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U.S. CodeTitle 29Chapter 8— Fair Labor Standards

29 U.S.C. § 215 (2026)

Prohibited acts; prima facie evidence

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1940–2026 1,463citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 1,463 opinions since 1940, 383 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(3) (18 cases).

(a) After the expiration of one hundred and twenty days from June 25, 1938, it shall be unlawful for any person—(1) to transport, offer for transportation, ship, deliver, or sell in commerce, or to ship, deliver, or sell with knowledge that shipment or delivery or sale thereof in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee was employed in violation of section 206 or section 207 of this title, or in violation of any regulation or order of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title; except that no provision of this chapter shall impose any liability upon any common carrier for the transportation in commerce in the regular course of its business of any goods not produced by such common carrier, and no provision of this chapter shall excuse any common carrier from its obligation to accept any goods for transportation; and except that any such transportation, offer, shipment, delivery, or sale of such goods by a purchaser who acquired them in good faith in reliance on written assurance from the producer that the goods were produced in compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and who acquired such goods for value without notice of any such violation, shall not be deemed unlawful;(2) to violate any of the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title, or any of the provisions of any regulation or order of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title;(3) to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee;(4) to violate any of the provisions of section 212 of this title;(5) to violate any of the provisions of section 211(c) of this title, or any regulation or order made or continued in effect under the provisions of section 211(d) of this title, or to make any statement, report, or record filed or kept pursuant to the provisions of such section or of any regulation or order thereunder, knowing such statement, report, or record to be false in a material respect; and(6) to violate any of the provisions of section 218d of this title.(b) For the purposes of subsection (a)(1) proof that any employee was employed in any place of employment where goods shipped or sold in commerce were produced, within ninety days prior to the removal of the goods from such place of employment, shall be prima facie evidence that such employee was engaged in the production of such goods.(June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 15, 52 Stat. 1068; Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 736, § 13, 63 Stat. 919; 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 6, §§ 1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263; Pub. L. 117–328, div. KK, § 102(b)(1), Dec. 29, 2022, 136 Stat. 6095.)Editorial NotesAmendments

2022—Subsec. (a)(6). Pub. L. 117–328 added par. (6).

1949—Subsec. (a)(1). Act Oct. 26, 1949, § 13(a), inserted provision protecting purchaser in good faith in sale of goods produced in violation of this chapter.

Subsec. (a)(5). Act Oct. 26, 1949, § 13(b), inserted “or any regulation or order made or continued in effect under the provisions of section 211(d) of this title” after “211(c) of this title”.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2022 Amendment

Pub. L. 117–328, div. KK, § 103(b), Dec. 29, 2022, 136 Stat. 6096, provided that: “The amendments made by section 102(b) [amending this section and section 216 of this title] shall take effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Dec. 29, 2022].”

Effective Date of 1949 Amendment

Amendment by act Oct. 26, 1949, effective ninety days after Oct. 26, 1949, see section 16(a) of act Oct. 26, 1949, set out as a note under section 202 of this title.

Liability of Public Agency for Discrimination Against Employee for Assertion of Coverage

Pub. L. 99–150, § 8, Nov. 13, 1985, 99 Stat. 791, provided that: “A public agency which is a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate governmental agency and which discriminates or has discriminated against an employee with respect to the employee’s wages or other terms or conditions of employment because on or after February 19, 1985, the employee asserted coverage under section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 [29 U.S.C. 207] shall be held to have violated section 15(a)(3) of such Act [29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)]. The protection against discrimination afforded by the preceding sentence shall be available after August 1, 1986, only for an employee who takes an action described in section 15(a)(3) of such Act.”

Executive DocumentsTransfer of Functions

For transfer of functions of other officers, employees, and agencies of Department of Labor, with certain exceptions, to Secretary of Labor, with power to delegate, see Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1950, §§ 1, 2, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263, set out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

