves County, Texas; and, in the alternative and subject to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, (iii) that Plaintiﬀ takes nothing; and (iii) Defendant be awarded such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which it may be justly entitled.

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Dated: May 5, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Kathryn E. Yukevich Jeffrey M. Tillotson Texas Bar No. 20039200 [email protected] Kathryn E. Yukevich State Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, TX 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564

Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF | STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was e-filed with the Clerk of the Court and will be served via email upon all counsel of record and on this 5th day of May 2025.

/s/ Kathryn E. Yukevich Kathryn E. Yukevich PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 8 OF 8 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kathryn Yukevich Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] Envelope ID: 100423717 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant Pecos HFC's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer, and Answer Status as of 5/5/2025 10:21 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 5/5/2025 10:12:43 AM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 5/5/2025 10:12:43 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kathryn Yukevich Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] Envelope ID: 100423717 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant Pecos HFC's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer, and Answer Status as of 5/5/2025 10:21 AM CST Case Contacts Eric Ruiz [email protected] 5/5/2025 10:12:43 AM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 5/5/2025 10:12:43 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 5/5/2025 10:12:43 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/5/2025 10:12:43 AM SENT FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 5/7/2025 1:34 PM THOMAS A. WILDER No. 348-363561-25 DISTRICT CLERK CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants. §

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PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE MEGAN FAHEY: In support of its Second Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff City of Arlington (“Arlington”) alleges the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 1 (oftentimes the same developer who originally purchased the property), who then shares the profits with the HFC. The upshot of this scheme is that the developer and landlord get a massive tax exemption, the HFC gets to collect fees and a portion of the development’s profits, and the other city (in this case, Arlington) bears 100% of the downside.

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II. PARTIES

4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

8. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN 9. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff seeks relief within the

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 2 jurisdictional limits of this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 65.001 et seq.; Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01, 43.03; Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

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11. Venue is also proper pursuant to the Tax Code. The Tax Code provides that “[a] taxing unit,” like Arlington, “may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with . . . applicable law.” Tex. Tax Code § 43.01. And it further provides that, in such a suit, “[v]enue is in the county in which the appraisal district is established.” Id. § 43.02. As such, because Arlington (a taxing unit) is suing the Tarrant Appraisal District, Tarrant County is the mandatory venue for this case. Id. Sections 43.01 and 43.03 of the Tax Code, moreover, waive any governmental immunity Defendant Bobbitt might have.

12. Arlington intends to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act. ^[13]. This suit concerns the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. (“the Act”). The Act was passed in 1979 to help facilitate the development of low-income housing. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.002(a) (the Act’s purpose is to “provide a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments”).

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 3 public purpose, the Act provides that HFC-owned properties and the income derived from those properties are tax-exempt. Id. § 394.905 (“The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public property used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of this state.”).

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15. HFCs are commonly a part of public/private real estate partnerships, in which a private developer acquires land for a new development or acquires an existing multifamily project and then conveys it to an HFC, which then acquires tax-exempt status for the property and leases the property to a private landlord who, in turn, pays fees to the HFC and shares the profits generated by the property with the HFC.

16. But because the Act allows for such an enormous tax benefit, it provides two specific restrictions on what residential developments an HFC can tax-exempt: (1) a residential development can receive tax exemption from an HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income,” as defined by the statute, id. § 394.004; and (2) the residential development “must be located within the local government,” id. § 394.903.

17. An HFC, in other words, can tax-exempt a residential development only if the development is located within the HFC’s local jurisdiction and is actually used to house low- income individuals. See id. §§ 394.004, 394.903.

B. Several faraway HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Arlington that do not house low-income residents. ^[18]. Arlington recently learned that the Defendant HFCs have been ignoring these statutory restrictions and has been giving tax exemptions to large, multifamily housing developments in Arlington without Arlington’s knowledge, input, or approval. [Affidavit of Mindy Cochran, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at ¶¶ 4‒10.]

19. The Defendant HFCs’ unlawful tax-exemption scheme has removed tens of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units’ tax rolls and has caused Arlington to lose Page 4 millions of dollars in annual tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 10.]

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20. To illustrate, several months ago, Defendant Pecos HFC acquired the Zenith North Collins (735 Washington Dr.) apartment complex—an already-built, upscale apartment complex located next to a golf course in Arlington.^[1] [Id. at ¶ 5.] After acquiring this complex, the Pecos HFC applied for and received a full tax exemption for this property. [Id.] And after receiving that exemption, it leased the complex to a private landlord and now collects a share of that complex’s profits. [Id.] This property was appraised at $86 million. [Id.] So, when it was removed from the tax rolls, that caused the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose $1.7 million in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that revenue was approximately $447,000. [Id.]

21. In other words, by exempting just one apartment complex in Arlington, the Pecos HFC caused Arlington to lose roughly $447,000 in annual tax revenue, and there is no clear path for Arlington (or other affected local entities) to recoup that loss. [See id.]

22. To make matters worse, the Zenith North Collins doesn’t even provide low-income housing. With fees and rent, a three-bedroom apartment in this complex costs well over $3,000 per month, and a two-bedroom is around $2,000 per month.^[2] And upon information and belief, this complex does not come close to meeting the 90%-low-income-housing threshold needed to receive an exemption under the Act. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.004 (providing that a residential development can receive tax exemption from a HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income”).

23. This is a widespread problem across the state. The City of Euless, for example, has seen at least a 2% drop in its overall annual revenue after a single apartment complex received tax- exempt status from the Cameron County HFC;3 and Dallas, Fort Worth, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and other north Texas cities have reported millions of dollars in total lost tax revenue.^[4]

1 At the time of acquisition, this complex was known as the “Jefferson North Collins” apartment complex. ^[2] https://www.zenitharlington.com/floorplans/. 3 Andrea Lucia, Euless Loses 2 Percent of Revenue to Controversial Tax Break Approved in Faraway County, CBS News (Feb. ^[21], 2024). 4 Andrea Lucia, Housing Group Made Millions Getting Tax Breaks for Developers, Costing Cities and Schools Even More, CBS News (Dec. ^[22], 2023).

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 5 Worse, these out-of-jurisdiction HFCs are often bestowing tax-exempt status to already-built structures (not new projects), and many of the exempted properties aren’t even affordable-housing projects; they are typical for-profit apartments and condos, usually located in upmarket neighborhoods, that do not offer reduced rent, housing vouchers, or other benefits to low-income applicants.^[5]

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24. Upon information and belief, the Pecos HFC also recently bestowed tax-exempt status to another apartment complex in Arlington called Cedar Point (2020 Cedar Point Dr.). [Exhibit 1 at ¶ 6.] That property is appraised at approximately $27.5 million, and Arlington’s lost ad valorem tax revenue because of this tax exemption amounts to about $165,000 per year. [Id.] That complex, similarly, does not offer affordable housing as contemplated by the Act.

25. Arlington, moreover, has good reason to believe the Pecos HFC plans to close on several more Arlington-based properties in the coming months, and that it is on the verge of closing on one of those properties in the coming days. [Id. at ¶ 10; Affidavit of Molly Shortall, attached hereto as Exhibit 2, at ¶ 5.]

26. Arlington also recently learned that the Pleasanton HFC and the La Villa HFC have been engaging in the same sort of unlawful tax-exemption scheme in Arlington. [Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 4, 8‒9.]

27. The Pleasanton HFC has acquired at least two properties in Arlington: The Washington apartment complex (707 Washington Dr.) and Cedars and River Legacy Park (903 Ashford Ln.). [Id. at ¶ 8.] Upon information and belief, the Pleasanton HFC has applied for, but has not yet received, tax exemptions for these properties. [Id.]

5 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a “luxurious community” in Irving and that the tenants’ rents went up significantly under the HFC’s ownership).

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 6 if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $710,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $195,000 per year. [Id. at ¶ 8b.]

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29. In other words, if the Pleasanton HFC receives tax exemptions for these properties, it will likely cause Arlington to lose over $400,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 8.]

31. Because of the widespread nature of this practice (see ¶ 22 supra), there has been a strong legislative push to (even more) explicitly outlaw this sort of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21 (link). Upon information and belief, because this sort of scheme is about to become indisputably illegal, HFCs have been scrambling to close their out-of-jurisdiction projects and apply for undeserved tax exemptions. V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT & TAX CODE

32. Texas’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) allows trial courts to “declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.003. The UDJA further provides that “[a] person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. § 37.004(a). The Legislature intended the UDJA to be “remedial” and “liberally construed,” and “its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” Id. § 37.002(b).

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 7

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33. In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

34. Arlington asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow the Defendant HFCs to bestow tax exemptions to Arlington-based properties.

35. The Tax Code, moreover, provides that “[a] taxing unit,” like Arlington, “may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with . . . applicable law.” Tex. Tax Code § 43.01. And it further empowers this Court to “enter . . . orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” Id. § 43.03.

36. Pursuant to these laws, Arlington asks for this Court to prevent Defendant Bobbitt from unlawfully awarding any further tax exemptions to the Defendant HFCs. See id. §§ 43.01, 43.03; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 37.001 et seq.

VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

37. To stop the Defendant HFCs from unlawfully removing any more Arlington-based properties from the tax rolls, Arlington asks this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that prohibits the Defendant HFCs from (a) closing on any Arlington-based properties or (b) requesting, obtaining, or receiving any tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.

38. Arlington further requests a TRO that prohibits Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Arlington-based properties.

39. Arlington requests the Court to issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 8 least one Arlington-based property in the coming days [Exhibit 2 at ¶ 5], and Arlington believes these HFCs will rush to close on deals and seek exemptions if they are made aware of this TRO application.

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41. The Pleasanton HFC and the La Villa HFC, moreover, have recently closed on Arlington properties and, upon information and belief, plan to request undeserved tax exemptions for these properties. [Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 8‒9.] If these HFCs receive these requested exemptions, Arlington will irrevocably lose about $545,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id.]

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Page 9 discretion,” and an order granting injunctive relief will be reversed on appeal only if “the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Id.

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Page 10 tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.

(D) To award Plaintiff its attorney’s fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004 Phone: 817-459-6878 Fax: 817-459-6897

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON Page 11

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348-363561-25

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

After considering the application for a temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiffs in the above-styled matter, the pleadings, and the evidence, the Court finds that-

1. There is a current controversy over Defendant Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation's (" CCHFC") efforts to seek exemption from ad valorem taxes for properties located in Williamson County, including the following real properties:

Temporary Restraining Order - Page 1 of 3 15.0496-acre h·act of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as The Sommery has been built ("The Sommery").

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4. There is no adequate remedy at law because such damages or harm to Plaintiffs cannot be calculated.

6. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that-

a. CCHFC, as well as its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with

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7. This order expires o n ~ \ L\:. q 2025 at _ _:oo _ _ _t1:__.m.

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II. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF

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III. PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Williamson County is a Texas county.

7. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 is a municipal utility district whose boundaries are located within Williamson County.

8. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 is a municipal utility district whose bmmdaries are located within Williamson County.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the relief Plaintiffs seek is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court.

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V. BACKGROUND

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act.

14. The Act creates a significant tax incentive for these residential developments, providing-

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B. The Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation.

C. The Williamson County Properties At Issue.

19. This case involves two properties located in Williamson County. One was

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D. CCHFC Seeks Removal of The Properties from the Ad Valorem Tax Rolls.

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E. The scope of CCHFC' s tax-exemption scheme.

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VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Declaratory Relief Against CCHFC.

29. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

32. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief from the Court pursuant to the UDJA declaring that: a. The Act prohibits CCHFC from acquiring property outside of Cameron

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County (in contravention of the Act), such property, including Siena Round

Rock and The Sommery, is not exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Act. B. • Alternative Claim: Violation of Texas Constitution.

33. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

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VII. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

36. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

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42. The impact of this lost revenue on Hutto ISD would be even more devastating. The two properties at issue are Hutto ISD' s fifth and twelfth highest appraised properties, and, as described above, removal of these properties from the tax rolls would result in a loss of at least $1.2 million annually in ad valorem tax revenue. As a fast-growing school district that has added more than 600 students this year alone, removal of these properties from the tax rolls would have grave and lasting consequences for Hutto ISD, including by limiting the ability to budget for and therefore fill needed teacher and staff positions.

43. Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded, and all or part of the relief requires the restraint of some act that is prejudicial to Plaintiffs.

PRAYER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully request that after a final trial on the merits, the Court enter a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against CCHFC awarding the declaratory and injunctive relief sought herein, attorney's fees, through trial and any appeal, under Section 37.009 of the UDJA, costs of court, and any other and further relief in law or in equity to which Plaintiffs are entitled.

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ATTORNEYS FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY

-and-

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VERIFICATION

1. 19_/_19_6_8_ _ _ _~ and My name is Russ Boles. My date of birth is __l_/_ my address is 3001 Joe DiMaggio Boulevard, Unit 1300, Round Rock, TX 78665.

3. Pursuant to Section 132.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is h·ue and correct.

Executed in Williamson County, Texas, on March 4, 2025.

7<@s gotes Russ Bo les (Mar 4, 2025 16:29 CST) The Honorable Russ Boles

Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 15 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Chelsea Coad on behalf of David King BarNo.24083310 ccoad@abaustin .com Envelope ID: 98063219 Filing Code Description: Petition Filing Description: Plaintiffs' Original Petition- Filed and signed by atty David King and R. Mark Dietz- Env# 98063219 Status as of 3/4/2025 4:57 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status David King [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT Jeff Hobbs [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT Martha Adams [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT Chelsea Coad [email protected] 3/4/2025 4:47:40 PM SENT 348-363561-25 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 5/13/2025 4:49 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 348th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS Worth-based properties from Tarrant County tax appraisal rolls in exchange for monetary kickbacks resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in real property value from the local tax base.

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2. Defendant HFCs’ scheme seems to work like this: a private developer acquires land for a new multifamily development (or acquires an already-existing multifamily development) in a city or county other than where the HFC is located; the private developer then conveys that property to the HFC; the HFC, as the new owner, then applies for and receives a 100% tax exemption from the Tarrant Appraisal District, and the property is removed from the tax rolls; the HFC then leases that now-exempt property back to a private landlord (oftentimes the same developer who originally purchased the property), who then shares the profits with the HFC. The upshot of this scheme is that the developer and landlord get a massive tax exemption, the HFC gets to collect fees and a portion of the development’s profits, and the other city (in this case, Fort Worth) bears 100% of the downside.

3. In short, a handful of tiny public corporations, located hundreds of miles away in towns with no connection to Fort Worth, have drastically reduced Fort Worth’s yearly tax revenue by millions of dollars while they rake in undeserved fees and profits from Fort Worth-based rental properties. Fort Worth now intervenes to ask this Court to halt the Defendant HFCs’ unlawful behavior before they do any further irreversible damage to Fort Worth’s tax base, and to stop the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs for any Fort Worth- based properties. II. PARTIES

4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

5. Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

6. Defendant Pecos HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It has already been served and appeared. City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 2 7. Defendant Pleasanton HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, Johnny Huizar, at 108 Second Street, Pleasanton, Texas 78064, or wherever else he may be located.

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8. Defendant La Villa HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, Rosa Perez, at 916 South Mike Chapa Drive, La Villa, Texas 78562, or wherever else she may be located.

9. Defendant Maverick County HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, the Honorable Ramsey English Cantu, at 500 Quarry Street, Suite 3, Eagle Pass, Texas 78852, or wherever else he may be located.

10. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only and has already been served and appeared.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

11. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiffs seek relief within the jurisdictional limits of this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 65.001 et seq.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

12. Venue is proper in Tarrant County because all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant County—and by conducting business in Tarrant County, Defendants have purposely availed themselves to this venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1). This suit, moreover, concerns real property located in Tarrant County, making Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case. See id. § 15.011.

13. Venue is also proper pursuant to the Tax Code, which provides that “[a] taxing unit,” like Fort Worth, “may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with…applicable law.” Tex. Tax Code § 43.01. It further provides that, in such a suit, “[v]enue is in the county in which the appraisal district is established.” Id. § 43.02. As such, because Fort Worth (a taxing unit) is suing the Tarrant Appraisal District, Tarrant County is the mandatory venue for this case. Id. Sections 43.01 and 4303 of the Tax Code, moreover, waive any governmental immunity Defendant Bobbitt might have.

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14. Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

15. This suit concerns the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. (“the Act”). The Act was passed in 1979 to help facilitate the development of low-income housing. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.002(a) (the Act’s purpose is to “provide a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments”).

16. To help create more low-income housing, the Act empowers local governments to create Housing Finance Corporations (“HFCs”)—nonprofit organizations, comprised of local officials, that help coordinate and facilitate affordable-housing projects. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.002, 394.011(a), 394.032. And because HFCs are (at least in theory) furthering a public purpose, the Act provides that HFC-owned properties and the income derived from those properties are tax-exempt. Id. § 394.905 (“The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public property used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of this state.”).

17. HFCs are commonly a part of public/private real estate partnerships, in which a private developer acquires land for a new development or acquires an existing multifamily project and then conveys it to an HFC, which then acquires tax-exempt status for the property and leases the property to a private landlord who, in turn, pays fees to the HFC and shares the profits generated by the property with the HFC.

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18. But because the Act allows for such an enormous tax benefit, it provides two specific restrictions on what residential developments an HFC can tax-exempt: (1) a residential development can receive tax exemption from an HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income,” as defined by the statute, id. § 394.004; and (2) the residential development “must be located within the local government,” id. § 394.903.

19. An HFC, in other words, can tax-exempt a residential development only if the development is located within the HFC’s local jurisdiction and is actually used to house low- income individuals. See id. §§ 394.004, 394.903.

B. Defendant HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Fort Worth that do not house low-income residents.

20. Fort Worth has learned that the Defendant HFCs have been ignoring these statutory restrictions and have been seeking and acquiring tax exemptions for large, multifamily housing developments in Fort Worth.

21. As described in further detail below, the Defendant HFCs’ unlawful tax-exemption scheme has already removed hundreds of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units’ tax rolls and have caused Fort Worth to lose millions of dollars in annual tax revenue.

22. To illustrate, in October of 2024, Defendant Maverick County HFC acquired The Sovereign (5301 North Tarrant Parkway) 1—an already-built, self-described “luxury apartment community” located in far north Fort Worth. ^[2] After acquiring this complex, Maverick County HFC applied for and received a full tax exemption for this property. ^[3] This property is appraised at $80,369,852. 4 So, when it was removed from the tax rolls, it caused the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose over $1.8 million in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Fort Worth’s share of that revenue is over $540,000. 5

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23. In other words, by exempting just one apartment complex in Fort Worth, the Maverick County HFC caused the City of Fort Worth to lose over a half million dollars in annual tax revenue, and there is no clear path for Fort Worth (or other affected local entities) to recoup that loss.

24. To make matters worse, it appears that The Sovereign doesn’t even provide low- income housing. Its smallest unit, a 660 square foot one-bedroom apartment, rents for $1,379 per month. ^[6] Upon information and belief, this complex does not come close to meeting the 90%-low- to moderate- income housing threshold needed to receive an exemption under the Act. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.004 (providing that a residential development can receive tax exemption from a HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income”).

25. In another example, on January 24, 2025, Defendant Pleasanton HFC acquired the Rocklyn Fort Worth apartment complex, located at 637 Samuels Avenue in the Rocklyn Trinity Uptown neighborhood on the bluffs overlooking the west fork of the Trinity River just north of Downtown Fort Worth. ^[7] Pleasanton HFC promptly secured a tax exemption for this property, removing its assessed value of over $70 million from the Tarrant County tax rolls. ^[8] This upscale apartment complex currently offers one- to three-bedroom apartments for monthly rents ranging from $1,464 to $2,976, 9 and upon information and belief, also does not satisfy the low- to moderate-income housing threshold required for an exemption under the Act. In fact, there appears to be no reason to believe renter demographics for this property have in any way changed since the complex opened in 2018. If true, Pleasanton HFC’s acquisition of this property has done nothing to increase access to affordable housing as required by statute. Meanwhile, its exemption from property taxes provides the complex with a windfall savings of over $1.5 million annually.^[10] Fort Worth loses approximately $474,000 in yearly tax revenue, yet still bears the costs of providing city services to the property. ^[11]

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26. This is a widespread problem across the state. The City of Euless, for example, has seen at least a 2% drop in its overall annual revenue after a single apartment complex received tax- exempt status from the Cameron County HFC; 12 and Dallas, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and other north Texas cities have reported millions of dollars in total lost tax revenue. ^[13] Worse, these out-of-jurisdiction HFCs are often bestowing tax-exempt status to already-built structures (not new projects), and many of the exempted properties aren’t even affordable-housing projects; they are typical for-profit apartments and condos, usually located in upmarket neighborhoods, that do not offer reduced rent, housing vouchers, or other benefits to low-income applicants. ^[14]

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27. According to information available on the Tarrant Appraisal District website, Defendant HFCs currently own a total of 26 properties located in Fort Worth [See the spreadsheet attached hereto as Exhibit 1]. For 13 of these properties, Defendants have already been granted a 2025 tax exemption by the Tarrant Appraisal District. These 13 exempt properties have a combined assessed value of $529,632,697 for the current tax year. The removal of this over half a billion dollars of taxable value from Tarrant County tax rolls will cost the City of Fort Worth alone over $3 million in 2025 tax revenue, and will similarly affect the tax revenues of Tarrant County, Tarrant Regional Water District, Tarrant County Hospital District, Tarrant County College, and the Fort Worth, Keller, Eagle Mountain-Saginaw, Crowley and Northwest Independent School Districts.

28. Defendant HFCs currently own another 13 properties in Fort Worth for which they have not yet acquired a tax exemption. These 13 properties have a combined assessed 2025 value of $486,878,261. These properties are the focus of Fort Worth’s claims in this lawsuit. Fort Worth intervenes to enjoin Defendants from acquiring tax-exempt status on these properties and to prevent this additional half a billion dollars of taxable value from being removed from the tax rolls, which otherwise would cost the City an additional $3 million in tax revenue.

29. Because of the widespread nature of this practice, there has been a strong bipartisan legislative push to remove any doubt about the illegality of this sort of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21. 15 A similar bill recently passed the House with overwhelming support and has moved to the Senate for consideration. ^[16] Upon information and belief, because this sort of

14 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a “luxurious community” in Irving and that the tenants’ rents went up significantly under the HFC’s ownership). 15 https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB21/id/3053018 16 See, e.g., Texas House Moves to Rein in “Traveling” Housing Finance Corporations, But Broader Reforms Still City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 8 scheme is about to become indisputably illegal, HFCs have been scrambling to close their out-of- jurisdiction projects and obtain exemptions.

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C. Texas Constitution

30. Tex. Const. art. VIII Section 11 limits counties’ ad valorem taxation authority to property within their prospective boundaries. Any law that purports to allow a local government to take properties off the tax rolls outside jurisdiction of that local government violates this constitutional principle.

V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

32. In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

33. Fort Worth asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow Defendants to bestow tax exemptions to Fort Worth-based properties.

34. Fort Worth further asks for a declaratory judgment that Article VIII, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution limits counties’ ad valorem taxation authority to “property within their respective boundaries” and that the Defendants’ scheme violates Constitutional limits on the scope of Texas counties’ taxing authority.

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VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

35. To stop the Defendant HFCs from closing on any more Fort Worth-based properties, Fort Worth asks this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that prohibits the Defendant HFCs from (a) closing on any Fort Worth-based properties or (b) requesting or receiving any tax exemptions for Fort Worth-based properties.

36. Fort Worth further requests a TRO that prohibits Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Fort Worth-based properties.

37. Fort Worth requests that this Court issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Fort Worth believes the Defendant HFCs are already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the short-term.

38. Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 2.] City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 10 39. This Court should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents Defendant HFCs from overstepping jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Fort Worth- based properties. And out of an abundance of caution, this Court should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by a Defendant HFC regarding any Fort Worth-based property.

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40. Once that TRO has expired, Fort Worth asks for a temporary injunction. “To obtain a temporary injunction, [an] applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). “Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion,” and an order granting injunctive relief will be reversed on appeal only if “the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Id.

41. All these elements are present. Fort Worth has pleaded a cause of action against Defendants: a declaratory action under the UDJA. Fort Worth has shown it will likely be successful in this declaratory action, as the Act’s plain language prohibits Defendant HFCs’ complained-of conduct. And, in the absence of injunctive relief, Defendant HFCs are likely to close on additional Fort Worth-based properties and/or apply for a tax exemptions, which would lead to an irreversible removal of this property from the local tax rolls. Simply put, this is precisely the sort of case in which equitable relief is warranted.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Based on the foregoing, Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth respectfully asks this Court for the following relief:

City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 11 (A) To issue a TRO against Defendant HFCs and Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt that (i) prevents Defendant HFCs from requesting or receiving tax exemptions for any Fort Worth-based properties, and (ii) prevents Mr. Bobbitt from granting tax exemptions requested by Defendant HFCs regarding any Fort Worth-based properties. A proposed TRO was filed contemporaneously herewith.

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(B) After the expiration of this TRO, and after a hearing, to issue a temporary injunction against the same Defendants that enjoins the same unlawful conduct pending trial.

(C) After the expiration of this temporary injunction, and after a final trial on the merits, to issue (i) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq., does not allow Defendant HFCs to bestow tax-exempt status to properties located in Fort Worth; and (ii) a permanent injunction that prevents Defendant HFCs from requesting or receiving tax exemptions for Fort Worth-based properties.

(D) To award Fort Worth its attorney’s fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

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CITY OF FORT WORTH Office of the City Attorney 100 Fort Worth Trail Fort Worth, Texas 76102 P: (817) 392-7600

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 13th day of May 2025 a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was e-filed with the Clerk of the Court and electronically served upon all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Stephen A. Cumbie STEPHEN A. CUMBIE CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 34g th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § P laintiff-Jntervenor § TARRANTCOUNTY,TEXAS statement contained therein is within his personal knowledge and is true and correct.

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8 ~ e , Afururt

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this 13 th day of May 2025.

,,,~~'tf:,,, ~~ ..... ~('~ LAURA GREGORY H\A,;•/:1 Notary Public, State of Texas ~~---~.;;..~~ Comm. Expires 03-08-2028 "",.'i•···~~- .... ,,,,,,~f,,,,,,' Notary ID 4463814 The State of Texas TRAVELING HFCs IN THE CITY OF FORT WORTH 1

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DATE OF EXEMPTION PROPERTY FORT WORTH'S TARRANT APPRAISAL DISTRICT PROPERTY ADDRESS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION ACQUISITION STATUS VALUE LOST REVENUE WEBSITE LINK 8901 S NORMANDALE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐02‐15 EXEMPT $30,773,181.00 $206,949.64 https://www.tad.org/property?account=03435024 9051 S NORMANDALE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐02‐15 EXEMPT $13,921,653.00 $93,623.12 https://www.tad.org/property?account=03435076 3391 WESTERN CENTER BLVD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐02‐27 EXEMPT $41,184,002.00 $276,962.41 https://www.tad.org/property?account=07008937 5301 NORTH TARRANT PKWY MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024‐10‐09 EXEMPT $80,369,852.00 $540,487.25 https://www.tad.org/property?account=41652207 8100 N RIVERSIDE DR PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024‐10‐31 EXEMPT $58,188,517.00 $391,317.78 https://www.tad.org/property?account=41410475 2188 E LOOP 820 PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024‐11‐15 EXEMPT $29,852,508.00 $200,758.12 https://www.tad.org/property?account=01184954 5801 BRIDGE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐01‐15 EXEMPT $28,579,464.00 $192,196.90 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04972759 6051 BRIDGE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐01‐15 EXEMPT $22,355,436.00 $150,340.31 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04972848 6776 WESTCREEK DR PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024‐12‐19 EXEMPT $33,857,834.00 $227,693.93 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05628954 637 SAMUELS AVE PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐01‐24 EXEMPT $70,526,952.00 $474,293.75 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402920 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402938 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402946 9632 BERKSHIRE LAKE BLVD PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐18 EXEMPT $69,600,728.00 $468,064.90 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42729627 BLUE MOUND RD PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐01‐27 EXEMPT $451,037.00 $3,033.22 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42721201 300 E. MORPHY ST MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2022‐09‐30 EXEMPT $49,971,533.00 $336,058.56 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42332301 14301 CENTRE STATION DR MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐02‐03 NO EXEMPTIONS $101,117,467.00 $680,014.97 https://www.tad.org/property?account=41424360 1505 HOMEDALE DR PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐19 NO EXEMPTIONS $25,793,728.00 $173,462.82 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04402324 500 E LOOP 820 LA VILLA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐04‐04 NO EXEMPTIONS $24,554,971.00 $165,132.18 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04325893 5600 COTSWOLD HILLS DR PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐24 NO EXEMPTIONS $27,759,851.00 $186,685.00 https://www.tad.org/property?account=00538744 6500 BOCA RATON BLVD MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐01‐17 NO EXEMPTIONS $12,398,461.00 $83,379.65 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05661846 6501 BOCA RATON BLVD MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐01‐17 NO EXEMPTIONS $23,082,702.00 $155,231.17 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05662486 6991 ANDERSON BLVD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐19 NO EXEMPTIONS $228,690.00 $1,537.94 https://www.tad.org/property?account=06468071 7040 JOHN T WHITE PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐19 NO EXEMPTIONS $25,851,059.00 $173,848.37 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05654395 8900 COTTONWOOD VILLAGE DR PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐02‐06 NO EXEMPTIONS $24,929,564.00 $167,651.32 https://www.tad.org/property?account=06493777 8900 RANDOL MILL RD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐24 NO EXEMPTIONS $45,043,125.00 $302,915.02 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05682045 6250 GRANBURY CUT OFF RD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐04‐09 NO EXEMPTIONS $24,791,114.00 $166,720.24 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05503396 113 WESTERN SWING WAY PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐04‐09 NO EXEMPTIONS $78,184,484.00 $525,790.65 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42699604 6032 TRAVERTINE LN PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025‐03‐07 NO EXEMPTIONS $73,143,045.00 $491,886.98 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42220783 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42220791

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('J . ,,~FILED .-, 'v o'clock c.~. L FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 5/14/2025 9:25 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Alexander Lindvall on behalf of Alexander Lindvall Bar No. 24139409 [email protected] Envelope ID: 100807162 Filing Code Description: Notice Filing Description: Rule 11 Agreement - Extending TRO and Postponing TI Hearing Status as of 5/14/2025 9:31 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Alexander Lindvall on behalf of Alexander Lindvall Bar No. 24139409 [email protected] Envelope ID: 100807162 Filing Code Description: Notice Filing Description: Rule 11 Agreement - Extending TRO and Postponing TI Hearing Status as of 5/14/2025 9:31 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 5/14/2025 9:25:07 AM SENT 348-363561-25 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 5/21/2025 4:20 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 34g th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS .,__ . _ trial on the merits. c. Plaintiff is exempt from posting a bond pursuant to§ 6.001 of the Texas Civil

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Practice and Remedies Code.

