(a) When a defendant is convicted of an offense, other than a sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15-20A-4, that is a Class A or Class B felony offense, and receives a sentence of 30 years or less, the judge presiding over the case may order:
(1) In cases where the defendant is convicted of a Class A, Class B, Class C, or Class D felony and the imposed sentence is not more than 15 years, that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a period not exceeding three years, that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, and that the defendant be placed on probation for a period as determined by the court.
(2) In cases where the defendant is convicted of a Class A, Class B, or Class C felony and the imposed sentence is greater than 15 years but not more than 20 years, that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a period of three to five years, that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, and that the defendant be placed on probation for a period as determined by the court.
(3) In cases where the defendant is convicted of a Class A, Class B, or Class C felony and the imposed sentence is greater than 20 years but not more than 30 years, that the convicted defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, or treatment institution for a minimum period of 10 years, that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, and that the defendant be placed on probation for a period as determined by the court. The minimum period of confinement provided by this subdivision may not be served in a county jail. Notwithstanding subsection (c), the court shall not suspend or alter the minimum period of confinement ordered.
(b) Probation may not be granted for a sex offense involving a child as defined in Section 15-20A-4 that is a Class A or Class B felony. Otherwise, probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. If an offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the court may impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one or more counts or indictments, but, in the absence of express limitation, shall extend to the entire sentence and judgment.
(c) Regardless of whether the defendant has begun serving the minimum period of confinement ordered under subsection (a) or (h), the court shall retain jurisdiction and authority to suspend that portion of the minimum sentence that remains and place the defendant on probation, notwithstanding any provision of the law to the contrary, and the court may revoke or modify any condition of probation or may change the period of probation.
(d) While incarcerated or on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant may be required to do any of the following:
(1) Pay a fine in one or several sums.
(2) Make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had.
(3) Provide for the support of any persons for whose support he or she is legally responsible.
(4) Complete an accountability court, including, but not limited to, a drug court, veterans court, mental health court, or theft court.
(e) Except as otherwise provided pursuant to Section 15-18-64, the defendant’s liability for any fine or other punishment imposed as to which probation is granted shall be fully discharged by the fulfillment of the terms and conditions of probation.
(f) During any term of probation, the defendant shall report to the probation authorities at a time and place as directed by the judge imposing the sentence.
(g) No defendant serving a minimum period of confinement ordered under subsection (a) or (h) shall be entitled to parole or to deductions from his or her sentence under the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act, during the minimum period of confinement so ordered; provided, however, that this subsection shall not be construed to prohibit application of the Alabama Correctional Incentive Time Act to any period of confinement which may be required after the defendant has served the minimum period.
(h) When a defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor or convicted of a municipal ordinance, the judge presiding over the case may impose a sentence in accordance with Section 13A-5-7. The court may order a portion of the sentence to be suspended and the defendant be placed on probation for a period not exceeding two years.
(i) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose the responsibility for offenders sentenced to a Department of Corrections facility upon a local confinement facility not operated by the Department of Corrections.
(Acts 1976, No. 754, p. 1038; Acts 1985, 2nd Ex. Sess., No. 85-905, p. 177, §1; Acts 1988, No. 88-163, p. 261, §1; Act 2000-759, p. 1736, §2; Act 2005-301, 1st Sp. Sess., p. 571, §1; Act 2015-185, p. 476, §3; Act 2015-463, p. 1506, §1; Act 2018-406, §1(b)(4); Act 2019-344, §1; Act 2023-461, §1; Act 2025-381, §1.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
118
cases (
21 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case:
Austin v. State, 864 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
Austin v. State, 864 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 12× “The trial court, however, did not have jurisdiction pursuant to the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975, to split Austin's sentence as it did and order him to serve 10 years in confinement.”
Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 13× “2002), this Court stated: "The plain language of [§ 15-18-8] indicates that a trial court can split a sentence only if the defendant is placed on probation for a definite period following the confinement portion of the split sentence.”
Enfinger v. State, 123 So. 3d 535 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
· cites it 13× “(State’s brief, p. 4.) Initially, we note that, although the legality of Enfinger’s sentence was not first argued in the circuit court, we have held that when the circuit court does not have the authority to split a sentence under the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.”
Ex Parte State, 932 So. 2d 118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
· cites it 14× “We remanded the case and stated: "Under § 15-18-8, Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement.”
Calloway v. State, 860 So. 2d 900 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 7× “However, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to split Calloway's sentence pursuant to the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975. "This Court has consistently treated sentences imposed pursuant to §§ 13A-12-250 and 13A-12-270, Ala.”
Brand v. State, 93 So. 3d 985 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
· cites it 21× “The trial court split each sentence under § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Split Sentence Act”), and ordered Brand to serve 5 years in prison and 10 years of supervised probation on each sentence.”
Ingram v. State, 878 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
· cites it 6× “On April 4, 2003, the trial court conducted another sentencing hearing and resentenced Ingram to 15 years' imprisonment; [1] the trial court split that sentence pursuant to § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975, and again sentenced Ingram to one year and one day in prison.”
Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “) In this case, Moore was sentenced pursuant to the Split Sentence Act, at § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975. Section 15-18-8(d) provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hile.”
Williams v. State, 203 So. 3d 888 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).
· cites it 17× “The Petitioner, under the Agreement, bargained for and received the sentence agreed upon by the parties and imposed by the Court under the HFOA.”
State v. Jones, 13 So. 3d 915 (Ala. 2008).
· cites it 6× “State, supra, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously held that *921 the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, “allows a trial court to suspend a sentence imposed pursuant to the school/housing enhancements [in §§ 13A-12-250 and 13A-12-270, Ala.”
Havis v. State, 710 So. 2d 527 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
· cites it 7× “The authority to sentence a defendant to a "split" sentence is found in § 15-18-8, Code of Alabama 1975. Section 15-18-8(a)(1) provides: "(a) When a defendant is convicted of an offense and receives a sentence of 15 years or less in any court having jurisdiction to try offenses…”
State v. Pickett, 911 So. 2d 755 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
· cites it 24× “The district attorney contends that there is no authority in the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”), for a trial court to suspend the mandatory minimum three- *757 year term of imprisonment for a 20-year split sentence.”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(1) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(a) — 18 cases
Enfinger v. State, 123 So. 3d 535 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
“(State’s brief, p. 4.) Initially, we note that, although the legality of Enfinger’s sentence was not first argued in the circuit court, we have held that when the circuit court does not have the authority to split a sentence under the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.”
State v. Jones, 13 So. 3d 915 (Ala. 2008).
“State, supra, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously held that *921 the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, “allows a trial court to suspend a sentence imposed pursuant to the school/housing enhancements [in §§ 13A-12-250 and 13A-12-270, Ala.”
Williams v. State, 203 So. 3d 888 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).
“The Petitioner, under the Agreement, bargained for and received the sentence agreed upon by the parties and imposed by the Court under the HFOA.”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(a)(1) — 18 cases
Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).
“2002), this Court stated: "The plain language of [§ 15-18-8] indicates that a trial court can split a sentence only if the defendant is placed on probation for a definite period following the confinement portion of the split sentence.”
Brand v. State, 93 So. 3d 985 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
“The trial court split each sentence under § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Split Sentence Act”), and ordered Brand to serve 5 years in prison and 10 years of supervised probation on each sentence.”
Ex Parte State, 932 So. 2d 118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
“We remanded the case and stated: "Under § 15-18-8, Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement.”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(a)(2) — 6 cases
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(a)(l) — 12 cases
State v. Pickett, 911 So. 2d 755 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
“The district attorney contends that there is no authority in the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”), for a trial court to suspend the mandatory minimum three- *757 year term of imprisonment for a 20-year split sentence.”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(b) — 18 cases
Enfinger v. State, 123 So. 3d 535 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
“(State’s brief, p. 4.) Initially, we note that, although the legality of Enfinger’s sentence was not first argued in the circuit court, we have held that when the circuit court does not have the authority to split a sentence under the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.”
Havis v. State, 710 So. 2d 527 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
“The authority to sentence a defendant to a "split" sentence is found in § 15-18-8, Code of Alabama 1975. Section 15-18-8(a)(1) provides: "(a) When a defendant is convicted of an offense and receives a sentence of 15 years or less in any court having jurisdiction to try offenses…”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(c) — 18 cases
Ex Parte State, 932 So. 2d 118 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
“We remanded the case and stated: "Under § 15-18-8, Austin must serve a minimum of 3 years, but no more than 5 years, in confinement.”
Enfinger v. State, 123 So. 3d 535 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
“(State’s brief, p. 4.) Initially, we note that, although the legality of Enfinger’s sentence was not first argued in the circuit court, we have held that when the circuit court does not have the authority to split a sentence under the Split-Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.”
State v. Pickett, 911 So. 2d 755 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
“The district attorney contends that there is no authority in the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975 (“the Act”), for a trial court to suspend the mandatory minimum three- *757 year term of imprisonment for a 20-year split sentence.”
Williams v. State, 203 So. 3d 888 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).
“The Petitioner, under the Agreement, bargained for and received the sentence agreed upon by the parties and imposed by the Court under the HFOA.”
Havis v. State, 710 So. 2d 527 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998).
“The authority to sentence a defendant to a "split" sentence is found in § 15-18-8, Code of Alabama 1975. Section 15-18-8(a)(1) provides: "(a) When a defendant is convicted of an offense and receives a sentence of 15 years or less in any court having jurisdiction to try offenses…”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(d) — 1 case
Moore v. City of Leeds, 1 So. 3d 145 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
“) In this case, Moore was sentenced pursuant to the Split Sentence Act, at § 15-18-8, Ala.Code 1975. Section 15-18-8(d) provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hile.”
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(d)(2) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(e) — 1 case
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(g) — 9 cases
— Ala. Code § 15-18-8(k) — 1 case
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