Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Norwood, “Hi ho, hi ho, it's off to work we go:” The 1993 Arkansas Workers' Compensation Code and the “Performing Work” Doctrine, 2007 Ark. L. Notes 91.

Ark. L. Rev.

Conflict of Laws: Arkansas, 32 Ark. L. Rev. 1.

Leflar, Compensation for Work-Related Illness in Arkansas, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 89.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Workers' Compensation Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1115.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

By allowing the Workers' Compensation Commission to review the evidence or, if deemed advisable, hear the parties, their representatives, and witnesses, subsection (b)(6)(A) adequately protects a claimant's due process rights; thus, the commission does not err and violate a claimant's right to due process by substituting its own credibility determinations for that of the law judge. Stiger v. State Line Tire Serv., 72 Ark. App. 250, 35 S.W.3d 335 (2000).

Construction.

Both the Commission and the court are required to construe the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act liberally, in accordance with its remedial purposes; however, liberal construction does not mean enlargement or restriction of any plain provision of the law. If a statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to enforce it as it is written. Holiday Inn-West v. Coleman, 31 Ark. App. 224, 792 S.W.2d 345 (1990).

In determining whether a condition is an injury or occupational disease, where the ambiguity of the statutory language permits alternative interpretations, the workers' compensation commission and courts should generally resolve the ambiguity in favor of claimants as mandated by subsection (c). Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990).

Workers' compensation statutes are to be liberally construed in accordance with the law's remedial purposes. Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992); Deffenbaugh Indus. v. Angus, 39 Ark. App. 24, 832 S.W.2d 869 (1992), aff'd, 313 Ark. 100, 852 S.W.2d 804 (1993).

The word “objective” in subdivision (c)(1) means based on observable phenomena. Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998).

When considering the requirement under subdivision (c)(1) that “any determination of physical impairment shall be supported by objective and measurable physical or mental findings,” the word “determination” refers to the Workers' Compensation Commission's determination. Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998).

An initiative petition filed under Ark. Const. Amend. 7 was insufficient because the ballot title was misleading due to various omissions and misstatements in its terms, particularly with respect to its hidden amendments of § 11-9-715, regarding attorney's fees, and this section, regarding the construction of this chapter. Bailey v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 277, 884 S.W.2d 938 (1994).

Administrative law judges, the Commission, and any reviewing courts are to construe this chapter strictly. Amlease, Inc. v. Kuligowski, 59 Ark. App. 261, 957 S.W.2d 715 (1997).

Prior to the 1993 amendment of this section, workers' compensation provisions were construed liberally. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 60 Ark. App. 64, 958 S.W.2d 538 (1997), aff'd, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).

Even though it was true that the Workers' Compensation Act had to be strictly construed, that construction had to take into account the express purpose of the act which was to pay benefits to all legitimately injured workers suffering an injury on the job in order to enable them to return to the work force; thus, the claimant was entitled to benefits where he requested that the employer provide medical benefits, the employer refused to do so, and the worker stayed on the job and tried to work through the pain since the worker did not “return to work” as that term was contemplated under the act. Farmers Coop. v. Biles, 77 Ark. App. 1, 69 S.W.3d 899 (2002).

Strict construction of Acts 1993, No. 793, does not require that courts review workers' compensation claims and appeals as simply a matter of determining whether the worker was performing a job task when the accident occurred; rather, courts must determine whether an injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee was carrying out the employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interest directly or indirectly. Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006).

In order to establish liability on the part of a freight lessor, a freight carrier, and a healthcare company under § 11-9-105(b), a truck driver, who injured his back while disconnecting a trailer from his truck, was required to demonstrate negligence on their part since, under the plain meaning of § 11-9-105(b), the no-fault theory of workers' compensation did not carry over to suits filed in tort. The statute did not state that suits filed in tort were to be based on a theory of strict liability, and under the rule of strict construction, no such intent could be inferred. Sykes v. Williams, 373 Ark. 236, 283 S.W.3d 209 (2008).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that the claim for additional benefits was barred by the statute of limitations, because the conclusion that the entry of the agreed order resolved the request for additional benefits and effectively adjudicated the claim for additional benefits ignored the statutory language allowing for an injured employee to pursue additional benefits when the need indisputably arose within the statutory framework; the case was never dismissed pursuant to § 11-9-702(d), and the agreed order granted a continuing award of benefits which included the physician referral. Curtis v. Big Lots, 2009 Ark. App. 292, 307 S.W.3d 37 (2009).