The 20 cases that cite 29 U.S.C. § 215 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENAvila v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 758 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014).
cites § 215 10×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 215
“Avila then brought this action, claiming that he was fired in retaliation for testifying, in violation of the FLSA anti- retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). The evidence at trial was that the only officers disciplined for not claiming overtime were those who testified…”
The case’s holding
Arguments not raised clearly and distinctly in the opening brief are waived and will not be considered on appeal.
Later courts cite it for
“arguments 'not raised clearly and distinctly in the opening brief' are waived.” · 7 citing courts
2
GREENAlla Rosenfield v. Globaltranz Enter., 811 F.3d 282 (9th Cir. 2015).
cites § 215 15×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 215
“” The panel held that a complaining employee’s position is an important part of the “context” that the fact- finder must consider, but the panel declined to formulate or adopt a special bright-line rule to apply when considering whether a manager has “filed any complaint” within…”
Later courts cite it for
“an employee's 11 managerial position is an important contextual element that must be considered 12 when assessing whether the employee has filed a complaint” · 1 citing court
3
GREENPeter Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000).
cites § 215 11×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 215
“Ball commenced this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that his discharge was retaliatory in that he was “about to testify” in a “proceeding under or related to” that Act, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). The district court granted Memphis Bar-B-Q’s…”
The case’s holding
The Fair Labor Standards Act anti-retaliation provision does not protect employees from discharge for internal complaints or for anticipated testimony in unfiled lawsuits.
Later courts cite it for
“cause of action for retaliation under the flsa is much more circumscribed.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENGreathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2015).
cites § 215 5×cited by 157 cases
Where it cites § 215
“1993), concerning what constitutes “fil[ing a] complaint” under the anti-retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). Section 215(a)(3) makes it unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner , discriminate against any employee because…”
The case’s holding
The Fair Labor Standards Act protects employees from retaliation for oral complaints made to employers if the communication is sufficiently clear to signal an assertion of protected rights.
Later courts cite it for
“the decision whether to enter default judgment is committed to the district court's discretion.” · 43 citing courts
5
GREENBrian Sexton v. Panel Processing, Inc., 754 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2014).
cites § 215 14×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 215
“§ 2087(a) (Consumer Product Safety Act); 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a) (Fair Labor Standards Act); id.”
Later courts cite it for
“all matters of interpretation begin with the text; some end there.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENDellinger v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 649 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2011).
cites § 215 10×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 215
“OPINION NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: Natalie Dellinger commenced this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA") against Science Applications International Corporation which, she alleges, retaliated against her, in violation of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision,…”
Later courts cite it for
“an applicant who never began or performed any work" would” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENEdwards v. AH Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010).
cites § 215 6×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 215
“29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). Section 510 of ERISA, in contrast, extends only to persons that have "given information or [] testified" in an *225 "inquiry or proceeding.”
The case’s holding
Section 510 of ERISA does not protect unsolicited internal complaints to management because the statutory terms inquiry or proceeding imply formal actions rather than informal statements.
Later courts cite it for
“even beyond the plain meaning of 'inquiry' and 'proceeding,' the phrase 'testified or is about to testify' implies that the phrase 'inquiry or proceeding' is limited to more formal actions.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENMiddleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
cites § 215 7×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 215
“(2001), apply to a claim against state employees sued in their individual capacities for retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1994). [1] We hold that state employees do not enjoy sovereign immunity when sued in their individual capacities for…”
The case’s holding
A state's notice-of-claim requirement is preempted by the Fair Labor Standards Act and does not bar an FLSA retaliation suit against state employees sued individually.
Later courts cite it for
“an analysis of federal preemption issues begins with 'the basic assumption that congress did not intend to displace state law.” · 4 citing courts
9
GREENDarveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2008).
cites § 215 4×cited by 151 cases
Where it cites § 215
“Darveau then amended his complaint in this case to allege that Detecon’s lawsuit constituted an illegal retaliatory action under 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) (2000) of the FLSA.”
The case’s holding
A retaliation claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act requires an action that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse and which could dissuade them from making a charge.
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff asserting a prima facie claim of retaliation under the flsa must show that (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the flsa; (2) he suffered adverse action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with such protected activity; and (3) a causal connection exists between the employee's activity and the employer's adverse action.” · 18 citing courts
10
GREENLambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 1998).
cites § 215 5×cited by 236 cases
Where it cites § 215
“Following their discharge, the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that they had been fired in retaliation for their complaints about the defendants’ failure to comply with federal overtime requirements, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3), and in violation of the…”
The case’s holding
The Fair Labor Standards Act protects employees from retaliation for filing complaints regarding wage and hour violations directly with their employers.
Later courts cite it for
“where an individual exercises control over the nature and structure of the employment relationship, or economic control over the relationship, that individual is an employer within the meaning of the flsa.” · 17 citing courts
11
GREENAvis K. Hornsby-Culpepper v. R. David Ware, 906 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2018).
cites § 215 2×cited by 183 cases
Where it cites § 215
“§ 206 (d)(1) ; and (3) retaliation by terminating her employment and not selecting her for an Associate Judge position, in violation of the Equal Pay Act, as incorporated into the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). 1 On appeal, she argues that the…”
The case’s holding
Summary judgment is proper when a plaintiff merely disputes the wisdom of an employer's reasoning without presenting affirmative evidence that the proffered reasons are false or pretextual.
Later courts cite it for
“summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows 'that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” · 67 citing courts
