25-409. Third party rights
A. Pursuant to section 25-402, subsection B, paragraph 2, a person other than a legal parent may petition the superior court for legal decision-making authority or placement of the child. The court shall summarily deny a petition unless it finds that the petitioner's initial pleading establishes that all of the following are true:
1. The person filing the petition stands in loco parentis to the child.
2. It would be significantly detrimental to the child to remain or be placed in the care of either legal parent who wishes to keep or acquire legal decision-making.
3. A court of competent jurisdiction has not entered or approved an order concerning legal decision-making or parenting time within one year before the person filed a petition pursuant to this section, unless there is reason to believe the child's present environment may seriously endanger the child's physical, mental, moral or emotional health.
4. One of the following applies:
(a) One of the legal parents is deceased.
(b) The child's legal parents are not married to each other at the time the petition is filed.
(c) A proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the legal parents is pending at the time the petition is filed.
B. Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, it is a rebuttable presumption that awarding legal decision-making to a legal parent serves the child's best interests because of the physical, psychological and emotional needs of the child to be reared by a legal parent. A third party may rebut this presumption only with proof showing by clear and convincing evidence that awarding legal decision-making to a legal parent is not consistent with the child's best interests.
C. Pursuant to section 25-402, subsection B, paragraph 2, a person other than a legal parent may petition the superior court for visitation with a child. The superior court may grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests and that any of the following is true:
1. One of the legal parents is deceased or has been missing at least three months. For the purposes of this paragraph, a parent is considered to be missing if the parent's location has not been determined and the parent has been reported as missing to a law enforcement agency.
2. The child was born out of wedlock and the child's legal parents are not married to each other at the time the petition is filed.
3. For grandparent or great-grandparent visitation, the marriage of the parents of the child has been dissolved for at least three months.
4. For in loco parentis visitation, a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation of the legal parents is pending at the time the petition is filed.
D. A petition filed under subsection A or C of this section must be verified or supported by affidavit and must include detailed facts supporting the petitioner's claim. The petitioner must also provide notice of this proceeding, including a copy of the petition and any affidavits or other attachments, and serve the notice pursuant to the Arizona rules of family law procedure to all of the following:
1. The child's legal parents.
2. A third party who possesses legal decision-making authority over the child or visitation rights.
3. The child's guardian or guardian ad litem.
4. A person or agency that possesses physical custody of the child or claims legal decision-making authority or visitation rights concerning the child.
5. Any other person or agency that has previously appeared in the action.
E. In deciding whether to grant visitation to a third party, the court shall give special weight to the legal parents' opinion of what serves their child's best interests and consider all relevant factors including:
1. The historical relationship, if any, between the child and the person seeking visitation.
2. The motivation of the requesting party seeking visitation.
3. The motivation of the person objecting to visitation.
4. The quantity of visitation time requested and the potential adverse impact that visitation will have on the child's customary activities.
5. If one or both of the child's parents are deceased, the benefit in maintaining an extended family relationship.
F. If logistically possible and appropriate, the court shall order visitation by a grandparent or great-grandparent if the child is residing or spending time with the parent through whom the grandparent or great-grandparent claims a right of access to the child.
G. A grandparent or great-grandparent seeking visitation rights under this section shall petition in the same action in which the family court previously decided legal decision-making and parenting time or, if no such case existed, by separate petition in the county of the child's home state, as defined in section 25-1002.
H. All visitation rights granted under this section automatically terminate if the child is adopted or placed for adoption. If the child is removed from an adoptive placement, the court may reinstate the visitation rights. This subsection does not apply if the child is adopted by the spouse of a natural parent after the natural parent remarries.
I. For the purposes of this section, a child who is adopted may be treated as if born in lawful wedlock only if the child is adopted jointly by parents who are married to one another as provided in section 8-103, subsection A.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
79
cases (
23 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case:
Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 78× “Stated differently, Egan contends that a nonparent must show a complete denial of visitation, or the substantial equivalent, as a prerequisite to filing a petition under § 25-415(C).”
McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 25× “¶ 1 Petitioners/appellants Montie and Ann McGovern filed an action under Arizona’s grandparents’ visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, to obtain court-ordered visitation with their granddaughter, C.”
Lisa Friedman v. David C Roels Jr, 418 P.3d 884 (Ariz. 2018).
· cites it 51× “That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests.”
Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 34× “Dodge, this court held that Arizona’s grandparent visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, did not unconstitutionally infringe upon a parent’s fundamental right to control child rearing.”
Goodman v. Forsen, 366 P.3d 587 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 24× “OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 In 2013, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 25-409 to require that a court give “special weight” to a parent’s decision to oppose visitation between a child and a nonparent.”
Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 22× “This distinction is also confirmed by the presence of a separate statute, A.R.S. § 25-409 (Supp.2003). That statute makes it clear that grandparents and great-grandparents can have visitation with a child without being in loco parentis: A.”
Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds, 356 P.3d 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 28× “OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 Petitioner Lori Lee Sheets seeks relief from the superior court’s order granting her former partner, Bonny Jean Reynolds, visitation with Sheets’ adopted child (“Child”) under A.R.S. § 25-409(0(2). We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief…”
Graville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 14× “See A.R.S. § 25-409(0(4). These differences are important because “[i]t shows that the legislature was conscious of parents’ superior right to the custody and care of their children.”
Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 60× “B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Christopher Hustrulid appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition seeking third-party rights under A.R.S. § 25-409, including joint legal decision-making, for his two minor children whom his sister adopted after his parental rights were terminated.”
