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U.S. CodeTitle 42Chapter 7— Social SecuritySubchapter XVIII— Health Insurance for Aged and DisabledPart E— Miscellaneous Provisions

42 U.S.C. § 1395gg (2026)

Overpayment on behalf of individuals and settlement of claims for benefits on behalf of deceased individuals

Edition and currency
U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTU.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point) cited 1972–2026 65citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 65 opinions since 1972, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (c) (20 cases).

(a) Payments to providers of services or other person regarded as payment to individuals

Any payment under this subchapter to any provider of services or other person with respect to any items or services furnished any individual shall be regarded as a payment to such individual.

(b) Incorrect payments on behalf of individuals; payment adjustmentWhere—(1) more than the correct amount is paid under this subchapter to a provider of services or other person for items or services furnished an individual and the Secretary determines (A) that, within such period as he may specify, the excess over the correct amount cannot be recouped from such provider of services or other person, or (B) that such provider of services or other person was without fault with respect to the payment of such excess over the correct amount, or(2) any payment has been made under section 1395f(e) of this title to a provider of services or other person for items or services furnished an individual,proper adjustments shall be made, under regulations prescribed (after consultation with the Railroad Retirement Board) by the Secretary, by decreasing subsequent payments—(3) to which such individual is entitled under subchapter II of this chapter or under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 [45 U.S.C. 231 et seq.], as the case may be, or(4) if such individual dies before such adjustment has been completed, to which any other individual is entitled under subchapter II of this chapter or under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 [45 U.S.C. 231 et seq.], as the case may be, with respect to the wages and self-employment income or the compensation constituting the basis of the benefits of such deceased individual under subchapter II of this chapter.As soon as practicable after any adjustment under paragraph (3) or (4) is determined to be necessary, the Secretary, for purposes of this section, section 1395i(g) of this title, and section 1395t(f) of this title, shall certify (to the Railroad Retirement Board if the adjustment is to be made by decreasing subsequent payments under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 [45 U.S.C. 231 et seq.]) the amount of the overpayment as to which the adjustment is to be made. For purposes of clause (B) of paragraph (1), such provider of services or such other person shall, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be deemed to be without fault if the Secretary’s determination that more than such correct amount was paid was made subsequent to the fifth year following the year in which notice was sent to such individual that such amount had been paid; except that the Secretary may reduce such five-year period to not less than one year if he finds such reduction is consistent with the objectives of this subchapter.(c) Exception to subsection (b) payment adjustment

There shall be no adjustment as provided in subsection (b) (nor shall there be recovery) in any case where the incorrect payment has been made (including payments under section 1395f(e) of this title) with respect to an individual who is without fault or where the adjustment (or recovery) would be made by decreasing payments to which another person who is without fault is entitled as provided in subsection (b)(4), if such adjustment (or recovery) would defeat the purposes of subchapter II or subchapter XVIII or would be against equity and good conscience. Adjustment or recovery of an incorrect payment (or only such part of an incorrect payment as the Secretary determines to be inconsistent with the purposes of this subchapter) against an individual who is without fault shall be deemed to be against equity and good conscience if (A) the incorrect payment was made for expenses incurred for items or services for which payment may not be made under this subchapter by reason of the provisions of paragraph (1) or (9) of section 1395y(a) of this title and (B) if the Secretary’s determination that such payment was incorrect was made subsequent to the fifth year following the year in which notice of such payment was sent to such individual; except that the Secretary may reduce such five-year period to not less than one year if he finds such reduction is consistent with the objectives of this subchapter.

(d) Liability of certifying or disbursing officer for failure to recoup

No certifying or disbursing officer shall be held liable for any amount certified or paid by him to any provider of services or other person where the adjustment or recovery of such amount is waived under subsection (c) or where adjustment under subsection (b) is not completed prior to the death of all persons against whose benefits such adjustment is authorized.

