Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (2026)

Eligibility — Conditions — Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026

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An insured worker shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week only if the Director of the Division of Workforce Services finds that:

Claim for Benefits. He or she has made a claim for benefits with respect to such week in accordance with such rules as the director may prescribe;
Registration and Reporting. He or she has registered for work at and thereafter continued to report to a Division of Workforce Services office in accordance with such rules as the director may prescribe. The director, by rule, may waive or alter either or both of the requirements of this subdivision (2) as to individuals attached to regular jobs and as to such other types of cases or situations with respect to which he or she finds that compliance with these requirements would be oppressive or would be inconsistent with the purpose of this chapter. However, no such rules shall conflict with § 11-10-501;
Able to Work and Available for Work.
1. 1. The worker is unemployed, is physically and mentally able to perform suitable work, and is available for the work. Mere registration and reporting at a local employment office shall not be conclusive evidence of ability to work, availability for work, or willingness to accept work unless the individual is doing those things which a reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work.
  2. In determining suitable work under this section and for refusing to apply for or accept suitable work under § 11-10-515, part-time work shall be considered suitable work unless the majority of weeks of work in the period used to determine monetary eligibility are from full-time work.
  3. In determining suitable work under this section or under § 11-10-515 for a worker who is on an approved medical leave from his or her last employer due to the unavailability of light-duty work, light-duty work shall be considered suitable work unless the majority of the number of weeks of work within the period used to determine monetary eligibility were weeks spent performing work that the worker is currently unable to perform due to his or her medical restrictions.
2. Persons who are on layoff and who are attending a state vocational school for the purpose of upgrading or improving their job skills shall be considered available for employment so long as they make reasonable efforts to secure employment unless, or until, they refuse suitable employment or referral or recall to suitable work. However, no otherwise eligible individual shall be denied benefits with respect to any week in which he or she is in training with the approval of the director by reason of the application of the provisions of subdivision (3)(A) of this section relating to availability for work.
3. For the purpose of this subdivision (3), the approval by the director of training for an individual shall be based on the following considerations:
  1. The claimant's skills must be obsolete, or the demands for his or her skills in his or her labor market must be minimal and not likely to improve;
  2. The claimant must possess aptitudes or skills which can be usefully supplemented within a short time by retraining;
  3. The training must be for an occupation for which there is a substantial and recurring demand; and
  4. The claimant must produce evidence of continued attendance and satisfactory progress.
4. In the event of the death of an individual's immediate family member, the eligibility requirements of availability for that individual shall be waived for the day of the death and for six (6) consecutive calendar days thereafter. For the purposes of this subdivision (3), “immediate family member” means a spouse, child, parent, brother, sister, grandchild, or grandparent of the individual.
5. An individual on short-term layoff who expects to be recalled by his or her employer to a full-time job and whose employer intends to recall the individual to a full-time job within ten (10) weeks after the initial date of his or her layoff shall not be required during the layoff to register for work at a division office or to seek other work.
6. Any individual who is not actively engaged in seeking work because he or she is before any court of the United States or of any state pursuant to a lawfully issued summons to appear for jury duty shall not be disqualified under this subdivision (3).
7. No individual shall be considered unavailable for work under this subdivision (3) during the entire week if he or she is required to withdraw from the labor market for less than four (4) days of the week because of a compelling personal emergency.
8. The individual participates in reemployment services, such as job search assistance services, if the individual has been determined to be likely to exhaust regular benefits and to need reemployment services pursuant to a profiling system established by the director, as provided for in section 4 of Pub. L. No. 103-152, unless the director determines that:
  1. The individual has completed such services; or
  2. There is justifiable cause for the claimant's failure to participate in such services;
Waiting Period. He or she has been unemployed for a waiting period of one (1) week. A week shall not be counted as a week of unemployment for the purposes of this subdivision (4):
1. Unless it occurs within the benefit year which includes the week with respect to which he or she claims payment of benefits;
2. If benefits have been paid with respect thereto; and
3. Unless the individual was eligible for benefits with respect thereto as provided in this section and §§ 11-10-512 — 11-10-519, except for the requirements of this subdivision (4); and
1. Qualifying Wages. For any benefit year, he or she has during his or her base period been paid wages in at least two (2) quarters of his or her base period for insured work, and the total wages paid during his or her base period equal not less than thirty-five (35) times his or her weekly benefit amount.
2. Requalifying Wages. For all benefit years, an individual shall not requalify on a succeeding benefit year claim unless he or she has been paid wages for insured work equal to not less than thirty-five (35) times his or her weekly benefit amount and has wages paid for insured work in at least two (2) calendar quarters of his or her base period and, subsequent to filing the claim that established his or her previous benefit year, he or she has had insured work and was paid wages for insured work equal to ten (10) times his or her weekly benefit amount.
3. With respect to weeks of unemployment, wages for insured work shall include wages paid for previously uncovered services. For the purposes of this section, the term “previously uncovered services” means services:
  1. Which were not employment as defined in § 11-10-210(a) and were not services covered pursuant to § 11-10-210(d) at any time during the one-year period; and
  2. Which are:
    1. Agricultural labor, as defined in § 11-10-210(f)(1); or
    2. Services performed by an employee of a political subdivision of this state, as provided in § 11-10-210(a)(2)(B), or by an employee of a nonprofit educational institution which is not an institution of higher education, as provided in § 11-10-210(a)(3), except to the extent that assistance under Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974 was paid on the basis of such services.
4. For the purpose of this subdivision (5), wages shall be counted as “wages for insured work” for benefit purposes with respect to any benefit year only if the benefit year begins subsequent to the date on which the employing unit by which the wages were paid has satisfied the conditions of § 11-10-209 with respect to becoming an employer.