12
GREENLori G. McKenzie v. Renberg's Inc., 94 F.3d 1478 (10th Cir. 1996).
cites § 215 6×cited by 127 cases
Where it cites § 215
“, and its president, Robert Renberg (collectively “defendants”), asserting claims for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3), and wrongful discharge in violation of Oklahoma public policy.”
The case’s holding
To engage in protected activity under the FLSA, an employee must step outside their professional role to take an action adverse to the employer.
Later courts cite it for
“in order to engage in protected activity under 215(a)(3), the employee must step outside his or her role of representing the company and either file (or threaten to file) an action adverse to the employer, actively assist other employees in asserting flsa rights, or otherwise engage in activities that reasonably could be perceived as directed towards the assertion of rights protected by the flsa.” · 9 citing courts
13
GREENBureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
cites § 215 6×cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 215
“Federal Law Governing Industrial Homeworkers Under 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(5), it is unlawful to violate any regulation or order made pursuant to 29 U.”
The case’s holding
A motion for a more definite statement should not be granted unless the defendant is literally unable to frame a responsive pleading.
Later courts cite it for
“the limited importance of pleadings in federal practice,” · 7 citing courts
14
GREENSantiago Pineda v. JTCH Apts., L.L.C., 843 F.3d 1062 (5th Cir. 2016).
cites § 215 6×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 215
“See 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). During the jury trial that followed, Defendants moved successfully for judgment as a matter of law on Pena’s retaliation claim, arguing that a nonemployee like Pena is outside the protections of the FLSA.”
15
YELLOWFrank L. LOEB v. TEXTRON, INC., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
cites § 215 3×cited by 808 cases
Abrogated by Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 215
“A relevant starting point may be 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3), which prohibits the retaliatory discharge of employees and is the FLSA provision most analogous to the ADEA’s prohibition against discriminatory discharges.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must prove that age was the determinative factor in an employment decision, meaning the adverse action would not have occurred but for the employee's age.
Later courts cite it for
“age was the 'determining factor' in his discharge in the sense that, 'but for' his employer's motive to discriminate against him because of age, he would not have been discharged.” · 14 citing courts
16
GREENBrach v. Conflict Kinetics Corp., 221 F. Supp. 3d 743 (E.D. Va. 2016).
cites § 215 7×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 215
“§§ 1132 (a) & 1140, if the complaint *745 fails to allege the existence of a benefit plan to which ERISA may apply; and (iii) Whether text messages, sent by a plaintiffs former supervisor and threatening a countersuit; are actionable as retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor…”
Later courts cite it for
“the overwhelming majority of courts, including the fifth circuit, have held that the current version of 3730(h) does not create a cause of action against supervisors sued in their individual capacities.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENClaudio-Gotay v. Becton Dickinson Caribe, Ltd., 375 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2004).
cites § 215 4×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 215
“29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). The elements of a retaliation claim under the .”
The case’s holding
To receive protection under the FLSA, an employee must take action beyond mere abstract grumblings rather than filing a formal complaint with a court or agency.
18
GREENGaughan v. Rubenstein, 261 F. Supp. 3d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
cites § 215 3×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 215
“” 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). The NYLL similarly provides that an employer shall not discharge, threaten, penalize or otherwise discriminate against an employee because she “has made a complaint to his or her employer .”
The case’s holding
A pre-litigation settlement agreement releasing fair labor standards act claims is enforceable without department of labor or court approval if signed by a counseled employee.
Later courts cite it for
“the prevailing view in this circuit is that the question of whether enterprise coverage applies goes to the merits of an flsa cause of action and is not jurisdictional.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENHagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C., 529 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. 2008).
cites § 215 3×cited by 132 cases
Where it cites § 215
“Specifically, Hagan claimed that he was engaged in protected activity under 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3) and that Echostar’s terminating him constituted unlawful retaliation.”
The case’s holding
An informal internal complaint constitutes protected activity under the FLSA because this broader interpretation better captures the anti-retaliation goals of the statute.
Later courts cite it for
“not all abstract grumblings or vague expressions of discontent are actionable as complaints.” · 7 citing courts
20
GREENMarie Patterson v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2022).
cites § 215 2×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 215
“The manager exception did not originate in the context of Title VII, but in cases involving the Fair Labor Standards Act, or 29 U.S.C. § 215 (a)(3). See, e.g., McKenzie v.”
The case’s holding
Title VII anti-retaliation provisions protect all employees regardless of job title or whether the protected activity involves the current employer.
Later courts cite it for
“the facts alleged in the charge matter most for determining what can reasonably be expected to grow out of an eeoc charge; the legal theory the charging party articulates is far less important.” · 8 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
194019832026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 144 cases in 2020–2021. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
S.D.N.Y.67E.D.N.Y526th Cir.465th Cir.4511th Cir.407th Cir.39N.D. Ill.339th Cir.31

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 149 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)6 cases
Walling v. Mut. Wholesale Food & Supply Co., 141 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1944).
Tilbury v. Rogers, 123 F. Supp. 109 (W.D. La. 1954).
Common Cause v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1971).
Shultz v. Deane-Hill Country Club, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 800 (M.D. Ga. 1957).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(2)3 cases
Marshall v. Morse Operations, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Wireless Boys, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-00718 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2023).
(a)(3)18 cases
Campusano v. Lusitano Constr. LLC, 56 A.3d 303 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
Quiles v. Parent, 28 Cal. App. 5th 1000 (Ct. App. 2018).
Keith D. Bailey v. Usx Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988).
Prosser v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (M.D. Ga. 2015).
Showing the top 5 of 18. More in the list view →

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Enactment and amendments
(June 25, 1938, ch. 676, § 15, 52 Stat. 1068; Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 736, § 13, 63 Stat. 919; 1950 Reorg. Plan No. 6, §§ 1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3174, 64 Stat. 1263; Pub. L. 117–328, div. KK, § 102(b)(1), Dec. 29, 2022, 136 Stat. 6095.)
Amendment years (notes): 2022, 1949
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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