7. This order expires within 14 days or further order, whichever occurs first.

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348-363561-25 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 5/22/2025 4:42 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 348 111 JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS Worth-based properties from Tarrant County tax appraisal rolls in exchange for monetary kickbacks resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in real property value from the local tax base.

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2. Defendant HFCs' scheme seems to work like this: a private developer acquires land for a new multifamily development (or acquires an already-existing multifamily development) in a city or county other than where the HFC is located; the private developer then conveys that prope1iy to the HFC; the HFC, as the new owner, then applies for and receives a 100% tax exemption from the Tarrant Appraisal District, and the prope1iy is removed from the tax rolls; the HFC then leases that now-exempt property back to a private landlord (oftentimes the same developer who originally purchased the prope1iy), who then shares the profits with the HFC. The upshot of this scheme is that the developer and landlord get a massive tax exemption, the HFC gets to collect fees and a po1iion of the development's profits, and the other city (in this case, F01i Wo1ih) bears 100% of the downside.

3. In sh01i, a handful of tiny public corporations, located hundreds of miles away in towns with no connection to F01i W01ih, have drastically reduced F01i Worth's yearly tax revenue by millions of dollars while they rake in undeserved fees and profits from F01i Wo1ih-based rental properties. Fort W01ih now intervenes to ask this Comito halt the Defendant HFCs' unlawful behavior before they do any further irreversible damage to Fort Worth's tax base, and to stop the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs for any Fort Worth- based properties.

II. PARTIES

4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

5. Intervenor-Plaintiff City of F01i Wo1ih is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

6. Defendant Pecos HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It has already been served and appeared. City of Fort Worth's First Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 2 7. Defendant Pleasanton HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, Johnny Huizar, at 108 Second Street, Pleasanton, Texas 78064, or wherever else he may be located.

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9. Defendant Maverick County HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, the Honorable Ramsey English Cantu, at 500 Quany Street, Suite 3, Eagle Pass, Texas 78852, or wherever else he may be located.

10. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tanant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only and has already been served and appeared.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

11. This Comt has jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiffs seek relief within the jurisdictional limits of this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§§ 65.001 et seq.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

12. Venue is proper in Tanant County because all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tanant County-and by conducting business in Tarrant County, Defendants have purposely availed themselves to this venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(l). This suit, moreover, concerns real prope1ty located in TaiTant County, making Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case. See id. § 15.011.

13. Venue is also proper pursuant to the Tax Code, which provides that "[a] taxing unit," like Fort W01th, "may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with ... applicable law." Tex. Tax Code§ 43.01. It fmther provides that, in such a suit, " [v] enue is in the county in which the appraisal district is established." Id. § 43.02. As such, because Fort Wmth (a taxing unit) is suing the Tarrant Appraisal District, Tarrant County is the mandatory venue for this case. Id. Sections 43.01 and 4303 of the Tax Code, moreover, waive any governmental immunity Defendant Bobbitt might have.

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14. Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

15 . This suit concerns the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov't Code§§ 394.001 et seq. ("the Act"). The Act was passed in 1979 to help facilitate the development oflow-income housing. See Tex. Local Gov't Code§ 394.002(a) (the Act' s purpose is to "provide a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments").

16. To help create more low-income housing, the Act empowers local governments to create Housing Finance Corporations ("HFCs")- nonprofit organizations, comprised of local officials, that help coordinate and facilitate affordable-housing projects. See Tex. Local Gov't Code §§ 394.002, 394.01 l(a), 394.032. And because HFCs are (at least in theory) fmthering a public purpose, the Act provides that RFC-owned prope1ties and the income derived from those prope1ties are tax-exempt. Id. § 394.905 ("The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public prope1ty used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of this state.").

17. HFCs are commonly a pait of public/private real estate partnerships, in which a private developer acquires land for a new development or acquires an existing multifamily project and then conveys it to an HFC, which then acquires tax-exempt status for the prope1iy and leases the property to a private landlord who, in turn, pays fees to the HFC and shares the profits generated by the property with the HFC.

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18. But because the Act allows for such an enormous tax benefit, it provides two specific restrictions on what residential developments an HFC can tax-exempt: (1) a residential development can receive tax exemption from an HFC only if at least 90% of the development "is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income," as defined by the statute, id. § 394.004; and (2) the residential development "must be located within the local government," id. § 394.903.

19. An HFC, in other words, can tax-exempt a residential development only if the development is located within the HFC's local jurisdiction and is actually used to house low- income individuals. See id. §§ 394.004, 394.903.

B. Defendant HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Fort Worth that do not house low-income residents.

20. Fort W01ih has learned that the Defendant HFCs have been ignoring these statutory restrictions and have been seeking and acquiring tax exemptions for large, multifamily housing developments in F01i Worth.

21. As described in further detail below, the Defendant HFCs' unlawful tax-exemption scheme has already removed hundreds of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units' tax rolls and have caused Fort Worth to lose millions of dollars in annual tax revenue.

22. To illustrate, in October of 2024, Defendant Maverick County HFC acquired The Sovereign (5301 North Tarrant Parkway) 1- an already-built, self-described "luxury apartment community" located in far north Fort Worth. ^[2] After acquiring this complex, Maverick County HFC applied for and received a full tax exemption for this prope1ty. 3 This property is appraised at $80,369,852. 4 So, when it was removed from the tax rolls, it caused the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose over $1.8 million in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Fort Worth's share of that revenue is over $540,000. 5

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23. In other words, by exempting just one apartment complex in Fmt Wo1th, the Maverick County HFC caused the City of Fmi Worth to lose over a half million dollars in annual tax revenue, and there is no clear path for Fort Wmth (or other affected local entities) to recoup that loss.

24. To make matters worse, it appears that The Sovereign doesn't even provide low- income housing. Its smallest unit, a 660 square foot one-bedroom apa1tment, rents for $1,379 per month. ^[6] Upon information and belief, this complex does not come close to meeting the 90%-low- to moderate- income housing threshold needed to receive an exemption under the Act. See Tex. Local Gov't Code § 394.004 (providing that a residential development can receive tax exemption from a HFC only if at least 90% of the development "is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons oflow and moderate income").

25. In another example, on January 24, 2025, Defendant Pleasanton HFC acquired the Rocklyn Fort Wmth apartment complex, located at 637 Samuels Avenue in the Rocklyn Trinity Uptown neighborhood on the bluffs overlooking the west fork of the Trinity River just 1101th of Downtown Fort Worth. ^[7] Pleasanton HFC promptly secured a tax exemption for this property, removing its assessed value of over $70 million from the Tarrant County tax rolls. ^[8] This upscale apartment complex currently offers one- to three-bedroom apartments for monthly rents ranging from $1,464 to $2,976, 9 and upon information and belief, also does not satisfy the low- to moderate-income housing threshold required for an exemption under the Act. In fact, there appears to be no reason to believe renter demographics for this property have in any way changed since the complex opened in 2018. If true, Pleasanton HFC's acquisition of this property has done nothing to increase access to affordable housing as required by statute. Meanwhile, its exemption from property taxes provides the complex with a windfall savings of over $1.5 million annually. ^[10] Fort Worth loses approximately $474,000 in yearly tax revenue, yet still bears the costs of providing city services to the property. ^[11]

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26. This is a widespread problem across the state. The City of Euless, for example, has seen at least a 2% drop in its overall annual revenue after a single apartment complex received tax- exempt status from the Cameron County HFC; 12 and Dallas, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and other north Texas cities have reported millions of dollars in total lost tax revenue. ^[13] Worse, these out-of-jurisdiction HFCs are often bestowing tax-exempt status to already-built structures (not new projects), and many of the exempted prope1iies aren't even affordable-housing projects; they are typical for-profit apaiiments and condos, usually located in upmarket neighborhoods, that do not offer reduced rent, housing vouchers, or other benefits to low-income applicants. ^[14]

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27. According to information available on the Tanant Appraisal District website, Defendant HFCs currently own a total of 26 properties located in Fort Worth [See the spreadsheet attached hereto as Exhibit 1]. For 13 of these properties, Defendants have already been granted a 2025 tax exemption by the Tarrant Appraisal District. These 13 exempt properties have a combined assessed value of $529,632,697 for the current tax year. The removal of this over half a billion dollars of taxable value from Tarrant County tax rolls will cost the City of F01i Wo1ih alone over $3 million in 2025 tax revenue, and will similarly affect the tax revenues of Tarrant County, Tarrant Regional Water District, Tarrant County Hospital District, Tarrant County College, and the Fo1i W01ih, Keller, Eagle Mountain-Saginaw, Crowley and N01ihwest Independent School Districts.

28. Defendant HFCs currently own another 13 prope1iies in Fo1i W01ih for which they have not yet acquired a tax exemption. These 13 prope1iies have a combined assessed 2025 value of $486,878,261. These prope1iies are the focus of Fort W01ih's claims in this lawsuit. Fo1i Wo1ih intervenes to enjoin Defendants from acquiring tax-exempt status on these prope1iies and to prevent this additional half a billion dollars of taxable value from being removed from the tax rolls, which othe1wise would cost the City an additional $3 million in tax revenue.

29. Because of the widespread nature of this practice, there has been a strong bipartisan legislative push to remove any doubt about the illegality of this s01i of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21. 15 A similar bill recently pl;lssed the House with overwhelming supp01i and · has moved to the Senate for consideration. ^[16] Upon information and belief, because this sort of

14 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a "luxurious community" in Irving and that the tenants' rents went up significantly under the HFC's ownership). 15 https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB21/id/3053018 16 See, e.g., Texas House Moves to Rein in "Traveling" Housing Finance Co1porations, But Broader Reforms Still City of Fort Worth's First Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 8 scheme is about to become indisputably illegal, HFCs have been scrambling to close their out-of- jurisdiction projects and obtain exemptions.

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C. Texas Constitution

30. Tex. Const. art. VIII Section 11 limits counties' ad valorem taxation authority to property within their prospective boundaries. Any law that purports to allow a local government to take properties off the tax rolls outside jurisdiction of that local government violates this constitutional principle.

V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT & TAX CODE

31. Texas's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) allows trial comis to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 37.003. The UDJA fu1iher provides that "[a] person ... whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the .. . statute ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." Id. § 37.004(a). The Legislature intended the UDJA to be "remedial" and "liberally construed," and "its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Id. § 37.002(b).

32. In a declaratory action, like this one, "the comi may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just." Id. § 37.009.

33 . F01i W01ih asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow Defendants to bestow tax exemptions to Fo1i Worth-based properties.

34. Fort Wo1ih further asks for a declaratory judgment that Article VIII, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution limits counties' ad valorem taxation authority to "prope1iy within their respective boundaries" and that the Defendants' scheme violates Constitutional limits on the scope of Texas counties' taxing authority.

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35. The Tax Code, moreover, provides that "[a] taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with ... applicable law." Tx. Tax Code § 43.01. It further empowers this Court to "enter ... orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office." Id. § 43.03.

36. Pursuant to these laws, Fo1i Worth asks this Court to prevent Defendant Bobbitt from unlawfully awarding any further tax exemptions to the Defendant HFCs. See id. § 43.01, 43.03; TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE§§ 37.001 et seq.

VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

37. To stop the Defendant HFCs from closing on any more Fo1i Wo1ih-based properties, F01i W01ih asks this Comi for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") that prohibits the Defendant HFCs from (a) closing on any F01i Worth-based prope1iies or (b) requesting or receiving any tax exemptions for F01i Worth-based prope1iies.

38. Fort Worth fu1iher requests a TRO that prohibits Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Fort Wo1ih-based properties.

39. F01i W01ih requests that this Comi issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Comito issue a TRO without notice if it "clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon." Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Fort Worth believes the Defendant HFCs are City of Fort Worth's First Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 10 already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the shmi-term.

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40. Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 2.]

41. This Cami should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents Defendant HFCs from overstepping jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Fort Wo1ih- based prope1iies. And out of an abundance of caution, this Cami should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by a DefendantHFC regarding any Fmi Wo1ih-based property.

42. Once that TRO has expired, Fort Wmih asks for a temporary injunction. "To obtain a temporary injunction, [an] applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim." Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). "Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial comi's sound discretion," and an order granting injunctive relief will be reversed on appeal only if "the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds ofreasonable discretion." Id.

43. All these elements are present. Fort Worth has pleaded a cause of action against Defendants: a declaratory action under the UDJA. Fort Worth has shown it will likely be successful in this declaratory action, as the Act's plain language prohibits Defendant HFCs' complained-of Page 11 conduct. And, in the absence of injunctive relief, Defendant HFCs are likely to close on additional Fort Worth-based properties and/or apply for a tax exemptions, which would lead to an irreversible removal of this property from the local tax rolls. Simply put, this is precisely the sort of case in which equitable relief is warranted.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Based on the foregoing, Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth respectfully asks this Court for the following relief:

(A) To issue a TRO against Defendant HFCs and Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt that (i) prevents Defendant HF Cs from requesting or receiving tax exemptions for any Fort Worth-based properties, and (ii) prevents Mr. Bobbitt from granting tax exemptions requested by Defendant HFCs regarding any Fort Worth-based properties. A proposed TRO was filed contemporaneously herewith.

(B) After the expiration of this TRO, and after a hearing, to issue a temporary injunction against the same Defendants that enjoins the same unlawful conduct pending trial.

(C) After the expiration of this temporary injunction, and after a final trial on the merits, to issue (i) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov't Code§§ 394.001 et seq., does not allow Defendant HFCs to bestow tax-exempt status to properties located in Fort Worth; and (ii) a permanent injunction that prevents Defendant HFCs from requesting or receiving tax exemptions for F01i Wo1ih-based prope1iies.

(D) To award Fort W01ih its attorney's fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Comi deems appropriate.

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Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24056724 stephen. [email protected]

CHRJSTOPHER B. MOSLEY Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 00789505 chris. [email protected]

OLYNPOOLE Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24037292 [email protected]

CITY OF FORT WORTH Office of the City Attorney 100 Fort Wo1ih Trail Fmt Wo1th, Texas 76102 P: (817) 392-7600

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I ce1tify that on the 22nd day of May 2025 a true and conect copy of the foregoing document was e-filed with the Clerk of the Court and electronically served upon all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

Isl Stephen A. Cumbie STEPHEN A. CUMBIE CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 34g th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § Plaintiff-Intervenor § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS statement contained therein is within his personal lmowledge and is true and correct.

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City of Fort Worth EXHIBIT

TRAVELING HFCs IN THE CITY OF FORT WORTH 1

DATE OF EXEMPTION PROPERTY FORT WORTH'S TARRANT APPRAISAL DISTRICT PROPERTY ADDRESS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION ACQUISITION STATUS VALUE LOST REVENUE WEBSITE LINK 8901 S NORMAN DALE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-02-15 EXEMPT $30,773,181.00 $206,949.64 https:/lwww.tad.org/property?account=03435024 9051 S NORMAN DALE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-02-15 EXEMPT $13,921,653.00 $93,623.12 https:/lwww.tad.org/property?account=03435076 3391 WESTERN CENTER BLVD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-02-27 EXEMPT $41,184,002.00 $276,962.41 https://www.tad.org/property?account=07008937 5'301 NORTH TARRANT PKWY MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024-10-09 EXEMPT $80,369,852.00 $540,487.25 https://www.tad .org/property?account=4l652207 8100 N RIVERSIDE DR PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024-10-31 EXEMPT $58,188,517.00 $391,317.78 https:/lwww.tad.org/property?account=41410475 2188 E LOOP 820 PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024-11-15 EXEMPT $29,852,508.00 $200,758.12 https://www.tad .org/property?account=0ll84954 5801 BRIDGE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-01-15 EXEMPT $28,579,464.00 $192,196.90 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04972759 6051 BRIDGE ST PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-01-15 EXEMPT $22,355,436.00 $150,340.31 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04972848 6776 WESTCREEK DR PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2024-12-19 EXEMPT $33,857,834.00 $227,693.93 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05628954 637 SAMUELS AVE PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-01-24 EXEMPT $70,526,952.00 $474,293.75 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402920 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402938 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402946 9632 BERKSHIRE lAKE BLVD PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-18 EXEMPT $69,600,728.00 $468,064.90 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42729627 BLUE MOUND RD PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-01-27 EXEMPT $451,037.00 $3,033.22 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42721201 300 E. MORPHY ST MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2022-09-30 EXEMPT $49,971,533.00 $336,058.56 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42332301 14301 CENTRE STATION DR MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-02-03 NO EXEMPTIONS $101,117,467.00 $680,014.97 https://www.tad.org/property?accounl=41424360 1505 HOMEDALE DR PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-19 NO EXEMPTIONS $25,793,728.00 $173,462.82 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04402324 500 E LOOP 820 lA VILlA HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-04-04 NO EXEMPTIONS $24,554,971.00 $165,132.18 https://www.tad.org/property?account=04325893 5600 COTSWOLD HILLS DR PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-24 NO EXEMPTIONS $27,759,851.00 $186,685.00 https://www.tad.org/property?account=00538744 6500 BOCA RATON BLVD MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-01-17 NO EXEMPTIONS $12,398,461.00 $83,379.65 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05661846 6501 BOCA RATON BLVD MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-01-17 NO EXEMPTIONS $23,082,702.00 $155,231.17 https://www.tad.org/property?account-05662486 6991 ANDERSON BLVD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-19 NO EXEMPTIONS $228,690.00 $1,537.94 https://www.tad.org/property?account-0646807l 7040 JOHN T WHITE PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-19 NO EXEMPTIONS $25,851,059.00 $173,848.37 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05654395 8900 COTTONWOOD VILLAGE DR PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-02-06 NO EXEMPTIONS $24,929,564.00 $167,651.32 https:/lwww.tad.org/property?account=06493777 8900 RANDOL MILL RD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-24 NO EXEMPTIONS $45,043,125.00 $302,915.02 https://www.tad .org/property?account=05682045 6250 GRANBURY CUT OFF RD PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-04-09 NO EXEMPTIONS $24,791,114.00 $166,720.24 https://www.tad.org/property?account=05503396 113 WESTERN SWING WAY PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-04-09 NO EXEMPTIONS $78,184,484.00 $525,790.65 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42699604 6032 TRAVERTINE LN PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION 2025-03-07 NO EXEMPTIONS $73,143,045.00 $491,886.98 https:/lwww.tad.org/property?account-42220783 https://www.tad.org/property?account='12220_7'9_1 MAR O5 2025 CAUSE NO. ;LJ5 .. 04-~" .. G4'2.-G' WILLIAMSON COUNTY, SIENA • § IN THEt ~ffi~ U~Co . 1 TX MUNICIPAL UTIILTY DISTRICT NO. l, § and SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY § DISTRICT NO. 2, § Plaintiffs, § § JUDICIAL DISTRICT v. § § THE CAMERON COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, § Defendant. § WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

After considering the application for a tempora ry restraini ng order filed by Plaintiffs in the above-styled matter, the pleadings, and the evidence, the Court finds that-

1. There is a current controversy ov~:r Defenda nt Cameron County Housing Finance Corporat ion's ("CCHFC") efforts to seek exemption from ad valorem taxes for properties located in Williamson County, including the following real properties:

a. Lot 1, Siena Section 30, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Docume nt No. 2020037410 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 6531 CR 110, Round Rock, Texas, 78655. That property is a 13.677-acre tract of land on which a multi-family apartme nt project known as Siena Round Rock Apartme nts has been built ("Siena Round Rock").

b. Lot 2, Block A, Siena South, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Docume nt No. 20200099820 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 5540 Sofia Place, Round Rock, Texas 78665. That Property is a

Temporary Restrainin g Order - Page 1 of 3 15.0496.acre tract of land on which a multi.family apartme nt project known as The Sommery has been built ("The Summery").

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2. As alleged in the Plaintiffs' petition and supporti ng verification, CCHFC currently owns Sienna Round Rock, and intends to acquire The Sommery, and seeks to remove both propertie s from the Williamson Central Appraisa l District ad valorem tax rolls, purporte dly under Section 394.905 of the Texas Local Governm ent Code.

3. Imminen t harm and irreparable harm will result if CCHFC is permitte d to acquire The Sommer y and seek and obtain exemptions of Sienna Round Rock and The Sommery from the William Central Appraisal District ad valorem tax rolls. Specifically, if a temporary restraining order is not granted, imminen t and irreparable harm will result to Plaintiffs since those properties within their jurisdictions will be removed from the tax rolls, which will immediately impact their fiscal budgetin g and decrease the ad valorem taxes they otherwise could collect for these propertie s.

4. There is no adequate remedy at law because such damages or harm to Plaintiffs cannot be calculated.

5. An ex pa1'te order, without notice to CCHFC, is necessary because there is not enough time to give notice to CCHFC, hold a hearing, and issue a restraining order before the imminen t and irreparab le injury, loss or damage occurs.

6. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that-

a. CCHFC, as well as its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with

CCHFC, are prohibited from (i) acquiring real property in Temporary Restrainin g Order - Page 2 of 3 Williamson County, including The Sommery; (ii) seeking or obtaining exemptions from ad valDl'em taxes for real property in Williamson County, including Siena Round Rock and The Sommer y. b. The clerk shall issue notice to CCHFC that the hearing on Plaintiffs' request for temporar y injunction is set for Wl.^[4].Yvh., \"?

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2025 at CJ~ ,x) : @.m. The purpose of the hearing shall be to determine whether this temporar y restraining order should be ; made a temporar y injunction pending a full trial on the merits. c. Plaintiffs are exempt from posting a bond pursuan t to Section 6.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Section 49.066(£) of the Texas Water Code.

7. This order expires o n ~ \'-\:. 2025 at 'f: 00 _lL.m.

Signed: March _Q_, 2025 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Chandra Jackson on behalf of Stephen Cumbie Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101182231 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: CFW-1st Amnd Pet in Intervention and Application for TRO and Injunctive Relief Status as of 5/22/2025 4:57 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Chandra Jackson on behalf of Stephen Cumbie Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101182231 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: CFW-1st Amnd Pet in Intervention and Application for TRO and Injunctive Relief Status as of 5/22/2025 4:57 PM CST Case Contacts Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/22/2025 4:42:15 PM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 5/27/2025 9:24 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

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CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of § the Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANT PLEASANTON HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE AND, SUBJECT THERETO, ORIGINAL ANSWER TO CITY OF ARLINGTON’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION

NOW COMES Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation (“Pleasanton HFC”), Defendant in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue And, Subject Thereto, Original Answer to Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Second Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief (“Second Amended Petition”) and would respectfully show the Court as follows:

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I. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

1. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition is that Pleasanton HFC has been “removing Arlington-based properties from the tax appraisal roll[.]” 2 nd Am. Pet. at ¶ 1.

2. Rather than bring its case under the Property Tax Code, Plaintiff brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

3. Plaintiff is a “taxing unit” under the Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(12). The exclusive means for a “taxing unit” to resolve the types of disputes raised in Plaintiff’s Petition is to seek relief under the Property Tax Code through a taxing unit challenge. Accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. See Tex. Tax Code § 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding).

4. Plaintiff’s claims related to any properties “removed” from the tax rolls fall within the statutory framework of the Property Tax Code. Indeed, the true nature of Plaintiff’s Petition is laid bare in its request for injunctive relief which asks the Court to “stop the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District from granting tax exemptions requested by Defendant HFCs for any Arlington-based properties.” 2nd Am. Pet. at ¶ 3.

5. As a result, the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid the Property Tax Code’s exclusive administrative process and remedies. See Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0537 (2007) at 3 (“whether any specific property is exempt from taxation depends on the facts and circumstances and is initially determined by the chief appraiser of the appraisal district”).

6. Moreover, Plaintiff’s reference to Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code does not excuse Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff does not raise Section 43.01

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as an independent basis for relief and the statute is referenced and incorporated into a single cause of action labelled “V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT & TAX CODE.” See 2nd Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 32-36. However Plaintiff cares to craft its Petition, the relief sought is the same—denial of ad valorem exemptions—and Plaintiff has therefore failed to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit before this Court.

8. Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege that Plaintiff has exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing suit because Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Pleasanton HFC (as well as the other HFCs named in the Second Amended Petition). To properly invoke the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v.

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Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). For these reasons, Pleasanton HFC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case in full.

II. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

9. Pleasanton HFC respectfully requests that the Court transfer the above-entitled and numbered cause to Atascosa County, Texas pursuant to Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86.

10. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86 provides that a motion to transfer venue “shall state that the action should be transferred to another specified county of proper venue because: (a) [t]he County where the action is pending is not a proper county; or (b) [m]andatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by one or more specific statutory provisions which shall be clearly designated or indicated.” The rules further provide that a motion to transfer venue “shall be made promptly by the court and such determination must be made in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial on the merits.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 87.

11. Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “the court, on motion filed and served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if […] the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county as provided by [Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.063(1). “In all venue hearings, no factual proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue” and “[t]he court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.” Id. § 15.064(a).

12. The Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines “proper venue” as “(1) the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B [Mandatory Venue] or another statute prescribing mandatory venue; or (2) if Subdivision (1) does not apply, the venue provided by this subchapter [General Venue] or Subchapter C [Permissive Venue]”). Section 15.016 of the Civil

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Practice and Remedies Code, encompassed within Subchapter B [Mandatory Venue] of Chapter 15, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” Id. § 15.016.

13. Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief. Id. § 65.023(a) (“[A] writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”); see In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“The statute placing venue for injunction suits in the county of the defendant’s domicile is mandatory.”). Section 65.023(a) is operative only when a plaintiff’s pleading in the underlying suit establishes the relief sought is “purely or primarily injunctive.” Cont’l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 736; Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959) (orig. proceeding) (“It is settled that [section 65.023(a)’s predecessor] only applies to and governs the issuance and return of writs and trial in cases in which the relief sought is purely or primarily injunctive.”); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1957) (holding that the injunction statute controlled venue over the situs of the real property in a dispute where an airport owner sought an injunction ordering removal of a television antenna that was allegedly interfering with an airport runway).

14. In In re FPWP GP LLC, the real parties filed a declaratory judgment and injunction action in Dallas County to resolve a dispute among partners to a limited partnership concerning “(1) their rights in and obligations to the partnership, (2) which partnership agreement govern[ed] their relationship, and (3) which entity [was] the partnership’s general partner.” See No. 05-16- 01145-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 633, 2017 WL 461355, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Relying on Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the

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relators filed a motion to transfer venue from Dallas County to Harris County, as all parties subject to the potential injunction were domiciled in Harris County.

15. After the trial court denied the motion, the court of appeals granted mandamus relief and determined that the real parties’ declaratory judgment action and plea for an injunction were a different means to the same end. Specifically, the court opined as follows:

By granting the requested declaratory relief, the trial court would enjoin FPWP from acting as general partner by naming Briarwood general partner and declaring relators' prior acts ineffective, void, and invalid. An injunction is another means to that same end. In either event, the real parties in interest were seeking to stop relators from taking actions on behalf of the partnership. Therefore, we conclude the primary purpose of the lawsuit is injunctive.

