AMENDED BY ACT 2026-372, EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 2026. SEE ACT FOR REVISED LANGUAGE.
(a) No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the Board of Pardons and Paroles is of the opinion that the prisoner meets criteria and guidelines established by the board to determine a prisoner’s fitness for parole and to ensure public safety. The guidelines shall serve as an aid in the parole process and shall promote the use of prison space for the most violent and greatest risk offenders, while recognizing that the board’s paramount duty is to protect public safety. The guidelines shall be structured, actuarially based, reviewed every three years by the board, after a specified open comment period determined by the board, and posted on the website of the board and include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) The prisoner’s risk to reoffend, based upon a validated risk and needs assessment as defined in Section 12-25-32.
(2) Progress by the prisoner and the Department of Corrections to plan for reentry.
(3) Input from the victim or victims, the family of the victim or victims, prosecutors, and law enforcement entities.
(4) Participation in risk-reduction programs while incarcerated.
(5) Institutional behavior of the prisoner while incarcerated.
(6) Severity of the underlying offense for which the prisoner was sentenced to incarceration.
(b) Except as provided in Section 15-22-37, if the board grants a prisoner parole, the prisoner shall be released from prison upon the terms and conditions set by the board, and while released on parole, shall remain in the legal custody of the warden of the prison from which he or she is paroled until the expiration of the maximum term specified in his or her sentence or until he or she is fully pardoned.
(c) The board shall clearly articulate its reasons for approval or denial of parole for each prisoner, based on its established guidelines, and shall provide the reasons for approval or denial to the prisoner, the victim, the Department of Corrections, or any other interested party upon written request submitted to the board. The use of established guidelines for parole consideration shall not create a right or expectation by a prisoner to parole release. Additionally, the articulated reasons for denial of parole release shall not create a right or expectation for parole release. The guidelines shall serve as an aid in the parole decisionmaking process, and the decision concerning parole release shall be at the complete discretion of the board.
(Acts 1939, No. 275, p. 426; Code 1940, T. 42, §7; Acts 1951, No. 599, p. 1030; Act 2015-185, p. 476, §3; Act 2019-393, §1.)
Notes of Decisions
Thompson v. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 806 So. 2d 374 (Ala. 2001).
· cites it 6× “This appeal challenges the constitutionality of § 15-22-26, Ala.Code 1975, as being vague on its face or as applied by the Board of Pardons and Paroles.”
Carl J. Monroe v. Morris Thigpen, Leland Lambert, 932 F.2d 1437 (11th Cir. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Applying Greenholtz , we have previously determined that the Alabama parole statute, Ala.Code § 15-22-26 (1975), does not confer a liberty interest in parole that is protected by the Due Process Clause because the statute provides that parole may be granted at the Board’s…”
Beavers v. State, 666 So. 2d 868 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
· cites it 5× “§ 15-22-26 and § 15-22-28. The Board is prohibited from releasing an inmate on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison.”
Fleming v. Dowdell, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (M.D. Ala. 2005).
· cites it 2× “See Ala.Code § 15-22-26 (1975); see also Williams v.”
Tony Lee Smith v. Governor For the State of Alabama, 562 F. App'x 806 (11th Cir. 2014).
“Although he stated that he had been denied parole as a result of the “Southern Brotherhood” designation, Alabama’s parole statute, Ala.Code § 15-22-26, does not confer a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, as parole may be granted at the parole board’s…”
Ex Parte Ellard, 474 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1985).
“As aptly pointed out by the amicus curiae, such a conclusion would base an inmate's eligibility for parole not upon the criteria established by the legislature under Code 1975, § 15-22-26, but, rather, upon the terms of a sentence imposed by a court in a foreign jurisdiction.”
Tucker v. Alabama Bd. Pardons & Paroles, 781 So. 2d 358 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
· cites it 2× “1996) (holding that prisoners do not have a liberty interest in parole, but that § 15-22-26, Ala. Code 1975, [1] "cannot be read as granting the Board the discretion to rely upon false information to determine whether to grant parole").”
Johnston v. Alabama Pardon & Parole Bd., 530 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. Ala. 1982).
“Section 15-22-26 of the Alabama Code provides in part: No prisoner shall be released on parole merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties assigned in prison, but only if the board of pardons and paroles is of the opinion that there is reasonable…”
Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles v. Wright, 37 So. 3d 842 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
· cites it 2× ““Section 15-22-26, Ala.Code 1975, contains the standards the Board must apply when considering whether an in *844 mate should be considered for parole.”
Johnson v. State, 797 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
“In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Court held that “by relying on the false information in [the inmate’s] file, the Board has exceeded its authority under [§ 15-22-26, Ala.Code 1975,] and treated [the inmate]…”
Ellard v. Alabama Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 824 F.2d 937 (11th Cir. 1987).
“Ala.Code § 15-22-26 (1975). The parole statute provides for the return of a parolee to prison only if the parolee violates the conditions of parole, Ala.”
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