A. Notwithstanding any other statute, an action or arbitration based in contract may not be instituted or maintained against a person who develops or develops and sells real property, or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, construction or observation of construction of an improvement to real property more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvement to real property.
B. Notwithstanding any other statute, a municipality or a county may not institute or maintain an action or arbitration against a person who develops or develops and sells real property or performs or furnishes the design, specifications, surveying, planning, supervision, testing, construction or observation of construction of an improvement to real property that is dedicated to the municipality or county more than eight years after the improvement to real property has been accepted by the municipality or county for ownership, operation and maintenance if the action or arbitration is based on either:
1. A municipal or county code, ordinance or other legal requirement.
2. A permit that is required as a condition of development.
C. The limitations of subsection B of this section do not apply to an action or arbitration that is based on a claim of a wilful, reckless or concealed violation of a municipal or county requirement.
D. Subsection B of this section does not limit any immunity or defense that is available to a municipality or county pursuant to chapter 7, article 2 of this title.
E. Notwithstanding subsection A or B of this section, in the case of injury to real property or an improvement to real property, if the injury occurred during the eighth year after the substantial completion or, in the case of a latent defect, was not discovered until the eighth year after substantial completion, an action to recover damages for injury to the real property may be brought within one year after the date on which the injury to real property or an improvement to real property occurred or a latent defect was discovered, but an action may not be brought more than nine years after the substantial completion of the improvement.
F. The limitations in subsections A, B and E of this section include any action based on implied warranty arising out of the contract or the construction, including implied warranties of habitability, fitness or workmanship.
G. This section does not apply to actions for personal injury or death or shorten the period of warranty provided in an express written warranty.
H. For the purposes of subsections A, E and F of this section, an improvement to real property is considered substantially complete when any of the following first occurs:
1. It is first used by the owner or occupant of the improvement.
2. It is first available for use after having been completed according to the contract or agreement covering the improvement, including agreed changes to the contract or agreement.
3. Final inspection, if required, by the governmental body that issued the building permit for the improvement.
I. In this section an action based in contract is an action based on a written real estate contract, sales agreement, construction agreement, conveyance or written agreement for construction or for the services set forth in subsection A of this section. This section does not extend the period prescribed by the laws of this state for bringing any action. If a shorter period of limitation is prescribed for a specific action, the shorter period governs.
J. With respect to an improvement to real property that was substantially complete on or before September 15, 1989, the eight and nine-year periods established in subsections A and E of this section shall begin to run on September 15, 1989. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection H of this section and section 12-505, subsection A, this subsection applies to claims that accrued before May 14, 1992.
Notes of Decisions
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 393 P.3d 919 (Ariz. 2017).
· cites it 45× “First, the legislature could have expressly provided in § 12-510 an exception for § 12-552, just as § 12-510 does for § 12-529.”
Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 88 P.3d 565 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 34× “1 *497 ¶ 6 Asilomar moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claims of the Maycocks were barred by A.R.S. § 12-552. This statute precludes contract and implied warranty claims against builders filed more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvements,…”
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 375 P.3d 1189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 65× “We conclude A.R.S. § 12-552 applies to governmental entities and that the City’s claims are based in contract within the meaning of A.”
Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 159 P.3d 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 23× “Because Evans Withycombe broadly pleaded a cause of action in common-law indemnity, and Western has not established that the common-law indemnity claim is by necessity one for implied contractual indemnity, we need not decide whether implied contractual indemnity is barred by…”
Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp., 290 P.3d 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 24× “1 Pulte counters that even if a latent defect was present, the Sullivans are barred from asserting a breach of implied warranty claim by the construction statute of repose, A.”
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360 (Ariz. 2011).
· cites it 19× “(collectively “Shea Homes”) as barred by Arizona’s statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552 (2003). The case pending before the Ninth Circuit is the third of four related lawsuits alleging construction defects in homes located in a Shea Homes planned community (Carnage Lane) in…”
Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P'ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664 (Ariz. 2010).
· cites it 4× “For example, the statute of repose in A.R.S. § 12-552 generally provides that actions based in contract involving the design, engineering, or construction of improvements to real property must be brought within eight years.”
Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc. v. Mather & Assocs., Inc., 900 P.2d 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 12× “In motions to dismiss, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ action arose from a contract to construct an improvement to real property and was therefore barred by the eight-year construction statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552. Although plaintiffs had not sued for breach of contract…”
Wilhelm v. Brewer, 192 P.3d 404 (Ariz. 2008).