Construing the provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act strictly, the Workers' Compensation Commission abused its discretion in dismissing as untimely a worker's pro se notice of appeal from an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) denying permanent total disability for carpal tunnel injuries because the ALJ's order could not become final under § 11-9-711(a)(1) until 30 days after the worker received a copy where the worker's attorney was disbarred 26 days after receiving a copy and thus did not have a full 30 days to appeal. Kirkendolph v. DF&A Revenue Servs. Div., 2009 Ark. App. 629 (2009).

Applicability.

Subdivision (c)(3), which was added by Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 10 applies in cases where the injury occurred before the effective date of the act, but which were heard by the commission after the effective date. Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987); Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

Where claim predated the 1993 amendment of subdivision (c)(3) of this section, the court properly declined to apply the new strict standard of construction to its interpretation of the notice provisions of § 11-9-701. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Johnson, 48 Ark. App. 100, 891 S.W.2d 64 (1995).

Compensation claimant's impairment rating was proper because, in part, pursuant to subdivision (c)(ii)(B) of this section and § 11-9-102(16)(A), pain, active range-of-motion, and straight-leg-raising tests could not be used for assessment of impairment in workers' compensation cases. Flowers v. Ark. State Police, 2010 Ark. App. 99, 377 S.W.3d 339 (2010), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. App. LEXIS 247 (Mar. 10, 2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 350 (June 17, 2010).

Appeals.

On appellate review of workers' compensation cases, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of the commission and given its strongest probative value in favor of its order; the extent of inquiry is to determine if the finding of the commission is supported by substantial evidence. Even where a preponderance of the evidence might indicate a contrary result, the court will affirm if reasonable minds could reach the commission's conclusion. Barrett v. Arkansas Rehabilitation Servs., 10 Ark. App. 102, 661 S.W.2d 439 (1983); Legacy Lodge Nursing Home v. McKellar, 26 Ark. App. 260, 763 S.W.2d 101 (1989).

When a determination of an administrative law judge is appealed to the commission, the commission does not sit as an appellate court to review the administrative law judge's findings; instead, the commission makes a de novo determination of the facts, and it is the commission's duty to make findings in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence and not to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the administrative law judge. Woods v. Best Western, 32 Ark. App. 196, 799 S.W.2d 565 (1990).

The commission is authorized to take testimony by deposition or other means under § 11-9-207(a)(10) or to remand the matter to the judge for the purpose of taking additional evidence under subdivision (b)(7) of this section. Quinn v. Webb Wheel Prods., 52 Ark. App. 208, 915 S.W.2d 740 (1996).

—Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals may, and should, upon its own motion, certify to the Supreme Court any appeal it finds to be excepted from its jurisdiction by Rule 1-2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court or to involve an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance, but if the case had been appealed to the Court of Appeals from the Workers' Compensation Commission, the case could not have been certified or transferred to the Supreme Court prior to a decision having been made by the Court of Appeals. Houston Contracting Co. v. Young, 267 Ark. 44, 589 S.W.2d 9 (1979).

When a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission is appealed to the Court of Appeals, that court gives no weight to the findings and conclusions of the administrative law judge. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988).

In workers' compensation cases, the commission conducts a de novo review of the record; it is not its function to review the decision made by the administrative law judge for error. On appeal to the court of appeals, the court reviews the decision of the commission and not that of the administrative law judge; thus, where there is no error in the proceedings before the commission, as opposed to the administrative law judge, the judgment of the commission will be affirmed. Thornton v. Bruce, 33 Ark. App. 31, 800 S.W.2d 723 (1990).

—Standard of Review.

On appeal, the court is required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the commission's decision and uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence; before it reverses a decision of the commission, it must be convinced that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the commission. Little v. Delta Rice Mill, Inc., 11 Ark. App. 114, 667 S.W.2d 373 (1984); Willmon v. Allen Canning Co., 38 Ark. App. 105, 828 S.W.2d 868 (1992); Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998).

When the issue is whether the Workers' Compensation Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court of Appeals must view the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings and give the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the commission's action. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Disheroon, 26 Ark. App. 145, 761 S.W.2d 617 (1988).