Id. at[*15] -16 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.)

16. Here, the Plaintiff’s requested relief is analogous to the pleadings the Dallas Court of Appeals considered in In re FPWP GP LLC to determine that section 65.023(a) established venue in Harris County. Plaintiff’s requested relief is “purely or primarily injunctive” consisting of “(i) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Texas Housing Finance Act […] does not allow the Defendant HFCs to bestow tax-exempt status to properties located in Arlington; and (ii) a permanent injunction that prevents the Defendant HFCs from requesting tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.” 2nd Am. Pet. at p. 10.

17. Insofar as Plaintiff’s sought-after after relief is “purely or primarily” injunctive, this proceeding is subject to the mandatory venue provision of Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.001(b) (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue.”). Accordingly, the Court must grant Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue

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and transfer the present proceedings to Atascosa, Texas (Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s county of domicile).

18. Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in Tarrant County because “all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant County” and Pleasanton HFC “purposely availed [itself] of the venue[.]” 2 nd Am. Pet. at ¶ 11 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1)).

19. Contrary to Plaintiff’s suggestion, Section 15.002(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this subchapter or Subchapter B or C, all lawsuits shall be brought […] (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; [or] (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person[.]” (emphasis added). Section 15.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, codified within Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” See also id. § 15.001 (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue[.]”). Thus, insofar as Section 65.023 mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief, it controls over the venue selection provisions encompassed within Section 15.002.

20. Plaintiff further alleges that venue in Tarrant County is proper because “this suit concerns real property located in Tarrant County[.]” 2 nd Am. Pet. at ¶ 11 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.011). Plaintiff’s allegation ignores the fact that the Civil Practice and Remedies Code’s mandatory venue provision concerning land does not apply based on the causes of action asserted in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition. Specifically, Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice

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and Remedies Code states that only “[a]ctions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.” Plaintiff has not pled any of the causes of action enumerated in section 15.011 and, therefore, this Court need not engage in an analysis of conflicting mandatory venue provisions under Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

21. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the Property Tax Code mandates venue in Tarrant County. See 2nd Am. Pet. at ¶ 11 (citing Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01-43.03). As explained above, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition does not raise an independent cause of action under the Texas Property Tax Code separate and apart from its request for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Property Tax Code does not control venue in this circumstance.

III. GENERAL DENIAL

22. Subject to Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s Motion to Transfer Venue, and pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Pleasanton HFC denies each and every allegation in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition, as well as any amended or supplemental petition, and demands that Plaintiff proves their allegations by the appropriate standard of proof under the laws of the State of Texas.

IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

23. Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

24. Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, by the doctrine of mootness/ripeness.

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25. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because by estoppel, laches, and/or waiver.

26. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of justification.

27. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Plaintiffs lack standing to bring the claims they assert.

28. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because they are not cognizable under the Texas Constitution.

V. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation respectfully requests that this court (i) dismiss all claims against Defendants; or in the alternative, (ii) grant its Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer this suit to Atascosa County, Texas; and, in the alternative and subject to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, (iii) that Plaintiffs take nothing; and (iv) Defendant be awarded such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which it may be justly entitled. Dated: May 27, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Danie J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendant Pleasanton HFC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 27th day of May, 2025, to the following counsel of record: Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Alexander J. Lindvall [email protected] [email protected] Christopher B. Mosley Jonathan M. Moss Senior Assistant City Attorney [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen Olyn Poole [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] [email protected] CITY OF FORTH WORTH CITY OF ARLINGTON OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 100 Forth Worth Trail P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Arlington, Texas 76004 Counsel for Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Forth Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington Worth

James R. Evans, Jr. Jeffrey M. Tillotson [email protected] [email protected] Eric Ruiz Kathryn E. Yukevich [email protected] [email protected] LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 4425 South Mopac Expressway 1201 Main Street, Ste 1300 Building 3, Suite 400 Dallas, TX 75202 Austin, Texas 78735 Counsel for Defendant Pecos HFC Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt

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Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kim Decker on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101259117 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Subject Thereto Original Answer to City of Arlington's Second Amended Petition Status as of 5/27/2025 9:41 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kim Decker on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101259117 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Subject Thereto Original Answer to City of Arlington's Second Amended Petition Status as of 5/27/2025 9:41 AM CST Case Contacts Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kim Decker on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101259117 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Subject Thereto Original Answer to City of Arlington's Second Amended Petition Status as of 5/27/2025 9:41 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/27/2025 9:24:50 AM SENT 348-363561-25 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 5/28/2025 9:40 PM CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of § the Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

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DEFENDANT PLEASANTON HFC’S SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE CITY OF ARLINGTON’S SECOND AMENDED PETITION

NOW COMES Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation (“Pleasanton HFC”), Defendant in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Special Exception to the City of Arlington’s (“Arlington” or “Plaintiff”) Second Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, and would respectfully show the Court as follows:

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This case concerns the City of Arlington's misguided attempt to use the Property Tax Code to circumvent established legal procedures for challenging tax exemption determinations. Arlington seeks to invoke Texas Tax Code Sections 43.01 and 43.03 to compel the Tarrant Appraisal District to deny tax exemptions to various Housing Finance Corporations, fundamentally misunderstanding both the scope and purpose of Chapter 43.

2. Arlington’s Second Amended Petition suffers from a fatal legal defect: it attempts to use Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code as a vehicle to challenge discretionary appraisal determinations, when that chapter is expressly limited to compelling compliance with non- discretionary policies and operating procedures. As Texas courts have consistently held, Chapter 43 applies only to procedural and administrative matters—not to substantive determinations regarding individual property exemptions.

3. Arlington has failed to identify any specific policy, procedure, or non-discretionary duty under the Property Tax Code, Comptroller rules, or applicable law that the appraisal district has violated. Instead, the City seeks to use Chapter 43 as an improper end-run around the established procedures for challenging tax exemption decisions (presumably to evade Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer venue). This fundamental pleading deficiency renders Arlington's petition legally insufficient and subject to dismissal.

4. Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation respectfully submits that Arlington's Second Amended Petition fails to state a cognizable claim under Chapter 43 and should be dismissed with leave to replead.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

5. In its Second Amended Petition, Arlington alleges that that “[t]he [Property] Tax Code […] provides that ‘[a] taxing unit,’ like Arlington, ‘may sue the appraisal district that

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appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with … applicable law.’” Arlington’s 2nd Am. Pet., ¶ 35 (citing Tex. Tax Code § 43.01). Without further explanation, Arlington concludes that the Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01 and 43.03 empowers the Court to “prevent Defendant [Joe Don] Bobbit[, his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District (“TAD”),]from unlawfully awarding any further tax exemptions to the Defendant HFCs.” Id. at ¶ 36.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

6. A special exception is the proper vehicle through which to raise disputes concerning the sufficiency of a party’s allegations and claims. See Ortiz v. Patterson, 378 S.W.3d 667, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7679 (Tex. App. Dallas Sept. ^[5], 2012, no pet.). The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “a special exception shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted to, but it shall also point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted to.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 91.

IV. LAW AND ARGUMENT A. Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code Applies Only to Taxing Unit Actions Requesting Relief With Respect to an Appraisal District’s Policies and Operating Procedures

7. Arlington’s invocation of Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01 and 43.03 is defective on its face. Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code provides that “[a] taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with the provisions of this title, rules of the comptroller, or other applicable law.” (emphasis added). Section 43.03 of the Property Tax Code further provides that the Court “as the evidence warrants shall enter those orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” (emphasis added).

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8. In raising Chapter 43 in its Second Amended Petition, Arlington conspicuously glosses over reference to Section 43.04 of the Property Tax Code. That provision, titled “Suit to Compel Compliance Deadlines,” clarifies that Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code is intended to address lawsuits by taxing units aimed at compelling compliance with the appraisal district’s non- discretionary functions:

The governing body of a taxing unit may sue the chief appraiser or members of the appraisal review board, as applicable, for failure to comply with the deadlines imposed by Section 25.22(a), 26.01(a), or 41.12. If the court finds that the chief appraiser or appraisal review board failed to comply for good cause shown, the court shall enter an order fixing a reasonable deadline for compliance. If the court finds that the chief appraiser or appraisal review board failed to comply without good cause, the court shall enter an order requiring the chief appraiser or appraisal review board to comply with the deadline not later than the 10th day after the date the judgment is signed. In a suit brought under this section, the court may enter any other order the court considers necessary to ensure compliance with the court’s deadline or the applicable statutory requirements. Failure to obey an order of the court is punishable as contempt.

9. Courts interpreting Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code have held that the chapter applies only to actions for relief with respect to policies and operating procedures—again, non- discretionary duties as opposed to discretionary determinations covered by challenges under Chapter 41. See Joaquin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Shelby Cty. Appraisal Dist., No. 12-13-00038-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 9792 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. ^[29], 2014, pet. denied).

10. In Joaquin Indep. Sch. Dist., Joaquin Independent School District (“JISD”) and Shelbyville Independent School District (“SISD”) had a disputed boundary line that affected property tax apportionment. From 2008 to 2011, JISD filed annual challenges to Shelby County Appraisal District’s (“SCAD”) appraisal rolls, claiming 164 tracts were taxed in the wrong district and that properties within JISD's boundaries were incorrectly attributed to SISD. The appraisal review board denied all challenges, determining that boundaries should remain unchanged until a court ordered modifications. Thereafter, JISD filed suit raising claims under Chapters 42 and 43

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of the Property Tax Code and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The trial court denied JISD’s requested relief.

11. On appeal, JISD re-urged its Chapter 42 and 43 claims. JISD asserted under Chapter 42 that “SCAD assessed property on a percentage less than one hundred percent of its appraised value and SCAD was prevented from obtaining correct assessments due to incorrect records in violation of the law.” Id. at *9-10; compare Tex. Tax Code § 41.03. The appellate court held against JISD because it failed to present any evidence to prove what percentage basis SCAD used to assess the property. Id. at[*10] . JISD also requested that the court order SCAD to correct the appraisal rolls for prior tax years and refund tax revenue to JISD. Since “JISD did not prove as a matter of law that it [was] entitled to have the requested corrections and refunds[,]” the appellate court held that the trial court did not err. Id.

12. For its Chapter 43 claims, JISD argued that the trial court should have ordered SCAD to take “certain corrective measures needed due to inaccurate school district boundary records” under Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code. Id. at *9. Without entertaining the merits of JISD’s claim, the court summarily held that “Chapter 43 is not the appropriate vehicle for the relief in this case” and that “Chapter 43 applies to actions for relief with respect to policies and operating procedures.” Id. at *9 (holding that “[t]he trial court did not err in denying JISD’s motion for summary judgment on its Chapter 43 complaints or in granting SISD’s motion for partial summary judgment on that issue.”) (citing Carr v. Bell Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 786 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, writ denied) (op. on reh'g)) (emphasis added).

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There, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held in an opinion on a motion for rehearing by a taxing unit that Section 43.01 of the Texas Tax Code did not authorize a taxing units’ collateral attack on an appraisal review board’s reduce appraisal determination. Specifically, the Carr court held that Section 43.01 “applies to actions for declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to policies and operating procedures” and “cannot refer to a suit to challenge the appraisal of a single taxpayer’s property.” Carr v. Bell Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Case No. 06-89-09783-CV, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 463, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. ^[27], 1990, no writ). 1 B. Arlington’s Has Failed to Allege a Policy or Procedure That the Appraisal District Must Comply With

14. Joaquin should control the Court’s review of Arlington’s Second Amended Petition. Nowhere in its Second Amended Petition does Arlington allege that TAD has failed to comply with its own policies or procedures under the Property Tax Code or the Comptroller rules. Instead, Arlington has alleged that a suit is necessary to compel TAD to “comply with” Chapter 394 of the Local Government Code, otherwise known as the Housing Finance Corporation Act (the “Act”).

15. Arlington does not allege any provisions of the Act that TAD can come into compliance with. See Tex. Tax Code § 43.01. Likewise, the Act does not compel TAD to do anything. With respect to remedies, the Second Amended Petition is similarly defective. Section 43.03 of the Property Tax Code, titled “Action by Court,” states that the Court “as the evidence warrants shall enter those orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” (emphasis added). Without any reference to what policies or procedures under the Property Tax Code, Comptroller rules, or HFC Act that TAD is currently out of compliance with, the pleading

1 In the appellate briefing for Joaquin there is discussion among the parties that Joaquin was miscited. This cite has been verified through Lexis Nexis, as of May 28, 2025, for the excerpts relied upon by the Joaquin court (as evidenced by appellee’s briefing).

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is defective on its face and, therefore, a special exception striking the Second Amended Petition is appropriate.

V. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation respectfully requests (i) that this court grant Defendant’s Special Exception; (ii) that Arlington’s Second Amended Petition be dismissed with leave to replead; and (iii) all further relief, special or general, legal or equitable, to which Defendant is justly entitled. Dated: May 28, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendant Pleasanton HFC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 28th day of May, 2025, to the following counsel of record: Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Alexander J. Lindvall [email protected] [email protected] Christopher B. Mosley Jonathan M. Moss Senior Assistant City Attorney [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen Olyn Poole [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] [email protected] CITY OF FORTH WORTH CITY OF ARLINGTON OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 100 Forth Worth Trail P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Arlington, Texas 76004 Counsel for Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Forth Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington Worth

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Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Lisa O'Sullivan on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101359863 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: No Fee Documents Status as of 5/29/2025 8:44 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Lisa O'Sullivan on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101359863 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: No Fee Documents Status as of 5/29/2025 8:44 AM CST Case Contacts Erica Salas [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Lisa O'Sullivan on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101359863 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: No Fee Documents Status as of 5/29/2025 8:44 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/28/2025 9:40:35 PM SENT FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 5/29/2025 2:20 PM CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, A TEXAS NONPROFIT § CORPORATION; JOE DON BOBBITT, § IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF § APPRAISER OF THE TARRANT § APPRAISAL DISTRICT, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

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FIRST AMENDED PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND ANSWER OF DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT

NOW COMES Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, and files this First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer to the Plaintiffs’ petitions and applications for temporary restraining orders and injunctive relief. This Defendant would show the Court as follows.

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

1. Plaintiffs’ decision to bring their cases under the Declaratory Judgments Act against Mr. Bobbitt rather than the administrative provisions of the Texas Property Tax Code means that this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Mr. Bobbitt, and this case should be dismissed as to Mr. Bobbitt. Because of the pervasive regulatory scheme contained in the Texas Property Tax Code that provides the exclusive means for parties to resolve disputes in connection with the Texas Property Tax Code, there is no jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against Mr. Bobbitt. In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding). Plaintiffs’ claims fit within the statutory framework of the Property Tax Code, so neither the Declaratory Judgments Act nor injunctive relief, the remedies asserted against Mr. Bobbitt, may be used to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the Tax Code. Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc.,

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48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). The remedial scheme available to Plaintiffs is in Chapter 41 of the Property Tax Code and not in the Declaratory Judgments Act and not through injunction. Vexler v. Spencer, No. 02-24-00305-CV, 2025 WL 1271691, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).1

2. Plaintiffs seek to use the DJA and injunctive relief to prohibit Mr. Bobbitt from granting exemptions Plaintiffs disagree with. However, as stated above, Plaintiffs’ remedies lie not in the DJA but in the exclusive remedies contained in the Property Tax Code. Specifically, as a taxing unit, the City’s remedy is to bring a taxing-unit challenge under Texas Tax Code section 41.03. Such a remedy is part of the pervasive scheme known as the Property Tax Code. See, In re ExxonMobil Corp.at 617. (“Our review of the entire Tax Code leads us to conclude it is no less comprehensive with respect to the rights and duties of taxing units than those of property owners[.]”

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3. The City of Arlington and City of Fort Worth have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. To properly invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit for judicial review. City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). Plaintiffs have failed to obtain any orders from the appraisal review board regarding any taxing unit challenge, their remedy under the Tax Code. Their failure deprives this Court of jurisdiction, and Mr. Bobbitt should be dismissed.

4. Mr. Bobbitt is immune from the present action under the Declaratory Judgments Act (“DJA”) because governmental immunity bars DJA actions against the state and its political divisions, and its employees, absent a legislative waiver. See TEX. TAX CODE § 6.01(c); City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. 2009); Stiefer v. Moers, No. 14-14-00617-CV, 2015 WL 6950104, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. Nov. ^[10], 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). (“In sum, we conclude that the Moerses’ declaratory judgment action does not state a waiver of governmental immunity.”)

DEFENDANT’S GENERAL DENIAL

5. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt denies each and every, all and singular, the allegations contained in Plaintiffs’ Petitions and demand strict proof thereof.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays that 1) this Court dismiss all claims against Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, 2) Plaintiffs take nothing by this action, 3) all costs be taxed against the Plaintiffs, and 4) the Defendant have such other and further relief to which it may be justly entitled.

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Respectfully submitted, LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC 4425 South Mopac Expressway Building 3, Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78735 (512) 379-5800 (512) 476-6685 (fax) [email protected]

By: /s/ James R. Evans, Jr James R. Evans, Jr. State Bar No. 06721500 [email protected] Eric Ruiz State Bar No. 24125845 [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT

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Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. James Evans, Jr. on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101391168 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer Status as of 5/29/2025 2:33 PM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. James Evans, Jr. on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101391168 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer Status as of 5/29/2025 2:33 PM CST Case Contacts Erica Salas [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. James Evans, Jr. on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101391168 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer Status as of 5/29/2025 2:33 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/29/2025 2:20:13 PM SENT 348-363561-25 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 5/30/2025 4:42 PM CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, § a Texas nonprofit corporation; PLEASANTON § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § 348TH DISTRICT COURT corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his official § capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal § District, § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANT LA VILLA HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ORIGINAL ANSWER TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

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NOW COMES Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation ("La Villa HFC"), Defendant in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer to Plaintiff City of Arlington’s First Amended Petition ("Petition"), and in support thereof respectfully shows the Court as follows:

I. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION 1. The gravamen of Plaintiff’s complaint is that La Villa HFC has been “removing Arlington-based properties from the tax appraisal rolls.” Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition at ¶ 1. 2. Rather than bring its case under the Property Tax Code, the City of Arlington (“Plaintiff” or “City”), Plaintiff brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 La Villa HFC Original Answer 1 of 7 3. The Texas Property Tax Code provides the exclusive means for parties to resolve disputes in connection with property taxation; therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim. See Tex. Tax Code § 42.09; In re Exxon Mobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding). 4. Plaintiff’s claims related to any properties “removed” from the tax rolls plainly fall within the statutory framework of the Tax Code. As a result, the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the Tax Code. Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). 5. Section 41.01 of the Tax Code sets out the duties of the appraisal review board, which, as relevant here, include the duties to determine protests initiated by property owners, determine challenges initiated by taxing units and “take any other action or make any other determination that this title specifically authorizes or requires.” Tex. Tax Code § 41.41. Taxing units are entitled to bring challenges of designated actions before the appraisal review board, among them, challenges to the level of appraisals of any category of property in the district and challenges to an exclusion of property from the appraisal records. Id. § 41.03. 6. Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege that it has exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing this suit because Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over La Villa HFC. To properly invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit for judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). 7. For these reasons, La Villa HFC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case in full.

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II. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE 8. La Villa HFC respectfully requests that the Court transfer this action to Hidalgo County, pursuant to Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86. 9. A motion to transfer venue is proper if (1) the County where the action is pending is not a proper county or (2) mandatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by one or more specific statutory provisions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 86. 10. Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “the court, on motion filed and served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if […] the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county as provided by [Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.063(1). “In all venue hearings, no factual proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue” and “[t]he court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.” Id. § 15.064(a). 11. Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief. Id. § 65.023(a) (“[A] writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”); In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“The statute placing venue for injunction suits in the county of the defendant’s domicile is mandatory.”). 12. Section 65.023(a) is operative when a plaintiff’s pleading in the underlying suit establishes the relief sought is “purely or primarily injunctive.” Cont’l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 736; Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959) (orig. proceeding) (holding same regarding Section 65.023(a)’s predecessor statute); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 La Villa HFC Original Answer 3 of 7 1957) (holding that the injunction statute controlled venue, not the location of the real property at issue, in a dispute where an airport owner sought an injunction ordering removal of a television antenna allegedly interfering with an airport runway). 13. Plaintiff’s goal here is clear: “a permanent injunction that prevents [La Villa HFC] from requesting tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.” 1st Am. Pet at Prayer ¶ C. Plaintiff’s declaratory relief is functionally identical, asking the Court to declare La Villa HFC cannot “bestow tax exemptions to Arlington-based properties.” 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 33. 14. Courts in nearly identical contexts have consistently held that transfer is required, emphasizing that when the plaintiff is “seeking to stop [a defendant] from taking actions,” then “the primary purpose of the lawsuit is injunctive.” In re FPWP GP LLC, No. 05-16-01145-CV, 2017 WL 461355, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.); see also In re Daniel, 12– 06–00232–CV, 2006 WL 2361350, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. ^[16], 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). 15. There can be no doubt that Section 65.023(a) applies, and this matter should be transferred to La Villa HFC’s domicile: Hidalgo County, Texas. Plaintiff’s Petition indisputably reflects that La Villa HFC is not at home in Tarrant County, acknowledging it is at home “hundreds of miles away” from the City of Arlington in Hidalgo County, Texas. 1st Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 3, 5. 16. Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in Tarrant County because (1) “all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant (2) La Villa HFC “purposely availed [itself] to this venue,” and (3) the suit “concerns real property located in Tarrant County,” making Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case pursuant to CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 La Villa HFC Original Answer 4 of 7 Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 15.011. 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 10. None of these allegations are sufficient to overcome the mandatory venue provision encompassed within Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. ^[17]. Section 15.002(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this subchapter or Subchapter B or C, all lawsuits shall be brought […] (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; [or] (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a) (emphasis added). 18. Section 15.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, codified within Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” Id. § 15.016 (emphasis added); see also id. § 15.001 (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue[.]”). 19. Because Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief, it controls over the venue selection provisions encompassed within Section 15.002. See id. § 65.023(a). 20. In addition, Plaintiff’s attempted invocation of Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unavailing. Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that only “[a]ctions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 La Villa HFC Original Answer 5 of 7 be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.” Id. § 65.023(a). Plaintiff has not pled any of the causes of action enumerated in section 15.011 and, therefore, this Court need not engage in an analysis of conflicting mandatory venue provisions under Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

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III. GENERAL DENIAL

21. Pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, La Villa HFC generally denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition and demands strict proof thereof as required by law.

IV. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 22. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided by the Texas Property Tax Code, specifically those remedies under Tex. Tax Code §§ 41.01, 41.03, and 42.09.

23. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of mootness/ripeness. ^[24]. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrines of estoppel, and/or waiver, and/or laches. ^[25]. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of justification. ^[26]. Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claims asserted because Plaintiff has failed to allege or demonstrate particularized harm distinct from that shared by the general public. ^[27]. Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because they fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ^[28]. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity, as La Villa HFC operates within its statutory authority under the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. ^[29]. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is barred because Plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law and has failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.

PRAYER CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 La Villa HFC Original Answer 6 of 7 WHEREFORE, Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation respectfully requests that (i) the Court dismiss all claims against Defendant La Villa HFC for lack of jurisdiction; or in the alternative, (ii) transfer venue to Hidalgo County, Texas; and subject thereto, that Plaintiff takes nothing by its suit, that all relief requested by Plaintiff be denied, and that Defendant recover its costs incurred herein, along with any other and further relief, general or special, at law or in equity, to which it may show itself justly entitled.

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Respectfully submitted, Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Roel Gutierrez Bar No. 24069842 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101459249 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant La Villa HFC's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer Status as of 5/30/2025 4:55 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Roel Gutierrez Bar No. 24069842 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101459249 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant La Villa HFC's Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer Status as of 5/30/2025 4:55 PM CST Case Contacts Steve ACumbie [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 5/30/2025 4:42:16 PM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/2/2025 8:08 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

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DEFENDANT MAVERICK HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE CITY OF FORT WORTH’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ORIGINAL ANSWER

NOW COMES Defendant Maverick Housing Finance Corporation and the Board Members (as named in the above caption in their official capacities) (collectively, “Maverick HFC”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Special Exceptions to the City of Fort Worth’s (“Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth”)’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and, Subject Thereto, Original Answer (“Intervenor-Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition”), and, in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:

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I. SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

1. This case concerns the Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s misguided attempt to use the Property Tax Code to circumvent established legal procedures for challenging tax exemption determinations. Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth seeks to invoke Texas Tax Code Sections 43.01 and 43.03 to compel the Tarrant Appraisal District to deny tax exemptions to the Defendant and fundamentally misunderstanding both the scope and purpose of Chapter 43.

2. Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition suffers from a fatal legal defect: it attempts to use Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code as a vehicle to challenge discretionary appraisal determinations, when that chapter is expressly limited to compelling compliance with non-discretionary policies and operating procedures. As Texas courts have consistently held, Chapter 43 applies only to procedural and administrative matters—not to substantive determinations regarding individual property exemptions.

3. Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth has failed to identify any specific policy, procedure, or non-discretionary duty under the Property Tax Code, Comptroller rules, or applicable law that the appraisal district has violated. Instead, the City seeks to use Chapter 43 as an improper end- run around the established procedures for challenging tax exemption decisions (presumably to evade Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer venue). This fundamental pleading deficiency renders Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth's petition legally insufficient and subject to dismissal.

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4. Maverick Housing Finance Corporation respectfully submits that Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition fails to state a cognizable claim under Chapter 43 and should be dismissed with leave to replead.

5. In its First Amended Petition, Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth alleges that that “[t]he [Property] Tax Code […] provides that ‘[a] taxing unit [may] sue an appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with … applicable law.’” First Am. Pet., ¶ 35 (citing Tex. Tax Code § 43.01).

B. CHAPTER 43 OF THE PROPERTY TAX CODE APPLIES ONLY TO TAXING UNIT ACTIONS REQUESTING RELIEF WITH RESPECT TO AN APPRAISAL DISTRICT’S POLICIES AND OPERATING PROCEDURES

7. Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s invocation of Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01 and 43.03 is defective on its face. Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code provides that “[a] taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with the provisions of this title, rules of the comptroller, or other applicable law.” (emphasis added). Section 43.03 of the Property Tax Code further provides that the Court “as the evidence warrants shall enter those orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” (emphasis added).

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8. In raising Chapter 43 in its First Amended Petition, Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth conspicuously glosses over reference to Section 43.04 of the Property Tax Code. That provision, titled “Suit to Compel Compliance Deadlines,” clarifies that Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code is intended to address lawsuits by taxing units aimed at compelling compliance with the appraisal district’s non-discretionary functions:

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of the Property Tax Code and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The trial court denied JISD’s requested relief.

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C. INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF FORT WORTH HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE A POLICY OR PROCEDURE THAT THE APPRAISAL DISTRICT MUST COMPLY WITH

14. Joaquin should control the Court’s review of Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition. Nowhere in its First Amended Petition does Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth allege that TAD has failed to comply with its own policies or procedures under the Property Tax Code or the Comptroller rules. Instead, Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth has alleged that a suit is necessary to compel TAD to “comply with” Chapter 394 of the Local Government Code, otherwise known as the Housing Finance Corporation Act (the “Act”).

15. Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth does not allege any provisions of the Act that TAD can come into compliance with. See Tex. Tax Code § 43.01. Likewise, the Act does not compel TAD to do anything. With respect to remedies, the First Amended Petition is similarly defective. Section 43.03 of the Property Tax Code, titled “Action by Court,” states that the Court “as the evidence warrants shall enter those orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” (emphasis added). Without any reference to what policies or procedures under the Property

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Tax Code, Comptroller rules, or HFC Act that TAD is currently out of compliance with, the pleading is defective on its face and, therefore, a special exception striking the First Amended Petition is appropriate.

II. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

16. The gravamen of Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition is that Maverick HFC has been removing Tarrant County-based properties from the tax appraisal roll. First Am. Pet. at ¶ 1.

17. Rather than bring its case under the Property Tax Code, Intervenor Plaintiff brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

18. Intervenor Plaintiff is a “taxing unit” under the Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(12). The exclusive means for a “taxing unit” to resolve the types of disputes raised in Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition is to seek relief under the Property Tax Code through a taxing unit challenge. Accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction over Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims. See Tex. Tax Code § 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding).

19. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims related to any properties “removed” from the tax rolls fall within the statutory framework of the Property Tax Code. Indeed, the true nature of Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition is laid bare in its request for injunctive relief which asks the Court to “stop the … Tarrant Appraisal District (“TAD”) from granting tax exemptions requested by Defendant HFCs for any Fort Worth-based properties.” First Am. Pet. at ¶ 3.

20. As a result, the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid the Property Tax Code’s exclusive administrative process and remedies. See Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0537 (2007) at 3 (“whether any specific property is exempt from taxation

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depends on the facts and circumstances and is initially determined by the chief appraiser of the appraisal district”).