(e) Settlement of claims for benefits under this subchapter on behalf of deceased individualsIf an individual, who received services for which payment may be made to such individual under this subchapter, dies, and payment for such services was made (other than under this subchapter), and the individual died before any payment due him under this subchapter with respect to such services was completed, payment of the amount due (including the amount of any unnegotiated checks) shall be made—(1) if the payment for such services was made (before or after such individual’s death) by a person other than the deceased individual, to the person or persons determined by the Secretary under regulations to have paid for such services, or if the payment for such services was made by the deceased individual before his death, to the legal representative of the estate of such deceased individual, if any;(2) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), to the person, if any, who is determined by the Secretary to be the surviving spouse of the deceased individual and who was either living in the same household with the deceased at the time of his death or was, for the month in which the deceased individual died, entitled to a monthly benefit on the basis of the same wages and self-employment income as was the deceased individual;(3) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1) or (2), or if the person who meets such requirements dies before the payment due him under this subchapter is completed, to the child or children, if any, of the deceased individual who were, for the month in which the deceased individual died, entitled to monthly benefits on the basis of the same wages and self-employment income as was the deceased individual (and, in case there is more than one such child, in equal parts to each such child);(4) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (3), or if each person who meets such requirements dies before the payment due him under this subchapter is completed, to the parent or parents, if any, of the deceased individual who were, for the month in which the deceased individual died, entitled to monthly benefits on the basis of the same wages and self-employment income as was the deceased individual (and, in case there is more than one such parent, in equal parts to each such parent);(5) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4), or if each person who meets such requirements dies before the payment due him under this subchapter is completed, to the person, if any, determined by the Secretary to be the surviving spouse of the deceased individual;(6) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5), or if each person who meets such requirements dies before the payment due him under this subchapter is completed, to the person or persons, if any, determined by the Secretary to be the child or children of the deceased individual (and, in case there is more than one such child, in equal parts to each such child);(7) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), or (6), or if each person who meets such requirements dies before the payment due him under this subchapter is completed, to the parent or parents, if any, of the deceased individual (and, in case there is more than one such parent, in equal parts to each such parent); or(8) if there is no person who meets the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (7), or if each person who meets such requirements dies before the payment due him under this subchapter is completed, to the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased individual, if any.(f) Settlement of claims for section 1395k benefits on behalf of deceased individualsIf an individual who received medical and other health services for which payment may be made under section 1395k(a)(1) of this title dies, and no assignment of the right to payment for such services was made by such individual before his death, and payment for such services has not been made—(1) if the person or persons who furnished the services agree to the terms of assignment specified in section 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) of this title with respect to the services, payment for such services shall be made to such person or persons, and(2) if the person or persons who furnished the services do not agree to the terms of assignment specified in section 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) of this title with respect to the services, payment for such services shall be made on the basis of an itemized bill to the person who has agreed to assume the legal obligation to make payment for such services and files a request for payment (with such accompanying evidence of such legal obligation as may be required in regulations),but only in such amount and subject to such conditions as would be applicable if the individual who received the services had not died.(g) Refund of premiums for deceased individuals

If an individual, who is enrolled under section 1395i–2(c) of this title or under section 1395p of this title, dies, and premiums with respect to such enrollment have been received with respect to such individual for any month after the month of his death, such premiums shall be refunded to the person or persons determined by the Secretary under regulations to have paid such premiums or if payment for such premiums was made by the deceased individual before his death, to the legal representative of the estate of such deceased individual, if any. If there is no person who meets the requirements of the preceding sentence such premiums shall be refunded to the person or persons in the priorities specified in paragraphs (2) through (7) of subsection (e).

(h) Appeals by providers of services or suppliers

Notwithstanding subsection (f) or any other provision of law, the Secretary shall permit a provider of services or supplier to appeal any determination of the Secretary under this subchapter relating to services rendered under this subchapter to an individual who subsequently dies if there is no other party available to appeal such determination.

(Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, title XVIII, § 1870, as added Pub. L. 89–97, title I, § 102(a), July 30, 1965, 79 Stat. 331; amended Pub. L. 90–248, title I, § 154(b), (c), Jan. 2, 1968, 81 Stat. 862; Pub. L. 92–603, title II, §§ 261(a), 266, 281(a), (b), Oct. 30, 1972, 86 Stat. 1448, 1450, 1454, 1455; Pub. L. 93–445, title III, § 309, Oct. 16, 1974, 88 Stat. 1358; Pub. L. 96–499, title IX, § 954(a), Dec. 5, 1980, 94 Stat. 2647; Pub. L. 97–248, title I, § 128(d)(1), Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat. 367; Pub. L. 100–203, title IV, §§ 4039(h)(7), 4096(a)(2), Dec, 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–139, as amended Pub. L. 100–360, title IV, § 411(e)(3), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 776; Pub. L. 100–360, title IV, § 411(j)(4)(B), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 791; Pub. L. 108–173, title IX, § 939(a), Dec. 8, 2003, 117 Stat. 2416; Pub. L. 112–240, title VI, § 638(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2357.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, referred to in subsec. (b), is act Aug. 29, 1935, ch. 812, as amended generally by Pub. L. 93–445, title I, § 101, Oct. 16, 1974, 88 Stat. 1305, which is classified generally to subchapter IV (§ 231 et seq.) of chapter 9 of Title 45, Railroads. For further details and complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Codification note set out preceding section 231 of Title 45, section 231t of Title 45, and Tables.

