42 U.S.C. § 11302

General definition of homeless individual

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(a) In generalFor purposes of this chapter, the terms “homeless”, “homeless individual”, and “homeless person” means— 11 So in original. Probably should be “mean—”.(1) an individual or family who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence;(2) an individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a regular sleeping accommodation for human beings, including a car, park, abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground;(3) an individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements (including hotels and motels paid for by Federal, State, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing);(4) an individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily resided;(5) an individual or family who—(A) will imminently lose their housing, including housing they own, rent, or live in without paying rent, are sharing with others, and rooms in hotels or motels not paid for by Federal, State, or local government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable organizations, as evidenced by—(i) a court order resulting from an eviction action that notifies the individual or family that they must leave within 14 days;(ii) the individual or family having a primary nighttime residence that is a room in a hotel or motel and where they lack the resources necessary to reside there for more than 14 days; or(iii) credible evidence indicating that the owner or renter of the housing will not allow the individual or family to stay for more than 14 days, and any oral statement from an individual or family seeking homeless assistance that is found to be credible shall be considered credible evidence for purposes of this clause;(B) has no subsequent residence identified; and(C) lacks the resources or support networks needed to obtain other permanent housing; and(6) unaccompanied youth and homeless families with children and youth defined as homeless under other Federal statutes who—(A) have experienced a long term period without living independently in permanent housing,(B) have experienced persistent instability as measured by frequent moves over such period, and(C) can be expected to continue in such status for an extended period of time because of chronic disabilities, chronic physical health or mental health conditions, substance addiction, histories of domestic violence or childhood abuse, the presence of a child or youth with a disability, or multiple barriers to employment.(b) Domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, and other dangerous, traumatic, or life-threatening conditions relating to such violenceNotwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary shall consider to be homeless any individual or family who—(1) is experiencing trauma or a lack of safety related to, or fleeing or attempting to flee, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, or other dangerous, traumatic, or life-threatening conditions related to the violence against the individual or a family member in the individual’s or family’s current housing situation, including where the health and safety of children are jeopardized;(2) has no other safe residence; and(3) lacks the resources to obtain other safe permanent housing.(c) Income eligibility(1) In general

A homeless individual shall be eligible for assistance under any program provided by this chapter, only if the individual complies with the income eligibility requirements otherwise applicable to such program.

(2) Exception

Notwithstanding paragraph (1), a homeless individual shall be eligible for assistance under title I of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act [29 U.S.C. 3111 et seq.].

(d) Exclusion

For purposes of this chapter, the term “homeless” or “homeless individual” does not include any individual imprisoned or otherwise detained pursuant to an Act of the Congress or a State law.

(e) Persons experiencing homelessness

Any references in this chapter to homeless individuals (including homeless persons) or homeless groups (including homeless persons) shall be considered to include, and to refer to, individuals experiencing homelessness or groups experiencing homelessness, respectively.

(Pub. L. 100–77, title I, § 103, July 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 485; Pub. L. 101–625, title VIII, § 822, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 4355; Pub. L. 101–645, title VI, § 602, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4734; Pub. L. 105–277, div. A, § 101(f) [title VIII, § 405(d)(41), (f)(32)], Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681–337, 2681–427, 2681–434; Pub. L. 111–22, div. B, § 1003(a), title V, § 1502(b), May 20, 2009, 123 Stat. 1664, 1701; Pub. L. 113–128, title V, § 512(s), July 22, 2014, 128 Stat. 1712; Pub. L. 117–103, div. W, title VI, § 605(a)(1), Mar. 15, 2022, 136 Stat. 886.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

This chapter, referred to in subsecs. (a), (c)(1), (d), and (e), was in the original “this Act”, meaning Pub. L. 100–77, July 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 482, known as the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, which is classified principally to this chapter. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 11301 of this title and Tables.

The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, referred to in subsec. (c)(2), is Pub. L. 113–128, July 22, 2014, 128 Stat. 1425. Title I of the Act is classified generally to subchapter I (§ 3111 et seq.) of chapter 32 of Title 29, Labor. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under section 3101 of Title 29 and Tables.

Amendments

2022—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 117–103 amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the Secretary shall consider to be homeless any individual or family who is fleeing, or is attempting to flee, domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, stalking, or other dangerous or life-threatening conditions in the individual’s or family’s current housing situation, including where the health and safety of children are jeopardized, and who have no other residence and lack the resources or support networks to obtain other permanent housing.”

2014—Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 113–128 substituted “a homeless individual shall be eligible for assistance under title I of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act” for “a homeless individual shall be eligible for assistance under title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998”.

2009—Pub. L. 111–22 added subsecs. (a), (b), and (e), redesignated former subsecs. (b) and (c) as (c) and (d), respectively, and struck out former subsec. (a) which defined “homeless” or “homeless individual or homeless person”.

1998—Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 105–277, § 101(f) [title VIII, § 405(f)(32)], struck out “the Job Training Partnership Act or” after “assistance under”.

Pub. L. 105–277, § 101(f) [title VIII, § 405(d)(41)], substituted “the Job Training Partnership Act or title I of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998” for “the Job Training Partnership Act”.

1990—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 101–625 inserted “or homeless person” after “homeless individual” in introductory provisions.

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 101–645 amended subsec. (b) generally. Prior to amendment, subsec. (b) read as follows: “A homeless individual shall be eligible for assistance under any program provided by this chapter, or by the amendments made by this Act, only if the individual complies with the income eligibility requirements otherwise applicable to such program.”