21. Moreover, Intervenor Plaintiff’s reference to Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code does not excuse Intervenor Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Intervenor Plaintiff does not raise Section 43.01 as an independent basis for relief and the statute is referenced and incorporated into a single cause of action labelled “Cause of Action: Declaratory Judgment & Tax Code.” See First Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 31-36. However Intervenor Plaintiff cares to craft its Petition, the relief sought is the same—denial of ad valorem exemptions—and Intervenor Plaintiff has therefore failed to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit before this Court.

22. Section 41.01 of the Property Tax Code sets out the duties of the appraisal review board, which, as relevant here, include the duties to determine protests initiated by property owners, determine challenges initiated by taxing units and “take any other action or make any other determination that this title specifically authorizes or requires.” Tex. Tax Code § 41.41. Taxing units are entitled to bring challenges of designated actions before the appraisal review board, among them, challenges to the level of appraisals of any category of property in the district and challenges to an exclusion of property from the appraisal records. Id. § 41.03. 2 Insofar as Intervenor Plaintiff contests the exemption status of the subject properties referenced in its Petition, Intervenor Plaintiff’s lawsuit should have been preceded by a taxing unit challenge pursuant to the Property Tax Code.

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23. Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege that Intervenor Plaintiff has exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing suit because Intervenor Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Maverick HFC. To properly invoke the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). For these reasons, Maverick HFC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case in full.

III. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

24. Maverick HFC respectfully requests that the Court transfer the above-entitled and numbered cause to Maverick County, Texas pursuant to Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86.

25. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86 provides that a motion to transfer venue “shall state that the action should be transferred to another specified county of proper venue because: (a) [t]he County where the action is pending is not a proper county; or (b) [m]andatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by one or more specific statutory provisions which shall be clearly designated or indicated.” The rules further provide that a motion to transfer venue “shall be made promptly by the court and such determination must be made in a reasonable time prior to commencement of the trial on the merits.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 87.

26. Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “the court, on motion filed and served concurrently with or before the filing of the answer, shall transfer an action to another county of proper venue if […] the county in which the action is pending is not a proper county as provided by [Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.063(1). “In all venue hearings, no factual proof concerning the merits of

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the case shall be required to establish venue” and “[t]he court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.” Id. § 15.064(a).

27. The Civil Practice and Remedies Code defines “proper venue” as “(1) the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B [Mandatory Venue] or another statute prescribing mandatory venue; or (2) if Subdivision (1) does not apply, the venue provided by this subchapter [General Venue] or Subchapter C [Permissive Venue]”). Section 15.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, encompassed within Subchapter B [Mandatory Venue] of Chapter 15, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” Id. § 15.016.

28. Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief. Id. § 65.023(a) (“[A] writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”); see In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“The statute placing venue for injunction suits in the county of the defendant’s domicile is mandatory.”). Section 65.023(a) is operative only when a plaintiff’s pleading in the underlying suit establishes the relief sought is “purely or primarily injunctive.” Cont’l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 736; Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959) (orig. proceeding) (“It is settled that [section 65.023(a)’s predecessor] only applies to and governs the issuance and return of writs and trial in cases in which the relief sought is purely or primarily injunctive.”); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1957) (holding that the injunction statute controlled venue over the situs of the real property in a dispute where an airport owner sought an injunction ordering removal of a television antenna that was allegedly interfering with an airport runway).

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29. In In re FPWP GP LLC, the real parties filed a declaratory judgment and injunction action in Dallas County to resolve a dispute among partners to a limited partnership concerning “(1) their rights in and obligations to the partnership, (2) which partnership agreement govern[ed] their relationship, and (3) which entity [was] the partnership’s general partner.” See No. 05-16- 01145-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 633, 2017 WL 461355, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). Relying on Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the relators filed a motion to transfer venue from Dallas County to Harris County, as all parties subject to the potential injunction were domiciled in Harris County.

30. After the trial court denied the motion, the court of appeals granted mandamus relief and determined that the real parties’ declaratory judgment action and plea for an injunction were a different means to the same end. Specifically, the court opined as follows:

31. Here, the Plaintiff’s requested relief is analogous to the pleadings the Dallas Court of Appeals considered in In re FPWP GP LLC to determine that section 65.023(a) established venue in Harris County. Plaintiff’s requested relief is “purely or primarily injunctive” consisting of a declaratory judgment “that prevents [TAD] from … awarding any further tax exemptions to the Defendant HFCs.” First Am. Pet. at ¶ 36.

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venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue.”). Accordingly, the Court must grant Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer the present proceedings to Maverick County, Texas (Defendant Maverick HFC’s county of domicile).

33. Intervenor Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in Tarrant County because “all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant County” and Maverick HFC “purposely availed [itself] to this venue[.]” First Am. Pet. at ¶ 12 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1)).

34. Contrary to Intervenor Plaintiff’s suggestion, Section 15.002(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this subchapter or Subchapter B or C, all lawsuits shall be brought […] (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; [or] (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person[.]” (emphasis added). Section 15.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, codified within Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” See also id. § 15.001 (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue[.]”). Thus, insofar as Section 65.023 mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief, it controls over the venue selection provisions encompassed within Section 15.002.

35. Intervenor Plaintiff further alleges that venue in Tarrant County is proper because this suit “concerns real property located in Tarrant County[.]” First Am. Pet. at ¶ 12 (citing Tex.

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Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.011). Intervenor Plaintiff’s allegation ignores the fact that the Civil Practice and Remedies Code’s mandatory venue provision concerning land does not apply based on the causes of action asserted in Intervenor Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition. Specifically, Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that only “[a]ctions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.” Intervenor Plaintiff has not pled any of the causes of action enumerated in section 15.011 and, therefore, this Court need not engage in an analysis of conflicting mandatory venue provisions under Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

36. Finally, Intervenor Plaintiff alleges that the Property Tax Code mandates venue in Tarrant County. See First Am. Pet. at ¶ 13 (citing Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01-43.03). As explained above, Intervenor Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition does not raise an independent cause of action under the Texas Property Tax Code separate and apart from its request for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Property Tax Code does not control venue in this circumstance.

IV. GENERAL DENIAL

37. Subject to Defendant Maverick HFC’s Special Exceptions, Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer Venue, and pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Maverick HFC denies each and every allegation in Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition, as well as any amended or supplemental petition, and demands that Intervenor Plaintiff prove their allegations by the appropriate standard of proof under the laws of the State of Texas.

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V. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

38. Subject to Defendant Maverick HFC’s Special Exceptions, Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer Venue, Defendant Maverick HFC asserts the following affirmative defenses.

39. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, because Intervenor Plaintiff has failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

40. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, by the doctrine of mootness/ripeness.

41. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because by estoppel, laches, and/or waiver.

42. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of justification.

43. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Intervenor Plaintiff lack standing to bring the claims they assert.

44. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because they are not cognizable under the Texas Constitution.

VI. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant Maverick Housing Finance Corporation respectfully requests that this court (i) dismiss all claims against Defendant based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; or in the alternative, (ii) grant Defendant’s Special Exception and dismiss Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition with leave to replead; (iii) grant its Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer this suit to Maverick County, Texas; and, in the alternative and subject to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, (iv) that Intervenor

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Plaintiff take nothing; and (v) Defendant be awarded such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which it may be justly entitled. Dated: June 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF | STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendants Maverick Housing Finance Corporation

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of June, 2025, to the following counsel of record: Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] [email protected] Alexander J. Lindvall Christopher B. Mosley [email protected] [email protected] Jonathan M. Moss Olyn Poole [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] Office of the City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh 100 Fort Wo1th Trail [email protected] Fort Worth, Texas 76102 (817) 392-7600 Telephone City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office Attorneys for Intervenor Plaintiff City of Fort P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Worth Arlington, Texas 76004 Jeffrey M. Tillotson Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington [email protected] Kathryn E. Yukevich James R. Evans, Jr. [email protected] [email protected] Tillotson Johnson & Patton Eric Ruiz 1201 Main Street, Ste 1300 [email protected] Dallas, TX 75202 Low Swinney Evans & James, PLLC 4425 South Mopac Expressway Counsel for Defendant Pecos HFC Building 3, Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78735 Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt

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Roel Gutierrez Law Office of Roel Gutierrez, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. McCallen, TX 78504 (956) 278-3529 Phone / (956) 278-3530 Fax [email protected] and Robert J. Salinas State Bar No. 17536000 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Tel: 956-464-2460 Email: [email protected] Attorneys for La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

/s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Daniel J. Lecavalier

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[*247][*248][*249]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of § the Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS DEFENDANT PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE CITY OF FORT WORTH’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ORIGINAL ANSWER

NOW COMES Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and the Board Members (as named in the above caption in their official capacities) (collectively, “Pleasanton HFC”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Special Exceptions to the City of Fort Worth’s (“Fort Worth”)’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and, Subject Thereto, Original Answer (“Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition”), and, in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:

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I. SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

2. Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition suffers from a fatal legal defect: it attempts to use Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code as a vehicle to challenge discretionary appraisal determinations, when that chapter is expressly limited to compelling compliance with non- discretionary policies and operating procedures. As Texas courts have consistently held, Chapter 43 applies only to procedural and administrative matters—not to substantive determinations regarding individual property exemptions.

3. Fort Worth has failed to identify any specific policy, procedure, or non- discretionary duty under the Property Tax Code, Comptroller rules, or applicable law that the appraisal district has violated. Instead, the City seeks to use Chapter 43 as an improper end-run around the established procedures for challenging tax exemption decisions (presumably to evade Defendant’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion to transfer venue). This fundamental pleading deficiency renders Fort Worth's petition legally insufficient and subject to dismissal.

4. Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation respectfully submits that Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition fails to state a cognizable claim under Chapter 43 and should be dismissed with leave to replead.

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B. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

5. In its First Amended Petition, Fort Worth alleges that that “[t]he [Property] Tax Code […] provides that ‘[a] taxing unit [may] sue an appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with … applicable law.’” First Am. Pet., ¶ 35 (citing Tex. Tax Code § 43.01).

C. LEGAL STANDARD

D. LAW AND ARGUMENT

i. Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code Applies Only to Taxing Unit Actions Requesting Relief With Respect to an Appraisal District’s Policies and Operating Procedures

7. Fort Worth’s invocation of Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01 and 43.03 is defective on its face. Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code provides that “[a] taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with the provisions of this title, rules of the comptroller, or other applicable law.” (emphasis added). Section 43.03 of the Property Tax Code further provides that the Court “as the evidence warrants shall enter those orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” (emphasis added).

8. In raising Chapter 43 in its First Amended Petition, Fort Worth conspicuously glosses over reference to Section 43.04 of the Property Tax Code. That provision, titled “Suit to

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Compel Compliance Deadlines,” clarifies that Chapter 43 of the Property Tax Code is intended to address lawsuits by taxing units aimed at compelling compliance with the appraisal district’s non- discretionary functions:

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13. In finding that Chapter 43 was limited to actions for relief with respect to “policies and operating procedures,” the court in Joaquin cited to Carr v. Bell Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 786 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, writ denied) (op. on reh'g)) (emphasis added). There, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held in an opinion on a motion for rehearing by a taxing unit that Section 43.01 of the Texas Tax Code did not authorize a taxing units’ collateral attack on

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an appraisal review board’s reduce appraisal determination. Specifically, the Carr court held that Section 43.01 “applies to actions for declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to policies and operating procedures” and “cannot refer to a suit to challenge the appraisal of a single taxpayer’s property.” Carr v. Bell Sav. & Loan Ass'n, Case No. 06-89-09783-CV, 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 463, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Feb. ^[27], 1990, no writ). 1

E. INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF FORT WORTH HAS FAILED TO ALLEGE A POLICY OR PROCEDURE THAT THE APPRAISAL DISTRICT MUST COMPLY WITH

14. Joaquin should control the Court’s review of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition. Nowhere in its First Amended Petition does Fort Worth allege that TAD has failed to comply with its own policies or procedures under the Property Tax Code or the Comptroller rules. Instead, Fort Worth has alleged that a suit is necessary to compel TAD to “comply with” Chapter 394 of the Local Government Code, otherwise known as the Housing Finance Corporation Act (the “Act”).

15. Fort Worth does not allege any provisions of the Act that TAD can come into compliance with. See Tex. Tax Code § 43.01. Likewise, the Act does not compel TAD to do anything. With respect to remedies, the First Amended Petition is similarly defective. Section 43.03 of the Property Tax Code, titled “Action by Court,” states that the Court “as the evidence warrants shall enter those orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” (emphasis added). Without any reference to what policies or procedures under the Property Tax Code, Comptroller rules, or HFC Act that TAD is currently out of compliance with, the pleading is defective on its face and, therefore, a special exception striking the First Amended Petition is appropriate.

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II. PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

16. The gravamen of Fort Worth’s Petition is that Pleasanton HFC has been removing Tarrant County-based properties from the tax appraisal roll. First Am. Pet. at ¶ 1.

17. Rather than bring its case under the Property Tax Code, Intervenor Plaintiff brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

21. Moreover, Intervenor Plaintiff’s reference to Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code does not excuse Intervenor Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Intervenor

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Plaintiff does not raise Section 43.01 as an independent basis for relief and the statute is referenced and incorporated into a single cause of action labelled “Cause of Action: Declaratory Judgment & Tax Code.” See First Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 31-36. However Intervenor Plaintiff cares to craft its Petition, the relief sought is the same—denial of ad valorem exemptions—and Intervenor Plaintiff has therefore failed to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit before this Court.

23. Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition does not allege that Intervenor Plaintiff has exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing suit because Intervenor Plaintiff has not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Pleasanton HFC. To properly invoke the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d

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607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). For these reasons, Pleasanton HFC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case in full.

III. MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

24. Pleasanton HFC respectfully requests that the Court transfer the above-entitled and numbered cause to Atascosa County, Texas pursuant to Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86.

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[*259]

relators filed a motion to transfer venue from Dallas County to Harris County, as all parties subject to the potential injunction were domiciled in Harris County.

32. Insofar as Intervenor Plaintiff’s sought-after after relief is “purely or primarily” injunctive, this proceeding is subject to the mandatory venue provision of Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.001(b) (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue.”). Accordingly, the Court must grant Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer the present proceedings to Atascosa County, Texas (Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s county of domicile).

33. Intervenor Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in Tarrant County because “all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant

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County” and Pleasanton HFC “purposely availed [itself] to this venue[.]” First Am. Pet. at ¶ 12 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1)).

35. Intervenor Plaintiff further alleges that venue in Tarrant County is proper because this suit “concerns real property located in Tarrant County[.]” First Am. Pet. at ¶ 12 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.011). Intervenor Plaintiff’s allegation ignores the fact that the Civil Practice and Remedies Code’s mandatory venue provision concerning land does not apply based on the causes of action asserted in Intervenor Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition. Specifically, Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that only “[a]ctions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet

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title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.” Intervenor Plaintiff has not pled any of the causes of action enumerated in section 15.011 and, therefore, this Court need not engage in an analysis of conflicting mandatory venue provisions under Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

IV. GENERAL DENIAL

37. Subject to Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s Special Exceptions, Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer Venue, and pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Pleasanton HFC denies each and every allegation in Intervenor Plaintiff’s Petition, as well as any amended or supplemental petition, and demands that Intervenor Plaintiff prove their allegations by the appropriate standard of proof under the laws of the State of Texas.

V. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

38. Subject to Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s Special Exceptions, Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion to Transfer Venue, Defendant Pleasanton HFC asserts the following affirmative defenses.

39. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, because Intervenor Plaintiff has failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

40. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, by the doctrine of mootness/ripeness.

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41. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because by estoppel, laches, and/or waiver.

42. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of justification.

43. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Intervenor Plaintiff lack standing to bring the claims they assert.

44. Intervenor Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because they are not cognizable under the Texas Constitution.

VI. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation respectfully requests that this court (i) dismiss all claims against Defendant based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; or in the alternative, (ii) grant Defendant’s Special Exception and dismiss Intervenor Plaintiff Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition with leave to replead; (iii) grant its Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer this suit to Atascosa County, Texas; and, in the alternative and subject to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, (iv) that Intervenor Plaintiff take nothing; and (v) Defendant be awarded such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which it may be justly entitled.

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Dated: June 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF | STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[*265]

Roel Gutierrez State Bar No. 24069842 Law Office of Roel Gutierrez, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. McCallen, TX 78504 (956) 278-3529 Phone / (956) 278-3530 Fax [email protected] and Robert J. Salinas State Bar No. 17536000 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Tel: 956-464-2460 Email: [email protected] Attorneys for La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

/s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Daniel J. Lecavalier

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DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ORIGINAL ANSWER

NOW COMES Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and file this, its Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue And, Subject Thereto, Original Answer to Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth’s Petition (“Petition”). In support thereof, Defendant respectfully shows the Court as follows:

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PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

1. The gravamen of Intervenor-Plaintiff’s complaint is that Pecos HFC has “removing Fort Worth-based properties from Tarrant County tax appraisal rolls[.]” 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 1.

2. Rather than bring their case under the Property Tax Code, the City of Fort Worth (“City” or “Intervenor-Plaintiff”) sued Defendants under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

3. Intervenor-Plaintiff is a “taxing unit” under the Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(12). The exclusive means for a “taxing unit” to resolve the types of disputes raised in Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Petition is to seek relief under the administrative process laid out in the Property Tax Code. Accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction over Intervenor- Plaintiff’s claims. See Tex. Tax Code § 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding).

4. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims related to any properties “removed” from the tax rolls plainly fall within the statutory framework of the Property Tax Code. Indeed, the true nature of Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims is laid bare in their request for declaratory relief and injunctive which asks the Court to stop Pecos HFC from “requesting or receiving tax exemptions for Fort Worth-based properties.” 1st Am. Pet. at Prayer ¶ (C).

5. As a result, the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid or evade the exclusive administrative process and remedies in the Property Tax Code. Vexler v. Spencer, No. 02-24-00305-CV, 2025 WL 1271691, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 1, 2025, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“the tax code jurisdictionally bars the Property Owners from

DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 2 OF 10 raising these three claims outside of the Texas Tax Code’s exclusive remedial scheme”); Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0537 (2007) at 3 (“whether any specific property is exempt from taxation depends on the facts and circumstances and is initially determined by the chief appraiser of the appraisal district”).

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6. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s “alternative” claim under the Texas Constitution seeks declaratory relief and, as a result, is governed by the Declaratory Judgment Act. See 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 34 (“Fort Worth further asks for a declaratory judgment that Article VIII, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution . . . that the Defendants’ scheme violates Constitutional limits on the scope of Texas counties’ taxing authority.”) (emphasis added).

7. Section 41.01 of the Property Tax Code sets out the duties of the appraisal review board, which, as relevant here, include the duties to determine protests initiated by property owners, determine challenges initiated by taxing units and “take any other action or make any other determination that this title specifically authorizes or requires.” Tex. Tax Code § 41.41. Taxing units are entitled to bring challenges of designated actions before the appraisal review board, among them, challenges to the level of appraisals of any category of property in the district and challenges to an exclusion of property from the appraisal records. Id. § 41.03.1 Intervenor-Plaintiff’s “alternative” declaratory judgment relief is similarly barred by Intervenor-Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust their administrative remedies to challenge the removal of any property from the tax rolls. To the extent Intervenor-Plaintiff’s complaint is that properties should not have been removed from the tax rolls to begin with, the instant lawsuit is premature. Intervenor-Plaintiff is required to challenge the exemption status of any property under the statutory scheme laid out by the Property Tax Code. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s failure to do so dooms their complaints in this case.

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8. Intervenor-Plaintiff does not allege that it has exhausted its administrative remedies prior to filing this suit because they have not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over Pecos HFC. To properly invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the district court, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before filing its suit for judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). For these reasons, Pecos HFC respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this case in full.

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

9. Pecos HFC respectfully requests that the Court transfer this action to Reeves County, pursuant to Section 15.063 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86.

10. A motion to transfer venue is proper if (1) the County where the action is pending is not a proper county or (2) mandatory venue of the action in another county is prescribed by one or more specific statutory provisions. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 86.

DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 4 OF 10 pending is not a proper county as provided by [Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code].” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.063(1). “In all venue hearings, no factual proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue” and “[t]he court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits.” Id. § 15.064(a).

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12. Section 65.023(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief. Id. § 65.023(a) (“[A] writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”); In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (“The statute placing venue for injunction suits in the county of the defendant’s domicile is mandatory.”).

13. Section 65.023(a) is operative when a plaintiff’s pleading in the underlying suit establishes the relief sought is “purely or primarily injunctive.” Cont’l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 736; Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959) (orig. proceeding) (holding same regarding Section 65.023(a)’s predecessor statute); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1957) (holding that the injunction statute controlled venue, not the location of the real property at issue, in a dispute where an airport owner sought an injunction ordering removal of a television antenna allegedly interfering with an airport runway).

14. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s goal here is clear: a temporary injunction and declaratory relief that will prevent Pecos HFC from “requesting tax-exempt status for any Fort Worth- based properties.” 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 41. Intervenor-Plaintiff also seeks a permanent injunction that prevents the City of Pecos from “requesting or receiving tax exemptions for Fort Worth- based properties.” 1st Am. Pet. at Prayer ¶ (C). There can be no doubt that the relief sought—

DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 5 OF 10 although fashioned under the UDJA—is intended to have the same effect as a permanent injunction.

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15. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s purported claim under the Texas Constitution fares no better. The goal of the claim, again, is to prohibit the City of Pecos from seeking exemptions for properties owned outside the City of Pecos. See 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 34 (“Fort Worth further asks for a declaratory judgment that Article VIII, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution . . . that the Defendants’ scheme violates Constitutional limits on the scope of Texas counties’ taxing authority.”) (emphasis added). In other words, Intervenor-Plaintiff seeks to prohibit Pecos HFC from seeking the same tax exemptions it seeks to void under their declaratory judgment claim.

16. Courts in nearly identical contexts have consistently held that transfer is required, emphasizing that when the plaintiff is “seeking to stop [a defendant] from taking actions,” then “the primary purpose of the lawsuit is injunctive.” In re FPWP GP LLC, No. 05-16-01145-CV, 2017 WL 461355, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.); see also In re Daniel, 12–06–00232–CV, 2006 WL 2361350, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. ^[16], 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

17. There can be no doubt that Section 65.023(a) applies, and this matter should be transferred to Pecos HFC’s domicile: Reeves County, Texas. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Petition indisputably reflects that Pecos HFC is not at home in Tarrant County, acknowledging it is at home “hundreds of miles away” from Tarrant County in Reeves County, Texas. 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 3.

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18. Intervenor-Plaintiff alleges that venue is proper in Tarrant County because (1) “all or a substantial part of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant County,” (2) Pecos HFC “conduct[ed] business in Tarrant County,” and (3) the lawsuit “concerns real property located in Tarrant County.” 1st Am. Pet. at ¶ 12. This allegation is insufficient to overcome the mandatory venue provision encompassed within Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

19. Section 15.002(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this subchapter or Subchapter B or C, all lawsuits shall be brought […] (1) in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred; [or] (3) in the county of the defendant’s principal office in this state, if the defendant is not a natural person[.]” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a) (emphasis added).

20. Section 15.016 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, codified within Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies, states that “[a]n action governed by any other statute prescribing mandatory venue shall be brought in the county required by that statute.” Id. § 15.016 (emphasis added); see also id. § 15.001 (defining “proper venue” to mean “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue[.]”).

21. Because Section 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code mandates venue in a defendant’s county of domicile for cases purely or primarily seeking injunctive relief, it controls over the venue selection provisions encompassed within Section 15.002. See id. § 65.023(a).

DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 7 OF 10 22. In addition, Intervenor-Plaintiff’s attempted invocation of Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is unavailing. Section 15.011 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that only “[a]ctions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or part of the property is located.” Id. § 65.023(a). Intervenor-Plaintiff has not pled any of the causes of action enumerated in section 15.011 and, therefore, this Court need not engage in an analysis of conflicting mandatory venue provisions under Subchapter B of Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.

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GENERAL DENIAL

23. Pursuant to Rule 92 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Pecos HFC generally denies the allegations contained in Intervenor-Plaintiff’s Petition and demands strict proof thereof.

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

24. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, because Intervenor- Plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.

25. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims are barred in, whole or in part, by the doctrine of mootness/ripeness.

26. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because by estoppel, laches, and/or waiver.

27. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of justification.

DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 8 OF 10 28. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Intervenor- Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the claims it assert.

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29. Intervenor-Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because they are not cognizable under the Texas Constitution.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Pecos HFC respectfully requests (i) dismiss all claims against Pecos HFC; or in the alternative, (ii) that this Court grant its Motion to Transfer Venue and transfer this suit to Reeves County, Texas; and, in the alternative and subject to Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue, (iii) that Intervenor-Plaintiff takes nothing; and (iv) Pecos HFC be awarded such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which it may be justly entitled.

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Dated: June 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Kathryn E. Yukevich Jeffrey M. Tillotson Texas Bar No. 20039200 [email protected] Kathryn E. Yukevich State Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, TX 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PECOS HFC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was e-filed with the Clerk of the Court and will be served via email upon all counsel of record and on this 27th day of May 2025.

/s/ Kathryn E. Yukevich Kathryn E. Yukevich

DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION, MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE, AND ANSWER PAGE 10 OF 10 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kathryn Yukevich Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101478786 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Pecos HFC Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer, and Answer to Intervenor-Plaintiff's Petition Status as of 6/2/2025 9:59 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/2/2025 8:41:12 AM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 8:41:12 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kathryn Yukevich Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101478786 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Pecos HFC Defendants' Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer, and Answer to Intervenor-Plaintiff's Petition Status as of 6/2/2025 9:59 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 8:41:12 AM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/2/2025 8:41:12 AM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/2/2025 10:27 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

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No. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants, § § v. § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS §

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE MEGAN FAHEY: In support of its Third Amended Petition and Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff City of Arlington (“Arlington”) alleges the following: I. INTRODUCTION

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 1 land for a new multifamily development (or acquires an already-existing development) in a city outside the HFC’s local jurisdiction; the private developer then conveys that property to the HFC; the HFC, as the new owner, then applies for and receives a 100% tax exemption, and the property is removed from the tax rolls; the HFC then leases that now-exempt property to a private landlord (oftentimes the same developer who originally purchased the property), who then shares the profits with the HFC. The upshot of this scheme is that the developer and landlord get a massive tax exemption, the HFC gets to collect fees and a portion of the development’s profits, and the other city (in this case, Arlington) bears 100% of the downside.

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II. PARTIES

4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas. ^[5]. Defendant Pecos HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It may be served with citation through its registered agent, John Salcido, at 2320 Teague Dr., Pecos, Texas 79772, or wherever else he may be located.

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 2

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8. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

9. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff seeks relief within the jurisdictional limits of this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 65.001 et seq.; Tex. Tax Code §§ 43.01, 43.03; Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

13. This suit concerns the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. (“the Act”). The Act was passed in 1979 to help facilitate the development of low-income housing. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.002(a) (the Act’s purpose is to “provide a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments”).

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 3

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14. To help create more low-income housing, the Act empowers local governments to create Housing Finance Corporations, or HFCs—nonprofit organizations, comprised of local officials, that help coordinate and facilitate affordable-housing projects. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.002, 394.011(a), 394.032. And because HFCs are (at least in theory) furthering a public purpose, the Act provides that HFC-owned properties and the income derived from those properties are tax-exempt. Id. § 394.905 (“The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public property used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of this state.”).

B. Several faraway HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Arlington that do not house low-income residents. ^[18]. Arlington recently learned that the Defendant HFCs have been ignoring these statutory restrictions and has been giving tax exemptions to large, multifamily housing Page 4 developments in Arlington without Arlington’s knowledge, input, or approval. [Affidavit of Mindy Cochran, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at ¶¶ 4‒10.]

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19. The Defendant HFCs’ unlawful tax-exemption scheme has removed tens of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units’ tax rolls and has caused Arlington to lose millions of dollars in annual tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 10.]

23. This is a widespread problem across the state. The City of Euless, for example, has

1 At the time of acquisition, this complex was known as the “Jefferson North Collins” apartment complex. ^[2] https://www.zenitharlington.com/floorplans/.

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 5 seen at least a 2% drop in its overall annual revenue after a single apartment complex received tax- exempt status from the Cameron County HFC;3 and Dallas, Fort Worth, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and other north Texas cities have reported millions of dollars in total lost tax revenue.^[4] Worse, these out-of-jurisdiction HFCs are often bestowing tax-exempt status to already-built structures (not new projects), and many of the exempted properties aren’t even affordable-housing projects; they are typical for-profit apartments and condos, usually located in upmarket neighborhoods, that do not offer reduced rent, housing vouchers, or other benefits to low-income applicants.^[5]

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26. Arlington also recently learned that the Pleasanton HFC and the La Villa HFC have been engaging in the same sort of unlawful tax-exemption scheme in Arlington. [Exhibit 1 at ¶¶ 4, 8‒9.]

