Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Unemployment compensation: Harassment or other mistreatment by coworker as “good cause” justifying abandonment of employment. 121 A.L.R.5th 467.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Labor Law, Employment Security Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 424.

Case Notes

In General.

Sections 11-10-512 — 11-10-519 are mutually exclusive. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 227 Ark. 288, 298 S.W.2d 56 (1957).

Unemployment benefits are not for those individuals who are voluntarily unemployed or incapable of working due to illness or family responsibilities which preclude them from accepting employment within their capabilities. Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980).

Where employees' acceptance of a severance package precluded unemployment benefits, the appellate court held that, because employees acted in reliance of the explicit prior policy of the employer, which allowed for unemployment benefits when their severance pay ran out, it was unfair and inequitable for the employees to be denied unemployment benefits when the employer later changed that policy and then denied benefits because the employees had not applied for unemployment benefits before the effective date of the policy change. Thompson v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 88 Ark. App. 181, 196 S.W.3d 521 (2004).

Conditioning the availability of unemployment benefits upon a person's willingness to violate “cardinal principles” of their religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of constitutional liberties. Guaranteed Auto Fin., Inc. v. Dir., ESD, 92 Ark. App. 295, 213 S.W.3d 39 (2005).

Construction.

It must be remembered in interpreting and applying this section that the basic design of this chapter is to protect the employee from the economic consequences of unemployment through no fault of the employee; and, to that end, this chapter should be liberally construed. Whitlow v. American Greetings Co., 268 Ark. 1122, 599 S.W.2d 410 (Ct. App. 1980).

Burden of Proof.

A claimant bears the burden of proving good cause by a preponderance of the evidence. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

Due Process.

Claimant was not denied due process even though the Board of Review denied his claim on the ground that he was disqualified due to misconduct, a different ground than that found by the referee; the board did not exceed the parameters of the defined issues and this case did not present a situation where the board disqualified a claim for benefits on a ground unanticipated by the claimant. Moore v. Price, 52 Ark. App. 10, 914 S.W.2d 318 (1996).

Erroneous Payment.

Employee, who voluntarily left employment, was not entitled to unemployment benefits, and amount erroneously paid could not be charged to employer's contribution experience account. Call v. Luten, 219 Ark. 640, 244 S.W.2d 130 (1951).

Evidence.

Evidence insufficient to find that claimant voluntarily left work and claimant was therefore entitled to benefits. Harmon v. Laney, 239 Ark. 603, 393 S.W.2d 273 (1965); Deatherage v. Daniels, 267 Ark. 683, 590 S.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1979); Jackson v. Daniels, 267 Ark. 685, 590 S.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1979); Woods v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 613, 599 S.W.2d 435 (Ct. App. 1980); Dobbins v. Everett, 2 Ark. App. 254, 620 S.W.2d 309 (1981); Stuart v. Everett, 4 Ark. App. 347, 631 S.W.2d 25 (1982).

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant voluntarily left work and claimant was therefore disqualified for benefits. Middleton v. Arkansas Employment Sec. Div., 265 Ark. 11, 576 S.W.2d 218 (1979); Buckley v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 763, 597 S.W.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1980); McKnight v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 1056, 598 S.W.2d 436 (Ct. App. 1980); Ogier v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 1151, 599 S.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1980); Lawson v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 701, 600 S.W.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1980); Broyles v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 712, 600 S.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1980); Graham v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 717, 601 S.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1980); Smith v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 817, 601 S.W.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1980); Gilbert v. Everett, 7 Ark. App. 260, 647 S.W.2d 486 (1983); Haig v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 255, 650 S.W.2d 593 (1983); Hopkins v. Stiles, 10 Ark. App. 77, 662 S.W.2d 177 (1983), rev'd, 282 Ark. 207, 666 S.W.2d 703 (1984); Nichols v. Stiles, 11 Ark. App. 212, 668 S.W.2d 554 (1984); Cowan v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 56 Ark. App. 17, 936 S.W.2d 766 (1997).

The Board of Review's denial of unemployment benefits pursuant to this section, based upon a finding that the claimant voluntarily left his last work without good cause connected with the work, was supported by substantial evidence, where the record contained three conflicting statements made by the claimant himself and a fourth version of the facts made by the manager of the grocery store where he was employed. Haynes v. Director of Labor, 19 Ark. App. 71, 719 S.W.2d 437 (1986).