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2022 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 117–103 not effective until Oct. 1 of the first fiscal year beginning after Mar. 15, 2022, see section 4(a) of div. W of Pub. L. 117–103, set out as an Effective Date note under section 6851 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

Effective Date of 2014 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 113–128 effective on the first day of the first full program year after July 22, 2014 (July 1, 2015), see section 506 of Pub. L. 113–128, set out as an Effective Date note under section 3101 of Title 29, Labor.

Effective Date of 2009 Amendment

Pub. L. 111–22, div. B, title V, § 1503, May 20, 2009, 123 Stat. 1702, provided that:

“Except as specifically provided otherwise in this division [see Short Title of 2009 Amendment note set out under section 11301 of this title], this division and the amendments made by this division shall take effect on, and shall apply beginning on—“(1) the expiration of the 18-month period beginning on the date of the enactment of this division [May 20, 2009], or“(2) the expiration of the 3-month period beginning upon publication by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development of final regulations pursuant to section 1504 [the first final regulations pursuant to section 1504 (42 U.S.C. 11301 note) were published on Dec. 5, 2011, see 76 F.R. 75994],whichever occurs first.”

Effective Date of 1998 Amendment

Amendment by section 101(f) [title VIII, § 405(d)(41)] of Pub. L. 105–277 effective Oct. 21, 1998, and amendment by section 101(f) [title VIII, § 405(f)(32)] of Pub. L. 105–277 effective July 1, 2000, see section 101(f) [title VIII, § 405(g)(1), (2)(B)] of Pub. L. 105–277, set out as a note under section 3502 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.

Regulations

Pub. L. 111–22, div. B, § 1003(b), May 20, 2009, 123 Stat. 1666, provided that: “Not later than the expiration of the 6-month period beginning upon the date of the enactment of this division [May 20, 2009], the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall issue regulations that provide sufficient guidance to recipients of funds under title IV of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. 11360 et seq.] to allow uniform and consistent implementation of the requirements of section 103 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 11302], as amended by subsection (a) of this section. This subsection shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this division.”

Clarification of Effect on Other Laws

Pub. L. 111–22, div. B, § 1003(c), May 20, 2009, 123 Stat. 1666, provided that: “This section [amending this section and enacting provisions set out as a note under this section] and the amendments made by this section to section 103 of the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11302) may not be construed to affect, alter, limit, annul, or supersede any other provision of Federal law providing a definition of ‘homeless’, ‘homeless individual’, or ‘homeless person’ for purposes other than such Act [42 U.S.C. 11301 et seq.], except to the extent that such provision refers to such section 103 or the definition provided in such section 103.”

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1987–2025 · leading case: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (2024) scotus “, 42 U. S. C. § 11302 (defning “homeless,” “homeless individual,” and “homeless person”); 24 CFR § 582.”
JONES v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES (2006) ca9 · cites it 2× “McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (a) (2000). Appellants are six of the more than 80,000 homeless individuals in Los Angeles County on any given night.”
Moore v. Lumpkin (1994) illappct “In May 1993, the named plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint on behalf of themselves and a class consisting of "all persons in Chicago, Illinois who, on or after January 1, 1991, have been, are or will be ’homeless’ as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (2).” Of the named plaintiffs,…”
Bullock v. Board of Education (2002) mdd “The original motion for certification utilizes the definition of "homeless” in the McKinney Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11302 . On or about July 17, 2002, Plaintiffs submitted a motion to amend the motion for class certification to revise the definition of Class A to reflect the definition…”
City of Grants Pass v. Johnson (2024) scotus “, 42 U. S. C. §11302 (defining “homeless,” “homeless individual,” and “homeless person”); 24 CFR §582.”
Mangiafico v. State Board of Education (2012) connappct “(A) means individuals who lack a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence (within the meaning of [ 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (a) (1)]); and (B) . . .”
Lampkin v. District of Columbia (1995) dcd “” 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (b)(1). Consequently, argues the District, there must first be a process of verifying the information in the family’s application for shelter services.”
Orozco Ex Rel. Arroyo v. Sobol (1987) nysd “482 , 485 (1987) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (a)), which provides in pertinent part: "[T]he term ‘homeless’ or ‘homeless individual’ includes — (1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence; and (2) an individual who has a primary…”
Smart v. U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs (2010) txwd “Therein, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiffs pleadings— along with evidence introduced at the motion hearing — established that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the HUD-VASH program because he did not meet the definition of “homeless” under the McKinney Act,…”
Smart v. US DEPT. OF VETERAN AFFAIRS (2010) txwd “Therein, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff's pleadings— along with evidence introduced at the motion hearing—established that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the HUD-VASH program because he did not meet the definition of "homeless" under the McKinney Act, 42…”
Dunn v. Covington (2020) ncctapp “]” 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (a)(1) (2015). The record shows that Defendants did “reside” overnight with Tracy in the extended-stay motel for a month; however, an extended-stay motel is “fixed, regular, and adequate” and is clearly meant for human habitation and Defendants were…”
Dunn v. Covington (2020) ncctapp “]” 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (a)(1) (2015). The record shows that Defendants did “reside” overnight with Tracy in the extended-stay motel for a month; however, an extended-stay motel is “fixed, regular, and adequate” and is clearly meant for human habitation and Defendants were…”
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