Where the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission was not supported by the law and evidence as to the holding that there was insufficient evidence of measurable physical findings to support a determination of physical impairment, the decision of the Commission was reversed. Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998).

On appeal of a workers' compensation case from the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the commission's decision and affirms that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence; thus, before the Supreme Court will reverse the commission's decision, it must be convinced that fair-minded persons considering the same facts could not have reached the conclusion made by the commission. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996).

—Timely Appeal.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing, does not extend the time to file the notice of appeal; a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing, may be acted upon within the 90-day period in which the record on appeal must be filed and docketed. Morrison v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 11 Ark. App. 161, 668 S.W.2d 47 (1984).

—Timely Filing of Documents.

The attorney's duty to ensure that documents which must be timely filed have been timely received may require transmitting the documents earlier in the time period to allow for a follow-up phone call and further transmission within the filing period if the previous notice of appeal or other document was somehow not received. Tracor/MBA v. Flowers, 41 Ark. App. 186, 850 S.W.2d 30 (1993).

Attorney's Fees.

Section § 11-9-715(b)(1) neither expressly provides for nor expressly prohibits an additional award of attorney's fees in cases where the claimant has been required to defend his award of workers' compensation benefits through two separate appeals brought by the employer; construing the attorney's fees provision liberally and in accordance with the remedial purposes given in subdivision (c)(3) of this section, an additional award of attorney's fees is authorized. Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 43 Ark. App. 79, 861 S.W.2d 114 (1993).

Capacity to Earn.

The question of capacity to earn during the healing period is not the same as the determination of “physical impairment” referred to in subdivision (c)(1). Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993).

Death.

Reference to this section in an oral argument settled the point argued in the brief of appellant that all unpaid compensation benefits awarded decedent abated by reason of his death and, accordingly, the commission's award would be modified by cancelling all of the permanent partial award subsequent to date of death. Dockery v. Thomas, 229 Ark. 984, 320 S.W.2d 257 (1959).

Pursuant to subsection (e) liability to an employee from his employer for compensation for disability does not survive to the employee's estate after his death. Zuercher v. Emerson Elec. Co., 31 Ark. App. 124, 789 S.W.2d 467 (1990).

Determination.

The word “determination” as used in this section refers to the commission's determination of physical impairment, not the doctor's determination. Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992).

Subdivision (c)(1) of this section provides that objective and measurable findings are necessary to support a determination of physical impairment, but they are not necessary to support a determination of wage loss disability. Brantley v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 48 Ark. App. 27, 887 S.W.2d 543 (1994).

The Commission had a substantial basis for denial of permanent disability benefits as the Commission's decision that the employee was not permanently disabled was based upon the fact that the impairment rating assigned by his treating physician was not supported by objective measurable physical findings and that the opinion of another physician, who evaluated the employee once, was entitled to greater weight as it was consistent with functional capacity evaluations performed on the employee. Vite v. Vite, 2010 Ark. App. 565, 377 S.W.3d 453 (2010).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's finding on permanent impairment was supported by substantial evidence as the claimant's treating physician found he had an 88% impairment under the American Medical Association Guides, and the claimant testified that he did have some functional use of his left arm. Main v. McGehee Metals, 2010 Ark. App. 585, 377 S.W.3d 506 (2010).

Because a determination of permanent impairment for a claimant's reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD) was premature, reversal of the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that the claimant sustained a zero-percent impairment rating for the claimant's RSD and remand for further proceedings was appropriate. Walker v. Fresenius Med. Care Holding, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 322, 436 S.W.3d 164 (2014).

—Findings of Impairment.

Physician's determination of impairment was not upheld where only range-of-motion tests were performed. Department of Parks & Tourism v. Helms, 60 Ark. App. 110, 959 S.W.2d 749 (1998).

Objective medical evidence, including pulmonary function test results and a doctor's opinion, showed that employee seeking workers' compensation had a 50% impairment due to silicosis and, for the purposes of this section and § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i), the pulmonary-function test was an objective test despite the fact that employee was at least partially able to control his breathing and may not have made a full effort during each breathing test. DeQueen Sand & Gravel Co. v. Cox, 95 Ark. App. 234, 236 S.W.3d 5 (2006).