Where petitioner worked as a quality control chemist for a plastics manufacturer and, without medical advice, quit to avoid certain chemicals in order to protect the integrity of her breast milk after having a child and voluntarily choosing to breast-feed the child, there was substantial evidence to support the board of review's finding that petitioner voluntarily left work without good cause. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

Where employee quit his job because the employer's president questioned him about an insurance claim he submitted for substance abuse treatment and employee felt that this was an invasion of his privacy and that he could not continue working under those conditions, the employee left his work voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work. Brown v. Director, Emp. Sec. Div., 54 Ark. App. 205, 924 S.W.2d 492 (1996).

Benefits denied where claimant failed to follow the employer's grievance procedure, and where her emotional reaction to perceived illegal actions by her colleagues or employer did not affect the voluntariness of her leaving and did not give her good cause to quit. Ahrend v. Director, Emp. Sec. Div., 55 Ark. App. 71, 930 S.W.2d 392 (1996).

Denial of benefits improper where the Board of Review's decision did not set forth sufficient findings of fact upon which it relied in reaching its conclusion; the decision presented a conclusory statement, labeled a “finding,” the Board did not detail or analyze the facts upon which this “finding” was based, and the Board failed to provide a simple straightforward statement of what happened. Ferren v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 59 Ark. App. 213, 956 S.W.2d 198 (1997).

Arkansas Board of Review's finding that the claimant voluntary left work without good cause was not supported by substantial evidence; whether there was good cause was irrelevant where the departure was not voluntary, but rather, the job was completed. Weaver v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 82 Ark. App. 616, 120 S.W.3d 158 (2003).

Arkansas Board of Review's decision granting unemployment benefits to an employee based on a finding that he left his employment after his employer requested volunteers for a work force reduction was not supported by substantial evidence; the Board never explicitly made a finding as to whether the employer “asked for volunteers” pursuant to the requirements of subsection (c) of this section. Southwestern Bell Tel., L.P. v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 88 Ark. App. 36, 194 S.W.3d 790 (2004).

Substantial evidence did not support the conclusion by the Arkansas Board of Review that the claimant made reasonable efforts to preserve his job rights, because while the Board suggested that requesting a leave of absence would have been impractical and would have constituted a futile effort to preserve his job rights, there was simply no evidence in the record regarding what the employer's response to such a request might have been. Woodunique, Inc. v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 103 Ark. App. 280, 288 S.W.3d 699 (2008).

Substantial evidence supported the award of unemployment benefits, because the employee was discharged, and due to the inclement weather, the Arkansas Board of Review found that the employee had good reason for refusing to report to work and that her refusal under the circumstances did not constitute a willful disregard of the employer's interests; it had been snowing on the day in question, police advised travelers to exercise caution on bridges, and the employee had to travel over at least one bridge to get to work. Ark. Internal Med. Clinic v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 95 (2012).

Good Cause.

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant had good cause for refusing job or leaving work. Ladish Co. v. Breashears, 263 Ark. 48, 563 S.W.2d 419 (1978); Jackson v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 714, 600 S.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1980); Teel v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 766, 606 S.W.2d 151 (1980); Bennett v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 19, 611 S.W.2d 801 (1981); Robinson v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 152, 613 S.W.2d 608 (1981); Murphy v. Everett, 5 Ark. App. 281, 635 S.W.2d 301 (1982); McEwen v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 32, 637 S.W.2d 617 (1982); Young v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 295, 641 S.W.2d 39 (1982); Barker v. Stiles, 9 Ark. App. 273, 658 S.W.2d 416 (1983).

What constitutes good cause is usually a question of fact within the province of the Board of Review. Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978).

Evidence insufficient to find that claimant had good cause for refusing job or leaving work. Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978); Armstrong v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 303, 603 S.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1980); Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980); Hunter v. Daniels, 2 Ark. App. 94, 616 S.W.2d 763 (1981); Wilson v. Director of Labor, 5 Ark. App. 212, 635 S.W.2d 5 (1982); Morton v. Director of Labor, 22 Ark. App. 281, 742 S.W.2d 118 (1987); Calvin v. Director of Labor, 31 Ark. App. 74, 787 S.W.2d 701 (1990); Garrett v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 58 Ark. App. 7, 944 S.W.2d 865 (1997).

