Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532 (2026)
Claims — Recovery
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- If the Director of the Division of Workforce Services finds that a person knowingly has made a false statement or misrepresentation of a material fact or knowingly has failed to disclose a material fact and as a result of either action has received benefits under this chapter to which he or she was not entitled, then he or she is liable to repay the amount to the Unemployment Compensation Fund.
- Once the overpayment becomes final under § 11-10-527, the amount owed shall accrue interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum beginning thirty (30) days after the date of the first billing statement.
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- A penalty of fifty percent (50%) of the amount of the overpayment at the time the overpayment becomes final shall be assessed on all fraudulent overpayments.
- An overpayment established under this subsection that is repaid within thirty (30) days of the mailing date of the determination shall be assessed a reduced penalty of fifteen percent (15%).
- An overpayment established under this subsection that is determined to have been as a result of benefits collected fraudulently, as well as any other penalties, interest, and costs assessed as a result of the fraudulent activity, shall be repaid before the person receives benefits under this chapter.
- The portion of the penalty assessed under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section in excess of fifteen percent (15%) of the overpayment shall be deposited into a subaccount of the Division of Workforce Services Special Fund under § 19-5-984, to be entitled the “UI Integrity Fund” that shall be used exclusively for integrity-related activities arising under this chapter.
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- If the director finds that a person has received an amount as benefits under this chapter to which he or she was not entitled by reasons other than fraud, willful misrepresentation, or willful nondisclosure of facts, the person is liable to repay the amount to the Unemployment Compensation Fund.
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- In lieu of requiring the repayment, the director may recover the amount by deduction of any future benefits payable to the person under this chapter unless the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against equity and good conscience.
- As used in subdivision (b)(2)(A) of this section, “direct result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services” does not include overpayments established under an appeal reversal as a result of the successful appeal of a denial of benefits.
- A person held liable to repay an amount to the Unemployment Compensation Fund is subject to having any state income tax refund to which he or she may be entitled intercepted pursuant to § 26-36-301 et seq., as administered by the Revenue Division of the Department of Finance and Administration.
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- When an overpayment becomes final under § 11-10-527, the director shall present a certificate of overpayment describing the amount owed by the claimant to the circuit clerk of the county where the claimant is domiciled.
- The circuit clerk shall enter the certificate of overpayment in the docket of the circuit court for judgments and decrees and note the time of the filing of the certificate.
- After entry by the circuit clerk, the certificate of overpayment shall have the force of a judgment of the circuit court and shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) annually.
- An interest payment recovered from an overpayment to a claimant shall be deposited into the Division of Workforce Services Special Fund.
- A penalty payment recovered from an overpayment to a claimant shall be deposited into the Unemployment Compensation Fund.
- The federal income tax refund of a person held liable to repay an amount to the Unemployment Compensation Fund is subject to interception under the Claims Resolution Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, or a regulation adopted to implement that law.
- The Division of Workforce Services may issue an overpayment determination contemporaneously with any other determination.
- The deductions from future benefits provided for in subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)(2) of this section may proceed during an appeal of the overpayment determination.
History. Acts 1941, No. 391, § 6; 1963, No. 93, § 8; 1981, No. 43, § 10; 1985, No. 8, § 7; 1985, No. 9, § 7; A.S.A. 1947, § 81-1107; Acts 1987, No. 753, § 16; 1993, No. 6, § 10; 1997, No. 234, § 21; 1999, No. 1116, §§ 13, 14; 2001, No. 1367, § 8; 2005, No. 902, § 7; 2007, No. 490, § 9; 2009, No. 802, §§ 9-11; 2011, No. 1040, § 3; 2013, No. 956, § 3; 2019, No. 453, §§ 9, 10; 2019, No. 910, §§ 261-263.
Amendments. The 2011 amendment, in (e), substituted “is subject” for “as the result of a finding of fraud shall be subject” and “under Pub. L. No. 111-291” for “pursuant to Pub. L. No. 110-328,” and deleted “or regulation” following “rule.”
The 2013 amendment substituted “Unemployment Compensation Fund” for “fund” in (b)(1), (c), and (e); rewrote (a)(1), (a)(3), and (e); substituted “An interest” for “Any interest or penalty” in (d)(4); and inserted (d)(5), (f), and (g).
The 2019 amendment by No. 453 deleted “or the director may recover the amount of the overpayment by deductions from any future benefits payable to the person under this chapter” from the end of (a)(1); redesignated (a)(3) as (a)(3)(A)(i); substituted “fifty percent (50%)” for “fifteen percent (15%)” in (a)(3)(A)(i); added (a)(3)(A)(ii), (a)(3)(B), and (a)(3)(C); redesignated (b)(2) as (b)(2)(A); substituted “as a direct result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services” for “without fault on the part of the recipient” in (b)(2)(A); added (b)(2)(B); and made a stylistic change.
The 2019 amendment by No. 910 substituted “Director of the Division of Workforce Services” for “Director of the Department of Workforce Services” in (a)(1); substituted “Division of Workforce Services Special Fund” for “Department of Workforce Services Special Fund” in (d)(4); and substituted “Division of Workforce Services” for “Department of Workforce Services” in (f).
Effective Dates. Acts 2019, No. 453, § 11: Oct. 1, 2019.
Case Notes
Construction.
This section and § 11-10-519 required the recipient to repay all benefits received during the period she was disqualified for committing fraud, not just the amount of overpayment after calculating unreported income. Hunt v. Director, Emp. Sec. Dep't, 57 Ark. App. 152, 942 S.W.2d 873 (1997).