History. Acts 1941, No. 391, § 4; 1943, No. 138, § 29; 1947, No. 398, § 3; 1949, No. 155, § 4; 1953, No. 162, § 2; 1959, No. 13, § 3; 1963, No. 93, § 5; 1971, No. 35, § 8; 1973, No. 329, § 5; 1975 (Extended Sess., 1976), No. 1083, § 5; 1977, No. 376, § 7; 1979, No. 492, § 4; 1979, No. 922, § 4; 1981, No. 43, §§ 6, 7; 1983, No. 482, §§ 13, 14; 1985, No. 8, § 5; 1985, No. 9, § 5; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1105; reen. Acts 1987, No. 672, § 4; Acts 1987, No. 753, § 12; 1989, No. 420, § 6; 1991, No. 48, § 3; 1991, No. 100, § 27; 1993, No. 6, § 5; 1995, No. 519, § 5; 1999, No. 1116, § 9; 2003, No. 1223, § 4; 2009, No. 653, §§ 2, 3; 2009, No. 802, § 3; 2011, No. 861, § 3; 2019, No. 315, § 820; 2019, No. 453, §§ 1, 2; 2019, No. 910, §§ 237-239.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Part of this section was reenacted by Acts 1987, No. 672, § 4. Acts 1987, No. 834 provided that 1987 legislation reenacting acts passed in the 1976 Extended Session should not repeal any other 1987 legislation and that such other legislation would be controlling in the event of conflict.

Amendments. The 2011 amendment substituted “thirty-five (35)” for “twenty-seven (27)” in (5)(A) and (5)(B); and substituted “eight (8)” for “three (3)” in (5)(B).

The 2019 amendment by No. 315 substituted “rules” for “regulations” in (1) and twice in (2); and substituted “rule” for “regulation” in (2).

The 2019 amendment by No. 453 redesignated (3)(A) as (3)(A)(i) and (3)(A)(ii) and added (3)(A)(iii); in (5)(B), inserted the fourth occurrence of “insured” and substituted “ten (10) times” for “eight (8) times”; and made stylistic changes.

The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Director of the Division of Workforce Services” for “Director of the Department of Workforce Services” in the introductory language of the section; substituted “Division of Workforce Services” for “Department of Workforce Services” in (2); and substituted “division” for “department” in (3)(E).

U.S. Code. As to Title II of the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of 1974, referred to in this section, see notes under 26 U.S.C. § 3304.

Public Law 103-152, § 4, referred to in this section, is codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 503 and 504.

Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 453, § 11: Oct. 1, 2019.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, Employment Security Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 424.

Case Notes

Availability for Work.