General economic conditions which lead to a claimant's seeking higher wages or lower living costs do not constitute “good cause connected with the work,” as contemplated in this section. Broyles v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 712, 600 S.W.2d 426 (Ct. App. 1980).

Although benefits would be denied an employee who left her work for general economic reasons not connected with some specific alleged unfairness perpetrated by her employer, an act by the employer which does economic injury to the employee may be good cause connected with the work. Jackson v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 714, 600 S.W.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1980).

There is nothing in the chapter which even remotely suggests that an employee may voluntarily quit her job because of an isolated incident which might arguably be in violation of a section of this chapter and thereby preserve unemployment insurance benefits. Graham v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 717, 601 S.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1980).

While allegations of substantial decrease in wages may be considered as good cause for voluntary departure from employment, complaints based primarily upon economic conditions beyond the control of the employer do not fit the statutory exemption from disqualification. Armstrong v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 303, 603 S.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1980).

The term “good cause” means a justifiable reason for not accepting the particular job offered and to constitute good cause, the reason for refusal must not be arbitrary or capricious and the reasons must be connected with the work itself; while personal factors may be considered in determining whether there is good cause, they are not controlling or dispositive of the issue. Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980); Rowlett v. Director, 45 Ark. App. 99, 872 S.W.2d 83 (1994).

The question of what is good cause must be determined in the light of the facts in each case. Wacaster v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 190, 603 S.W.2d 907 (1980).

Sexual harassment endured by an unemployment benefits claimant does not have to be unbearable before the treatment could be considered good cause for the claimant to voluntarily quit her job. McEwen v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 32, 637 S.W.2d 617 (1982).

Good cause to refuse work which is otherwise suitable, as required to remain eligible for unemployment compensation under this section, does not exist merely because the employee's acceptance of the offered position will result in the discharge of a fellow employee of less seniority. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Couch, 8 Ark. App. 37, 648 S.W.2d 497 (1983).

In determining the existence of good cause for voluntarily leaving one's work under this section, factors to be considered include the degree of risk to one's health, safety, and morals, and her physical fitness, prior training, and experience. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

Good cause is dependent not only on the good faith of the employee involved, which includes the presence of a genuine desire to work and to be self-supporting, but also on the reaction of the average employee. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

Good cause is a cause that would reasonably impel the average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up his or her employment. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

What constitutes good cause is ordinarily a question of fact for the board of review to determine from the particular circumstances of each case. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 42 Ark. App. 218, 856 S.W.2d 636 (1993).

It was not unreasonable for the employer to request employee to go to the night shift, nor was it unreasonable to demote employee for refusing to do so. Khan v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 48 Ark. App. 64, 892 S.W.2d 513 (1994).

“Good cause” depends not only on the good faith of the employee involved but also on the reaction of the average employee and includes the element of whether the employee took appropriate steps to rectify the problem. Claflin v. Price, 53 Ark. App. 126, 920 S.W.2d 20 (1996).

Claimant lacked good cause for quitting where her supervisor originally informed her that reduction in work hours was something that he wanted to try and that it was his intention to move her back to full-time after a week of half-time work. Claflin v. Price, 53 Ark. App. 126, 920 S.W.2d 20 (1996).

Employee's decision not to commute to new place of employment did not constitute failure to accept suitable work where the commute was 50 additional miles, the travel expenses, although partially reimbursed, would result in a net decrease in pay, and where the inherent conditions of the mountainous road presented a safety hazard. Carpenter v. Director of Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 55 Ark. App. 39, 929 S.W.2d 177 (1996).

The claimant did not have good cause to leave his work voluntarily where: (1) the day before he resigned, the claimant took off work to go deer hunting and did not call in to inform his supervisor; (2) the next day, he reported to work and was confronted by his supervisor regarding his absence; (3) the supervisor presented him with a written reprimand, and the claimant refused to sign it; (4) the claimant objected to the reprimand and maintained that there was a disparate application of the absenteeism policy; (5) thereafter, the supervisor retrieved the reprimand document and gave the claimant a choice between taking a demotion with a pay cut or resigning; and (6) the claimant chose to resign and seek benefits. Barber v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 67 Ark. App. 20, 992 S.W.2d 159 (1999).

