For the purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
(1) ABORTION. The use or prescription of any instrument, medicine, drug, or any other substance or device with the intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant. Such use or prescription is not an abortion if done with the intent to save the life or preserve the health of an unborn child, remove a dead unborn child, or to deliver an unborn child prematurely in order to preserve the health of both the mother (pregnant woman) and her unborn child.
(2) CONCEPTION. The fusion of a human spermatozoon with a human ovum.
(3) EMANCIPATED MINOR. Any minor who is or has been married or has by court order otherwise been legally freed from the care, custody, and control of her parents.
(4) GESTATIONAL AGE. The time that has elapsed since the first day of the woman’s last menstrual period.
(5) MEDICAL EMERGENCY. That condition which, on the basis of the physician’s good faith clinical judgment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or in which a delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.
(6) MINOR. Any person under the age of 18 years.
(7) PHYSICIAN. Any person licensed to practice medicine in this state. The term includes medical doctors and doctors of osteopathy.
(8) PREGNANT or PREGNANCY. The female reproductive condition of having an unborn child in the mother’s (woman’s) body.
(9) QUALIFIED PERSON. An agent of the physician who is a psychologist, licensed social worker, licensed professional counselor, registered nurse, or physician.
(10) UNBORN CHILD. The offspring of any human person from conception until birth.
(11) VIABLE. That stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.
(12) WOMAN. Any female person.
(Act 2002-419, p. 1074, §3.)
Notes of Decisions
Summit Med. Ctr. of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
“at § 26-23A-3(9). 2 . Like United Foods , these case have generally arisen in the context of an agricultural or livestock “check off” program in which a state or federal statute authorizes the creation of a board that imposes fees on handlers of certain goods.”
Summit Med. Ctr. of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Code § 26-23A-3. 13 . In actuality, neither this case nor United Foods involved any type of formal group membership, as the statutes at issue simply required a designated class of persons to contribute money that was later spent on speech that some members found objectionable.”
State v. King, 23 So. 3d 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
· cites it 2× “” § 26-23A-3(7), Ala.Code 1975. The issues in the case are whether what King, who is a certified registered-nurse practitioner, did constituted performing an abortion and, if so, whether she did so intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.”
Hicks v. State, 153 So. 3d 53 (Ala. 2014).
“” § 26-23A-3(10), Ala.Code 1975. Additionally, Hicks argues that the legislature’s intent to exclude unborn children from the definition of the word “child” in the chemieal-endangerment statute is evidenced by the fact that § 13A-6-l(d), Ala.”
— Ala. Code § 26-23A-3(10) — 1 case
Hicks v. State, 153 So. 3d 53 (Ala. 2014).
“” § 26-23A-3(10), Ala.Code 1975. Additionally, Hicks argues that the legislature’s intent to exclude unborn children from the definition of the word “child” in the chemieal-endangerment statute is evidenced by the fact that § 13A-6-l(d), Ala.”
— Ala. Code § 26-23A-3(7) — 1 case
State v. King, 23 So. 3d 72 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008).
“” § 26-23A-3(7), Ala.Code 1975. The issues in the case are whether what King, who is a certified registered-nurse practitioner, did constituted performing an abortion and, if so, whether she did so intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.”
— Ala. Code § 26-23A-3(9) — 2 cases
Summit Med. Ctr. of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
“at § 26-23A-3(9). 2 . Like United Foods , these case have generally arisen in the context of an agricultural or livestock “check off” program in which a state or federal statute authorizes the creation of a board that imposes fees on handlers of certain goods.”
Summit Med. Ctr. of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
“Code § 26-23A-3. 13 . In actuality, neither this case nor United Foods involved any type of formal group membership, as the statutes at issue simply required a designated class of persons to contribute money that was later spent on speech that some members found objectionable.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.