U.S. Code » Title 42 » Chapter CHAPTER 21— CIVIL RIGHTS › Subchapter SUBCHAPTER I–A— INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS

42 U.S.C. § 1997

Definitions

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As used in this subchapter—(1) The term “institution” means any facility or institution—(A) which is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on behalf of any State or political subdivision of a State; and(B) which is—(i) for persons who are mentally ill, disabled, or retarded, or chronically ill or handicapped;(ii) a jail, prison, or other correctional facility;(iii) a pretrial detention facility;(iv) for juveniles—(I) held awaiting trial;(II) residing in such facility or institution for purposes of receiving care or treatment; or(III) residing for any State purpose in such facility or institution (other than a residential facility providing only elementary or secondary education that is not an institution in which reside juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent, in need of supervision, neglected, placed in State custody, mentally ill or disabled, mentally retarded, or chronically ill or handicapped); or(v) providing skilled nursing, intermediate or long-term care, or custodial or residential care.(2) Privately owned and operated facilities shall not be deemed “institutions” under this subchapter if—(A) the licensing of such facility by the State constitutes the sole nexus between such facility and such State;(B) the receipt by such facility, on behalf of persons residing in such facility, of payments under title XVI, XVIII [42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., 1395 et seq.], or under a State plan approved under title XIX [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.], of the Social Security Act, constitutes the sole nexus between such facility and such State; or(C) the licensing of such facility by the State, and the receipt by such facility, on behalf of persons residing in such facility, of payments under title XVI, XVIII [42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq., 1395 et seq.], or under a State plan approved under title XIX [42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq.], of the Social Security Act, constitutes the sole nexus between such facility and such State;(3) The term “person” means an individual, a trust or estate, a partnership, an association, or a corporation;(4) The term “State” means any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any of the territories and possessions of the United States;(5) The term “legislative days” means any calendar day on which either House of Congress is in session.(Pub. L. 96–247, § 2, May 23, 1980, 94 Stat. 349.)Editorial NotesReferences in Text

The Social Security Act, referred to in par. (2)(B), (C), is act Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620. Titles XVI, XVIII, and XIX of the Social Security Act are classified generally to subchapters XVI (§ 1381 et seq.), XVIII (§ 1395 et seq.), and XIX (§ 1396 et seq.) of chapter 7 of this title, respectively. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1305 of this title and Tables.

Statutory Notes and Related SubsidiariesShort Title

Pub. L. 96–247, § 1, May 23, 1980, 94 Stat. 349, provided: “That this Act [enacting this subchapter] may be cited as the ‘Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act’.”

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 748 cases (282 in the last 5 years), 1981–2026 · leading case: Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
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Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982). · cites it 10× “B The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp.”
Daniel v. Cook Cnty., 833 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2016). · cites it 2× “The Department of Justice conducted its investigation in accordance with its authority under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 . It prepared the report based on extensive visits to the Jail, in collaboration “with consultants in the fields of…”
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). · cites it 2× “349, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp.”
George Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2019). “Obaisi and Wexford’s motion for summary judgment after concluding: (1) the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement barred Walker’s claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e); (2) Dr. Obaisi was not working at the prison during the relevant time when Walker wished to be sent back…”
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). · cites it 2× “Having reached that general conclusion, however, it bears pointing out that a prisoner plaintiff’s right to monetary relief is severely circumscribed by the terms of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e). The PLRA provides that a prisoner may not…”
Randle Griffin v. Mary Berghuis, 563 F. App'x 411 (6th Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “It would have been protected by the First Amendment and the Eighth Amendment, as well as his grievance rights under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 . I would not shut off the prisoner’s right to his day in court by summary judgment when there is a clear…”
Norelus v. Denny's, Inc., 628 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2010). · cites it 2× “2003) (holding "that fees-on-fees are recoverable under" The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e)(d)(1)(A)); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.”
Gregory Ricks v. D. Shover, 891 F.3d 468 (3rd Cir. 2018). “" 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (e). And "sexual act" as defined explicitly excludes touching that is unintentional or "through the clothing.”
Roberts v. Barreras, 484 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2007). · cites it 2× “In sum, for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the burden lies with the plaintiff; for administrative exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 , the burden lies with the defendants.”
Marie Hicks-Fields v. Christopher Pool, 860 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 2017). “2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1997 . 20 . Daniel, 833 F.3d at 741 .”
Johnson v. State of FL, 348 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003). · cites it 3× “In June 1996, the Justice Department moved to intervene in the case on the Plaintiffs’ side under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. (“CRIPA”). CRIPA empowers the Attorney General to bring or join litigation seeking injunctive relief on…”
Kellogg v. Nebraska Dep't of Corr. Servs., 690 N.W.2d 574 (Neb. 2005). · cites it 2× “” Finally, Kellogg alleges that he “has exhausted available administrative remedies pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.A. §§1997 (e) [sic].” For relief, Kellogg seeks, inter alia, a temporary restraining order, injunctive and declaratory relief, restoration of good time, restoration of…”
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— 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) — 3 cases
Victorian v. Stalder, 770 So. 2d 382 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
Luna v. Gentry (W.D. Ark. 2023).
(PC) Freeman v. Lynch (E.D. Cal. 2019).
— 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(2) — 1 case
Scott v. United States (N.D.W. Va. 2019).
— 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a) — 8 cases
Johnson v. Kahl (C.D. Ill. 2021).
Rush v. Kahl (C.D. Ill. 2021).
Patrick v. Kahl (C.D. Ill. 2021).
Gordon v. Vercellino (C.D. Ill. 2021).
Knell v. Brown (C.D. Ill. 2020).
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