Where the only evidence presented was employee's testimony that he was subjected to verbal and physical abuse on the job, employee quit for good cause and was entitled to unemployment benefits. Gunter v. Dir,. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 82 Ark. App. 346, 107 S.W.3d 902 (2003).

Former employee was properly denied unemployment benefits where he voluntarily resigned without good cause connected to the employee's work; although the employee claimed that he was asked to violate the provisions of § 25-33-101 et seq., the court did not see how any alleged restrictions imposed on the employee prevented him from performing duties as required by §§ 25-33-104(a)(3), (4), (8) and (13) [repealed]. Bradford v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't., 83 Ark. App. 332, 128 S.W.3d 20 (2003).

After reviewing §§ 25-19-102, 25-19-105, 25-19-106, the court found nothing in the Freedom of Information Act that specifies that the communications media by which the public's business is conducted are limited to publicly owned communications; thus, the court rejected a state employee's claim that the employee was asked to violate the law by communicating with the governor via a private email address and, thus, the employee's subsequent resignation was voluntary without good cause and the employee was not entitled to benefits under subdivision (a)(1). Bradford v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't., 83 Ark. App. 332, 128 S.W.3d 20 (2003).

Employee was entitled to unemployment benefits where it was determined that he left his job for good cause; the employee had spent five years of complaining to all levels of management about his reassignment and quit after having management violate its own seniority rules and take no action to provide a permanent remedy such that his circumstances would reasonably impel an average worker to give up his or her employment. Lewis v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 84 Ark. App. 381, 141 S.W.3d 896 (2004).

Arkansas Board of Review properly held that employee was entitled to unemployment benefits under under subdivision (a)(1) of this section where the employee had good cause to leave once his constitutionally protected religious beliefs diverged with his job requirement of working on Saturdays as an automobile salesman; the employee could not be denied unemployment compensation solely because he chose his religion over his job. Guaranteed Auto Fin., Inc. v. Dir., ESD, 92 Ark. App. 295, 213 S.W.3d 39 (2005).

Court disagreed with the Arkansas Board of Review's conclusion that an employee failed to prove that she left her job for reasons that would have impelled the average able-bodied, qualified worker to give up her employment and that, in the absence of such good cause, she was disqualified from receiving benefits pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of this section. In the court's view, reasonable minds could not have concluded, on the basis of the facts actually found by the board, that the employee lacked good cause connected with the work for terminating her employment unless she continued to endure abuse, later including abuse for whistle blowing, after she had made two fruitless efforts to rectify her problem with management. Swain v. Dep't of Workforce Servs., 102 Ark. App. 171, 283 S.W.3d 603 (2008).

Employee's claim for unemployment benefits was wrongfully denied under subdivision (a)(1) of this section because the employee voluntarily left work with good cause; the employee was sexually harassed by a coworker, who was relative of the employer. Upon learning of the harassment, the employer did not separate the coworker from the employee completely. Relyea v. Dir., 104 Ark. App. 235, 290 S.W.3d 34 (2008).

Arkansas Board of Review erred by determining that claimant was disqualified from unemployment benefits as she voluntarily left her job without good cause connected with the work under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, because the Board made no findings with respect to her claim of gender discrimination. McAlister v. Williams, 2012 Ark. App. 349 (2012).

Board of Review erred in denying unemployment benefits, because reasonable minds could not conclude, on the basis of the facts actually found by the Board, that an employee lacked good cause connected with the work for terminating his employment when the employee was not being compensated; the employee did not allege a substantial decrease, but rather no compensation at all, and the Board made a specific finding that the employee showed he continued to work for several weeks without pay. Ballard v. Director, 2012 Ark. App. 371 (2012).

Board of Review erred under subdivision (a)(1) of this section in denying a claimant unemployment benefits based on a finding that she quit her previous employment as a dental assistant voluntarily and without good cause because the employer admitted that he continued making inappropriate sexual remarks regarding the claimant in front of patients. Pepper v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 605 (2012).

Board of Review’s finding that the employee voluntarily quit her employment without good cause connected to the work was not supported by substantial evidence, as the employee presented evidence that she experienced verbal lashings from the employer and physical threats by a resident while working as community manager and the employer acknowledged that a resident threatened the employee’s physical safety but the employer took no remedial action the court could see. Davis v. Director, Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 260 (2014).