3 Andrea Lucia, Euless Loses 2 Percent of Revenue to Controversial Tax Break Approved in Faraway County, CBS News (Feb. ^[21], 2024). 4 Andrea Lucia, Housing Group Made Millions Getting Tax Breaks for Developers, Costing Cities and Schools Even More, CBS News (Dec. ^[22], 2023). 5 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a “luxurious community” in Irving and that the tenants’ rents went up significantly under the HFC’s ownership).

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 6 has not yet received, tax exemptions for these properties. [Id.]

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28. The Washington is appraised at approximately $34.5 million; if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $754,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $207,000 per year. [Id. at ¶ 8a.] Cedars and River Legacy Park is appraised at approximately $32.5 million; if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $710,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $195,000 per year. [Id. at ¶ 8b.]

29. In other words, if the Pleasanton HFC receives tax exemptions for these properties, it will likely cause Arlington to lose over $400,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 8.]

30. Arlington also recently learned that the La Villa HFC has acquired at least one property in Arlington: The Carmin apartment complex (711 Brentford Pl.). [Id. at ¶ 9.] Upon information and belief, the La Villa HFC has applied for, but has not received, a tax exemption for this property. [Id.] The Carmin is appraised at $23.9 million; if taken off the tax rolls, it would cause the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose about $522,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that lost revenue would be approximately $143,000 per year. [Id.] In other words, if the La Villa HFC receive a tax exemption for this property, it will likely cause Arlington to lose about $143,000 in annual ad valorem tax revenue. [Id.] 31. Because of the widespread nature of this practice (see ¶ 22 supra), there has been a strong legislative push to (even more) explicitly outlaw this sort of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21 (link). Upon information and belief, because this sort of scheme is about to become indisputably illegal, HFCs have been scrambling to close their out-of-jurisdiction projects and apply for undeserved tax exemptions.

V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT & TAX CODE

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 7 status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. § 37.004(a). The Legislature intended the UDJA to be “remedial” and “liberally construed,” and “its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” Id. § 37.002(b).

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33. In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

34. Arlington asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow the Defendant HFCs acquire real property in Arlington or to bestow tax exemptions to Arlington-based properties.

VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION 37. To stop the Defendant HFCs from unlawfully removing any more Arlington-based properties from the tax rolls, Arlington asks this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that prohibits the Defendant HFCs from (a) closing on any Arlington-based properties or (b) requesting, obtaining, or receiving any tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.

39. Arlington requests the Court to issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 8 by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

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40. Arlington has seen a surge in out-of-jurisdiction HFC activity, with many moving to close on properties and apply for tax exemptions at breakneck speed; and at least one of the Defendant HFCs has averred to the Arlington City Attorney that it is on the verge of closing on at least one Arlington-based property in the coming days [Exhibit 2 at ¶ 5], and Arlington believes these HFCs will rush to close on deals and seek exemptions if they are made aware of this TRO application.

42. Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Arlington believes the Defendant HFCs are already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the short-term. ^[43]. Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 3.]

44. This Court should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents the Defendant HFCs from overstepping their jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Arlington-based properties. And out of an abundance of caution, this Court should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any

PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 9 Arlington-based properties.

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Page 10 against the same Defendants that enjoins the same unlawful conduct pending trial.

(C) After the expiration of this temporary injunction, and after a final trial on the merits, to issue (i) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Texas Housing Finance

Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq., does not allow the Defendants HFCs to acquire real property in Arlington or bestow tax-exempt status

to properties located in Arlington; and (ii) a permanent injunction that prevents the Defendant Bobbitt from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Arlington-based properties.

(D) To award Plaintiff its attorney’s fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

CITY OF ARLINGTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004 Phone: 817-459-6878 Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Arlington Page 11

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348-363561-25

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

After considering the application for a temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiffs in the above-styled matter, the pleadings, and the evidence, the Court finds that-

1. There is a current controversy over Defendant Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation's (" CCHFC") efforts to seek exemption from ad valorem taxes for properties located in Williamson County, including the following real properties:

Temporary Restraining Order - Page 1 of 3 15.0496-acre h·act of land on which a multi-family apartment project known as The Sommery has been built ("The Sommery").

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4. There is no adequate remedy at law because such damages or harm to Plaintiffs cannot be calculated.

6. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that-

a. CCHFC, as well as its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation with

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7. This order expires o n ~ \ L\:. q 2025 at _ _:oo _ _ _t1:__.m.

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II. DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF

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III. PARTIES

6. Plaintiff Williamson County is a Texas county.

7. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 is a municipal utility district whose boundaries are located within Williamson County.

8. Plaintiff Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 is a municipal utility district whose bmmdaries are located within Williamson County.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter because the relief Plaintiffs seek is within the jurisdictional limits of the Court.

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V. BACKGROUND

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporations Act.

14. The Act creates a significant tax incentive for these residential developments, providing-

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B. The Cameron County Housing Finance Corporation.

C. The Williamson County Properties At Issue.

19. This case involves two properties located in Williamson County. One was

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D. CCHFC Seeks Removal of The Properties from the Ad Valorem Tax Rolls.

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[*309]

E. The scope of CCHFC' s tax-exemption scheme.

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VI. CAUSES OF ACTION

A. Declaratory Relief Against CCHFC.

29. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

32. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief from the Court pursuant to the UDJA declaring that: a. The Act prohibits CCHFC from acquiring property outside of Cameron

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County (in contravention of the Act), such property, including Siena Round

Rock and The Sommery, is not exempt from ad valorem taxation under the Act. B. • Alternative Claim: Violation of Texas Constitution.

33. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

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VII. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

36. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

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43. Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief demanded, and all or part of the relief requires the restraint of some act that is prejudicial to Plaintiffs.

PRAYER

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ATTORNEYS FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY

-and-

[*316]

VERIFICATION

1. 19_/_19_6_8_ _ _ _~ and My name is Russ Boles. My date of birth is __l_/_ my address is 3001 Joe DiMaggio Boulevard, Unit 1300, Round Rock, TX 78665.

3. Pursuant to Section 132.001, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is h·ue and correct.

Executed in Williamson County, Texas, on March 4, 2025.

7<@s gotes Russ Bo les (Mar 4, 2025 16:29 CST) The Honorable Russ Boles

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CITY OF ARLINGTON AND CITY OF FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BOBBITT’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE MEGAN FAHEY: As part of his answer, Defendant Bobbitt included a plea to the jurisdiction. In his plea, Defendant Bobbitt argues this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against him (1) because Plaintiffs should have brought their case under the Tax Code, not the Declaratory Judgments Act; and (2) because Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies, and “taxing unit[s] must exhaust [their] administrative remedies before filing [a] suit for judicial review.” [Def. Bobbitt Answer and PTJ at 1, 3.]

Defendant Bobbitt’s first argument is moot because Plaintiffs have since amended their petition to include a cause of action under the Tax Code, and his second argument is simply incorrect, as Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Accordingly, because this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Bobbitt, his plea should be denied.

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Page 1

1. Plaintiffs have brought a cognizable cause of action against Defendant Bobbitt under the Tax Code, and this Court undeniably has jurisdiction over that claim. Defendant Bobbitt argues “the Declaratory Judgment[s] Act cannot be used as a vehicle” to sue him because, as a Chief Appraiser for an appraisal district, “the Texas Property Tax Code provides the exclusive means for parties to resolve disputes” against him. [Id. at 1‒2.]

This argument, however, is moot, as Plaintiffs have since amended their petition to include a cause of action under Chapter 43 of the Tax Code, which provides that “[a] taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with . . . applicable law,” Tex. Tax Code § 43.01, and authorizes the courts to “enter . . . orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office,” id. § 43.03. [Plf. City of Arlington 3d Amend. Pet. at ¶¶ 35‒36, 46.]

This statute’s language is crystal-clear: taxing units, like Arlington and Fort Worth, can sue their appraisal district to force the district to comply with applicable law, id. § 43.01, and this Court can enter whatever orders are necessary to compel the appraisal district to comply with applicable law, id. § 43.03. Phrased differently, § 43.01 authorizes taxing units to bring “actions for declaratory or injunctive relief” against their appraisal districts. Carr v. Bell Sav. And Loan Ass’n, 786 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, no pet.). That is precisely what is happening in this case: Arlington and Fort Worth, two taxing units, are suing their appraisal district to compel it to comply with applicable law. Section 43.01 undeniably gives this Court jurisdiction over Arlington and Fort Worth’s claims. Accordingly, this Court should deny Defendant Bobbitt’s plea.

2. Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. Defendant Bobbitt also argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Arlington and Fort Worth did not exhaust their administrative remedies before filing suit. [Def. Bobbitt Answer and PTJ at 3.] He is mistaken; Chapter 43 of the Tax Code gives this Court original jurisdiction over this case, and Plaintiffs were not required to go through the administrative process before filing suit.

ARLINGTON AND FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BOBBITT’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION Page 2

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Defendant Bobbitt seems to be referencing the administrative procedures in Chapter 41 and 42 of the Tax Code, which describe how a private property owner can protest an appraisal of their property. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 41.41 et seq. (laying out the procedures and requirements for a property-appraisal protest). But those provisions of the Tax Code have nothing to do with this case. Plaintiffs are not asking this Court to review one of Defendant Bobbitt’s appraisals. Rather, they are asking this Court to interpret the HFC Act, see Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq., and determine whether HFCs are entitled to tax exemptions for residential developments that are located outside their local jurisdictions, see id. § 394.903 (providing that an HFC-owned residential development “must be located within the local government”).

A property-appraisal protest is a retrospective process, but Plaintiffs’ requested relief in this case is all prospective. The Defendant HFCs have requested, but has not yet received, tax exemptions for multiple properties located in Arlington and Fort Worth. Plaintiffs are asking for a temporary injunction that prevents these HFCs from obtaining those requested tax exemptions, because the HFC Act prohibits them from acquiring property in Arlington or Fort Worth. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.903 (providing that an HFC-owned residential development “must be located within the local government”). This suit is not about second-guessing one of Defendant Bobbitt’s past appraisals; this case is about stopping a handful of rogue HFCs from unlawfully syphoning millions of taxpayer dollars out of Tarrant County, and § 43.01 undeniably gives this Court jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Bobbitt.

The Court of Appeals addressed this exact issue in City of Cleburne v. Central Appraisal Dist. of Johnson Cnty., 2004 WL 1574577 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.). In that case, the City of Cleburne sued its appraisal district under § 43.01, “seeking an injunction . . . to compel the District to comply with the Tax Code.” Id. at *1. The appraisal district filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing the City failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Id. The trial court granted the appraisal district’s plea, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 43.01 “authorize[d] the City to sue the Appraisal District to compel it to comply with” applicable law, and that “the district court had jurisdiction” to hear that dispute, even though the City did not

ARLINGTON AND FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BOBBITT’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION Page 3 exhaust its administrative remedies before filing suit. Id. at *1, *2; see also Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex. 2000) (observing that, for “courts of general jurisdiction,” like this Court, “the presumption is that they have subject matter jurisdiction unless a chowing can be made to the contrary”).

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The Texas Supreme Court, moreover, has repeatedly held that housing authorities, like HFCs, “ha[ve] no power to acquire, hold, or use property beyond [their] statutory authorization,” and “[i]f an injured party with standing brings and proves an action seeking to confine [the housing authority] within its statutory constraints . . . courts may intervene and provide an appropriate remedy.” Tex. Student Housing Authority v. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d 137, 143‒

44 (Tex. 2015). Here, Plaintiffs are injured parties whose tax revenues are being depleted by the Defendant HFCs’ illegal property acquisitions, and Texas Student Housing Authority recognizes that this Court can intervene to provide an appropriate remedy—that is, a declaratory judgment determining that the Defendant HFCs’ are not entitled to tax exemptions for their real properties located in Arlington and Fort Worth because the acquisition of those properties was outside their statutory authority under the HFC Act. Id. at 143‒44; see also City of Sherman v. Pub. Utility Comm’n of Tex., 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983) (upholding an injunction to prevent an agency from acting beyond its authority); Westheimer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brockette, 567 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex. 1978) (holding that court intervention is “permissible when an agency is exercising authority beyond its statutorily conferred powers”).

ACCORDINGLY, because multiple statutes give this Court jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Bobbitt, the City of Arlington and the City of Fort Worth respectfully ask this Court to deny Defendant Bobbitt’s plea to the jurisdiction.

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Page 4

CITY OF ARLINGTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004 Phone: 817-459-6878 Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Arlington

By: /s/ Christopher B. Mosley (w/ permission) Stephen A. Cumbie State Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Christopher B. Mosley State Bar No. 00789505 [email protected] Olyn Poole State Bar No. 24037292 [email protected]

CITY OF FORT WORTH OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 100 Fort Worth Trail Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Phone: 817-459-6878 Attorneys for Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth Page 5

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Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Alexander Lindvall on behalf of Alexander Lindvall Bar No. 24139409 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101487064 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: COA and CFW Joint Response to Def Bobbitt PTJ Status as of 6/2/2025 12:02 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM I SENT I Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Alexander Lindvall on behalf of Alexander Lindvall Bar No. 24139409 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101487064 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: COA and CFW Joint Response to Def Bobbitt PTJ Status as of 6/2/2025 12:02 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Alexander Lindvall on behalf of Alexander Lindvall Bar No. 24139409 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101487064 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: COA and CFW Joint Response to Def Bobbitt PTJ Status as of 6/2/2025 12:02 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:30:29 AM SENT FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/2/2025 10:46 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

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CITY OF ARLINGTON AND CITY OF FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE MEGAN FAHEY: As part of its answer, Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”) included a plea to the jurisdiction and a motion to transfer venue. Pecos HFC asks this Court (a) to “dismiss this case in full” because it believes this dispute must be handled administratively, like a tax-appraisal protest filed by a private citizen; or (b) in the alternative, to “transfer this case to Reeves County.” [Def. Pecos HFC’s PTJ, Mtn. to Transfer, and Orig. Answer at ¶¶ 7, 8.] This Court should deny both requests.

A. PECOS HFC’S PLEA SHOULD BE DENIED.

In its plea, Pecos HFC argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedies under the Tax Code before filing suit. [Def. Pecos HFC’s PTJ, Mtn. to Transfer, and Orig. Answer at ¶¶ 3, 6.] Pecos HFC’s plea should be denied because the provisions of the Tax Code it relies on have nothing to do with Plaintiffs’

ARLINGTON AND FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 1 claims against Pecos HFC, and Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before suing Pecos HFC under the Declaratory Judgments Act.

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The provisions of the Tax Code cited by Pecos HFC concern how a private property owner can protest an appraisal of their property. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 41.41 et seq. (laying out the procedures and requirements for a property-appraisal protest). Granted, if Plaintiffs were private property owners protesting an appraisal, they would have to go through the administrative process before filing suit in this Court. See id. § 42.09 (for “a property owner,” the “procedures . . . for adjudication of the grounds of protest . . . are exclusive”) (emphasis added). But that’s not what’s happening in this case: Plaintiffs are not private property owners; they are not protesting a property’s appraised value; and they are not asking this Court to determine whether any piece of property was misappraised. Rather, they are asking this Court to interpret the HFC Act, see Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq., and determine whether Pecos HFC’s acquisition of property in Arlington and Fort Worth was proper under that Act, see id. § 394.903 (providing that an HFC- owned residential development “must be located within the local government”). That issue is squarely within this Court’s jurisdiction, and Pecos HFC’s plea should therefore be denied. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a) (“A person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.”).

Pecos HFC has requested, but has not yet received, tax exemptions for multiple properties located in Arlington and Fort Worth. Plaintiffs are asking for a temporary injunction that prevents Pecos HFC from obtaining those requested tax exemptions, because the HFC Act prohibits Pecos HFC from acquiring property in Arlington or Fort Worth. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.903 (providing that an HFC-owned residential development “must be located within the local government”). A property-appraisal protest is a retrospective process, but Plaintiffs’ requested relief in this case is all prospective—Plaintiffs are asking for this Court to temporarily enjoin Pecos HFC from receiving not-yet-granted tax exemptions for real property located in Arlington or Fort

ARLINGTON AND FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 2 Worth. This case is about stopping a handful of rogue HFCs from unlawfully syphoning millions of taxpayer dollars out of Tarrant County. Plaintiffs’ suit against Pecos HFC is proper under the Declaratory Judgments Act, and this Court should therefore deny Pecos HFC’s plea.

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The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that housing authorities, like HFCs, “ha[ve] no power to acquire, hold, or use property beyond [their] statutory authorization,” and “[i]f an injured party with standing brings and proves an action seeking to confine [the housing authority] within its statutory constraints . . . courts may intervene and provide an appropriate remedy, such as an injunction to prevent [the housing authority] from continuing to exceed its limited statutory authority.” Tex. Student Housing Authority v. Brazos Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 460 S.W.3d 137, 143‒

44 (Tex. 2015). Here, Plaintiffs are injured parties whose tax revenues are being depleted by the Defendant HFCs’ illegal property acquisitions, and Texas Student Housing Authority recognizes that this Court can intervene to provide an appropriate remedy—that is, a declaratory judgment determining that the Defendant HFCs’ acquisition of real properties in Arlington and Fort Worth was outside their statutory authority under the HFC Act. Id. at 143‒44; see also City of Sherman v. Pub. Utility Comm’n of Tex., 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983) (upholding an injunction to prevent an agency from acting beyond its authority); Westheimer Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brockette, 567 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Tex. 1978) (holding that court intervention is “permissible when an agency is exercising authority beyond its statutorily conferred powers”). B. PECOS HFC’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE SHOULD BE DENIED.

In the alternative, Pecos HFC asks this Court to transfer this case to Reeves County. [Def. Pecos HFC’s PTJ, Mtn. to Transfer, and Orig. Answer at ¶ 8.] Pecos HFC points to § 65.023 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, which provides that a writ of permanent injunction must normally be tried in the county of a defendant’s domicile. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 65.023(a). Pecos HFC’s motion should be denied for two reasons: (1) Plaintiffs have amended their petitions to remove their request for a permanent injunction against Pecos HFC, making this issue moot; and (2) there are at least three statutes that prescribe Tarrant County as the mandatory venue for this case.

ARLINGTON AND FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 3

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Section 65.023 applies only to permanent injunctions, not temporary injunctions. In re FPWP GP LLC, No. 05-16-01145-CV, 2017 WL 461355, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. ^[25], 2017, no pet.) (“When the injunctive relief is sought simply to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the lawsuit, then the injunctive relief is ancillary to the relief sought and § 65.023 does not apply. . . . Similarly, when the party does not plead for a permanent injunction, the injunctive relief is ancillary to the other relief sought.”); In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (“When those pleadings show that the issuance of a permanent injunction is the primary and principal relief sought in the lawsuit, venue is mandatory in the county of the defendant’s domicile. On the other hand, if a review of the allegations and the prayer in the plaintiff’s petition shows that issuance of a permanent injunction would be merely ancillary to a judgment awarding declaratory relief, the requirement that the suit be brought in the county of the defendant’s domicile does not apply.”). And after Pecos HFC filed its motion to transfer venue, Plaintiffs amended their petition to remove their request for a permanent injunction against the Defendant HFCs. [See Arlington’s 3d Amend. Pet. at 11, Prayer for Relief ¶ (C).] As a result, § 65.023 no longer applies, and Pecos HFC’s motion to transfer venue should be denied as moot.

Pecos HFC’s motion to transfer venue should also be denied because at least three statutes—including the injunction-venue statute cited by Pecos HFC—make Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 15.011, 65.023(a); Tex. Tax Code § 43.02. Plaintiffs have brought a cause of action against Defendant Bobbitt under § 43.01 of the Texas Tax Code, which allows a taxing unit to sue its appraisal district for declaratory and injunctive relief. See Tex. Tax Code § 43.01 (“A taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with . . . applicable law.”); Carr v. Bell Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 786 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1990, no pet.) (section 43.01 allows taxing units to bring “actions for declaratory or injunctive relief” against their appraisal districts). And § 43.02 of the Tax Code requires suits like this to be pursued “in the county in which the appraisal district is established.” Tex. Tax Code § 43.02. And though Plaintiffs are not seeking a permanent injunction against the Defendant HFCs,

ARLINGTON AND FORT WORTH’S JOINT RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION AND MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE Page 4 they are seeking a permanent injunction against Defendant Bobbitt. [See Arlington’s 3d Amend. Pet. at 11, Prayer for Relief ¶ (C).] As a result, because Plaintiffs are seeking a permanent injunction against Defendant Bobbitt and Defendant Bobbitt is domiciled in Tarrant County, § 65.023(a) makes Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case. See In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998).

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Section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, moreover, provides that actions affecting real property “shall be brought in the county in which all or a part of the property is located.” This suit affects real property located in Tarrant County, and Tarrant County is thus the mandatory venue for this case. This case concerns real estate transactions that occurred in Tarrant County, real property located in Tarrant County, and tax exemptions that were granted in Tarrant County by the Tarrant Appraisal District. Given the parties, issues, and properties involved in this case, transferring this case to Reeves County makes little sense.

C. CONCLUSION.

Pecos HFC’s plea to the jurisdiction should be denied because its exhaustion-of-remedies argument is misplaced, and the UDJA undoubtedly gives this Court jurisdiction over this case. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.004(a). Pecos HFC’s motion to transfer venue should be denied because Plaintiffs have amended their petition to remove their request for a permanent injunction against Pecos HFC, making Pecos HFC’s relied-upon statute inapplicable and its venue argument moot, City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d at 803, and because there are at least three statutes that prescribe Tarrant County as the mandatory venue for this case, see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 15.011, 65.023(a); Tex. Tax Code § 43.02.

ACCORDINGLY, because this Court has jurisdiction and venue is proper, the City of Arlington and the City of Fort Worth respectfully ask this Court to deny Pecos HFC’s plea to the jurisdiction and its motion to transfer venue.

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Page 5

CITY OF ARLINGTON CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Arlington, Texas 76004 Phone: 817-459-6878 Attorneys for Plaintiff City of Arlington

CITY OF FORT WORTH OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 100 Fort Worth Trail Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Phone: 817-459-6878 Attorneys for Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth Page 6

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FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/2/2025 10:57 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 348th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS Worth-based properties from Tarrant County tax appraisal rolls in exchange for monetary kickbacks resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in real property value from the local tax base.

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4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

5. Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

6. Defendant Pecos HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It has already been served and appeared. City of Fort Worth’s Second Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 2 7. Defendant Pleasanton HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, Johnny Huizar, at 108 Second Street, Pleasanton, Texas 78064, or wherever else he may be located.

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10. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only and has already been served and appeared.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

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14. Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

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B. Defendant HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Fort Worth that do not house low-income residents.

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29. Because of the widespread nature of this practice, there was a strong bipartisan legislative push to remove any doubt about the illegality of this sort of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21. 15 This bill has been signed by the governor and is now law.

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C. Texas Constitution

V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT & TAX CODE

32. In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

33. Fort Worth asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Act prohibits Defendant HFCs from acquiring property outside of their geographical jurisdictions;

34. Fort Worth asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow Defendants to bestow tax exemptions to Fort Worth-based properties.

35. Fort Worth further asks for a declaratory judgment that Article VIII, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution limits counties’ ad valorem taxation authority to “property within their respective boundaries” and that the Defendants’ scheme violates Constitutional limits on the scope of Texas counties’ taxing authority.

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36. The Tax Code, moreover, provides that “[a] taxing unit may sue the appraisal district that appraises property for the unit to compel the appraisal district to comply with …applicable law.” Tx. Tax Code § 43.01. It further empowers this Court to “enter…orders necessary to compel compliance by the appraisal office.” Id. § 43.03.

37. Pursuant to these laws, Fort Worth asks this Court to prevent Defendant Bobbitt from unlawfully awarding any further tax exemptions to the Defendant HFCs. See id. § 43.01, 43.03; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 37.001 et seq.

VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

38. To stop the Defendant HFCs from closing on any more Fort Worth-based properties, Fort Worth asks this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a temporary injunction that prohibits the Defendant HFCs from (a) closing on any Fort Worth-based properties or (b) requesting or receiving any tax exemptions for Fort Worth-based properties.

39. Fort Worth further requests a TRO and a temporary injunction that prohibits Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Fort Worth-based properties.

40. Fort Worth requests that this Court issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Fort Worth believes the Defendant HFCs are already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and City of Fort Worth’s Second Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 10 months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the short-term.

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41. Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 2.]

42. This Court should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents Defendant HFCs from overstepping jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Fort Worth- based properties. And out of an abundance of caution, this Court should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by a Defendant HFC regarding any Fort Worth-based property.

43. Once that TRO has expired, Fort Worth asks for a temporary injunction. “To obtain a temporary injunction, [an] applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). “Whether to grant or deny a temporary injunction is within the trial court’s sound discretion,” and an order granting injunctive relief will be reversed on appeal only if “the trial court’s action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of reasonable discretion.” Id.

44. All these elements are present. Fort Worth has pleaded a cause of action against Defendants: a declaratory action under the UDJA. Fort Worth has shown it will likely be successful in this declaratory action, as the Act’s plain language prohibits Defendant HFCs’ complained-of conduct. And, in the absence of injunctive relief, Defendant HFCs are likely to close on additional Fort Worth-based properties and/or apply for a tax exemptions, which would lead to an irreversible removal of this property from the local tax rolls. Simply put, this is precisely the sort of case in which equitable relief is warranted.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Based on the foregoing, Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth respectfully asks this Court for the following relief:

(A) To issue a TRO and temporary injunction against Defendant HFCs and Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt that (i) prevents Defendant HFCs from requesting or receiving tax exemptions for any Fort Worth-based properties, and (ii) prevents Mr. Bobbitt from granting tax exemptions requested by Defendant HFCs regarding any Fort Worth-based properties. A proposed TRO was filed contemporaneously herewith.

(B) After the expiration of this TRO, and after a hearing, to issue a temporary injunction against the same Defendants that enjoins the same unlawful conduct pending trial.

(C) After a final trial on the merits, to issue (i) a declaratory judgment declaring that the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq., does not allow Defendant HFCs to bestow tax-exempt status to properties located in Fort Worth; a declaration that Defendant HFCs may not acquire property in Fort Worth; and a declaration and permanent injunction against the Chief Appraiser of TAD from grant further tax exemptions to foreign HFCs.

(D) To award Fort Worth its attorney’s fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

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Respectfully submitted, /s/ Stephen A. Cumbie STEPHEN A. CUMBIE Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24056724 [email protected]

CHRISTOPHER B. MOSLEY Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 00789505 [email protected]

OLYN POOLE Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24037292 [email protected]

CITY OF FORT WORTH Office of the City Attorney 100 Fort Worth Trail Fort Worth, Texas 76102 P: (817) 392-7600

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 2nd day of June 2025 a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was e-filed with the Clerk of the Court and electronically served upon all counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.

/s/ Stephen A. Cumbie STEPHEN A. CUMBIE CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 34g th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § P laintiff-Jntervenor § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS statement contained therein is within his personal knowledge and is true and correct.

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Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Laura Gregory on behalf of Stephen Cumbie Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101489841 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: City of Fort Worth's Second Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Status as of 6/2/2025 12:06 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Laura Gregory on behalf of Stephen Cumbie Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101489841 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: City of Fort Worth's Second Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Status as of 6/2/2025 12:06 PM CST Case Contacts Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 10:57:37 AM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/2/2025 11:00 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

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CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of § the Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS HFC DEFENDANTS’ JOINT BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CITY OF ARLINGTON’S AND CITY OF FORT WORTH’S APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

NOW COMES Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation (“Pleasanton HFC”), Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”), La Villa Housing Finance Corporation (“La Villa HFC”), and Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation (“Maverick HFC”) (collectively, “HFC Defendants”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction and Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction and would respectfully show the Court as follows:

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff and Intervenor-Plaintiff’s gambit has run its course. Improperly leveraging protected Rule 408 communications to secure an ex parte temporary restraining order from this Court, the City of Arlington (“Arlington” or “Plaintiff”) manufactured an urgent need for relief for the sole purpose of avoiding an administrative review that would undoubtedly confirm what Plaintiffs already know: Defendant HFC’s actions are proper and plainly permissible under the law. Intervenor-Plaintiff, the City of Fort Worth (“Fort Worth” or “Intervenor-Plaintiff”) (together with Arlington, “Plaintiffs”).

2. Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is a calculated misuse of judicial process, pursued not to prevent imminent harm but to circumvent the established administrative procedures specifically designed to address the very issues raised in Plaintiffs’ petitions. Rather than seeking relief through the appropriate administrative channels, Plaintiffs rushed to this Court pleading that without immediate intervention properties owned by the Defendant HFCs would be permanently removed from the tax rolls and Plaintiffs would have no recourse to recoup lost revenue, even if they ultimately prevailed on the merits of their challenge.

3. As Plaintiffs know, that is simply not the case. Not only is there an administrative review process painstakingly detailed in the Property Tax Code, but there is similarly a procedure for collecting back taxes on properties that were—for whatever reason—undertaxed.

4. Plaintiffs’ rush to Court was not rooted in any genuine emergency. It was intended instead to manufacture leverage over the Defendant HFCs in an ongoing legislative debate over the future of Housing Finance Corporations (“HFCs”) in the State of Texas and to freeze the market for HFCs during the pendency of that debate.