Amendments

2013—Subsecs. (b), (c). Pub. L. 112–240 substituted “fifth year” for “third year” and “five-year” for “three-year” in last sentence.

2003—Subsec. (h). Pub. L. 108–173 added subsec. (h).

1988—Pub. L. 100–360, § 411(e)(3), added Pub. L. 100–203, § 4039(h)(7), see 1987 Amendment note below.

Subsec. (f)(1), (2). Pub. L. 100–360, § 411(j)(4)(B), substituted “of assignment specified in” for “specified in subclauses (I) and (II) of”.

1987—Pub. L. 100–203, § 4039(h)(7), as added by Pub. L. 100–360, § 411(e)(3), amended section catchline generally.

Subsec. (f)(1), (2). Pub. L. 100–203, § 4096(a)(2), substituted “to the terms specified in subclauses (I) and (II) of section 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) of this title with respect to the services” for “that the reasonable charge is the full charge for the services”.

1982—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 97–248 substituted “section 1395y(a)” for “section 1395y”.

1980—Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 96–499 amended subsec. (f) generally, inserting provision for payments to providers of medical and other health services where the person or persons furnishing the services did not agree that the reasonable charge was the full charge for such services.

1974—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 93–445 substituted “Railroad Retirement Act of 1974” for “Railroad Retirement Act of 1937”, wherever appearing.

1972—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 92–603, § 281(a), required that provider of services or other person be without fault with respect to payment of excess over correct amount as prerequisite to adjustment or recovery of incorrect payments.

Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 92–603, §§ 261(a), 281(b), substituted “or where the adjustment (or recovery) would be made by decreasing payments to which another person who is without fault is entitled as provided in subsection (b)(4), if” for “and where”, inserted reference to subchapter XVIII of this chapter, and inserted provisions covering the adjustment or recovery of incorrect payments against individuals who are without fault.

Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 92–603, § 266, added subsec. (g).

1968—Pub. L. 90–248, § 154(b), provided for settlement of claims for benefits on behalf of deceased individuals in section catchline.

Subsecs. (e), (f). Pub. L. 90–248, § 154(c), added subsecs. (e) and (f).

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesEffective Date of 2013 Amendment

Pub. L. 112–240, title VI, § 638(b), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2357, provided that: “The amendments made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Jan. 2, 2013].”

Effective Date of 2003 Amendment

Pub. L. 108–173, title IX, § 939(b), Dec. 8, 2003, 117 Stat. 2416, provided that: “The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 8, 2003] and shall apply to items and services furnished on or after such date.”

Effective Date of 1988 Amendment

Except as specifically provided in section 411 of Pub. L. 100–360, amendment by Pub. L. 100–360, as it relates to a provision in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100–203, effective as if included in the enactment of that provision in Pub. L. 100–203, see section 411(a) of Pub. L. 100–360, set out as a Reference to OBRA; Effective Date note under section 106 of Title 1, General Provisions.

Effective Date of 1987 Amendment

Amendment by section 4096(a)(2) of Pub. L. 100–203 applicable to services furnished on or after Jan. 1, 1988, see section 4096(d) of Pub. L. 100–203, set out as a note under section 1320c–3 of this title.

Effective Date of 1982 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 97–248 effective Sept. 3, 1982, see section 128(e)(3) of Pub. L. 97–248, set out as a note under section 1395x of this title.

Effective Date of 1980 Amendment

Pub. L. 96–499, title IX, § 954(b), Dec. 5, 1980, 94 Stat. 2647, provided that: “The amendment made by this section [amending this section] shall apply only to claims filed on or after January 1, 1981.”

Effective Date of 1974 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 93–445 effective Jan. 1, 1975, see section 603 of Pub. L. 93–445, set out as a note under section 402 of this title.

Effective Date of 1972 Amendment

Pub. L. 92–603, title II, § 261(b), Oct. 30, 1972, 86 Stat. 1448, provided that: “The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall apply with respect to waiver actions considered after the date of the enactment of this Act [Oct. 30, 1972].”