Good Cause Not Shown.

Lack of transportation is not a reason connected with the work to establish good cause for failing to accept suitable work. Nelson v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 533 (2013).

Unemployment benefits were denied because an employer’s decision to not extend the practice of helping the claimant with travel expenses with a bonus did not create good cause for the applicant to quit. Also, there was no good cause to quit based on a reassignment to a different position; there was no evidence that the applicant complained about a loss of pay or that the new position was more dangerous. Allen v. Director, Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 233, 434 S.W.3d 384 (2014).

Board of Review's decision that an employee left his last work without good cause connected with work was supported by substantial evidence where he walked off the job without permission and never returned, he gave conflicting information in his unemployment applications, and he stated that cursing was not unusual in the workplace and had not caused him to quit in the past. Fowlkes v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 56, 512 S.W.3d 667 (2017).

Husband and Wife.

Sexual harassment by her supervisor has been held to be good cause for an employee to voluntarily resign her employment; such good cause also extends to the husband of the victim of the sexual harassment where husband and wife have the same employer. Boothe v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 59 Ark. App. 169, 954 S.W.2d 946 (1997).

Labor Disputes.

Where claimants were disqualified under former provision of this section relating to labor disputes they could not also be again disqualified under this section when they offered to return to work. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner of Labor, 227 Ark. 288, 298 S.W.2d 56 (1957); Rainfair, Inc. v. Cobb, 229 Ark. 37, 312 S.W.2d 906 (1958) (decision prior to 1955 amendment).

Leaves of Absence.

Inasmuch as this chapter contains no definition of leave of absence, the court would consider language of the contract between the parties, prior conduct and dealings by the employer with employees, and any other relevant facts at hand in determining if a leave of absence existed. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thornbrough, 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960).

Where the leave of absence had not been terminated, it was error for the commissioner to declare claimant eligible for benefits. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thornbrough, 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960).

A woman who has a leave of absence for pregnancy does not have to secure thirty days of new work if she is not rehired, in order to receive benefits. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thornbrough, 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960).

Where contract of employment provided for leaves of absence for good cause and for reasonable periods and employee was granted leave of absence of one year for pregnancy although document stated that there probably would be no place for employee when she returned, but record reflected that employees granted the leave were nearly always hired back without loss of seniority benefits, the employee was granted a leave of absence within the meaning of this chapter. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thornbrough, 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960).

Where employee was granted year's pregnancy leave but applied for reinstatement and was refused prior to expiration of the year, commissioner erred in declaring employee eligible for unemployment benefits since leave of absence had not expired and one year leave of absence was not an unreasonable time. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Thornbrough, 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960).

The evidence upon which claimant's disqualification for benefits was based was not substantial where the claimant sought a 30 days leave of absence prior to leaving work for family emergency, but was refused. Morse v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 402, 609 S.W.2d 80 (1980).

Misapplication by Board of Review.

Award of unemployment benefits under § 11-10-514(a) to an employee by the Arkansas Board of Review had to be reversed because the Board misapplied the law when it, in effect, ignored subdivision (a)(1) of this section to determine whether the employee should be disqualified for benefits if she voluntarily and without good cause left her last work. A Team Temps. v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 104 Ark. App. 71, 289 S.W.3d 158 (2008).

Part-time Employment.

A claimant who voluntarily leaves part-time employment is ineligible for further unemployment benefits only to the extent that his benefits would have been decreased by his part-time wages. Hopkins v. Stiles, 10 Ark. App. 77, 662 S.W.2d 177 (1983), rev'd, 282 Ark. 207, 666 S.W.2d 703 (1984).

Where it appeared from the record that had claimant continued her part-time employment, her part-time wages were too small to have any effect on unemployment benefits which she was already receiving, claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits even though she voluntarily left part-time job without good cause. Hopkins v. Stiles, 10 Ark. App. 77, 662 S.W.2d 177 (1983), rev'd, 282 Ark. 207, 666 S.W.2d 703 (1984).

An employee who was laid off from a full-time job after ten years, subsequently obtained a part-time job with an employment agency, and later quit the part-time job was entitled to unemployment benefits based upon the full-time job subject only to partial reduction by the amount of her part-time wages. Stiles v. Coit, 285 Ark. 212, 686 S.W.2d 405 (Ark. 1985).