Overpayment.
Before a claimant who has been paid benefits to which she was not entitled can be required to repay the amount so received, due process requires that she has been afforded the opportunity of a hearing, after proper notice, upon all the issues set out in this section. Prichett v. Director of Labor, 5 Ark. App. 194, 634 S.W.2d 397 (1982).
If an unemployment compensation claimant has been paid benefits to which he was not entitled, due process requires that his liability to repay the amount so received must be determined after he has been afforded the opportunity of a hearing, after proper notice, upon all the issues set out in this section. Farmer v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 23, 648 S.W.2d 513 (1983).
Evidence supported a determination that the appellant was liable to repay $1,155 based upon a finding that he received benefits to which he was not entitled and that it would not violate equity and good conscience to require repayment where (1) after receiving benefits, the appellant was later disqualified by a decision of the Appeal Tribunal, which decision was not appealed and became final, and (2) at the time of the hearing on the repayment question, the appellant was unemployed, his wife was earning $ 30 per week, their monthly expenses for necessities were approximately $ 1,000, they owned their own home, they also owned a 1993 Buick Regal and a 1992 Nissan pickup, both paid-in-full, and they had about $ 14,000 in savings. Trigg v. Director Ark. Empl. Sec. Dep't, 72 Ark. App. 266, 34 S.W.3d 783 (2000).
Pursuant to subdivision (b)(1)(B) of this section, requiring a worker to repay the overpayment of benefits would violate principles of equity and good conscience where there was substantial evidence that his wife's sources of funds were extremely limited, due to the fact that she was attending school, and the household expenses exceeded the household income. Peterson v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 90 Ark. App. 19, 203 S.W.3d 655 (2005).
Where the appellate court was unable to reconcile the Arkansas Board of Review's findings of claimant's expenditures with the facts in the record, and where claimant had no savings, the board's decision to hold her liable to repay the overpaid unemployment benefits under subdivision (b)(1) of this section was not supported by substantial evidence. Tilson v. Dir., Ark. Empl. Sec. Dep't., 91 Ark. App. 111, 208 S.W.3d 819 (2005).
In a case concerning the repayment of unemployment benefits under subsection (b) of this section, a claimant was at fault in causing an overpayment for the time period after she filed a disability claim. However, a remand was necessary as to whether the claimant was at fault for overpayment during the time period before she filed for disability; although the claimant was subsequently determined by the Social Security Administration to be totally disabled for this time period, the claimant thought she was physically capable of working according to her testimony. Johnson v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 74 (2013).
Unemployment insurance benefits claimant was required to repay benefit amounts he was overpaid because given that he had a fixed income, a small household with no mortgage on his home, and significant monthly income remaining after paying expenses, recovery was not against equity and good conscience. Worden v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 579 (2013).
Appeal Tribunal's decision finding an employee liable to repay unemployment benefits was remanded because it was not found that he made a “knowing” misrepresentation or omission to the Department of Workforce Services, or, if such findings were made regarding a related overpayment proceeding, the findings were not in the record on appeal, so the Appeal Tribunal rendered no findings on the issue presented of whether the employee's failure to correctly report his earnings during certain weeks was knowingly fraudulent, under subsection (a) of this section. Patterson v. Dir., 2014 Ark. App. 113 (2014).
Where the debtor sought to characterize two certificates of overpayment of unemployment benefits as judicial liens amenable to avoidance and not statutory liens that would not be avoidable, analysis of facts and appropriate law compelled the conclusion that the certificates represented avoidable judicial liens as they did not arise solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions, but rather as a result of other legal or equitable process or proceeding, as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. In re Leaks, 552 B.R. 741 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2016), aff'd, Ark. Dep't of Workforce Servs. v. Leaks, No. 5:16CV00267 JLH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91306 (E.D. Ark. June 14, 2017).
Cited: Andrews v. Victor Metal Prods. Corp., 241 Ark. 889, 411 S.W.2d 515 (1967); Garrett v. Cline, 257 Ark. 829, 520 S.W.2d 281 (1975); Harris v. Daniels, 263 Ark. 897, 567 S.W.2d 954 (1978); Bradshaw v. Daniels, 268 Ark. 716, 595 S.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1980); Hodnett v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 479, 609 S.W.2d 122 (1980); Duvall v. Daniels, 1 Ark. App. 50, 613 S.W.2d 116 (1981); Massey v. Barnes, 1 Ark. App. 329, 615 S.W.2d 398 (1981); Taylor v. Everett, 2 Ark. App. 181, 617 S.W.2d 864 (1981); Rogers v. Daniels, 2 Ark. App. 312, 621 S.W.2d 227 (1981); Terry v. Director of Labor, 3 Ark. App. 197, 623 S.W.2d 857 (1981); Hamby v. Everett, 4 Ark. App. 52, 627 S.W.2d 266 (1982); Osterhout v. Everett, 6 Ark. App. 216, 639 S.W.2d 539, 36 A.L.R.4th 392 (1982); Woodus v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 111, 648 S.W.2d 528 (1983); Hirschy v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 174, 649 S.W.2d 412 (1983); Linscott v. Director of Labor, 9 Ark. App. 103, 653 S.W.2d 150 (1983); Jacks v. Stiles, 19 Ark. App. 129, 717 S.W.2d 828 (1986); Wall v. Dir., Empl. Sec. Dep't, 83 Ark. App. 424, 128 S.W.3d 480 (2003).