Pub. L. 92–603, title II, § 281(g), Oct. 30, 1972, 86 Stat. 1456, provided that: “The provisions of subsection (a)(1) [amending this section] shall apply with respect to notices of payment sent to individuals after the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 30, 1972]. The provisions of subsections (a)(2), (b), (c), and (d) [amending this section and sections 1395u and 1395cc of this title] shall apply in the case of notices sent to individuals after 1968. The provisions of subsections (e) and (f) [amending sections 1395f and 1395n of this title] shall apply in the case of services furnished (or deemed to have been furnished) after 1970.”

Waiver of Liability Limiting Recoupment in Certain Cases

Pub. L. 101–239, title VI, § 6109, Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2213, provided that: “In the case where more than the correct amount may have been paid to a physician or individual under part B of title XVIII of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1395j et seq.] with respect to services furnished during the period beginning on July 1, 1985, and ending on March 31, 1986, as a result of a carrier’s establishing statewide fees for certain procedure codes while the carrier was in the process of implementing the national common procedure coding system of the Health Care Financing Administration, the provisions of section 1870(c) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 1395gg(c)] shall apply, without the need for affirmative action by such a physician or individual, so as to prevent any recoupment, or other decrease in subsequent payments, to the physician or individual. The previous sentence shall apply to claims for items and services which were reopened by carriers on or after July 31, 1987.”