Personal Emergency.

Evidence sufficient to find existence of personal emergency. Wade v. Thornbrough, 231 Ark. 454, 330 S.W.2d 100 (1959); Turner v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 418, 605 S.W.2d 465 (1980); Valentine v. Barnes, 1 Ark. App. 308, 615 S.W.2d 386 (1981); Timms v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 163, 639 S.W.2d 368 (1982).

This section does not require an individual to offer medical proof of a personal emergency to his employer; it requires the individual to make reasonable efforts to preserve his job rights. An individual may preserve his job rights by requesting a leave of absence from his employer. Timms v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 163, 639 S.W.2d 368 (1982).

Threats of physical abuse and ejection from one's home, sufficient to cause claimant to seek shelter with others, clearly constitute a personal emergency. Rivers v. Stiles, 16 Ark. App. 121, 697 S.W.2d 938 (1985).

Board of Review erred in denying an employee's claim for unemployment benefits based on voluntary unemployment because the employee quit her employment due to a family situation, she asked the employer about a change of duties prior to quitting, but none were available, the employee's personal emergency did not disappear when her ex-husband moved out of state and was no longer being available for childcare, and she was unable to afford alternate childcare. Thompson v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 303 (2014).

Preservation of Job Rights.

Evidence insufficient to find that claimant made sufficient efforts to preserve job rights. Daves v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 255 Ark. 723, 502 S.W.2d 106 (1973); Gordos Ark., Inc. v. Stiles, 16 Ark. App. 30, 696 S.W.2d 320 (1985); Western Sizzlin of Russellville, Inc. v. Director of Labor, 30 Ark. App. 141, 783 S.W.2d 875 (1990).

Where claimant becomes unemployed, he is not required to request alternative work when he had already been told that there were no more openings. Graham v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 774, 601 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant made sufficient efforts to preserve job rights. Graham v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 774, 601 S.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1980); Turner v. Daniels, 270 Ark. 418, 605 S.W.2d 465 (1980); Butler v. Director of Labor, 3 Ark. App. 229, 624 S.W.2d 448 (1981).

Claimant's failure to seek a leave of absence from her employer because he did not grant leaves did not disqualify her under this section as not having made reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights, since asking for a leave of absence after her employer had released her would be a useless act and since a claimant who is terminated by her employer through no fault of her own is not bound to preserve her job rights as is required when she voluntarily quits her employment. Ireland v. Daniels, 2 Ark. App. 44, 616 S.W.2d 33 (1981).

This section requires the individual to make reasonable efforts to preserve his job rights. An individual may preserve his job rights by requesting a leave of absence from his employer. Timms v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 163, 639 S.W.2d 368 (1982).

Where employee was informed by personnel manager that leave had to be granted by her supervisor and employee tried that avenue but was denied, was never informed of Family Medical Leave and was not given a personnel handbook, employee made reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights and was entitled to unemployment benefits. Williams v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 81 Ark. App. 147, 98 S.W.3d 856 (2003).

Under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, appellant was not entitled to unemployment benefits as she left her last employment without making reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights because she did not provide her employer with her release to return to work, and because she did specifically ask, and only assumed, she had been fired. Foster v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 190 (2013).

Board of Review's denial of unemployment benefits to appellant was reversed because substantial evidence did not support the Board's finding that appellant voluntarily left her job due to a disability and failed to make any reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights before quitting under subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(2)(A) of this section, as appellant did take active steps to preserve her job rights by requesting a transfer to another position that could accommodate her disability. Alexander v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 225 (2013).

It was proper to deny unemployment-compensation benefits to a teacher on the basis that she voluntarily left her work without good cause because she had the right to present information to the school board as to why it should not accept the superintendent's recommendation to terminate her employment. Davis v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 515 (2013).

Denial of unemployment benefits was affirmed, given that although the worker had been interrupted several times during her distribution of medicine at her place of employment, a long-term care and rehabilitation facility, and she was behind when she was told to go to the dining room, the worker never explained the situation to the administrator or asked for help in distributing medication or supervising the dinner; she was required to make reasonable efforts to preserve her job rights before simply walking off the job, which the Board of Review found she did not do, and substantial evidence supported that conclusion. Buck v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 685, 449 S.W.3d 705 (2014).