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 28× “enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
Olesen v. daniel/burge, 484 P.3d 139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 6× “See A.R.S. § 25-409. The court conducted a trial on the competing petitions.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(A) — 23 cases
McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“¶ 1 Petitioners/appellants Montie and Ann McGovern filed an action under Arizona’s grandparents’ visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, to obtain court-ordered visitation with their granddaughter, C.”
Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
“B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Christopher Hustrulid appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition seeking third-party rights under A.R.S. § 25-409, including joint legal decision-making, for his two minor children whom his sister adopted after his parental rights were terminated.”
Riepe v. Riepe, 91 P.3d 312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
“This distinction is also confirmed by the presence of a separate statute, A.R.S. § 25-409 (Supp.2003). That statute makes it clear that grandparents and great-grandparents can have visitation with a child without being in loco parentis: A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(A)(1) — 3 cases
Graville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
“See A.R.S. § 25-409(0(4). These differences are important because “[i]t shows that the legislature was conscious of parents’ superior right to the custody and care of their children.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(A)(2) — 3 cases
Lisa Friedman v. David C Roels Jr, 418 P.3d 884 (Ariz. 2018).
“That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests.”
Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
“B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Christopher Hustrulid appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition seeking third-party rights under A.R.S. § 25-409, including joint legal decision-making, for his two minor children whom his sister adopted after his parental rights were terminated.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(A)(3) — 3 cases
McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“¶ 1 Petitioners/appellants Montie and Ann McGovern filed an action under Arizona’s grandparents’ visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, to obtain court-ordered visitation with their granddaughter, C.”
Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds, 356 P.3d 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
“OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 Petitioner Lori Lee Sheets seeks relief from the superior court’s order granting her former partner, Bonny Jean Reynolds, visitation with Sheets’ adopted child (“Child”) under A.R.S. § 25-409(0(2). We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(A)(4) — 1 case
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(A)(4)(b) — 1 case
Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
“B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Christopher Hustrulid appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition seeking third-party rights under A.R.S. § 25-409, including joint legal decision-making, for his two minor children whom his sister adopted after his parental rights were terminated.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(B) — 9 cases
Olesen v. daniel/burge, 484 P.3d 139 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2021).
“See A.R.S. § 25-409. The court conducted a trial on the competing petitions.”
Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
“B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Christopher Hustrulid appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition seeking third-party rights under A.R.S. § 25-409, including joint legal decision-making, for his two minor children whom his sister adopted after his parental rights were terminated.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(C) — 25 cases
Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“Stated differently, Egan contends that a nonparent must show a complete denial of visitation, or the substantial equivalent, as a prerequisite to filing a petition under § 25-415(C).”
Lisa Friedman v. David C Roels Jr, 418 P.3d 884 (Ariz. 2018).
“That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests.”
McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“¶ 1 Petitioners/appellants Montie and Ann McGovern filed an action under Arizona’s grandparents’ visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, to obtain court-ordered visitation with their granddaughter, C.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(C)(1) — 3 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(C)(2) — 13 cases
Goodman v. Forsen, 366 P.3d 587 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 In 2013, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 25-409 to require that a court give “special weight” to a parent’s decision to oppose visitation between a child and a nonparent.”
Sheets v. Hon. mead/reynolds, 356 P.3d 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
“OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 Petitioner Lori Lee Sheets seeks relief from the superior court’s order granting her former partner, Bonny Jean Reynolds, visitation with Sheets’ adopted child (“Child”) under A.R.S. § 25-409(0(2). We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief…”
Hustrulid v. Stakebake, 516 P.3d 18 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2022).
“B R O W N, Judge: ¶1 Christopher Hustrulid appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his petition seeking third-party rights under A.R.S. § 25-409, including joint legal decision-making, for his two minor children whom his sister adopted after his parental rights were terminated.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(C)(3) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(C)(4) — 2 cases
Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211 P.3d 1213 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009).
“Stated differently, Egan contends that a nonparent must show a complete denial of visitation, or the substantial equivalent, as a prerequisite to filing a petition under § 25-415(C).”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(C)(l) — 1 case
McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
“¶ 1 Petitioners/appellants Montie and Ann McGovern filed an action under Arizona’s grandparents’ visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, to obtain court-ordered visitation with their granddaughter, C.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(D) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(D)(1) — 2 cases
Lisa Friedman v. David C Roels Jr, 418 P.3d 884 (Ariz. 2018).
“That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(E) — 23 cases
Lisa Friedman v. David C Roels Jr, 418 P.3d 884 (Ariz. 2018).
“That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests.”
Goodman v. Forsen, 366 P.3d 587 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
“OPINION SWANN, Judge: ¶ 1 In 2013, the legislature amended A.R.S. § 25-409 to require that a court give “special weight” to a parent’s decision to oppose visitation between a child and a nonparent.”
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(E)(1) — 1 case
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(E)(2) — 1 case
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(E)(4) — 4 cases
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(E)(5) — 2 cases
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(F) — 6 cases
Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
“Dodge, this court held that Arizona’s grandparent visitation statute, A.R.S. § 25-409, did not unconstitutionally infringe upon a parent’s fundamental right to control child rearing.”
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
Lisa Friedman v. David C Roels Jr, 418 P.3d 884 (Ariz. 2018).
“That statute allows "a person other than a legal parent" to "petition the superior court for visitation with a child," and generally authorizes the court to "grant visitation rights during the child's minority on a finding that the visitation is in the child's best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(G) — 1 case
In re the Marriage of Friedman, 397 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017).
“enumerated in A.R.S. § 25-409.” See § 25^09(E). In doing so, the court explicitly “g[ave] deference to [Friedman]’s position” and “applied the presumption that [Friedman] has and shall continue to make decisions that are in the children’s best interests.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-409(H) — 3 cases
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