5. If the administrative process expressly laid out in the Property Tax Code been allowed to proceed, Defendant Joe Don Bobbit, in his capacity as Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 2 Appraisal District (“TAD”), would have had the ability to confirm that the Defendant HFC’s subject properties in Arlington and Fort Worth met the requirements for an exemption under the applicable provisions of the Property Tax Code.

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6. If the TAD ultimately determined an exemption applied under the Property Tax Code, Plaintiffs would then have had the opportunity to challenge that determination before the Appraisal Review Board (“ARB”) under Chapter 41 of the Property Tax Code under the same grounds raised in its Second Amended Petition. Only if the ARB denied Plaintiff or Intervenor- Plaintiff’s challenge, would Plaintiffs be permitted to seek judicial review of that determination. And if the ARB ultimately sustained Plaintiff or Intervenor-Plaintiff’s challenge, the Defendant HFCs would be permitted to seek judicial review of the same decision.

7. Plaintiffs did not follow this process because the time required to comply with the Property Tax Code’s administrative framework would have upset its actual goal: freezing the market for HFC-owned, affordable housing developments before the enactment of H.B. No. 21. See Act of May 28, 2025, 89th Leg., Ch. 394 (“H.B. No. 21”), Relating to housing finance corporations; authorizing a fee, available at https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB21/id/3238122. Six days ago, Governor Abbott signed H.B. No. 21 into law. The bill took immediate effect and explicitly prohibits the Defendant HFCs from acquiring property or engaging in residential development outside of their sponsor’s boundaries without approval from the jurisdiction in which they seek to acquire property. Unfortunately for the merits of Plaintiffs’ argument, it also expressly provides that properties owned by the Defendant HFCs are eligible for the same exemption Defendant HFCs seek here from now until January 1, 2027.

8. Plaintiffs’ claim that allowing the TAD to actuate (and, to a lesser extent, the HFCs to receive) tax exempt status would result in “irreversible removal of these properties from the local tax rolls, causing Plaintiffs to forever lose out on hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of much-needed tax revenues,” is patently incorrect. Any such claim, at best, is a gross distortion of the Property Tax Code which infects the entirety of Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and jurisdictional claims.

[*352]

9. Plaintiffs have no probable, imminent, or irreparable injury because they can seek redress through the exclusive remedies afforded under the Property Tax Code. Likewise, H.B. ^[21]’s recent passage verifies that HFC property acquisitions and exemptions outside of an HFC’s sponsoring jurisdiction were permitted under prior law.

10. Ultimately, Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is a transparent attempt to create conflict where none existed, leveraging judicial intervention not to protect rights, but to gain strategic advantage amid ongoing legislative deliberations. Plaintiffs’ misuse of the equitable remedy of injunctive relief undermines both the integrity of this Court and the orderly function of the legislative branch. For these reasons, Arlington and Fort Worth’s Applications for Injunctive Relief must be denied.

II. STANDARD

11. Under Texas law, “[a] temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and does not issue as a matter of right.” Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw., & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tex. 2020). The party applying for a temporary injunction “must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant, (2) a probable right to the relief sought, and (3) a probable imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim.” Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002).

12. A trial court “abuse[s] its discretion by misapplying the law to established facts.” Draper v. City of Arlington, 629 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (citing T.L. v. Cook Children’s Med. Ctr., 607 S.W.3d 9, 34 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, pet. denied)). HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 4

[*353]

III. THE TEXAS PROPERTY TAX CODE

A. Appraisal of Property

13. An “ad valorem tax” is a tax on property at a certain rate based on the property’s value. Jim Wells Cty. v. El Paso Prod. Oil & Gas Co., 189 S.W.3d 861, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). The basis for the amount of ad valorem tax owed is the appraised value of the property. Id. Appraisal of real property for ad valorem tax purposes is carried out by county-based appraisal districts and appraisal review boards throughout the State. See Tex. Tax Code § 6.01(b) (stating that each appraisal district “is responsible for appraising property in the district for ad valorem tax purposes of each taxing unit that imposes ad valorem taxes on property in the district”).

14. In Atascosa Cty. v. Atascosa Cty. Appraisal Dist., 990 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1999), the Texas Supreme Court succinctly summarized the appraisal process:

The Tax Code also establishes a procedure for the appraisal and back-appraisal of property. Subject to limited exceptions, the chief appraiser must appraise all taxable property at market value as of January 1 each year, and must determine whether exemptions should be granted based on the claimant’s eligibility on that date. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 11.42, 11.43, 23.01. Once property is appraised and an exemption denied, the chief appraiser lists all taxable property and its appraised value. See id. § 25.01. The chief appraiser’s listing of all taxable property in the district and its appraisal value constitutes the appraisal records. See id. The chief appraiser submits the appraisal records to the review board, which reviews the records and hears challenges. See id. §§ 41.01-.03.[1] When approved by the review board, these records become the appraisal district's tax roll. See id. § 25.24.

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15. Importantly, the Property Tax Code distinguishes between a chief appraiser’s submission of the appraisal records under Section 25.01 and the ARB’s approval of the appraisal district’s tax roll under Section 25.24. See Atascosa Cty., 990 S.W.2d at 258.

16. In the context of exemptions, the chief appraiser makes the initial determination of whether an exemption applies to a particular property in the appraisal district. Tex. Tax Code §§ 11.45(a) (“The chief appraiser shall determine separately each applicant’s right to an exemption”), (c) (The chief appraiser “shall determine the validity of each application for exemption filed with him before he submits the appraisal records for review and determination of protests as provided by Chapter 41 of [the Property Tax Code].”); 6.05(c) (“The chief appraiser is the chief administrator of the appraisal office” and is “appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the appraisal district board of directors.”).2

17. For existing exemptions, “[i]f the chief appraiser learns of any reason indicating that an exemption previously allowed should be canceled, the chief appraiser shall investigate.” Id. § 11.43(h). Then, “[i]f the chief appraiser determines that the property should not be exempt, the chief appraiser shall cancel the exemption and deliver written notice of the cancellation within five days after the date the exemption is canceled.” Id.3

B. Taxing Unit Challenges

18. “[E]xcept for certain specifically circumscribed rights,” the Tax Code’s comprehensive legislative scheme generally excludes taxing units, like Plaintiffs, from the appraisal process. Jim Wells, 189 S.W.3d at 871. Chapter 41, subchapter A, of the Tax Code provides taxing units, like Plaintiffs, with a mechanism for challenging certain actions by their local appraisal districts. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 41.03-.07. One of those actions is an “exclusion of property from the appraisal records.” Id. § 41.03(a)(1).

[*355]

19. A taxing unit challenge is initiated by the taxing unit’s filing of a petition with the ARB, see id. § 41.04, which subsequently conducts a hearing on the challenge petition, see id. § 41.05, determines the challenge, and makes its decision by written order, see id. § 41.07.4

20. Section 41.04 of the Tax Code provides that the “appraisal review board is not required to hear or determine a challenge unless the taxing unit initiating the challenge files a petition with the board before June 1 or within 15 days after the date that the appraisal records are submitted to the appraisal review board, whichever is later” and said petition “must include an explanation for the grounds of the challenge.” Id. § 41.04.

21. Tarrant County is currently following the administrative process laid out by the Tax Code. On May 28, 2025, Tarrant County announced it filed petitions with the TAD “challenging the exclusion of 28 properties from the TAD’s appraisal records, owned by various HFCs and for which a ‘public property’ exclusion was unlawfully claimed.”5

22. After the ARB decides a taxing unit challenge, the taxing unit may then appeal the decision to the district court in the county in which the ARB is located. Id. §§ 42.031 (right of appeal by taxing unit), 42.21 (petition for review). The district court reviews the ARB’s decision by trial de novo. Id. § 42.23.6 C. A Taxing Unit Can Challenge an Appraisal District’s Failure to Back Appraise Property Previously Subject to a Total Exemption from Ad Valorem Taxation

[*356]

23. As recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal Dist, the appraisal district and chief appraiser “must back-appraise and assess taxes on property erroneously exempted for the past five years.” 990 S.W.2d at 257.

24. The facts in Atascosa are as follows: In the mid-1950s, Atascosa Hospital Association (“the Atascosa Plaintiff”), a nonprofit corporation, bought land and built Mercy Hospital on it. For nearly thirty years, a charitable society operated Mercy. Id. In the 1980s, for- profit organizations assumed responsibility for operating the hospital. One of the for-profit organizations leased the hospital’s buildings and equipment. The Atascosa Plaintiff requested a tax exemption for the land, buildings, and equipment, which the Atascosa County Appraisal District granted.

25. In 1995, Atascosa County and Jourdanton Independent School District, relying on Tex. Tax Code § 41.03, filed a challenge petition with the Atascosa County Review Board requesting a finding that the property was improperly granted tax-exempt status for tax years 1990-1995 and an order compelling the chief appraiser to add the property’s reappraisal to the 1995 tax rolls.

26. The taxing units’ challenge was undoubtedly to the “exempt” status (a “total exemption” or 100% exemption from ad valorem taxes) granted to the hospital for the land, buildings, and equipment which constitute Mercy Hospital. See Atascosa Cty. v. Atascosa Cty. Appraisal Dist., 962 S.W.2d 188, 189 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998), rev’d in part, 990 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1999).

[*357]

27. The ARB revoked the exemption for 1995, but not for 1990-1994. The taxing units then petitioned for judicial review under chapter 42 of the Property Tax Code, complaining of the ARB’s failure to revoke the exemption for 1990-1994 and back-appraise the property.

28. The case ultimately reached the Texas Supreme Court which held that the Texas Constitution creates the obligation to appraise and assess property for purposes of taxation, and provides that all property must be equally and uniformly taxed. Atascosa Cty., 990 S.W.2d at 257 (citing Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 11 (“All lands and other property not rendered for taxation by the owner thereof shall be assessed at its fair value by the proper officer.); Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 1(a) (“Taxation shall be equal and uniform”)).

29. The Texas Supreme Court further held Section 11.43(i) mandates that the chief appraiser back-appraise “erroneously exempted property […] ‘[i]f the chief appraiser discovers that an exemption that is not required to be claimed annually has been erroneously allowed in any one of the five preceding years, the chief appraiser shall add the property or appraised value that was erroneously exempted for each year to the appraisal roll as provided by Section 25.21 of this code for other property that escapes taxation.’” Id. at 258.

30. The Texas Supreme Court further found that Tex. Tax Code § 25.21 mandated the procedure for back-appraisal of property as follows:

(a) If the chief appraiser discovers that real property was omitted from an appraisal roll in any one of the five preceding years . . ., he shall appraise the property as of January 1 of each year that it was omitted and enter the property and its appraised value in the appraisal records.

[*358]

(b) The entry shall show that the appraisal is for property that was omitted from an appraisal roll in a prior year and shall indicate the year and the appraised value for each year. Id.

31. Finally, the Texas Supreme Court held that the “taxing units [had] standing under [C]hapter 41 of the Tax Code to challenge the appraisal district’s and chief appraiser’s failure to back-appraise improperly exempted property” and that “[i]f the chief appraiser were not required to back-appraise improperly exempted property, then the remedies granted a taxing unit in chapter 41 of the Tax Code would be surplusage.” Id. at 259.

32. The Court next addressed whether the taxing units could challenge the chief appraiser’s decision to omit a back-appraisal from the current tax roll. On this issue, the Court held that “taxing units have standing to challenge appraisal decisions through the chapter 41 challenge petition process, and the decision to omit a back-appraisal from the current tax roll is an appraisal decision.” In holding that “taxing units have standing to challenge a refusal to back appraise,” the Court rejected the taxpayers’ argument that sections 11.43 and 25.21 prevented taxing units from bringing a challenge. Such a reading, the Court explained, “would eviscerate the purpose of the section 41.04 challenge petition process” by “allowing only the chief appraiser to discover improperly granted exemptions.” Id. The Court further clarified that the practical implications of such an interpretation would leave taxing units without the ability to “collect duly owed revenue, and a windfall would result for property owners who wrongfully claim an exemption.” Id.

IV. ARGUMENT

33. Plaintiffs’ claims do not merit injunctive relief. First, Plaintiffs have failed to show standing to bring any underlying cause of action, let alone probability of success on the merits. Second, there is no imminent irreparable injury here. Plaintiffs’ assertion of irreparable injury is based on a fundamental misreading or misrepresentation of the relevant Property Tax Code. HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 10 A. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Probable Right to Relief.

[*359]

34. Plaintiffs are not entitled to a temporary injunction because they cannot demonstrate a probable right to the relief sought. To show a probable right of recovery, “the applicant must raise a bona fide issue as to its right to ultimate relief, and it cannot do this without presenting some evidence to support every element of at least one valid legal theory.” Tex. Health Res. v. Pham, No. 05-15-01283-CV, 2016 WL 4205732, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. ^[3], 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[T]he preliminary determination of whether an applicant has shown a probable right to the relief it seeks—that is, whether the applicant furnished some evidence tending to support at least one of the legal theories it will urge at trial—entails a thorough review of the law applicable to the parties’ claims and defenses.” Cameron Int’l Corp. v. Guillory, 445 S.W.3d 840, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). i. Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies.

35. Plaintiffs cannot establish a probable right to relief because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing suit and seeking the injunctive relief at issue.

36. The gravamen of Arlington’s Second Amended Petition is that Defendant HFCs have been “removing Arlington-based properties from the tax appraisal roll[.]” Arlington’s Second Amended Petition (2nd Am. Pet.) at ¶ 1. Rather than bring its case in a challenge petition under the Property Tax Code, Plaintiffs brought suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Fort Worth advances a substantially similar argument. See Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition (1st Am. Pet.) at ¶ 1.

37. Plaintiffs are a “taxing unit” under the Property Tax Code. See Tex. Tax Code § 1.04(12). The exclusive means for a “taxing unit” to resolve the types of disputes raised in Plaintiffs’ Petitions is to seek relief under the Property Tax Code through a taxing unit challenge. Accordingly, the Court has no jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. See, e.g., Tex. Tax Code § 42.09 (“Remedies Exclusive”); In re ExxonMobil Corp., 153 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding).

[*360]

38. As a result, the Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used as a vehicle to avoid the Property Tax Code’s exclusive administrative process and remedies. See Fort Worth v. Pastusek Indus., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 366, 370-371 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0537 (2007) at 3 (“whether any specific property is exempt from taxation depends on the facts and circumstances and is initially determined by the chief appraiser of the appraisal district”).

39. Moreover, any passing reference to Section 43.01 of the Property Tax Code does not excuse Plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The relief sought is the same— denial of ad valorem exemptions—and Plaintiffs have therefore failed to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit before this Court.

40. Plaintiffs do not allege that they have exhausted their administrative remedies prior to filing suit because Plaintiffs have not done so. Accordingly, this Court is deprived of jurisdiction over the Defendant HFCs. To properly invoke the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the taxing unit must exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. See, e.g., City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 618 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.). Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiffs lack a probable right to relief necessary to justify its requested temporary injunction.

ii. Fort Worth cannot challenge the constitutionality of the Housing Finance Corporation Act or the Property Tax Code.

HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 12 41. Standing is a necessary component of subject matter jurisdiction. Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 1996).

[*361]

42. Defendant HFCs are public nonprofit corporations created pursuant to Chapter 394 of the Local Government Code, otherwise known as the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act (the “Act”).7

43. Defendants HFCs’ collective public purpose is to provide “a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments." Tex. Loc. Gov. Code § 394.002(a) (2024).

44. The Act broadly authorizes housing finance corporations to "purchase, lease, hold, and operate real property and improve the property and sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the property." Id. § 394.037 (2024). The Act specifically exempts housing finance corporations, their property, and their activities from taxation. Id. § 394.905 (2024).

[*362]

Harris Cnty. Emergency Servs. Dist. No. 2 v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 132 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001) (emphasis added); see also City of Austin v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 506 S.W.3d 607, 616 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.) (“a municipal corporation or other governmental subdivision has standing to bring a constitutional challenge . . . if the subdivision has been charged with implementing a statute it believes violates the Texas Constitution.”) (quotation marks omitted); 12B Tex. Jur. 3d Constitutional Law § 38 (same).

[*363]

following items for the purpose of providing decent, safe, and sanitary housing and nonhousing facilities that are an integral part of or are functionally related to any affordable housing project, whether in one or multiple locations, including any facilities used for the purpose of delivering tenant services, as defined by Section 2306.254, Government Code:

(A) land, an interest in land, a building or other structure, facility, system, fixture, improvement, addition, appurtenance, or machinery or other equipment; (B) real or personal property considered necessary in connection with an item described by Paragraph (A); or (C) real or personal property or improvements functionally related and subordinate to an item described by Paragraph (A). Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 394.003(13) (2024).

[*364]

(2) for a housing finance corporation sponsored by a county under Section 394.011, the boundaries of the county that sponsored the corporation; or (3) for a housing finance corporation sponsored by more than one local government under Section 394.012: (A) the boundaries of each municipal sponsor of the corporation; and (B) the boundaries of each county sponsor of the corporation. (d) A housing finance corporation may own real property for residential development or engage in residential development outside an area described by Subsection (c) only if a resolution or order, as applicable, approving that ownership or development in the outside area is adopted by the governing bodies of: (1) each municipality that contains any part of the outside area in which the corporation proposes to own real property for residential development or engage in residential development; (2) for a residential development or home located in the unincorporated area of a county, each county that contains any part of the outside area in which the corporation proposes to own real property for residential development or engage in residential development; and (3) any housing finance corporation sponsored by a municipality or county described by Subdivision (1) or (2), as applicable.

[*365]

real property or engage in residential development under Section 394.031(c), Local Government Code, […] is not eligible for an ad valorem tax exemption under Section 394.905, Local Government Code […] after January 1, 2027, unless the corporation obtains the appropriate resolutions or orders required under Section 394.031(d) […] before that date.”

[*366]

damages, it is, by definition, not irreparable.” Veterinary Specialists of N. Texas, PLLC v. King, 2022 WL 406095, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. ^[9], 2022).

[*367]

V. PRAYER

WHEREFORE, Defendant HFCs respectfully request that this court (i) deny Arlington and Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction; and (ii) award Defendant HFCs all such other relief required by law or equity.

[*368]

/s/ Roel Gutierrez Roel Gutierrez State Bar No. 24069842 Law Office of Roel Gutierrez, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. McCallen, TX 78504 (956) 278-3529 Phone / (956) 278-3530 Fax [email protected] and Robert J. Salinas State Bar No. 17536000 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Tel: 956-464-2460 Email: [email protected]

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS

[*369]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

James R. Evans, Jr. [email protected] Eric Ruiz [email protected] LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC 4425 South Mopac Expressway Building 3, Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78735 Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt EXHIBIT A fiv TC'A1J 1 ,. V . ~~ , .ii., UI aa TOP WORK PU.CES TOP WORK FtAaS "Our mission is to provide .w nccurote, fair and cost-c/Tectil'c appr,1isal roll while m,1int.1ininc high levels oftransp.vrcncy and giving industry le.,ding customer service to tl,e consumeTY ofour f.Mtlff -~ ,; ,As data and servic,s, " Williamson Centml Appraisal District 625 FM 1460. Georgetown, TX 78626 (512) 930.1787 wivw. wcad.org

[*370][*371]

"Our mission is to provide an accurate, fair and cost-effective f iV\t1C.'A1J~ (m:·f .,-..u., ..,, TOP TOP !! '121 Ila WORK ; WORK • PLACES PLACES ' appraisal roll while maintaining high levels oftransparency and

l!/tNi .:@ ....... "" 1• ,......-..• '"' 1 giving industl)' leading customer service to the consumers ofour data and services. " Williamson Central Appraisal District 625 FM 1460, Georgetown. TX78626 (512) 930.3787 www.wcad.org

[*372]

[*373][*375]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 348th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS Worth-based properties from Tarrant County tax appraisal rolls in exchange for monetary kickbacks resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in real property value from the local tax base.

[*376]

4. Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

5. Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

6. Defendant Pecos HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It has already been served and appeared. City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 2 7. Defendant Pleasanton HFC is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It can be served with citation through its registered agent, Johnny Huizar, at 108 Second Street, Pleasanton, Texas 78064, or wherever else he may be located.

[*377]

10. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only and has already been served and appeared.

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

[*378]

14. Plaintiffs intend to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery control plan. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 190.4.

IV. BACKGROUND & RELEVANT LAW

A. The Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act.

[*379]

B. Defendant HFCs are unlawfully exempting properties in Fort Worth that do not house low-income residents.

[*380]

[*381]

[*382]

[*383]

C. Texas Constitution

V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT & TAX CODE

32. In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

33. Fort Worth asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court that the Act prohibits Defendant HFCs from acquiring property outside of their geographical jurisdictions;

34. Fort Worth asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow Defendants to bestow tax exemptions to Fort Worth-based properties.

[*384]

VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

40. Fort Worth requests that this Court issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Fort Worth believes the Defendant HFCs are already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 10 months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the short-term.

[*385]

[*386]

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Based on the foregoing, Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Fort Worth respectfully asks this Court for the following relief:

(B) After the expiration of this TRO, and after a hearing, to issue a temporary injunction against the same Defendants that enjoins the same unlawful conduct pending trial.

(D) To award Fort Worth its attorney’s fees and costs.

(E) To award any other relief this Court deems appropriate.

[*387]

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Stephen A. Cumbie STEPHEN A. CUMBIE Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24056724 [email protected]

CHRISTOPHER B. MOSLEY Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 00789505 [email protected]

OLYN POOLE Senior Assistant City Attorney State Bar No. 24037292 [email protected]

CITY OF FORT WORTH Office of the City Attorney 100 Fort Worth Trail Fort Worth, Texas 76102 P: (817) 392-7600

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/s/ Stephen A. Cumbie STEPHEN A. CUMBIE CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § 34g th JUDICIAL DISTRICT Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH § § P laintiff-Jntervenor § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS statement contained therein is within his personal knowledge and is true and correct.

[*388][*389][*390]

TRAVELING HFCs IN THE CITY OF FORT WORTH 1

[*391]

('J . ,,~FILED .-, 'v o'clock c.~. L Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Laura Gregory on behalf of Stephen Cumbie Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101502900 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: City of Fort Worth's Third Amended Petition in Intervention and App for Temp Injunction (added Exhibits 1 and 2) Status as of 6/2/2025 3:54 PM CST Case Contacts Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/2/2025 3:24 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, A TEXAS NONPROFIT § CORPORATION; JOE DON BOBBITT, § IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHIEF § APPRAISER OF THE TARRANT § APPRAISAL DISTRICT, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

[*395][*396]

RESPONSE BY DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT TO DEFENDANT HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATIONS’ MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE

NOW COMES Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, and files this Response to Defendants’ motions to transfer venue. This Defendant would show the Court as follows.

1. Plaintiffs City of Arlington and City of Fort Worth sued Defendant housing finance corporations and their directors (“HFCs”) and Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, Chief Appraiser, Tarrant Appraisal District over certain exemption issues in which Defendant HFCs have received property tax exemptions and in which HFCs seek pending exemptions. The HFCs have moved to transfer venue. Mr. Bobbitt objects to the motions.

[*397]

2. Plaintiffs have invoked Texas Tax Code Chapter 43.01 for relief. Section 43.02 specifically provides that “[v]enue is in the county in which the appraisal district is established.” According to this section, Mr. Bobbitt is entitled to venue in Tarrant County.

3. Venue is proper in Tarrant County since the Tarrant Appraisal District is in Tarrant County. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023(a).

4. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt requests that this Court deny the HFCs’ motions to transfer venue.

Respectfully submitted, LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC 4425 South Mopac Expressway Building 3, Suite 400 Austin, Texas 78735 (512) 379-5800 (512) 476-6685 (fax) [email protected]

By: /s/ James R. Evans, Jr James R. Evans, Jr. State Bar No. 06721500 [email protected] Eric Ruiz State Bar No. 24125845 [email protected]

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT

[*398]

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Liz Hansen on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101513870 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: RESPONSE BY DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT TO DEFENDANT HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATIONS MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE Status as of 6/2/2025 4:18 PM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Liz Hansen on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101513870 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: RESPONSE BY DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT TO DEFENDANT HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATIONS MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE Status as of 6/2/2025 4:18 PM CST Case Contacts Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Liz Hansen on behalf of James Evans, Jr. Bar No. 6721500 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101513870 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: RESPONSE BY DEFENDANT JOE DON BOBBITT TO DEFENDANT HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATIONS MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE Status as of 6/2/2025 4:18 PM CST Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT 348-363561-25 FILED TARRANT COUNTY 6/2/2025 9:13 PM CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of § the Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

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DEFENDANT PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION AND MAVERICK HFC’S MOTION FOR JOINDER IN PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION AND JOE DON BOBBIT’S PLEA’S TO THE JURISDICTION

NOW COMES Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation ( “Pleasanton HFC”) and Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation (“Maverick HFC”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Motion for Joinder in Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”) and Joe Don Bobbitt (“Bobbitt”)’s (collectively “Co-Defendants”) Pleas to the Jurisdiction (“Plea’s to Jurisdiction”), and, in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:

1. On May 5, 2025, Defendant Pecos HFC filed its Plea to the Jurisdiction 2. On May 29, 2025, Defendant Bobbitt filed his First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction.

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3. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 58, Pleasanton HFC and Maverick HFC join in Co-Defendants’ Plea’s to the Jurisdiction and incorporates their arguments and evidence, in its entirety, by reference as if fully stated herein. Pleasanton HFC joins in the Pleas to the Jurisdiction in all respects, arguments, evidence, and relief. Maverick HFC joins in the Pleas to the Jurisdiction in all respects, arguments, evidence, and relief to the extent they apply to City of Fort Worth’s claims against Maverick HFC.

4. To the extent that Defendants’ Pleas to the Jurisdiction are granted, the Court should similarly enter an order in favor of, and with respect to Defendants, as they pertain to the claims filed against Pleasanton HFC and Maverick HFC by City of Arlington and City of Fort Worth. Dated: June 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF | STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendants Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and Board Members

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of June, 2025, to the following counsel of record: Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] [email protected] Alexander J. Lindvall Christopher B. Mosley [email protected] [email protected] Jonathan M. Moss Olyn Poole [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] Office of the City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh 100 Fort Wo1th Trail [email protected] Fort Worth, Texas 76102 (817) 392-7600 Telephone City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office Attorneys for Intervenor Plaintiff City of Fort P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Worth Arlington, Texas 76004 Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington James R. Evans, Jr. Jeffrey M. Tillotson [email protected] [email protected] Eric Ruiz Kathryn E. Yukevich [email protected] [email protected] Low Swinney Evans & James, PLLC Tillotson Johnson & Patton 4425 South Mopac Expressway 1201 Main Street, Ste 1300 Building 3, Suite 400 Dallas, TX 75202 Austin, Texas 78735 Counsel for Defendant Pecos HFC Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt

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DEFENDANTS PLEASANTON HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION AND MAVERICK COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION’S MOTION FOR JOINDER IN PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION AND JOE DON BOBBIT’S PLEAS TO THE JURISDICTION

NOW COMES Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation ( “Pleasanton HFC”) and Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation (“Maverick HFC”), in the above-entitled and numbered cause, and files this, its Motion for Joinder in Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”) and Joe Don Bobbitt’s (“Bobbitt”) (collectively “Co-Defendants”) Pleas to the Jurisdiction (“Pleas to Jurisdiction”), and, in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:

1. On May 5, 2025, Defendant Pecos HFC filed its Plea to the Jurisdiction 2. On May 29, 2025, Defendant Bobbitt filed his First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction.

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3. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 58, Pleasanton HFC and Maverick HFC join in Co-Defendants’ Pleas to the Jurisdiction and incorporates their arguments and evidence, in its entirety, by reference as if fully stated herein. Pleasanton HFC joins in the Pleas to the Jurisdiction in all respects, arguments, evidence, and relief. Maverick HFC joins in the Pleas to the Jurisdiction in all respects, arguments, evidence, and relief to the extent they apply to City of Fort Worth’s claims against Maverick HFC.