Temporary Employment.

Once a claimant is disqualified for leaving a permanent job he cannot wipe out disqualification by taking a temporary job for a week knowing the job is temporary. Hope Brick Works v. Call, 221 Ark. 928, 256 S.W.2d 729 (1953).

While it is understandable and logical why an employee who quits a permanent job in order to accept a temporary one is dissentitled to benefits when the temporary employment ceases, the same disqualifying rule would not be applicable when an employee leaves a temporary assignment to accept another temporary position which affords more pay. Kilgore v. Falls Church Animal Hosp., 267 Ark. 801, 590 S.W.2d 671 (1979).

Substantial evidence supported the decision of the Board of Review that a temporary employee voluntarily quit her employment and was disqualified from unemployment benefits, because she was offered work assignments after her last job ended and she declined each assignment without good cause. Nelson v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 533 (2013).

There is no authority that would allow an employee's pre-employment statements regarding the terms of her temporary employment to qualify as a prospective resignation that the employer could then accelerate at any time, and acceleration of an employee's separation from work, which does not flow from the employee's voluntary resignation, is simply called termination. Without substantial evidence to support the finding that the temporary employee voluntarily left her last work without good cause, the judgment was reversed for an award of benefits. Cline v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 106, 483 S.W.3d 828 (2016).

Time to Disqualify.

Once commissioner has determined that claimant has left his job he must impose the disqualification. Hope Brick Works v. Call, 221 Ark. 928, 256 S.W.2d 729 (1953).

Voluntary Leaving Not Shown.

Plaintiff did not voluntarily leave his position as president of a business without good cause connected with his work, notwithstanding that he agreed to resign, signed a covenant not to compete, and was paid $60,000, where he had worked for the business for 28 years, the business was in the process of being sold at the time of his resignation, and he was being replaced as president and was not hired by the new owners except as a consultant. Hiner v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 61 Ark. App. 139, 965 S.W.2d 785 (1998).

Pizza cook did not voluntarily quit his employment without good cause connected to the work where both he and the employer's representative testified that the outside temperature was at least 100 degrees on the day he quit, the air conditioning in the kitchen was not working, the door to the kitchen was closed on orders of the employer, the employer was aware of the problem with the air conditioning, and the cook had complained about the problem several times. Brooks v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 62 Ark. App. 85, 966 S.W.2d 941 (1998).

Arkansas Board of Review's finding, denying an inmate unemployment benefits because he voluntarily left his last work, pursuant to this section, was not supported by substantial evidence where the inmate was transferred out of the work release program by the correction department and had no choice in the matter. Rankin v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 78 Ark. App. 174, 79 S.W.3d 885 (2002).

Evidence established that the employee was discharged when the main plant manager suddenly decided to discontinue the employer's past practice of providing a substitute worker during hours that the employee, who was reliant on public transportation, could not be present for overtime work on the weekend; thus, the employee did not leave the employee's work voluntarily and without good cause connected with the work, and the board of review's decision to the contrary was reversed. Missouri v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 84 Ark. App. 172, 137 S.W.3d 436 (2003).

Where an owner of a company used an expletive when calling a former employee a liar after she denied methamphetamine use, it was determined that the employee voluntarily quit with good cause when she left the premises a few minutes later; thus, substantial evidence supported a finding that she was entitled to unemployment benefits. Pocahontas Elecs. v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 96 Ark. App. 227, 240 S.W.3d 130 (2006).

Because the claimant repeatedly brought her complaints to her superiors to no avail and the employer was unavailable to respond, it was futile for her to request a leave of absence or an adjustment of her hours; substantial evidence did not support that she voluntarily left work without good cause. Adams v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 200, 487 S.W.3d 405 (2016).

Voluntary Leaving Shown.

Cashier who quit as a result of harassment by temporary manager trainee was not entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Owens v. Director, Ark. Emp. Sec. Dep't, 55 Ark. App. 255, 935 S.W.2d 285 (1996).

Employee on suspension who quit when faced with probable, but not absolutely certain, discharge, voluntarily left employment without good cause. Anderson v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 59 Ark. App. 266, 957 S.W.2d 712 (1997).

Employee left his last work without making reasonable efforts to preserve his job rights, where after returning from a medical leave of absence, he was unable to resume his normal duties and resigned before there was opportunity to remedy the situation. Wenzl v. Director, 60 Ark. App. 21, 959 S.W.2d 63 (1997).