Company resisting efforts of claimants to obtain unemployment benefits has burden to go forward to overcome the prima facie case made by the determination of the examiner that claimants were available for work. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 227 Ark. 288, 298 S.W.2d 56 (1957).

Mere fact that applicants for unemployment payments were available for picket duty did not of itself show that they were unavailable for employment. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Thornbrough, 229 Ark. 362, 314 S.W.2d 493 (1958).

Where applicant for unemployment benefits refused to accept offered employment contending the rules of the labor union to which he belongs would subject him to a fine and possible discharge from the union for accepting a job paying less than the union scale, he was not protected from disqualification for unemployment benefits as he was not required to resign from the labor organization. Thornbrough v. Stewart, 232 Ark. 53, 334 S.W.2d 699 (1960).

An unemployed person, partially disabled by an industrial injury, whose physician has released her for light-duty work, may still be able to compete in the labor market and may qualify for unemployment benefits as one available for work, although she may be receiving, under the Workers' Compensation Law, partial permanent disability benefits as distinguished from temporary total disability benefits during the period of recuperation. Ross v. Daniels, 266 Ark. 1056, 599 S.W.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1979).

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant was not available for work. Loftin v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 611, 594 S.W.2d 578 (Ct. App. 1980); Hodnett v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 479, 609 S.W.2d 122 (1980); Lanoy v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 922, 611 S.W.2d 524 (1981); Duvall v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 50, 613 S.W.2d 116 (1981); Price v. Director of Labor, 4 Ark. App. 341, 631 S.W.2d 22 (1982).

There is no exception to the availability or search for work requirement on the basis of “good cause” for personal reasons. Hodnett v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 479, 609 S.W.2d 122 (1980).

The availability requirement cannot be read out of § 11-10-214(a) to allow pro-rata benefits to the worker under a liberal interpretation of the statute. Lanoy v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 922, 611 S.W.2d 524 (1981).

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant was available for work. Washington v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 28, 639 S.W.2d 57 (1982).

Where claimants have no more than a hope of future employment with employer, they are available for work as required by this section. Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Stiles, 17 Ark. App. 20, 702 S.W.2d 421 (1986).

Arkansas Board of Review erred by determining that appellant was not eligible for unemployment benefits because he did not have transportation or a driver's license; as long as there existed employment that did not require appellant to have a driver's license, he was available to work. Buchanan v. Dir. of Ark. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 91 Ark. App. 35, 207 S.W.3d 567 (2005).

Denial of unemployment benefits to the employee was appropriate pursuant to subdivision (3)(A) of this section because her own statements and testimony undermined her present contentions that she was currently available for work. In part, the employee testified that she was not looking for work because she was devoting all of her time to school and that it would be difficult to work and go to school; she also testified that she was only available to work a couple of hours a day. Hayden v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 298 (2010).

Even if claimant may have been hesitant to ask for rides, the Board of Review failed to find that he was unwilling to use the option if he found available work; thus, claimant had offered an alternative form of transportation to and from work and the board's denial of unemployment benefits was reversed. Debnam v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 537, 471 S.W.3d 657 (2015).

Board of Review did not err in finding that the employee was ineligible for benefits due to not being available for work given his testimony that he was not available to work due to a death in the family, childcare, and other dependent-care arrangements. Fowlkes v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 56, 512 S.W.3d 667 (2017).

Efforts to Secure Work.

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant was doing those things a reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work. Terry Dairy Prods. Co. v. Cash, 224 Ark. 576, 275 S.W.2d 12 (1955); Hefton v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 857, 606 S.W.2d 379 (1980); Rainbolt v. Everett, 3 Ark. App. 48, 621 S.W.2d 877 (1981).

Evidence insufficient to find that claimant was doing those things a reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work. Faught v. Daniels, 267 Ark. 784, 590 S.W.2d 79 (Ct. App. 1979); Eubanks v. Daniels, 267 Ark. 888, 591 S.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1979); Teegarden v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Div., 267 Ark. 893, 591 S.W.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1979); Tate v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Div., 267 Ark. 1081, 593 S.W.2d 501 (Ct. App. 1980); Sanders v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 672, 599 S.W.2d 770 (Ct. App. 1980); Everett v. Jones, 277 Ark. 162, 639 S.W.2d 739 (1982).