Counsel for Defendants Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and Board Members and Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 2nd day of June, 2025, to the following counsel of record: Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] [email protected] Alexander J. Lindvall Christopher B. Mosley [email protected] [email protected] Jonathan M. Moss Olyn Poole [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] Office of the City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh 100 Fort Worth Trail [email protected] Fort Worth, Texas 76102 (817) 392-7600 Telephone City of Arlington City Attorney’s Office Attorneys for Intervenor Plaintiff City of Fort P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Worth Arlington, Texas 76004 Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington James R. Evans, Jr. Jeffrey M. Tillotson [email protected] [email protected] Eric Ruiz Kathryn E. Yukevich [email protected] [email protected] Low Swinney Evans & James, PLLC Tillotson Johnson & Patton 4425 South Mopac Expressway 1201 Main Street, Ste 1300 Building 3, Suite 400 Dallas, TX 75202 Austin, Texas 78735 Counsel for Defendant Pecos Housing Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt Finance Corporation Roel Gutierrez Robert J. Salinas [email protected] [email protected] Law Office of Roel Gutierrez, PLLC 2101 Wood Ave. 4415 N. McColl Rd. Donna, Texas 78537 McCallen, TX 78504 Attorneys for La Villa Housing Finance Attorneys for La Villa Housing Finance Corporation Corporation

/s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Daniel J. Lecavalier

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Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kim Decker on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101529542 Filing Code Description: Motion (No Fee) Filing Description: Defendant Pleasanton HFC and Maverick County HFC's Motion for Joinder in Pecos HFC and Joe Don Bobbit's Pleas to the Jurisdiction Status as of 6/3/2025 8:22 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kim Decker on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101529542 Filing Code Description: Motion (No Fee) Filing Description: Defendant Pleasanton HFC and Maverick County HFC's Motion for Joinder in Pecos HFC and Joe Don Bobbit's Pleas to the Jurisdiction Status as of 6/3/2025 8:22 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kim Decker on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101529542 Filing Code Description: Motion (No Fee) Filing Description: Defendant Pleasanton HFC and Maverick County HFC's Motion for Joinder in Pecos HFC and Joe Don Bobbit's Pleas to the Jurisdiction Status as of 6/3/2025 8:22 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/3/2025 3:17 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

Before the Court is Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation’s plea to the jurisdiction, which asks this Court to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. After reviewing Defendant’s plea and hearing the arguments of counsel, the Court determines the plea should be denied.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s plea is DENIED.

SIGNED June 3, 2025.

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Page 1

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FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/3/2025 4:30 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK No. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants, § § v. § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS §

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF ARLINGTON’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

On June 3, 2025, came to be heard Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction (the “Application”) against Defendants Pecos Housing Finance Corporation; Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation; La Villa Housing Finance Corporation; and Joe Don Bobbitt, in his official capacity as the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. After considering the Application, briefing and arguments of the parties, evidence admitted into the record, papers on file with the Court, and applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Application should be and hereby is GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a Temporary Injunction is granted pending a final hearing and determination of this case as follows:

1. Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title to real Page 1

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property in the City of Arlington, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Arlington, Texas.

2. Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title

to real property in the City of Arlington, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Arlington, Texas.

3. Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title to real

property in the City of Arlington, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Arlington, Texas.

4. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, in his official capacity as the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, shall not grant any tax exemptions requested by

Defendants Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, Pleasanton Housing Finance

Corporation, or La Villa Housing Finance Corporation for any properties located in the City of Arlington, Texas.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff City of Arlington is exempt from filing and executing a bond with the Clerk. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 6.002.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial in this case is set for the week of December 1, 2025.

Signed: June 3, 2025, at 3:48 p.m.

___________________________ Judge Presiding Page 2

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FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/3/2025 4:33 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT § the Tarrant Appraisal District, § Defendants, § § v. § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS §

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF FORT WORTH’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

On June 3, 2025, came to be heard Plaintiff City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction (the “Application”) against Defendants Pecos Housing Finance Corporation; Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation; La Villa Housing Finance Corporation; Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation; and Joe Don Bobbitt, in his official capacity as the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. After considering the Application, the briefing and arguments of the parties, the evidence admitted into the record, the papers on file with the Court, and applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Application should be and hereby is GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that a Temporary Injunction is granted pending a final hearing and determination of this case as follows:

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property in the City of Fort Worth, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Fort Worth, Texas.

real property in the City of Fort Worth, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Fort Worth, Texas.

property in the City of Fort Worth, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Fort Worth, Texas.

4. Defendant Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation, its officers, agents, employees, servants, and attorneys, and those in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this order, are prohibited from (i) acquiring title to

real property in the City of Fort Worth, Texas; or (ii) obtaining, seeking to obtain, or receiving tax exemptions for any properties located in the City of Fort Worth, Texas.

5. Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, in his official capacity as the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, shall not grant any tax exemptions requested by

Defendants Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, Pleasanton Housing Finance

Corporation, La Villa Housing Finance Corporation, or Maverick County Housing

Finance Corporation for any properties located in the City of Fort Worth, Texas.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff City of Fort Worth is exempt from filing and Page 2 executing a bond with the Clerk. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 6.002.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the trial in this case is set for the week of December 1, 2025.

Signed: June 3, 2025, at 3:50 p.m.

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Page 3

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FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/23/2025 3:11 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 25.1 and 28.1, Defendant, Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, states its desire to appeal: (1) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction and (2) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction, both signed on June 3, 2025, in City of Arlington, et al. v. Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, et al., Cause No. 348-363561-25, in the 348th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, Texas. Defendant appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas sitting in Austin, Texas.

This appeal is accelerated under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(a) and Section NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 1 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and is not “a parental termination or child protection case or an appeal from an order certifying a child to stand trial as an adult, as defined in Rule 28.4.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(d)(6).

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This appeal involves a matter: “(A) brought by or against the state or a board, commission, department, office, or other agency in the executive branch of the state government, including a university system or institution of higher education; (B) brought by or against an officer or employee of the state or a board, commission, department, office, or other agency in the executive branch of the state government arising out of that officer’s or employee’s official conduct; or (C) in which a party to the proceeding challenges the constitutionality or validity of a state statute or rule and the attorney general is a party to the case.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(d)(9).

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Dated: June 23, 2025 /s/ Amanda L. Reichek Jeffrey M. Tillotson Texas Bar No. 20039200 [email protected] Amanda L. Reichek Texas Bar No. 24041762 [email protected] Kathryn E. Yukevich State Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564

Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 [email protected] Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] CHASNOFF STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: (210) 469-4155

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by E-Service to counsel herein on June 23, 2025.

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FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/23/2025 3:26 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in his § official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF CLERK’S RECORD

TO THE DISTRICT CLERK OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS:

Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5, Defendant, Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, files this request for preparation of the clerk’s record for the appeal in the above-referenced case. Defendant is appealing the Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction and the Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction, both signed by this

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Court on June 3, 2025. The Notice of Accelerated Appeal is being filed simultaneously herewith, on June 23, 2025. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b), 28.1, 35.3(a)(1).

Because this is an accelerated appeal, the clerk’s record is to be filed with the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas in Austin, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, by July 3, 2025. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.1(b). Defendant hereby agrees to pay for the preparation of the clerk’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(a)(2). Pursuant to the rules of the Fifteenth Court of Appeals, the clerk’s record must be filed electronically.

Defendant requests that the clerk include the following items in the appellate record, in addition to any other items required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5(a), including all exhibits, attachments, and appendices to the documents set forth below: Date Pleading April 10, 2025 Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief April 11, 2025 Temporary Restraining Order April 24, 2025 Rule 11 Agreement Extending TRO and Temporary Injunction Hearing May 1, 2025 Rule 11 Agreement Extending TRO and Temporary Injunction Hearing May 5, 2025 Defendant Pecos HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer May 13, 2025 City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief May 14, 2025 Rule 11 Agreement Extending TRO and Temporary Injunction Hearing May 21, 2025 Temporary Restraining Order May 27, 2025 Defendant Pleasanton HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and, Subject Thereto, Original Answer to City of Arlington’s Second Amended Petition May 29, 2025 First Amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Answer of Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt May 30, 2025 Defendant La Villa HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue,

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and Original Answer June 2, 2025 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief June 2, 2025 Plaintiff City of Arlington’s Third Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief June 2, 2025 Defendant Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation’s Special Exceptions to the City of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer June 2, 2025 Defendant Maverick Housing Finance Corporation’s Special Exceptions to the City of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer June 2, 2025 Defendant Pecos HFC’s Plea to the Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer June 2, 2025 HFC Defendants’ Joint Brief in Opposition to City of Arlington’s and City of Fort Worth’s Applications for Temporary Injunction June 3, 2025 Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction June 3, 2025 Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction June 23, 2025 Defendants’ Notice of Appeal June 23, 2025 Defendants’ Request for Clerk’s Record June 23, 2025 Defendants’ Request for Reporter’s Record

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Respectfully submitted, /s/Amanda L. Reichek Jeffrey M. Tillotson Texas Bar No. 20039200 [email protected] Amanda L. Reichek Texas Bar No. 24041762 [email protected] Kathryn E. Yukevich State Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Request for Reporter’s Record was served on the following counsel of record via e-service on June 23, 2025. Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Alexander J. Lindvall [email protected] [email protected] Christopher B. Mosley Jonathan M. Moss Senior Assistant City Attorney [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen Olyn Poole [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] [email protected] CITY OF FORTH WORTH CITY OF ARLINGTON OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 100 Forth Worth Trail P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Arlington, Texas 76004 Counsel for Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Forth Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington Worth James R. Evans, Jr. Roel Gutierrez [email protected] Texas Bar No. 24069842 Eric Ruiz [email protected] [email protected] LAW OFFICE OF ROEL GUTIERREZ, PLLC LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. 4425 South Mopac Expressway McCallen, TX 78504 Building 3, Suite 400 Telephone: (956) 278-3529 Austin, Texas 78735 Facsimile: (956) 278-3530 Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt Robert J. Salinas State Bar No. 17536000 [email protected] 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Telephone: (956) 464-2460

Attorneys for Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

[*440]

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Amanda Reichek on behalf of Amanda Reichek Bar No. 24041762 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102315336 Filing Code Description: Request Filing Description: Defendant's Request for Preparation of Clerk's Record Status as of 6/23/2025 3:52 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Amanda Reichek on behalf of Amanda Reichek Bar No. 24041762 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102315336 Filing Code Description: Request Filing Description: Defendant's Request for Preparation of Clerk's Record Status as of 6/23/2025 3:52 PM CST Case Contacts Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:26:42 PM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/23/2025 10:43 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

[*441][*442]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; CAMERON COUNTY § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; and JOE DON § BOBBITT, in his official capacity as Chief § Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District; § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 25.1 and 28.1, Defendants, Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, Maverick Housing Finance Corporation, and La Villa Housing Finance Corporation, state their desire to appeal (1) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction as to Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and La Villa Housing Finance Corporation; and (2) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction as to Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, La Villa Housing Finance Corporation, and Maverick Housing Finance Corporation, all signed on June 3, 2025, in City of Arlington, et al. v. Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, et al., Cause No. 348-363561-25, in the 348th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, Texas. Defendants appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas sitting in Austin, Texas.

[*443]

This appeal is accelerated under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.1(a) and Section 51.014(a)(4) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and is not “a parental termination or child protection case or an appeal from an order certifying a child to stand trial as an adult, as defined in Rule 28.4.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(d)(6).

[*444]

Dated: June 23, 2025 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Defendants Pleasanton County Housing Finance Corporation and Maverick Housing Finance Corporation

Roel Gutierrez Texas Bar No. 240693842 LAW OFFICE OF ROEL GUTIERREZ, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. McCallen, TX 78504 Telephone: 956-278-3529 Fax: 956-278-3530 [email protected] and Robert J. Salinas Texas Bar No. 17536000 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Telephone: 956-464-2460 Counsel for Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

[*445]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served in compliance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on this 23rd day of June, 2025, to the following counsel of record: Galen G. Gatten Stephen A. Cumbie [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Alexander J. Lindvall [email protected] [email protected] Christopher B. Mosley Jonathan M. Moss Senior Assistant City Attorney [email protected] [email protected] Joseph N. Nguyen Olyn Poole [email protected] Senior Assistant City Attorney Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] [email protected] CITY OF FORTH WORTH CITY OF ARLINGTON OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY CITY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 100 Forth Worth Trail P.O. Box 90231, MS 63-0300 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Arlington, Texas 76004 Counsel for Intervenor-Plaintiff City of Forth Counsel for Plaintiff City of Arlington Worth

James R. Evans, Jr. Jeffrey M. Tillotson [email protected] Texas Bar No. 20039200 Eric Ruiz [email protected] [email protected] Amanda L. Reichek LOW SWINNEY EVANS & JAMES, PLLC Texas Bar No. 24041762 4425 South Mopac Expressway [email protected] Building 3, Suite 400 Kathryn E. Yukevich Austin, Texas 78735 State Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] Counsel for Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, Texas 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564

Counsel for Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation

[*446]

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM I SENT I Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/23/2025 10:43 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

[*447][*448][*449]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; CAMERON COUNTY § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; and JOE DON § BOBBITT, in his official capacity as Chief § Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District; § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF REPORTER’S RECORD

TO THE COURT REPORTER OF THE 348th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS:

Defendants Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, La Villa Housing Finance Corporation, and Maverick Housing Finance Corporation, request that the official court report and any substitute court reporter of the 348th Judicial District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, prepare, certify, and file the reporter’s record from these proceedings in the Fifteenth Court of Appeals. This request is filed in accordance with Rule 34.6(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

[*450]

The interlocutory orders being appealed in this case (i.e., the Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction and the Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction) were signed on June 3, 2025. The notice of appeal was filed today, June 23, 2025. This is an accelerated appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(a); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4). Therefore, the reporter’s record is due to be filed with the Fifteenth Court of Appeals within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, or by July 3, 2025. TEX. R. APP. P. 35.1(b).

Defendants request that the Court Reporter transcribe all proceedings in their entirety, including but not limited to the temporary injunction hearings, and request that in doing so the Court Reporter include arguments of counsel, objections of counsel, court rulings, all testimony, bench conferences, closing arguments, and all tendered exhibits. The proceedings covered by this request include, but are not limited to, the proceedings listed below. Date Event/Hearing June 3, 2025 Hearing on Plaintiffs’ Requests for Temporary Injunctions

Defendants hereby agree to pay any additional fees for the preparation of the record and to make any arrangements for any such additional payments. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(b)(3).

[*451]

Counsel for Defendants Pleasanton County Housing Finance Corporation, Maverick Housing Finance Corporation

/s/ Roel Gutierrez Roel Gutierrez Texas Bar No. 240693842 LAW OFFICE OF ROEL GUTIERREZ, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. McCallen, TX 78504 Telephone: 956-278-3529 Fax: 956-278-3530 [email protected] and Robert J. Salinas Texas Bar No. 17536000 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Telephone: 956-464-2460

Counsel for Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

[*452]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Counsel for Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation

[*453]

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM I SENT I Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/23/2025 10:43 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

[*454][*455][*456]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; CAMERON COUNTY § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; and JOE DON § BOBBITT, in his official capacity as Chief § Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District; § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST FOR PREPARATION OF THE CLERK’S RECORD

TO THE DISTRICT CLERK OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS:

Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5, Defendants Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, La Villa Housing Finance Corporation and Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation (collectively, “Defendants”) file this request for preparation of the clerk’s record for the appeal in the above-referenced case. Defendants are appealing (1) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction as to Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation and La Villa Housing Finance Corporation; and (2) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction as to Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation, La Villa Housing Finance Corporation, and Maverick Housing Finance Corporation, all signed on June 3, 2025, in City of Arlington, et al. v. Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, et al., Cause No. 348-363561-25, in the 348th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, Texas. The Notice of Accelerated Appeal is being filed simultaneously herewith, on June 23, 2025. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b), 28.1, 35.3(a)(1).

[*457]

Because this is an accelerated appeal, the clerk’s record is to be filed with the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas in Austin, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, by July 3, 2025. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.1(b). Defendants hereby agree to pay for the preparation of the clerk’s record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(a)(2). Pursuant to the rules of the Fifteenth Court of Appeals, the clerk’s record must be filed electronically.

Defendants request that the clerk include the following items in the appellate record, in addition to any other items required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.5(a), including all exhibits, attachments, and appendices to the documents set forth below: Date Pleading April 10, 2025 Plaintiff’s Original Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief April 11, 2025 Temporary Restraining Order April 24, 2025 Rule 11 Agreement Extending Temporary Restraining Order April 30, 2025 Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief May 1, 2025 Temporary Restraining Order May 1, 2025 Rule 11 Agreement Extending Temporary Restraining Order May 5, 2025 Pecos Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Original Answer May 5, 2025 Answer and Plea to Jurisdiction of Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt

[*458]

May 7, 2025 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief May 13, 2025 City of Fort Worth’s Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief May 14, 2025 Rule 11 Agreement Extending Temporary Restraining Order May 21, 2025 Intervenor’s Temporary Restraining Order May 22, 2025 City of Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief May 27, 2025 Pleasanton’s Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Original Answer to Arlington’s Second Amended Petition May 29, 2025 Pleasanton’s Special Exceptions to Arlington’s Second Amended Petition May 29, 2025 First Amended Plea to Jurisdiction and Answer of Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt May 30, 2025 Defendant La Villa Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Original Answer June 2, 2025 Maverick County’s Special Exceptions, Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Original Answer to Forth Worth’s First Amended Petition June 2, 2025 Pleasanton’s Special Exceptions, Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue and Original Answer to Fort Worth’s First Amended Petition June 2, 2025 Defendant Peco’s Plea to Jurisdiction, Motion to Transfer Venue, and Original Answer June 2, 2025 Arlington and Fort Worth’s Joint Response to Bobbitt’s Plea to Jurisdiction June 2, 2025 Arlington and Pecos’ Joint Response to Bobbitt’s Plea to Jurisdiction June 2, 2025 Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief June 2, 2025 City of Fort Worth’s Second Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief June 2, 2025 HFC’s Joint Brief in Opposition to Arlington/Fort Worth’s Applications for Temporary Injunctions June 2, 2025 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief June 2, 2025 Response by Defendant Bobbitt to HFC’s Motions to Transfer

[*459]

June 3, 2025 Pleasanton and Maverick’s Motion for Joinder in Pecos and Bobbitt’s Plea’s to Jurisdiction June 3, 2025 Pleasanton and Maverick’s Motion for Joinder in Pecos and Bobbitt’s Pleas to Jurisdiction June 3, 2025 Order Granting Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction June 3, 2025 Order Granting Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction June 3, 22025 Notice of Appeal June 3, 2025 Request for Clerk’s Record June 3, 2025 Request for Reporter’s Record

[*460]

Counsel for Defendants Pleasanton County Housing Finance Corporation and Maverick Housing Finance Corporation

Counsel for Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

[*461]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Counsel for Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation

[*462]

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM I SENT I Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Rachel Feltner on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102331236 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 9:26 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT FILED TARRANT COUNTY 348-363561-25 6/23/2025 11:56 PM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK

[*463][*464][*465]

CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; CAMERON COUNTY § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; and JOE DON § BOBBITT, in his official capacity as Chief § Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District; § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

[*466]

[*467]

Counsel for Defendants Pleasanton County Housing Finance Corporation and Maverick Housing Finance Corporation

s/ Roel Gutierrez Roel Gutierrez Texas Bar No. 240693842 LAW OFFICE OF ROEL GUTIERREZ, PLLC 4415 N. McColl Rd. McCallen, TX 78504 Telephone: 956-278-3529 Fax: 956-278-3530 [email protected] and Robert J. Salinas Texas Bar No. 17536000 2101 Wood Ave. Donna, Texas 78537 Telephone: 956-464-2460

Counsel for Defendant La Villa Housing Finance Corporation

[*468]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Counsel for Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation

[*469]

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Daniel Lecavalier on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102366068 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: Amended Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 2:44 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Daniel Lecavalier on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102366068 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: Amended Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 2:44 PM CST Case Contacts Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Daniel Lecavalier on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102366068 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: Amended Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 2:44 PM CST Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT FILED 348-363561-25 TARRANT COUNTY 6/24/2025 9:01 AM THOMAS A. WILDER DISTRICT CLERK CAUSE NO. 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT § Plaintiff, § § v. § § PECOS HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; PLEASANTON HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, a Texas § nonprofit corporation; LA VILLA § HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, a § Texas nonprofit corporation; MAVERICK § 348TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY HOUSING FINANCE § CORPORATION, a Texas nonprofit § corporation; and JOE DON BOBBITT, in § his official capacity as Chief Appraiser of the § Tarrant Appraisal District, § § Defendants, § § v. § § CITY OF FORT WORTH, § § Intervenor-Plaintiff. § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS

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AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL

Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 25.1 and 28.1, Defendant, Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, states its desire to appeal: (1) the interlocutory Order Denying Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation’s Plea to the Jurisdiction; (2) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Arlington’s Application for Temporary Injunction; and (3) the interlocutory Order Granting City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction, all signed on June 3, 2025, in City of Arlington, et al. v. Pecos Housing Finance Corporation, et al., Cause No. 348-363561-25, in the 348th Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, Texas. Defendant appeals to the Court of Appeals for the Fifteenth District of Texas sitting in Austin, Texas.

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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by E-Service to counsel herein on June 23, 2025.

/s/ Amanda L. Reichek Amanda L. Reichek Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Amanda Reichek on behalf of Amanda Reichek Bar No. 24041762 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102338456 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: Amended Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 10:13 AM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Amanda Reichek on behalf of Amanda Reichek Bar No. 24041762 [email protected] Envelope ID: 102338456 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: Amended Notice of Appeal Status as of 6/24/2025 10:13 AM CST Case Contacts Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/24/2025 9:01:45 AM SENT BILL OF COSTS TARRANT COUNTY DISTRICT COURT Trial Court Number: 348-363561-25 CITY OF ARLINGTON VS PECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION, ET AL District Clerk's Fees $ 64.00 DCRM Fees $ DCRA Fee $ ADRS Fee $ Library Fee $ Security Fee $ Records Fee $ Appellant Fee $ Clerk's Record Fee (Preparation of) $ 481.00 **** Certification and Seal Fee $ 10.00 **** Court Reporter Fee $ lndigency Fee $ Consignment Fee $ Judicial Support Fee $ Cash Bond $ Deposition Fees $ Constable Fees $ Private Service Fees $ Witness Fees $ Copy Fees $ 3.00 Document Preservation Fees $ Court Fines $ EFST Fee $ Civil Judicial Personnel Training Fee $ LCCS/LCCI Fees $ 318.00 SCCS/SCCI Fees $ 182.00 TOTAL $ 1,058.00 *Clerk's Record & Seal Fee paid by Appellant* FEES PAID $ 708.00 COURT COST BALANCE $350.00 ATTEST: THOMAS A WILDER TARRANT COUNTY DISTRICT CLERK Certified True Copy

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¹ This case concerns a misuse and abuse of the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. Arlington recently learned that the Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”) has been unlawfully removing Arlington-based properties from the tax appraisal rolls in exchange for monetary kickbacks, resulting in the loss of millions of dollars in real property value from the local tax base.

² Pecos HFC’s scheme seems to work like this: a private developer acquires land for a new multifamily development (or acquires an already-existing multifamily development) in a city other than Pecos; the private developer then conveys that property to the Pecos HFC; the Pecos HFC, as the new owner, then applies for and receives a 100% tax exemption, and the property is removed from the tax rolls; the Pecos HFC then leases that now-exempt property to a private landlord (oftentimes the same developer who originally purchased the property), who then shares the profits with the Pecos HFC. The upshot of this scheme is that the developer and landlord get PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

³ In short, a tiny public corporation, located over 400 miles away in a town with less than 13,000 residents, has singlehandedly reduced Arlington’s yearly tax revenue by well over $1 million while it rakes in undeserved fees and profits from Arlington-based rental properties. Arlington now asks this Court to halt the Pecos HFC’s unlawful behavior before it does any further irreversible damage to Arlington’s tax base, and to stop the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District from granting tax exemptions requested by the Pecos HFC regarding Arlington- based properties. II. PARTIES

⁴ Plaintiff City of Arlington is a home-rule municipality located in Tarrant County, Texas.

⁵ Defendant Pecos Housing Finance Corporation is a Texas nonprofit corporation. It may be served with citation through its registered agent, John Salcido, at 2320 Teague Dr., Pecos, Texas 79772, or wherever else he may be located.

⁶ Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt is the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District. He is being sued in his official capacity only. III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND DISCOVERY CONTROL PLAN

⁷ This Court has jurisdiction over this matter because Plaintiff seeks relief within the jurisdictional limits of this Court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 65.001 et seq.; Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.

⁸ Venue is proper in Tarrant County because all (or at least a substantial part) of the events and actions giving rise to this case occurred in Tarrant County—and by conducting business in Tarrant County, Defendant Pecos HFC has purposely availed itself to this venue. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.002(a)(1). This suit, moreover, concerns real property located in Tarrant County, making Tarrant County the mandatory venue for this case. See id. § 15.011.

⁹ Arlington intends to conduct discovery in this case under the Level 3 discovery PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

¹⁰ This suit concerns the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. (“the Act”). The Act was passed in 1979 to help facilitate the development of low-income housing. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code § 394.002(a) (the Act’s purpose is to “provide a means to finance the cost of residential ownership and development that will provide decent, safe, and sanitary housing at affordable prices for residents of local governments”).

¹¹ To help create more low-income housing, the Act empowers local governments to create Housing Finance Corporations (“HFCs”)—nonprofit organizations, comprised of local officials, that help coordinate and facilitate affordable-housing projects. See Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.002, 394.011(a), 394.032. And because HFCs are (at least in theory) furthering a public purpose, the Act provides that HFC-owned properties and the income derived from those properties are tax-exempt. Id. § 394.905 (“The housing finance corporation, all property owned by it, the income from the property, all bonds issued by it, the income from the bonds, and the transfer of the bonds are exempt, as public property used for public purposes, from license fees, recording fees, and all other taxes imposed by this state or any political subdivision of this state.”).

¹² HFCs are commonly a part of public/private real estate partnerships, in which a private developer acquires land for a new development or acquires an existing multifamily project and then conveys it to an HFC, which then acquires tax-exempt status for the property and leases the property to a private landlord who, in turn, pays fees to the HFC and shares the profits generated by the property with the HFC.

¹³ But because the Act allows for such an enormous tax benefit, it provides two specific restrictions on what residential developments an HFC can tax-exempt: (1) a residential development can receive tax exemption from an HFC only if at least 90% of the development “is for use by or is intended to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income,” as defined by the statute, id. § 394.004; and (2) the residential development “must be located within the local PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

¹⁴ An HFC, in other words, can tax-exempt a residential development only if the development is located within the HFC’s local jurisdiction and is actually used to house low- income individuals. See id. §§ 394.004, 394.903. B. The Pecos HFC is exempting properties in Arlington—over 400 miles outside its jurisdiction—that do not house low-income residents.

¹⁵ Arlington recently learned that the Pecos HFC has been ignoring these statutory restrictions and has been giving tax exemptions to large, multifamily housing developments in Arlington without Arlington’s knowledge, input, or approval. [Affidavit of Mindy Cochran, attached hereto as Exhibit 1, at ¶¶ 4‒6.]

¹⁶ The Pecos HFC’s unlawful tax-exemption scheme has removed tens of millions of dollars from Tarrant County taxing units’ tax rolls and has caused Arlington to lose well over $1 million in annual tax revenue. [Id. at ¶ 7.]

¹⁷ To illustrate, several months ago, the Pecos HFC acquired the Zenith North Collins (735 Washington Dr.) apartment complex—an already-built, upscale apartment complex located next to a golf course in Arlington.1 [Id. at ¶ 5.] After acquiring this complex, the Pecos HFC applied for and received a full tax exemption for this property. [Id.] And after receiving that exemption, it leased the complex to a private landlord and now collects a share of that complex’s profits. [Id.] This property was appraised at $86 million. [Id.] So, when it was removed from the tax rolls, that caused the Tarrant County Appraisal District to lose $1.7 million in annual ad valorem tax revenue, and Arlington’s share of that revenue was approximately $447,000. [Id.]

¹⁸ In other words, by exempting just one apartment complex in Arlington, the Pecos HFC caused Arlington to lose roughly $447,000 in annual tax revenue, and there is no clear path for Arlington (or other affected local entities) to recoup that loss. [See id.]

¹⁹ To make matters worse, the Zenith North Collins doesn’t even provide low-income housing. With fees and rent, a three-bedroom apartment in this complex costs well over $3,000 1 At the time of acquisition, this complex was known as the “Jefferson North Collins” apartment complex. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Page 4

²⁰ This is a widespread problem across the state. The City of Euless, for example, has seen at least a 2% drop in its overall annual revenue after a single apartment complex received tax- exempt status from the Cameron County HFC;3 and Dallas, Fort Worth, McKinney, Irving, Lewisville, and other north Texas cities have reported millions of dollars in total lost tax revenue.4 Worse, these out-of-jurisdiction HFCs are often bestowing tax-exempt status to already-built structures (not new projects), and many of the exempted properties aren’t even affordable-housing projects; they are typical for-profit apartments and condos, usually located in upmarket neighborhoods, that do not offer reduced rent, housing vouchers, or other benefits to low-income applicants.5

²¹ Upon information and belief, the Pecos HFC also recently bestowed tax-exempt status to another apartment complex in Arlington called Cedar Point (2020 Cedar Point Dr.). [Exhibit 1 at ¶ 6.] That property is appraised at approximately $27.5 million, and Arlington’s lost ad valorem tax revenue because of this tax exemption amounts to about $165,000 per year. [Id.] That complex, similarly, does not offer affordable housing as contemplated by the Act.