Where employees had voluntarily applied for a voluntary severance package (VSP), the board of review did not err in finding that the employees had voluntarily left their work without good cause connected with the work and were not entitled to unemployment benefits; the employee's jobs were clearly suitable for them because the work would have been a continuation of the jobs they were already performing and they were not in imminent danger of losing their jobs. Billings v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 84 Ark. App. 79, 133 S.W.3d 399 (2003).

Board of Review's decision denying appellant unemployment benefits under this section on the basis that he voluntarily left his job as a carpenter without good cause connected to the work was supported by substantial evidence, because appellant made no attempt to go to his supervisor's house to report for work when he had not been contacted by telephone. Rivas v. Director, 2013 Ark. App. 91 (2013).

Unemployment benefits were denied because an applicant voluntarily left his job after his employer discontinued travel assistance; the applicant abandoned his job when he did not contact a plant manager about continued employment. Allen v. Director, Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 233, 434 S.W.3d 384 (2014).

Unemployment benefits were not awarded because a benefits claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause; by the time the claimant had formally resigned, an incident of alleged elder abuse had already been reported, and the claimant decided to quit before a meeting was held about the incident. The reasons that the claimant gave for not going to higher management were unpersuasive. Jones v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2014 Ark. App. 668 (2014).

Board of Review's decision that the employee voluntarily left work without good cause and failed to address his concerns was supported by evidence the employee was suspended after a positive drug test but returned to work with full compensation, the employer made a reasonable request for a doctor's verification that prescription medication would not interfere with the employee's job, and the employee terminated his employment without voicing concerns to a supervisor or management. Voss v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 521, 471 S.W.3d 661 (2015).

Claimant was properly disqualified for unemployment benefits as she voluntarily left her work without good cause because, when she learned that a coworker was going to tell the employer's wife about the nude pictures she had sent to the employer, she left work, but there was no evidence that the employer fired her; although she exchanged emails with the employer two days after she quit, she did not ask him about returning to work; there was evidence that the employer did not want the claimant to quit, he was expecting her to return to work, and he would have let her stay if she wanted; and, although the claimant testified that she did not return to her work because she was afraid of the employer, the Board of Review found her fear was unwarranted. Ridley v. Dir., Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 465, 503 S.W.3d 856 (2016).

Withdrawal of Resignation.

An employee who voluntarily resigns his employment without good cause connected with the work is not entitled to unemployment benefits even if he attempted to withdraw his resignation prior to his last day of employment with that employer. Osterhout v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 216, 639 S.W.2d 539, 36 A.L.R.4th 392 (1982).

Cited: Cash v. Rocket Mfg. Co., 223 Ark. 561, 267 S.W.2d 318 (1954); Garrett v. Cline, 257 Ark. 829, 520 S.W.2d 281 (1975); Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978); Stagecoach Motel v. Krause, 267 Ark. 1093, 593 S.W.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1980); Jordan v. Dukes, 269 Ark. 581, 600 S.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1980); Stewart v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 809, 601 S.W.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1980); Cross v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 201, 607 S.W.2d 680 (1980); Hodnett v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 479, 609 S.W.2d 122 (1980); Ireland v. Daniels, 2 Ark. App. 44, 616 S.W.2d 33 (1981); Jeffreys v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 265, 640 S.W.2d 465 (1982); Ramsey v. Everett, 7 Ark. App. 120, 644 S.W.2d 621 (1983); Jones v. Director of Labor, 8 Ark. App. 234, 650 S.W.2d 601 (1983); Feagin v. Everett, 9 Ark. App. 59, 652 S.W.2d 839 (1983); Linscott v. Director of Labor, 9 Ark. App. 103, 653 S.W.2d 150 (1983); Stiles v. Hopkins, 282 Ark. 207, 666 S.W.2d 703 (1984); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Couch, 12 Ark. App. 267, 675 S.W.2d 838 (1984); Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Stiles, 15 Ark. App. 30, 688 S.W.2d 326 (1985); Shipley Baking Co. v. Stiles, 17 Ark. App. 72, 703 S.W.2d 465 (1986); Rankin v. Dir,. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 82 Ark. App. 575, 120 S.W.3d 169 (2003).