Eligibility Generally.

Claimants held to be eligible for benefits. Harmon v. Laney, 239 Ark. 603, 393 S.W.2d 273 (1965); Springer v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 103, 613 S.W.2d 121 (1981); Prosser v. Everett, 4 Ark. App. 344, 631 S.W.2d 24 (1982); Haywood v. Everett, 5 Ark. App. 140, 633 S.W.2d 395 (1982).

Claimant held not eligible for benefits. Garrett v. Cline, 257 Ark. 829, 520 S.W.2d 281 (1975); Alexander v. Walnut Fork Design, 267 Ark. 1130, 593 S.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1980); McVey v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 409, 605 S.W.2d 483 (1980).

Unemployment benefits are not for those individuals who are voluntarily unemployed or incapable of working due to illness or family responsibilities which preclude them from accepting employment within their capabilities. Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980).

Court reversed a finding that an employee engaged in misconduct under § 11-10-514(a)(1) by not requesting using accrued leave time for the military leave because (1) the employer allowed its employees to use accrued vacation or sick time for military leave, (2) the employee had done so with no problem in the past, (3) there was no written policy that the employee was required to request using accrued leave time for his military leave, and (4) there was no evidence that the employee intentionally disregarded company policy or procedure; thus, the matter was remanded with instructions that an order be entered awarding the employee benefits. Maxfield v. Dir., Ark. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 84 Ark. App. 48, 129 S.W.3d 298 (2003).

Findings.

The board's findings of fact are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Terry Dairy Prods. Co. v. Cash, 224 Ark. 576, 275 S.W.2d 12 (1955).

Registration.

Where plaintiff was declared ineligibile to receive benefits and thereafter did not report and register at the Employment Security Division office, trial courts' finding that plaintiff's appeal from the commissioner's rulings of ineligibility made it unnecessary for plaintiff to thereafter report and register weekly was error since the making of a weekly claim for benefits is a prerequisite to the right of an insured worker to claim benefits. Commissioner, Ark. Dep't of Labor v. Mitchell, 263 Ark. 458, 565 S.W.2d 431 (1978).

Social Security Disability.

Substantial evidence supported a Social Security administrative law judge's finding, that an Arkansas disability claimant was able to work during the period of time that she was laid off and collected unemployment benefits, because pursuant to this section, only individuals who were physically and mentally able to perform work were eligible to collect unemployment benefits. Thompkins v. Astrue, — F. Supp. 2d —, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92255 (W.D. Ark. Dec. 12, 2007).

State Vocational School.

The legislature did not intend that the scope of the phrase state vocational school be interpreted to include any vocational school within the state attended for the purpose of upgrading or improving the worker's job skills; the phrase was intended to include only state-sponsored, tax-supported, vocational schools. Thus, where an unemployment benefits claimant attended nursing assistant school at a private hospital, she was not attending a state vocational school, and was not fully available for work. Blaylock v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 323, 641 S.W.2d 728 (1982).

Suitable Work.

The duty and obligation of an unemployed individual, who has made application for benefits, to accept available and suitable work may exist regardless of whether the work is temporary employment or full-time employment; moreover, suitability of work does not require that the job offered must be equal in every respect to the prior working conditions, that the pay be equal to or better than the previous wage scale. Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980).

Where only employment offered claimant involved a 50 percent salary reduction, it was not suitable employment under the circumstances. Price v. Everett, 2 Ark. App. 98, 616 S.W.2d 766 (1981).

Board of Review's determination that the claimant was disqualified from benefits because she failed without good cause to accept suitable work when offered was remanded because the Board did not set forth a factual basis for concluding that the claimant's training was without the approval of the director. Fraysher v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 603 (2013).