²² Arlington, moreover, has good reason to believe the Pecos HFC plans to close on several more Arlington-based properties in the coming months, and that it is on the verge of closing on one of those properties in the coming days. [Id. at ¶ 7; Affidavit of Molly Shortall, attached 2 https://www.zenitharlington.com/floorplans/. 3 Andrea Lucia, Euless Loses 2 Percent of Revenue to Controversial Tax Break Approved in Faraway County, CBS News (Feb. 21, 2024). 4 Andrea Lucia, Housing Group Made Millions Getting Tax Breaks for Developers, Costing Cities and Schools Even More, CBS News (Dec. 22, 2023). 5 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a “luxurious community” in Irving and that the tenants’ rents went up significantly under the HFC’s ownership). PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

²³ Because of the widespread nature of this practice (see ¶ 20 supra), there has been a strong legislative push to (even more) explicitly outlaw this sort of tax-exemption scheme. See, e.g., 2025 H.B. No. 21.6 Upon information and belief, because this sort of scheme is about to become indisputably illegal, HFCs have been scrambling to close their out-of-jurisdiction projects. V. CAUSE OF ACTION: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

²⁴ Texas’s Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) allows trial courts to “declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.003. The UDJA further provides that “[a] person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. § 37.004(a). The Legislature intended the UDJA to be “remedial” and “liberally construed,” and “its purpose is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” Id. § 37.002(b).

²⁵ In a declaratory action, like this one, “the court may award costs and reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” Id. § 37.009.

²⁶ Arlington asks for a declaratory judgment from this Court declaring that the Act does not allow the Pecos HFC to bestow tax exemptions to Arlington-based properties. VI. APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION

²⁷ To stop the Pecos HFC from closing on any more Arlington-based properties, Arlington asks this Court for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) that prohibits the Pecos HFC from (a) closing on any Arlington-based properties or (b) requesting any tax exemptions for Arlington-based properties.

²⁸ Arlington further requests a TRO that prohibits Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, from granting tax exemptions requested by the Pecos 6 https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB21/id/3053018. PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR TRO AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

²⁹ Arlington requests that this Court issue this TRO without notice to Defendants. Rule 680 allows the Court to issue a TRO without notice if it “clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. The Pecos HFC has averred to the Arlington City Attorney that it is on the verge of closing on at least one Arlington-based property in the coming days, and Arlington believes the Pecos HFC will rush to close on this deal if it is made aware of this TRO application. [Exhibit 2 at ¶ 5.] Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Arlington believes the Pecos HFC is already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and months. A no- notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Pecos HFC in the short-term.

³⁰ Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 3.]

³¹ This Court should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents the Pecos HFC from overstepping its jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Arlington- based properties. And out of an abundance of caution, this Court should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by the Pecos HFC regarding any Arlington-based properties.

³² Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief from the Court pursuant to the UDJA declaring that: Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 9 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1

³³ Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

³⁴ To the extent CCHFC takes the position that, conh·ary to its plain language, the Act does not prohibit it from acquiring and seeking tax exemptions for properties in Williamson County, and to the extent CCHFC prevails in such interpretation of the Act, Plaintiffs alternatively request a declaration from the Court that, as applied by CCHFC, the Act violates the Texas Constitution's rules against exh·a-jurisdictional taxation by seeking to impose a system of taxation on properties located outside of the boundaries of Cameron County.

³⁵ The Texas Constitution requires that all property shall be assessed for Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 10 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1

³⁶ Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference herein the allegations in the paragraphs above.

³⁷ CCHFC is prohibited by the Act itself from acquiring and seeking tax exemptions on residential projects outside of Cameron County, and injunctive relief is therefore necessary here to compel CCHFC' s compliance with the Act.

³⁸ To obtain injunctive relief, an applicant must show it has a cause of action, that it has a probable right to relief, and that it is faced with imminent irreparable harm. Butnaru v . Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). An applicant has a probable right to relief if it has a cause of action for which relief may be granted. Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 577-78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) . Among other grounds, "[a] trial court may . . . grant injunctive relief .. .when a dispute involves real property." Shor v. Pelican Oil & Gas Mgmt., LLC, 405 S.W.3d 737, 750 (Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

³⁹ As detailed above, Plaintiffs have well-supported causes of action against CCHFC to establish and protect their rights in accordance with the Act. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 11 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1

⁴⁰ In the absence of such relief, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury for which no remedy at law exists without the protections of a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. CCHFC is rushing to acquire properties in Williamson County (and elsewhere) in a nefarious attempt to remove as many properties from Williamson County's tax roles as possible before its misuse of the Act is stopped. 4 If its tactics are permitted with respect to the two subject properties identified in this Petition, Plaintiffs- along with Hutto ISD and other local governmental units - will face the dire consequence of losing millions of dollars in ad valorem tax revenue. The removal of these properties from the tax rolls would immediately affect Plaintiffs' budgeting, thereby necessarily preventing Plaintiffs from allocating that lost revenue to be used for public services. 41 . Siena Municipal Utility District No. 1 and Siena Municipal Utility District No. 2 would be particularly and severely impacted by the removal of these properties from the tax rolls. In 2024, The Sommery was Siena MUD No. 1' s highest appraised 4 \/Vhy Are Distant Texas Agencies Tn;ing to Take San Antonio Apartments Of!Tax Rolls?, San Antonio Express News, Feb. 17, 2025 ("Most of the local d eals have occurred in the past few months as developers and corporations rush to execute transactions before the Legislature cracks down, which some lawmakers have vowed to do this session."), available at https://www .expressnews.com/bus iness/real- es tate/ article/ san-antonio-hill-country-housing-tax-breaks-?00??805.ph p. Plaintiffs' Original Petition - Page 12 of 15 4925-0205-0851, V. 1

⁴² Additionally, as previously noted, this sort of tax-exemption scheme is, in all likelihood, about to become indisputably illegal, and Arlington believes the Defendant HFCs are already in a rush to close on as many out-of-jurisdiction deals as possible in the coming weeks and months. A no-notice TRO will prevent this unlawful behavior from occurring and will not unduly prejudice the Defendant HFCs in the short-term.

⁴³ Judge Betsy Lambeth, of the 425th District Court in Williamson County, recently granted a no-notice TRO against the Cameron County HFC on virtually identical grounds. [See Plf. Orig. Pet. & TRO, Williamson Cnty. et al. v. Cameron Cnty. Housing Finance Corp., 425th Judicial District Court, No. 25-0488-C425 (March 5, 2025), attached hereto as Exhibit 3.]

⁴⁴ This Court should follow suit and issue a TRO that prevents the Defendant HFCs from overstepping their jurisdictional bounds and from requesting tax-exempt status for any Arlington-based properties. And out of an abundance of caution, this Court should also issue a TRO against the Defendant Joe Don Bobbitt, the Chief Appraiser of the Tarrant Appraisal District, that prevents him from granting tax exemptions requested by the Defendant HFCs regarding any Arlington-based properties.

⁴⁵ A two-part test governs whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge a statute. “First, the plaintiff must suffer some actual or threatened injury under the statute.” Id. (citing Texas Workers' Compensation Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 518 (Tex. 1995)). “Second, the plaintiff must contend that the statute unconstitutionally restricts the plaintiff’s own rights.” Id.

⁴⁶ Fort Worth lacks the standing to challenge the tax exemptions at issue here. Political subdivisions can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only when that political subdivision is “charged with implementing a statute it believes violates the Texas Constitution.” 7 Changes to the law were recently entered into effect through the signing of H.B. No. 21 on May 28, 2025. All references to the Act in the following section refer to the prior law in effect before H.B. No. 21’s passage when the subject properties at issue were acquired. According to Section 13(c) of H.B. No. 21, “Section 394.9026, Local Government Code, as added by this Act, and Section 394.905, Local Government Code, as amended by this Act, apply only to a tax for a tax year that begins on or after the effective date of this Act.). HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 13

⁴⁷ Fort Worth is not the administrator of the relevant provisions of the Act or the Property Tax Code for the purposes of granting, denying, or effectuating exemptions. As a result, Fort Worth has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of either statute, either on its face or as applied. iii. Plaintiffs cannot establish that the Housing Finance Corporation Act, codified in the Local Government Code, prohibits the Defendant HFCs from acquiring property outside of its boundaries

⁴⁸ Contrary to Plaintiffs’ claims, the Act did not previously limit where an HFC could acquire property or conduct its activities. While Section 394.003 states that a residential development covered by the chapter must be "located within the local government," this provision merely establishes that a residential development must be located within any local government in Texas to qualify under the chapter—not that it must be located within the specific local government that created the HFC.

⁴⁹ First, the Act defines “local government” as “any municipality or county,” indicating that an HFC residential development can be located in any municipality or county. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 394.003(10) (2024).

⁵⁰ Next, the Act defines “[r]esidential development” to mean: [T]he acquisition, construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, improvement, or extension of any of the following items or any combination of the HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 14

⁵¹ The Act’s purposes reflect that “the creation of housing finance corporation is for the benefit of the people of the state, improves the public health and welfare, and promotes the economy.” Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.002(c)(1); (2) (“those purposes are public purposes”), (3) (“the corporation[…]performs an essential government function on behalf of and for the benefit for the general public, the local government, and this state.”); 394.015(d) (“The corporation may issue bonds and carry out the public purposes for which it is incorporated on behalf of or for the benefit of the general public, the local government, and this state.”) (2024).

⁵² This interpretation is consistent with the Act’s purpose of expanding affordable housing opportunities throughout Texas. If the Legislature had intended to limit housing finance corporations to operating solely within their creating jurisdictions under the former law, it would have included explicit language to that effect. The passage of H.B. No. 21 confirms this intent, insofar as it codifies the following new subsections into Loc. Gov’t Code § 394.031: (c) Subject to Subsection (d), the area in which a housing finance corporation may own real property for residential development or engage in residential development is limited to: (1) for a housing finance corporation sponsored by a municipality under Section 394.011, the boundaries of the municipality that sponsored the corporation; HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 15

⁵³ In line with this departure from the liberal provisions of the former law, H.B. No. 21 also amends Loc. Gov’t Code § 394.905 by adding a new subsection (b) which provides that: (b) A multifamily residential development owned by a housing finance corporation is eligible for an exemption from ad valorem taxes, and the materials used to improve the applicable property are eligible for an exemption from sales and use taxes, only if: (1) the property is located in an area in which the housing finance corporation is authorized to own real property or engage in residential development under Section 394.031(c) or (d)

⁵⁴ Finally, H.B. No. 21 extends the former law’s exemption for HFC residential development for two years without local government approval. Specifically, Section 13(i) of H.B. No. 21 provides that: “[a] residential development that is owned by a housing finance corporation on September 1, 2025, and is located outside an area in which the corporation is authorized to own HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 16

⁵⁵ Plaintiffs’ narrow interpretation of the Act would lead to absurd results. The interpretation of the Act contradicts the plain text definitions incorporated in the Act and subverts the broad public and state-wide purposes to expand affordable housing across the Lone Star State encompassed within the Act. B. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish a Threat of Imminent Irreparable Injury

⁵⁶ Plaintiffs have failed to identify any harm that is actually irreparable. An injury is irreparable only “if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204 (emphasis added). To prove probable injury, an applicant must show that he has no adequate remedy at law. Savering v. City of Mansfield, 505 S.W.3d 33, 49 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied).

⁵⁷ Plaintiffs’ proposed injunctive relief is, by definition, prospective. With the passage of H.B.21, the only possible properties still at issue are those which (1) the Defendant HFCs have acquired prior to the passage of H.B.21, but (2) the TAD has not yet effectuated the applicable property tax exemption under the prior law.

⁵⁸ As a result, Plaintiffs’ sole alleged harm is the loss of potential tax revenue from a narrow subset of properties. There is no doubt that any potential injury that Plaintiffs are ultimately able to establish can be remedied with money damages. And “if an injury is compensable by money HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 17

⁵⁹ There is no doubt that Plaintiffs are aware that failure to pay money owed to a taxing unit is not an irreparable injury that warrants injunctive relief. Arlington successfully advanced this exact argument in a dispute with Fort Worth. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. City of Fort Worth, 873 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (holding that the City of Arlington’s failure to pay the City of Fort Worth for sludge treatment was not such irreparable harm as would support issuance of temporary injunction, since it could be compensated with monetary damages).

⁶⁰ There is no dispute that any injury suffered by Plaintiffs would ultimately be readily quantified in terms of money damages. In fact, Plaintiffs quantify the precise amount of tax revenue that it alleges it has lost from prior exemptions. See, e.g., 2nd Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 20-21, 24; 1st Am. Pet. at ¶¶ 22-25. Any claimed losses, further, can be recovered through a back-appraisal if Plaintiffs raise such a request in a challenge petition this year or within the next four tax years under the back-appraisal provision’ five-year limitations period.

⁶¹ Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that any irreparable harm will result if the TAD is permitted to effectuate the noticed exemptions. HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 18 Dated: June 2, 2025. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Kathryn E. Yukevich Jeffrey M. Tillotson Texas Bar No. 20039200 [email protected] Kathryn E. Yukevich State Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] TILLOTSON JOHNSON & PATTON 1201 Main Street, Suite 1300 Dallas, TX 75202 Telephone: (214) 382-3041 Facsimile: (214) 292-6564 COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT PECOS HFC /s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Blake W. Stribling Texas Bar No. 24070691 Daniel J. Lecavalier Texas Bar No. 24129028 CHASNOFF STRIBLING, LLP 1020 N.E. Loop 410, Suite 150 San Antonio, Texas 78209 Telephone: 210-469-4155 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 19 HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 20 /s/ Kathryn E. Yukevich Kathryn E. Yukevich HFC DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ APPLICATIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION PAGE 21 SI usted necesita asistencia en espaiiol, por favor llame Certified Mail No: 7019 1120 0000 4967 1923 al telefono 512 930-3787. Para mas informacion vlsite nuestra pagina web: www.wcad.org. April 27, 2023 Protest Deadline: May 30, 2023 I 1111111111111111 lllll 111111111111111 11111111 ACCOUNT NO: LEGAL DESCR: Dear Property Owner: Pursuant to Tax Code Section 1l.45(a)(4), Williamson Central Appraisal District must Deny your request for 2023 TEXAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE 303.042 exemption(s) on the above referenced property. Reason(s) for denial include, but are not limited to the following: 1. The requester is not entitled to t he exemption. 2. The property does not qualify for t he exemption. 3. Documentation filed with the request does not support the exemption. 4. The requestor failed t o demonstrate t hat the property is used for a public purpose, as required by t he Texas Constitution. These constitutiona l requirements include, but are not necessarily limited to, those found in article VIII, section 2 and article XI, sect ion 9 of the Texas Constitution. 5. The requestor failed to demonstrate that the property benefits the residents or property of SH 130 (SH130 MMD) and/or the Texas Essential Housing Public Facility Corporation (TEHPFC.) 6. To the extent that Texas Local Government Code section 303.042-o r any other statutory provision-exempts property even absent a showing t hat the property is used for a public purpose, such a provision is unconstitutional. 7. Section 303.042 of t he Local Government Code does not apply to the subject property and therefore does not entitle it to an exemption. 8. The requester did not fully comply with section 303.042. 9. The requestor failed to demonstrate that they met the affordability restrictions in section 303.042. 10. Lo cal Government Code section 303.042(d)'s affordability restrictions apply only to a PFC that is created by a housing authority. Because the TEHPFC was not created by a housing authority, section 303.042(d) is inapplicable to the TEHPFC. 11. The requestor provided no other argument or evidence that the property is used for a public purpose other than section 303.042(d) of the Local Government Code. If the requester puts forward another basis for the exemption, WCAD will review that request and provide a determination on that request. 12. Section 303.042(f) only applies to exempt a leasehold from taxation under Section 25.07 of the Tax Code, but section 303.042(f) does not authorize an exemption to the owner of the property for the underlying full fee simple value of the property. 13. Leasing property to a private developer does not constitute a public purpose. 14. A PFC is not entitled to an exemption on property outside its boundaries, and there is no showing that the property serves a public purpose and benefits the residents of the PFC. 15. The requester failed to demonstrate that a PFC may acquire property outside the PFC's geographic boundaries or the geographic boundaries of the PFC's sponsor. 16. The public purpose ofan MMD may include providing housing inside the MMD's boundaries, but there is no authorization for providing housing outside the MM D's geographic boundaries. 17. Even if the TEHPFC or SH130 MMD may own housing developments outside their geographic boundaries, there is not authorization for that property to be entitled to an ad valorem tax exemption. 18. The taxing units in which the subject property sits never consented to the purchase or development of this property by the SH130 MMD or the TEHPFC, nor did they consent to the creation of the MMD or the TEHPFC and the potential attending reduction in tax liabilities. 19. PFCs are not political subdivisions and cannot qualify for an exemption as a governmental entity. Instead, PFCs must establish they are a charitable entity and qualify for exemptions as such. The TEHPFC has not demonstrated that they qualify for such an exemption. 20. The applicant has otherwise failed to meet the required showings for entitlement to the requested exemptions, including a failure to demonstrate that the project at issue meets the "affordability restrictions" found in section 303.042(d}. You are entitled to protest this denial by filing a written notice of protest with the Appraisal Review Board within 30 days of the date of this denial. If a timely protest is filed, you will be notified of an opportunity to appear before the ARB to present evidence and arguments regarding this matter. The Property Owner's Notice of Protest Form 50-132 1s located at https://comptroller.texas.gov/ please mail to the address below. Thank you, Exemptions Department Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH 374 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Kathryn Yukevich Bar No. 24133390 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101489903 Filing Code Description: Answer/Response Filing Description: Defendant HFC's Response in Opposition to Arlington and Fort Worth's Application for Temporary Injunction Status as of 6/2/2025 12:11 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 11:00:22 AM SENT CITY OF FORT WORTH’S THIRD AMENDED PETITION IN INTERVENTION AND APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT: In support of its Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff-Intervenor City of Fort Worth (“Fort Worth”) alleges the following: I. INTRODUCTION 1. This case concerns a misuse and abuse of the Texas Housing Finance Corporation Act, Tex. Local Gov’t Code §§ 394.001 et seq. Fort Worth recently learned that the Pecos Housing Finance Corporation (“Pecos HFC”), the Pleasanton Housing Finance Corporation (“Pleasanton HFC”) the La Villa Housing Finance Corporation (“La Villa HFC”), and the Maverick County Housing Finance Corporation (“Maverick County HFC”) have been unlawfully removing Fort City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 3 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 4 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 5 1 https://www.tad.org/property?account=41652207 2 https://www.sovereignkeller.com 3 https://www.tad.org/property?account=41652207 4 Id. 5 Calculated from information found at https://taxonline.tarrantcounty.com/TaxWeb/ratesExemptions.asp 6 https://www.sovereignkeller.com/floor-plans City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 6 7 https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402920, https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402938, and https://www.tad.org/property?account=42402946 8 Id. 9 https://www.rocklynfortworth.com/floorplans 10 Calculated from information found at https://taxonline.tarrantcounty.com/TaxWeb/ratesExemptions.asp 11 Id. 12 Andrea Lucia, Euless Loses 2 Percent of Revenue to Controversial Tax Break Approved in Faraway County, CBS News (Feb. 21, 2024). 13 Andrea Lucia, Housing Group Made Millions Getting Tax Breaks for Developers, Costing Cities and Schools Even More, CBS News (Dec. 22, 2023). City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 7 14 Id. (documenting that an out-of-town HFC purchased an apartment complex in a “luxurious community” in Irving and that the tenants’ rents went up significantly under the HFC’s ownership). 15 https://legiscan.com/TX/text/HB21/id/3053018 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 8 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 9 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 11 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 12 City of Fort Worth’s Third Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief Page 13 VERIFICATION THE STATE OF TEXAS § § COUNTY OFTARRANT § BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public in and for the State of Texas on this day personally appeared Stephen A. Cumbie, Senior Assistant City Attorney for the City of Fort Worth, who, after being duly sworn, stated under oath that he has read the above Second Amended Petition in Intervention and its Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief; and that every ~ b i e , Affi;i;'2 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME on this 2nd day of June 2025. ,,,~~~::,,, LAURA GREGORY .:,:~ ..... ~<.~ ff(.A~:·:~ Notary Public, State of Texas ;V:>.···.~,4.~S Comm. Expires 03-08-2028 ~Jz,:~f;,,,,,'" Notary ID 4463814 The State of Texas MAR O5 2025 WILLIAMSON COUNTY, SIENA § MUNICIPAL lfTIILTY DISTRICT NO. 1, § and SIENA MUNICIPAL UTIILTY § DISTRICT NO. 2, § Plaintiffs, § § JUDICIAL DISTRICT V. § § THE CAMERON COUNTY HOUSING § FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendant. § WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TEXAS TEMPORARY RESTRAI NING ORDER After consideri ng the applicatio n for a temporary restrainin g order filed by Plaintiffs in the above-styled matter, the pleadings, and the evidence, the Court finds that - 1. There is a current controversy over Defendan t Cameron County Housing Finance Corporati on's ("CCHFC") efforts to seek exemptio n from ad valorem taxes for properties located in Williamson County, including the following real properties: a. Lot 1, Siena Section 30, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Documen t No. 2020037410 in the Official Public Records of Williamso n County, Texas, located at 6531 CR 110, Round Rock, Texas, 78655. That property is a 13.677-acre tract of land on which a multi-family apartmen t project known as Siena Round Rock Apartmen ts has been built ("Siena Round Rock"). b. Lot 2, Block A, Siena South, according to the map or plat thereof recorded as Documen t No. 20200099820 in the Official Public Records of Williamson County, Texas, located at 5540 Sofia Place, Round Rock, Texas 78665. That Property is a Temporary Restraining Order - Page 1 of 3 Exhibit 1 392 15.0496-acre tract of land on which a multi-family apartmen t project known as The Sommery has been built {"The Sommery"). 2. As alleged in the Plaintiffs' petition and supportin g verification, CCHFC currently owns Sienna Round Rock, and intends to acquire The Sommery, and seeks to remove both properties from the Williamson Central Appraisal District ad valorem tax rolls, purported ly under Section 394.905 of the Texas Local Governm ent Code. 3. Imminent harm and irreparable harm will result if CC::HFC is permitted to acquire The Sommery and seek and obtain exemption s of Sienna Round Rock and The Somrnery from the William Central Appraisal District ad valorem tax rolls. Specifically, if a temporary restrainin g order is not granted, imminent and irreparabl e harm will result to Plaintiffs since those properties within their jurisdictions will be removed from the tax rolls, which will immediat ely impact their fiscal budgeting and decrease the ad valorem taxes they otherwise could collect for these properties. 4. There is no adequate remedy at law because such damages or harm to Plaintiffs cannot be calculated. 5. An ex parte order, without notice to CCHFC, is necessary because there is not enough time to give notice to CCHFC, hold a hearing, and issue a restrainin g order before the imminent and irreparabl e injury, loss or damage occurs. 6. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that- a. CCHFC, as well as its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participat ion with CCHFC, are prohibited from (i) acquiring real property in Temporary Restraining O rder - Page 2 of 3 Exhibit 1 393 William son County, includin g The Sommery; (ii) seeking or obtainin g exemptions from ad valorem taxes for real property in Williamson County, includin g Siena Round Rock and The Sommery. b. The clerk shall issue notice to CCHFC that the hearing on Plaintiffs' request for tempora ry injunction is set for mu~ \1 2025 at CJ~ W @ .m. The purpose of the hearing shall be to determine whether this tempora ry restraining order should be made a tempora ry injunction pending a full trial on the merits. c. Plaintiffs are exempt from posting a bond pursuan t to Section 6.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Section 49.066(£) of the Texas Water Code. 7. This order expires on ~ \L\: 2025 at 'f :Ot) _lL.m. Signed: March _2_, 2025 ~ ,. , ~ _,/ L ~ ~- - Temporary Restrainin g Order - Page 3 of 3 Exhibit 1 394 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Laura Gregory on behalf of Stephen Cumbie Bar No. 24056724 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101502900 Filing Code Description: Amended Filing Filing Description: City of Fort Worth's Third Amended Petition in Intervention and App for Temp Injunction (added Exhibits 1 and 2) Status as of 6/2/2025 3:54 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 1:35:51 PM SENT CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served on counsel of record on this 2nd day of June, 2025 by electronic service. By: /s/ James R. Evans, Jr. James R. Evans, Jr. Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Rosa Perez I I [email protected] I 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM I I SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name I BarNumber I Email TimestampSubmitted I Status I Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 3:24:39 PM SENT /s/ Daniel J. Lecavalier Daniel J. Lecavalier Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Galen Gatten I I [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt I I [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM I SENT I 407 Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules. Lisa O'Sullivan on behalf of Daniel Lecavalier Bar No. 24129028 [email protected] Envelope ID: 101529334 Filing Code Description: Motion (No Fee) Filing Description: Motion Status as of 6/3/2025 8:20 AM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:13:38 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Case Contacts Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/2/2025 9:34:56 PM SENT Hon. Megan Fahey Judge, 348th Judicial District Court Tarrant County, Texas ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT PECOS HFC’S PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION Envelope ID: 101567325 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD DENY DEFN PECO PLEA JURISDICTION Status as of 6/3/2025 3:29 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM ISENT I Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Envelope ID: 101567325 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD DENY DEFN PECO PLEA JURISDICTION Status as of 6/3/2025 3:29 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Envelope ID: 101567325 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD DENY DEFN PECO PLEA JURISDICTION Status as of 6/3/2025 3:29 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/3/2025 3:17:34 PM SENT ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF CITY OF ARLINGTON’S APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION Envelope ID: 101575163 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD GRANT CITY ARLINGTON APPL TEMP INJ Status as of 6/3/2025 4:43 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM ISENT I Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Envelope ID: 101575163 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD GRANT CITY ARLINGTON APPL TEMP INJ Status as of 6/3/2025 4:43 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Envelope ID: 101575163 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD GRANT CITY ARLINGTON APPL TEMP INJ Status as of 6/3/2025 4:43 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:30:55 PM SENT Order Granting Plaintiff City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction Page 1 Order Granting Plaintiff City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction Judge Presiding Order Granting Plaintiff City of Fort Worth’s Application for Temporary Injunction Envelope ID: 101575417 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD GRANT CITY FW APPL TEMP INJ Status as of 6/3/2025 4:46 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: THEPECOS HOUSING FINANCE CORPORATION Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM ISENT I Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Lisa O'Sullivan [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Envelope ID: 101575417 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD GRANT CITY FW APPL TEMP INJ Status as of 6/3/2025 4:46 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Envelope ID: 101575417 Filing Code Description: No Fee Documents Filing Description: ORD GRANT CITY FW APPL TEMP INJ Status as of 6/3/2025 4:46 PM CST Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/3/2025 4:33:43 PM SENT NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 2 NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 3 NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 4 Envelope ID: 102313843 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Accelerated Appeal Status as of 6/23/2025 3:51 PM CST Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Jeffrey MTillotson [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Jonathan RPatton [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Kathryn Yukevich 24133390 [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Kira Lytle [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT TJP Service [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Galen Gatten [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Eric Ruiz [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT JAMES EVANS [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Envelope ID: 102313843 Filing Code Description: Notice of Appeal Filing Description: Notice of Accelerated Appeal Status as of 6/23/2025 3:51 PM CST Case Contacts Amanda L.Reichek [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Devlin Browne [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Jannet Alarcon [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Erica Salas [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Joseph Nguyen [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Steve ACumbie [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Christopher BMosley [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT Olyn Poole [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 3:11:38 PM SENT 4 /s/ Amanda L. Reichek Amanda L. Reichek Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Robert Salinas 17536000 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Roel Gutierrez 24069842 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Rosa Perez [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF ARLINGTON Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Alexander JLindvall [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM I SENT I Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/23/2025 10:43:11 PM SENT Associated Case Party: JOEDONBOBBITT Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Joe DonBobbitt [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM I SENT I Case Contacts Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Liz Hansen [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Jonathan Moss [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Nena Chima-Tetteh [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THEPLEASANTON HFC Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Blake Stribling [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Kim Decker [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Rachel Feltner [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Christopher Schluter [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Daniel Lecavalier 24129028 [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Julie Whitson [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Faith Lowry [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT Associated Case Party: THELA VILLA HFC Associated Case Party: THECITY OF FORT WORTH Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status Chandra Jackson [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT THE CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT THE A.CITY OF FORT WORTH [email protected] 6/24/2025 2:35:20 PM SENT AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 1 AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 2 AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 3 AMENDED NOTICE OF ACCELERATED APPEAL PAGE 4 :~;n~u~ THE STATE OF TEXAS COUNTY OF TARRANT I, Thomas A. Wilder , Clerk of the District Courts of Tarrant County, Texas, do hereby certify that the documents contained in this record to which this certification is attached are all of the documents specified by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedures 34.S(a) and all other documents timely requested by a party to this proceeding under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.S(b). GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL at my office in Tarrant County, Texas, this date of June 26, 2025. Thomas A. Wilder District Clerk Tarrant County, Texas By:E~U~ Deputy District Clerk