Notes of Decisions
In re the Arbitration between Blackburne & Governor's Off. of Emp. Relations, 664 N.E.2d 1222 (N.Y. 1996).
· cites it 3× “A violator is subject to discharge from employment (see, 5 USC § 1505 [2]; § 1506). If removal is warranted, the governmental employer must impose that sanction or subject itself to the loss of Federal funds equivalent to two years of the violator’s salary (see, 5 USC § 1505…”
Robert D. Alexander v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 165 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 1999).
· cites it 2× “The Merit System Protection Board has plenary jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 1505 to determine after a hearing whether a state or local employee has violated the Hatch Act, and “whether the violation warrants the removal of the officer or employee from his office or…”
State of Minnesota v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 875 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1989).
· cites it 3× “On June 23, 1987, the district court issued a decision reversing the Board’s ruling in part and remanding the case to the Board for the issuance of an opinion and order consistent with the court’s finding that neither the DJT nor Kehoe willfully or knowingly violated the Hatch…”
State of Minnesota v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 858 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1988).
· cites it 2× “DISCUSSION Under 5 U.S.C. § 1505 (1982) of the Hatch Act, the Board has plenary jurisdiction to determine whether the Hatch Act has been violated and, after a hearing, the Board is authorized to determine whether the violation warrants removal from employment.”
Lisa B. Williams v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 55 F.3d 917 (4th Cir. 1995).
· cites it 2× “On appeal from the administrative decision, the district court reversed and remanded, finding that Williams was not a “covered employee” because she did not exercise “dis *920 cretionary or supervisory authority” over the use of federal funds.”
Bottoms Farm P'ship v. Sonny Perdue, 895 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2018).
“Given the Act's broad grant of authority to the Corporation, and the specific authority over the provisions of insurance and insurance contracts found in 5 U.S.C. §§ 1505 and 1506, we conclude that we must give substantial deference to the FCIC's interpretation of the special…”
Stanley J. Brown v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 553 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977).
“As the CSC observed in its decision of the present cases, “ ‘Once it is found that a violation has occurred, the Commission is required by the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 1505 to determine whether the violation warrants removal.”
Minnesota, Dep't of Jobs & Training v. United States Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 666 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Minn. 1987).
· cites it 3× “The MSPB further found that Kehoe’s violation of the Hatch Act was of such scope and effect as to warrant removal of Kehoe from his position with DJT, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 1505 . The MSPB then ordered that Kehoe be removed from his position within thirty days of the MSPB’s…”
Perkins v. Off. of Special Couns., 522 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
“5 U.S.C §§ 1505, 1506. Additionally, paragraph (a)(4) of section 1215 states that “[a]n employee subject to a final order imposing disciplinary action under this subsection may obtain judicial review” in this court.”
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