The 20 cases that cite 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENHadden v. United States, 661 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2011).
cites § 1395gg 4×subsections: (c) 4×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“" See 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(c). The Medicare Appeals Council agreed with each of those findings.”
Later courts cite it for
“if two statutes use the same words in related contexts, the caselaw for one statute might be relevant in construing the other.” · 1 citing court
2
GREENCalifano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
cites § 1395gg 1×cited by 1,861 cases
The case’s holding
The Social Security Act does not prohibit class-action relief or the certification of a nationwide class under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Later courts cite it for
“an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” · 140 citing courts
3
GREENMaine Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, 841 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2016).
cites § 1395gg 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“See 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg. The Secretary rejoins that the statute on which the Hospitals rely, 42 U.”
4
GREENMacKenzie Med. Supply, Inc. v. Leavitt, 506 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2007).
cites § 1395gg 3×subsections: (c) 3×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“; and (3) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395gg(c) and 1395pp(a) entitled it to waiver of repayment.”
Later courts cite it for
“secretary's final decision in this case . . . is to be based solely on the administrative record, and the secretary's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” · 3 citing courts
5
REDAction All. of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt, 456 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2006).
cites § 1395gg 6×subsections: (c) 2× (a) (b)cited by 6 cases
Vacated by Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt (2007): the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 1395gg
“The provision gives the Secretary general authority to recover from a beneficiary an overpayment “for items or services furnished an individual” (usually due to a coverage error) by decreasing that beneficiary’s subsequent Social Security payments.”
6
NO FLAGAction All. of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt, 483 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
cites § 1395gg 6×subsections: (a) (c)cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“§ 404 (b), we find that the district court lacked jurisdiction; and the second claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg, clearly lacks merit. Thus, we vacate the injunction and remand.”
7
GREENUnited States v. John Canova, 412 F.3d 331 (2d Cir. 2005).
cites § 1395gg 1×cited by 144 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“1998) (explaining that carriers "are indispensable components of the governmental program and are in a unique position to combat the drain on public resources caused by fraudulent claims”), and the recoupment of any payments made to a provider for services not covered by…”
The case’s holding
A district court must apply a loss enhancement when fraudulent conduct causes a pecuniary loss to a victim, even if the services provided retain some value.
Later courts cite it for
“focus primarily on the sentencing court's compliance with its statutory obligation to consider the factors detailed in 18 u.s.c. 3553 (a).” · 19 citing courts
8
GREENAction All. of Senior Citizens v. Johnson, 607 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2009).
cites § 1395gg 4×subsections: (c) 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“) The complaint rested in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg, which allows the government to recover funds where “more than the correct amount is paid under th[e] [Medicare] subchapter .”
9
GREENVisiting Nurses Ass'n of Sw. Indiana v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2000).
cites § 1395gg 15×subsections: (c) 5× (a) (b) (d)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“The Providers sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg, a section of the Social Security Act governing Medicare payments.”
Later courts cite it for
“because the only adjustment contemplated by 1395gg(b) is an adjustment of payments to individuals, no waiver under 1395gg(c) is possible for these providers.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENUnited States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 399 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
cites § 1395gg 1×subsections: (b)cited by 92 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“La-hey relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(b) for the *6 proposition that no collection may be had from a provider who is "without fault,” and that the statute presumes that a provider is without fault if the reimbursement determination is more than three years’ old.”
The case’s holding
The government retains the right to sue for restitution to recover monies wrongly paid from the Treasury even in the absence of express statutory authorization.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion to dismiss an action under rule 12(b)(1) . . . raises the fundamental question whether the federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it.” · 16 citing courts
11
GREENFlorida Med. Ctr. of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius, 614 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010).
cites § 1395gg 2×subsections: (b)cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“See 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(b). Thus, we ask only if the ALJ’s legal conclusion was a “permissible construction” of the Secretary’s recoupment power.”
Later courts cite it for
“for reasons of administrative efficiency, carriers typically authorize payment on claims immediately upon receipt of claims, so long as the claims do not contain glaring irregularities.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENCochran v. U.S. Health Care Fin. Admin., 291 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 2002).
cites § 1395gg 1×subsections: (e)cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“To exhaust her administrative appeals, Cochran would first have to request that the agency exercise its discretion to waive its right to collect from the proceeds of her tort suit the medical expenses it had paid on her behalf.”
The case’s holding
Statutory exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite that cannot be bypassed by a judicial exception for futility or fear of success.
Later courts cite it for
“may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even if not relied on by the district court.” · 10 citing courts
13
GREENUnited States v. Canova, 485 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 2007).
cites § 1395gg 1×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“The Government was entitled to recoup full payment for all noncompliant tests, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg; 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.371 (a), 405.”
Later courts cite it for
“reasonableness review involves consideration of both the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness) and the procedures used to arrive at the sentence (procedural reasonableness).” · 14 citing courts
14
GREENLaura Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
cites § 1395gg 1×subsections: (b)cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(b). 11 . § 1331. Federal question The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
The case’s holding
Tucker Act jurisdiction is preempted for claims arising under the Medicare Act when Congress provides a specific and comprehensive scheme for administrative and judicial review.
Later courts cite it for
“we do not suggest that the application of 42 u.s.c. 405 (h) precludes judicial review through other avenues in cases where the specialized administrative and judicial review processes provided in the statute are not available.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENLivinrite, Inc. v. Azar, 386 F. Supp. 3d 644 (E.D. Va. 2019).
cites § 1395gg 2×subsections: (b)cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“§ 1395pp or a waiver of recoupment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg should be set aside because these determinations apply incorrect legal standards and are unsupported by substantial evidence.”
16
GREENWilson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 760 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
cites § 1395gg 2×subsections: (c)cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“§ 405 (h), the administrative review procedure provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg is available to plaintiff.”
Later courts cite it for
“medical care thus is secured for a medicare-eligible person whose care is covered by an insurer that should be the primary payer, but has not resolved the claim timely enough to pay for the medical care at the time payment is due.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 1395gg 1×subsections: (c)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“IV Having addressed Taransky’s col-orable arguments, we turn only briefly to her remaining claims, which we dismiss out of hand for lack of jurisdiction.”
Later courts cite it for
“as its title suggests, the statute designates medicare as a 'secondary payer' of medical benefits, and thus precludes the program from providing such benefits when a 'primary plan' could be expected to pay.” · 2 citing courts
18
cites § 1395gg 1×cited by 64 cases
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions requiring administrative exhaustion for Medicare benefits do not bar federal-question jurisdiction for qui tam actions brought under the False Claims Act.
Later courts cite it for
“subsection 405(h) prevents beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries from evading administrative review by creatively styling their benefits and eligibility claims as constitutional or statutory challenges to medicare statutes and regulations.” · 5 citing courts
19
GREENIn re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
cites § 1395gg 1×subsections: (c)cited by 21 cases
Later courts cite it for
“recognizing its obligation to exercise careful oversight of this national 'quasi-class action,' the court has already utilized its equitable power to limit attorneys' fees and costs.” · 10 citing courts
20
GREENAnghel v. Sebelius, 912 F. Supp. 2d 4 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
cites § 1395gg 1×subsections: (c)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 1395gg
“42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(c). Section 7102 of the Medicare Carrier Manual states that a provider of services is without fault where she exercises reasonable care in the billing for, and acceptance of, payments made to her by the Medicare Program.”

