In this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
1. "Aggregate" means cinder, crushed rock or stone, decomposed granite, gravel, pumice, pumicite and sand.
2. "General plan" means a municipal statement of land development policies, that may include maps, charts, graphs and text that set forth objectives, principles and standards for local growth and redevelopment enacted under the provisions of this article or any prior statute.
3. "Municipal" or "municipality" means an incorporated city or town.
4. "Planning agency" means the official body designated by local ordinance to carry out the purposes of this article and may be a planning department, a planning commission, a hearing officer, the legislative body itself, or any combination thereof.
5. "Right-of-way" means any public right-of-way and includes any area required for public use pursuant to any general or specific plan.
6. "Specific plan" means a detailed element of the general plan enacted under the provisions of this article or a prior statute.
7. "Street" means streets, highways, freeways, expressways, avenues, boulevards, parkways, roads, lanes, walks, alleys, viaducts, subways, tunnels, bridges, public access easements and rights-of-way.
8. "Subdivision regulations" means a municipal ordinance regulating the design and improvement of subdivisions enacted under the provisions of article 6.2 of this chapter, or any prior statute, regulating the design and improvement of subdivisions.
9. "Zoning ordinance" means a municipal ordinance regulating the use of land or structures, or both, under the provisions of this article.
Notes of Decisions
Haines v. City of Phoenix, 727 P.2d 339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 20× “Laws 1973, Chapter 178; A.R.S. § 9-461 et seq. The act requires municipalities to adopt long-range, general plans for urban development.”
Norton v. First Fed. Sav., 624 P.2d 854 (Ariz. 1981).
· cites it 4× “Laws 1764 (A.R.S. § 9-461 et seq. (1977)). Going to the merits of the argument, however, we note that there is a vast difference between identifying the broad purpose of an entire statutory scheme and holding that, because of such broad purpose, a benefitted group gains rights…”
Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 819 P.2d 44 (Ariz. 1991).
· cites it 4× “The Court of Appeals joined Whiteco's claim with the same statutory question certified from the appeal filed by Outdoor.”
City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 439 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1968).
· cites it 4× “* * *” It is imperative to keep in mind that we are here dealing with a matter on municipal zoning. This field of law is still relatively new and was not expressly considered by our constitutional fathers.”
City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 363 P.2d 607 (Ariz. 1961).
· cites it 4× “A.R.S. § 9-461. "A classification in a municipal zoning ordinance must be based on natural *22 distinguishing characteristics and must bear a reasonable relation to the subject of legislation, must be founded upon distinctions reasonable in principle and have a just relation to…”
Winkle v. City of Tucson, 949 P.2d 502 (Ariz. 1997).
· cites it 2× “Because these eases might be read to support preelection review of other types of initiatives, we believe some clarification is in order.”
Ne. Phoenix Homeowners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Mun. Airport, 636 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 4× “This is apparently a reference to a general statement of land development plans and policies adopted by the City of Scottsdale pursuant to A.R.S. § 9-461, et seq. 3 . An exception contained in the judgment leaves Counts I and II viable as to claims asserted by plaintiffs…”
Specht v. City of Page, 627 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 6× “A.R.S. § 9-461(1). Therefore, it appears that a body engaged in formulating zoning ordinances for *597 submission to the municipality’s legislative body for final approval need not, in all instances, be a “planning commission” as contemplated by A.”
Levitz v. State, 613 P.2d 1259 (Ariz. 1980).
· cites it 2× “The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Ordinance G-1508, under which the City sought to prosecute the appellees, is valid. The City readily admits that the revised sign ordinance in question was not enacted in accordance with the statutory requirements of the Urban…”
Bd. of Regents of the Universities & State Coll. v. City of Tempe, 356 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1960).
· cites it 2× “” A.R.S. § 9-461, subdivision B, provides u “A city or town may, within an established [zoning] district, regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use_ of buildings, structures or lands.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461(1) — 3 cases
Haines v. City of Phoenix, 727 P.2d 339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
“Laws 1973, Chapter 178; A.R.S. § 9-461 et seq. The act requires municipalities to adopt long-range, general plans for urban development.”
Ne. Phoenix Homeowners' Ass'n v. Scottsdale Mun. Airport, 636 P.2d 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
“This is apparently a reference to a general statement of land development plans and policies adopted by the City of Scottsdale pursuant to A.R.S. § 9-461, et seq. 3 . An exception contained in the judgment leaves Counts I and II viable as to claims asserted by plaintiffs…”
Specht v. City of Page, 627 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
“A.R.S. § 9-461(1). Therefore, it appears that a body engaged in formulating zoning ordinances for *597 submission to the municipality’s legislative body for final approval need not, in all instances, be a “planning commission” as contemplated by A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461(3) — 1 case
Specht v. City of Page, 627 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
“A.R.S. § 9-461(1). Therefore, it appears that a body engaged in formulating zoning ordinances for *597 submission to the municipality’s legislative body for final approval need not, in all instances, be a “planning commission” as contemplated by A.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 9-461(5) — 2 cases
Haines v. City of Phoenix, 727 P.2d 339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
“Laws 1973, Chapter 178; A.R.S. § 9-461 et seq. The act requires municipalities to adopt long-range, general plans for urban development.”
Specht v. City of Page, 627 P.2d 1091 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981).
“A.R.S. § 9-461(1). Therefore, it appears that a body engaged in formulating zoning ordinances for *597 submission to the municipality’s legislative body for final approval need not, in all instances, be a “planning commission” as contemplated by A.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.