Cited: Reddick v. Scott, 217 Ark. 38, 228 S.W.2d 1008 (1950); Andrews v. Victor Metal Prods. Corp., 237 Ark. 540, 374 S.W.2d 816 (1964); Daves v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 255 Ark. 723, 502 S.W.2d 106 (1973); Whitford v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 222, 563 S.W.2d 469 (1978); Bradshaw v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 716, 595 S.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1980); Lemay v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 683, 599 S.W.2d 771 (Ct. App. 1980); Hirschy v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 174, 649 S.W.2d 412 (1983).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 28 cases (17 in the last 5 years), 2005–2025 · leading case: Worsham v. Bassett, 2016 Ark. 146 (Ark. 2016).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Worsham v. Bassett, 2016 Ark. 146 (Ark. 2016). · cites it 8× “appeals should have ordered the Board to conduct a further hearing to take additional evidence; that the Board and the Appeal Tribunal erred in refusing to offer a further hearing, thereby denying her equal protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution; and that the…”

Daniel Carman v. Dir., Div. of Workforce Servs. & Dewayne Higgins Trucking Co., Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 50 (Ark. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 9× “His own testimony confirmed this at the hearing. And he does not dispute on appeal that he was unavailable to work from April 5 through August 1, 2020.”

Richard Hastings v. Dir., Div. of Workforce Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 138 (Ark. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 9× “The agency, the Appeal Tribunal, and the Board found that Hastings was disqualified from receiving benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (a)(3)(A) (Supp.”

Hubbard v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 460 S.W.3d 294 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 2× “We remand for further proceedings as necessary based on Hubbard’s eligibility to receive benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (3)(A). Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.”

Fowlkes v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 56 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 14× “As such, the claimant did not take appropriate steps to prevent any alleged mistreatment from continuing and thus has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he left last work with good cause connected with the work under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513 . [[Image here]]…”

Rachel Hourston v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 142 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 10× “On July 14, 2020, the Division of Workforce Services issued Hourston a notice of agency determination holding that she was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (3) on finding that she was not able and available to perform suitable work.”

McDaniel v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 288 S.W.3d 281 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “The Department of Workforce Services denied benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(3) (A) (Repl. 2002), which requires that a person be unemployed, physically and mentally able to perform suitable work, available for such work, and doing things that a…”

Buchanan v. Dir., Arkansas Emp. Sec. Dep't, 207 S.W.3d 567 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “The Employment Security Department denied benefits pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (3)(A) (Repl. 2002), which requires that a person be unemployed, physically and mentally able to perform suitable work, available for such work, and doing things that a reasonably prudent…”

Amanda Sharum v. Dir., Arkansas Departmentof Com., Div. of Workforce Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 96 (Ark. Ct. App. 2022). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (5)(A) (Supp. 2021).”

Daniel Carman v. Dir., Div. of Workforce Servs. & Dewayne Higgins Trucking Co., Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 51 (Ark. Ct. App. 2023). · cites it 8× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (3)(A) (Supp. 2021).”

Show all 28 citing cases →

— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(1) — 1 case

Fowlkes v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 56 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). “As such, the claimant did not take appropriate steps to prevent any alleged mistreatment from continuing and thus has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he left last work with good cause connected with the work under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513 . [[Image here]]…”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(3) — 2 cases

McDaniel v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 288 S.W.3d 281 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). “The Department of Workforce Services denied benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(3) (A) (Repl. 2002), which requires that a person be unemployed, physically and mentally able to perform suitable work, available for such work, and doing things that a…”

Findley v. Soc. Sec. Admin. (E.D. Ark. 2020).

— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(3)(A) — 12 cases

Daniel Carman v. Dir., Div. of Workforce Servs. & Dewayne Higgins Trucking Co., Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 50 (Ark. Ct. App. 2023). “His own testimony confirmed this at the hearing. And he does not dispute on appeal that he was unavailable to work from April 5 through August 1, 2020.”

Debnam v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 537 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015).

Daniel Carman v. Dir., Div. of Workforce Servs. & Dewayne Higgins Trucking Co., Inc., 2023 Ark. App. 51 (Ark. Ct. App. 2023). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507 (3)(A) (Supp. 2021).”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(3)(B) — 1 case

Fraysher v. Dir., 2013 Ark. App. 603 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013).

— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(3)(G) — 2 cases

— Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-507(5)(A) — 1 case

Worsham v. Bassett, 2016 Ark. 146 (Ark. 2016). “appeals should have ordered the Board to conduct a further hearing to take additional evidence; that the Board and the Appeal Tribunal erred in refusing to offer a further hearing, thereby denying her equal protection guaranteed by the United States Constitution; and that the…”

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