Show all 65 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197219992026

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 2005. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
11th Cir.52d Cir.59th Cir.5D.D.C.4D.C. Cir.3E.D.N.Y31st Cir.23rd Cir.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 40 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)8 cases
Alabama Hosp. Ass'n v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 176 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
Evelyn Buckner v. Margaret Heckler, 804 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1986).
Smith v. Travelers Indem. Co., 763 F. Supp. 554 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
United States v. LaHue, 998 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Kan. 1998).
Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Leavitt, 456 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2006).“The provision gives the Secretary general authority to recover from a beneficiary an overpayment “for items or services furnished an individual” (usually due to a coverage error) by decreasing that beneficiary’s subsequent Social Security payments.”
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(b)13 cases
United States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 399 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).“La-hey relies on 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(b) for the *6 proposition that no collection may be had from a provider who is "without fault,” and that the statute presumes that a provider is without fault if the reimbursement determination is more than three years’ old.”
Laura Wilson v. United States, 405 F.3d 1002 (Fed. Cir. 2005).“42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(b). 11 . § 1331. Federal question The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Florida Med. Ctr. of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius, 614 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010).“See 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(b). Thus, we ask only if the ALJ’s legal conclusion was a “permissible construction” of the Secretary’s recoupment power.”
Livinrite, Inc. v. Azar, 386 F. Supp. 3d 644 (E.D. Va. 2019).“§ 1395pp or a waiver of recoupment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg should be set aside because these determinations apply incorrect legal standards and are unsupported by substantial evidence.”
US ex rel. Schuhardt v. Washington Univ., 228 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
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(c)20 cases
Hadden v. United States, 661 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2011).“" See 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(c). The Medicare Appeals Council agreed with each of those findings.”
MacKenzie Med. Supply, Inc. v. Leavitt, 506 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2007).“; and (3) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395gg(c) and 1395pp(a) entitled it to waiver of repayment.”
Action All. of Senior Citizens v. Johnson, 607 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2009).“) The complaint rested in part on 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg, which allows the government to recover funds where “more than the correct amount is paid under th[e] [Medicare] subchapter .”
Taransky v. Sec'y of the United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 760 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2014).“IV Having addressed Taransky’s col-orable arguments, we turn only briefly to her remaining claims, which we dismiss out of hand for lack of jurisdiction.”
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
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(d)1 case
Visiting Nurses Ass'n of Sw. Indiana v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2000).“The Providers sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg, a section of the Social Security Act governing Medicare payments.”
(e)5 cases
Cochran v. U.S. Health Care Fin. Admin., 291 F.3d 775 (11th Cir. 2002).“To exhaust her administrative appeals, Cochran would first have to request that the agency exercise its discretion to waive its right to collect from the proceeds of her tort suit the medical expenses it had paid on her behalf.”
Zinman v. Shalala, 835 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
New York State Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bowen, 684 F. Supp. 775 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
Romero v. Missirlian (In re Missirlian), 113 B.R. 129 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990).
(f)1 case
Romero v. Missirlian (In re Missirlian), 113 B.R. 129 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990).

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Enactment and amendments
(Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, title XVIII, § 1870, as added Pub. L. 89–97, title I, § 102(a), July 30, 1965, 79 Stat. 331; amended Pub. L. 90–248, title I, § 154(b), (c), Jan. 2, 1968, 81 Stat. 862; Pub. L. 92–603, title II, §§ 261(a), 266, 281(a), (b), Oct. 30, 1972, 86 Stat. 1448, 1450, 1454, 1455; Pub. L. 93–445, title III, § 309, Oct. 16, 1974, 88 Stat. 1358; Pub. L. 96–499, title IX, § 954(a), Dec. 5, 1980, 94 Stat. 2647; Pub. L. 97–248, title I, § 128(d)(1), Sept. 3, 1982, 96 Stat. 367; Pub. L. 100–203, title IV, §§ 4039(h)(7), 4096(a)(2), Dec, 22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330–139, as amended Pub. L. 100–360, title IV, § 411(e)(3), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 776; Pub. L. 100–360, title IV, § 411(j)(4)(B), July 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 791; Pub. L. 108–173, title IX, § 939(a), Dec. 8, 2003, 117 Stat. 2416; Pub. L. 112–240, title VI, § 638(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2357.)
Amendment years (notes): 2013, 2003, 1988, 1987, 1982, 1980, 1974, 1972, 1968
Versions

Edition shown: U.S. Code current through Pub. L. 119-102 (OLRC release point). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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