Code of Alabama
Ala. Code § 15-8-30 (2026)
Statement of Time.
✓ official Alabama Legislature (ALISON) text, current July 2026
It is not necessary to state the precise time at which an offense was committed in an indictment; but it may be alleged to have been committed on any day before the finding of the indictment, or generally before the finding of the indictment, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense.
(Code 1852, §565; Code 1867, §4115; Code 1876, §4788; Code 1886, §4373; Code 1896, §4901; Code 1907, §7139; Code 1923, §4534; Code 1940, T. 15, §237.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1980–2025 · leading case: United States v. Joshua Reshi Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249 (11th Cir. 2021).
United States v. Joshua Reshi Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249 (11th Cir. 2021). “See Ala. Code § 15-8-30 (1975) (“It is not necessary to state the precise time at which an offense was committed in an indictment .”
Bush v. State, 431 So. 2d 555 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). “2d 284 (1953); Alabama Code § 15-8-30 (1975). We find none of the exceptions to the general rule applicable to appellant's argument.”
Cade v. State, 521 So. 2d 80 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). “2d 284 (1953); Ala. Code § 15-8-30 (1975). We find none of the exceptions to the general rule applicable to appellant's argument.”
Brown v. State, 392 So. 2d 1248 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980). “He asserts that it did not allege with particularity and specificity the occasion, type of transaction and quantity of marijuana involved in the instant offense. The indictment is in a form that substantially follows the language of § 20-2-70(a) Code of Alabama 1975, the statute…”
Hutcherson v. State, 677 So. 2d 1174 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). “" See § 15-8-30, Code of Alabama 1975. The Supreme Court of Alabama in 1878 defined "material ingredient" as follows: "We think the ingredient meant, is an ingredient of the act committed, something that gives to it an evil character or effect, which causes the law to denounce…”
Minnifield v. State, 941 So. 2d 1000 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005). “Section 15-8-30, Ala.Code 1975, which has been in effect in its current state since the adoption of the 1940 Code of Alabama, and which was in effect at the time of the crime, provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]t is not necessary to state the precise time at which an offense…”
Robinson v. State, 428 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). “Ala.Code 1975, § 15-8-30. *151 The statute of limitations for violation of § 20-2-80 is three years.”
Beck v. State, 485 So. 2d 1203 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). “III After the completion of the voir dire examination of all of the prospective jurors, the appellant moved to dismiss all prospective jurors who had heard of his previous conviction on this same capital murder charge. Of the twenty-eight prospective jurors challenged by the…”
Giddens v. State, 565 So. 2d 1277 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). “See also § 15-8-30, Code of Alabama 1975. In the instant case the indictment stated that the offense occurred during the period October 19, 1982, through May 22, 1984.”
R.L.G. v. State, 712 So. 2d 348 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). “See also §§ 15-8-30 and -31 (making it unnecessary to allege in the indictment the precise time when, and the place where, the offense was committed, respectively).”
R.A.S. v. State, 718 So. 2d 117 (Ala. 1998). “‘It is not necessary to state the precise time or date at which or on which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or the place where the offense is alleged to have been committed unless the time or place is a material element of the offense.”
D.C.H. v. State of Alabama (Ala. Crim. App. 2025). “1991) (citing § 15-8-30, Ala. Code 1975) ("[I]t is not necessary to state the time at which an offense occurred, and the time may be generally held as being before the finding of the indictment.”
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