A. A person shall not drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, conditions and actual and potential hazards then existing. A person shall control the speed of a vehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with any object, person, vehicle or other conveyance on, entering or adjacent to the highway in compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to exercise reasonable care for the protection of others.
B. Except as provided in subsections C and D of this section or except if a special hazard requires a lesser speed, any speed in excess of the following speeds is prima facie evidence that the speed is too great and therefore unreasonable:
1. Fifteen miles per hour approaching a school crossing.
2. Twenty-five miles per hour in a business or residential district.
3. Sixty-five miles per hour in other locations.
C. The speed limits prescribed in this section may be altered as authorized in sections 28-702 and 28-703.
D. The maximum speed provided in this section is reduced to the speed that is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and with regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, including the following conditions:
1. Approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad crossing.
2. Approaching and going around a curve.
3. Approaching a hillcrest.
4. Traveling on a narrow or winding roadway.
5. A special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.
E. A person shall not drive a motor vehicle at a speed that is less than the speed that is reasonable and prudent under existing conditions unless the speed that is reasonable and prudent exceeds the maximum safe operating speed of the lawfully operated implement of husbandry.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
60
cases (
5 in the last 5 years), 1956–2024 · leading case:
State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 3× “At oral argument before this court, appellant urged that Baxley had not been justified in stopping appellant because the warning Baxley ultimately issued was for violating A.R.S. § 28-701(A), which proscribes driving "at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the…”
Gibson v. Boyle, 679 P.2d 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 6× “See A.R.S. §§ 28-701 [3] , 702 and 703; State v.”
State v. Rich, 563 P.2d 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 9× “A.R.S. § 28-701. Other states, faced with an argument similar to that presented by appellant in this case, have upheld speeding laws which were substantially similar to our basic speed law set forth in paragraph (A) above of A.”
Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin, 411 P.2d 809 (Ariz. 1966).
· cites it 6× “The Crespins argue, however, that “the failure by defendant to control his automobile in such a manner as to avoid a collision is an obvious violation of A.R.S. § 28-701” and hence negligence per se.”
Trickel v. Rainbo Baking Co. of Phoenix, 412 P.2d 852 (Ariz. 1966).
· cites it 8× “A.R.S. § 28-701 is a general speed law setting forth lawful speeds not only for school crossings, but for business districts, residential districts, and highways.”
Dykeman v. Engelbrecht, 803 P.2d 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 6× “Plaintiff also objected to the trial court’s refusal to give the jury instructions regarding the last clear chance doctrine and the applicability of A.R.S. § 28-701(A), which requires that drivers control the speed of their vehicles.”
Rimondi v. Briggs, 606 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1980).
· cites it 4× “5 on contributory negligence error? 6) Should the trial court have separately instructed the jury on proper lookout and foreseeability? 7) Should the trial court have instructed the jury on A.R.S. § 28-701(A), speed not reasonable and prudent? Regarding admissibility of the…”
Deering Ex Rel. Deering v. Carter, 376 P.2d 857 (Ariz. 1962).
· cites it 6× “" A.R.S. § 28-701, subd. E. The question of what is an “appropriate reduced speed” under any set of circumstances is a question for the jury.”
Barlage v. Valentine, 110 P.3d 371 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 2× “1977) (A.R.S. § 28-701(B), which prescribes certain speeds that, if exceeded, constitute “prima facie evidence” of unreasonable speed, is “rule[] of evidence and not rule[] of substantive law” and merely “raise[s] rebuttable presumptions, which may be overcome by evidence”); cf.”
Evans v. Pickett, 430 P.2d 413 (Ariz. 1967).
· cites it 4× “No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions *398 and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event speed shall he so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with…”
St. Ex Rel. De Concini v. City Ct. of City of Tucson, Pima Cnty., 454 P.2d 192 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
· cites it 8× “This court has issued a special writ to test the propriety of an order entered by a city magistrate granting to the defendant a jury trial in a criminal action in which the defendant is charged with violating two sections of our state statutes pertaining to the operation of…”
Katz v. Filandro, 739 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “He also cross-appeals claiming the court gave an *603 improper instruction on speed pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-701(B)(3). He argues the wrongful death statute does not allow a cause of action brought in the name of the personal representative of the estate of a deceased statutory…”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-701(A) — 16 cases
State v. Box, 73 P.3d 623 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
“At oral argument before this court, appellant urged that Baxley had not been justified in stopping appellant because the warning Baxley ultimately issued was for violating A.R.S. § 28-701(A), which proscribes driving "at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the…”
Dykeman v. Engelbrecht, 803 P.2d 119 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
“Plaintiff also objected to the trial court’s refusal to give the jury instructions regarding the last clear chance doctrine and the applicability of A.R.S. § 28-701(A), which requires that drivers control the speed of their vehicles.”
Rimondi v. Briggs, 606 P.2d 412 (Ariz. 1980).
“5 on contributory negligence error? 6) Should the trial court have separately instructed the jury on proper lookout and foreseeability? 7) Should the trial court have instructed the jury on A.R.S. § 28-701(A), speed not reasonable and prudent? Regarding admissibility of the…”
Gibson v. Boyle, 679 P.2d 535 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
“See A.R.S. §§ 28-701 [3] , 702 and 703; State v.”
State v. Rich, 563 P.2d 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
“A.R.S. § 28-701. Other states, faced with an argument similar to that presented by appellant in this case, have upheld speeding laws which were substantially similar to our basic speed law set forth in paragraph (A) above of A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-701(B) — 2 cases
Barlage v. Valentine, 110 P.3d 371 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
“1977) (A.R.S. § 28-701(B), which prescribes certain speeds that, if exceeded, constitute “prima facie evidence” of unreasonable speed, is “rule[] of evidence and not rule[] of substantive law” and merely “raise[s] rebuttable presumptions, which may be overcome by evidence”); cf.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-701(B)(3) — 1 case
Katz v. Filandro, 739 P.2d 822 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
“He also cross-appeals claiming the court gave an *603 improper instruction on speed pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-701(B)(3). He argues the wrongful death statute does not allow a cause of action brought in the name of the personal representative of the estate of a deceased statutory…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.