· cites it 6× “The summary did not refer to a proposed amendment to A.R.S. § 12-552, which proposes extending the statute of repose for certain actions concerning “real property” from eight to ten years.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(A) — 13 cases
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 393 P.3d 919 (Ariz. 2017).
“First, the legislature could have expressly provided in § 12-510 an exception for § 12-552, just as § 12-510 does for § 12-529.”
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 375 P.3d 1189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We conclude A.R.S. § 12-552 applies to governmental entities and that the City’s claims are based in contract within the meaning of A.”
Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 159 P.3d 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“Because Evans Withycombe broadly pleaded a cause of action in common-law indemnity, and Western has not established that the common-law indemnity claim is by necessity one for implied contractual indemnity, we need not decide whether implied contractual indemnity is barred by…”
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360 (Ariz. 2011).
“(collectively “Shea Homes”) as barred by Arizona’s statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552 (2003). The case pending before the Ninth Circuit is the third of four related lawsuits alleging construction defects in homes located in a Shea Homes planned community (Carnage Lane) in…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(B) — 7 cases
Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 88 P.3d 565 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“1 *497 ¶ 6 Asilomar moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claims of the Maycocks were barred by A.R.S. § 12-552. This statute precludes contract and implied warranty claims against builders filed more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvements,…”
Sullivan v. Pulte Home Corp., 290 P.3d 446 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
“1 Pulte counters that even if a latent defect was present, the Sullivans are barred from asserting a breach of implied warranty claim by the construction statute of repose, A.”
Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 159 P.3d 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“Because Evans Withycombe broadly pleaded a cause of action in common-law indemnity, and Western has not established that the common-law indemnity claim is by necessity one for implied contractual indemnity, we need not decide whether implied contractual indemnity is barred by…”
Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360 (Ariz. 2011).
“(collectively “Shea Homes”) as barred by Arizona’s statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552 (2003). The case pending before the Ninth Circuit is the third of four related lawsuits alleging construction defects in homes located in a Shea Homes planned community (Carnage Lane) in…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(C) — 3 cases
Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 159 P.3d 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“Because Evans Withycombe broadly pleaded a cause of action in common-law indemnity, and Western has not established that the common-law indemnity claim is by necessity one for implied contractual indemnity, we need not decide whether implied contractual indemnity is barred by…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(D) — 1 case
Flagstaff Affordable Hous. Ltd. P'ship v. Design All., Inc., 223 P.3d 664 (Ariz. 2010).
“For example, the statute of repose in A.R.S. § 12-552 generally provides that actions based in contract involving the design, engineering, or construction of improvements to real property must be brought within eight years.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(E) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(E)(3) — 3 cases
Evans Withycombe, Inc. v. W. Innovations, Inc., 159 P.3d 547 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
“Because Evans Withycombe broadly pleaded a cause of action in common-law indemnity, and Western has not established that the common-law indemnity claim is by necessity one for implied contractual indemnity, we need not decide whether implied contractual indemnity is barred by…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(F) — 5 cases
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 393 P.3d 919 (Ariz. 2017).
“First, the legislature could have expressly provided in § 12-510 an exception for § 12-552, just as § 12-510 does for § 12-529.”
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 375 P.3d 1189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We conclude A.R.S. § 12-552 applies to governmental entities and that the City’s claims are based in contract within the meaning of A.”
Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc. v. Mather & Assocs., Inc., 900 P.2d 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
“In motions to dismiss, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ action arose from a contract to construct an improvement to real property and was therefore barred by the eight-year construction statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552. Although plaintiffs had not sued for breach of contract…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-552(G) — 3 cases
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 393 P.3d 919 (Ariz. 2017).
“First, the legislature could have expressly provided in § 12-510 an exception for § 12-552, just as § 12-510 does for § 12-529.”
City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elec., Inc., 375 P.3d 1189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“We conclude A.R.S. § 12-552 applies to governmental entities and that the City’s claims are based in contract within the meaning of A.”
Fry's Food Stores of Arizona, Inc. v. Mather & Assocs., Inc., 900 P.2d 1225 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
“In motions to dismiss, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ action arose from a contract to construct an improvement to real property and was therefore barred by the eight-year construction statute of repose, A.R.S. § 12-552. Although plaintiffs had not sued for breach of contract…”
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