Workers' Compensation Commission rejected the doctor's assignment of an impairment rating upon the finding that she relied solely on the presence of an annular tear, and this finding was reversed in light of the doctor's deposition testimony, and the matter was remanded for further findings on the issue of impairment. Thompson v. Mt. Home Good Samaritan Vill., 2014 Ark. App. 493, 442 S.W.3d 873 (2014).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in assigning the claimant a 50% permanent anatomical-impairment rating to her lower left extremity due to her total knee replacement. That issue was ripe for consideration as the claimant had reached maximum medical improvement; and the impairment rating was supported by substantial evidence as the administrative law judge relied on the medical evidence provided in a report by the orthopedic surgeon and cross-referenced that information with the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Shields, 2018 Ark. App. 247, 548 S.W.3d 208 (2018).

—Rapid Repetitive Motion.

The decisions in both Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ, 58 Ark. App. 194, 948 S.W.2d 100 (1997) and Lay v. United Parcel Serv., 58 Ark. App. 35, 944 S.W.2d 867 (1997) should be used to determine whether a particular activity constitutes rapid repetitive motion. Rudick v. Unifirst Corp., 60 Ark. App. 173, 962 S.W.2d 819 (1998).

In General.

—Medical.

Medical evidence insufficient to support award for injury. Johnson v. Little Rock Furn. Mfg. Co., 206 Ark. 1016, 178 S.W.2d 249 (1944) (decision under prior law); Foster v. Fort Smith Cotton Oil Co., 224 Ark. 394, 273 S.W.2d 529 (1954); Grimsley v. Manufacturers Furn. Co., 224 Ark. 769, 276 S.W.2d 64 (1955); McFall v. Farmers Tractor & Truck Co., 227 Ark. 985, 302 S.W.2d 801 (1957); Shipp v. Tanner Estate, 229 Ark. 815, 318 S.W.2d 821 (1958).

An employee must object to the failure to verify a doctor's report on the cause of disability when the case is before the commission so that it can be verified and the doctor cross-examined. Foster v. Fort Smith Cotton Oil Co., 224 Ark. 394, 273 S.W.2d 529 (1954).

A doctor's report, even though properly verified, is only entitled to such weight as may be warranted from all the evidence in the case. Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956).

Doctor's reports which were not verified as required by statute but to which no objections were made and no opportunity for cross-examination afforded were only entitled to such weight as was warranted from all the facts of the case. Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956).

Commission was in error in holding that employee's healing period terminated several months prior to date of physician's contrary testimony. Hamilton v. Kelley-Nelson Constr. Co., 228 Ark. 612, 309 S.W.2d 323 (1958).

It was proper for expert medical witnesses to give their opinion on basis of information contained in autopsy report and hospital record. Holstein v. Quality Excelsior Coal Co., 230 Ark. 758, 324 S.W.2d 529 (1959).

Where pivotal question of fact as to the exact cause of medical condition could not be resolved by any witness with complete certainty, conflicts in proof had a bearing on the testimony of each witness but did not have effect of depriving testimony of all substantiality. Holstein v. Quality Excelsior Coal Co., 230 Ark. 758, 324 S.W.2d 529 (1959).

Since autopsy reports and clinical histories are statements of fact rather than expressions of an opinion, they are admissible. Rhea v. M-K Grocer Co., 236 Ark. 615, 370 S.W.2d 33 (1963).

Commission did not err in admitting letter of physician expressing medical opinion where physician subsequently testified and was available for cross-examination. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965).

Medical evidence sufficient to support award for injury. Sneed v. Colson Corp., 254 Ark. 1048, 497 S.W.2d 673 (1973).

In a hearing before the commission, a physician's letter report to the claimant's attorney could be admitted into evidence and accorded such weight as was warranted from all the evidence. Meadors Lumber Co. v. Wysong, 262 Ark. 425, 557 S.W.2d 395 (1977).

Inasmuch as the commission was not bound by civil rules of evidence in its admission and consideration of evidence, the commission was within its discretion in hearing the testimony of a doctor on the issue of whether an employee's fatal heart attack was the result of his employment, despite the fact that the testimony was in conflict with the opinions of more celebrated experts. Barksdale Lumber Co. v. McAnally, 262 Ark. 379, 557 S.W.2d 868 (1977).

Where letter written by doctor was more in the nature of advocacy than a medical opinion and was of questionable admissibility, and the opinion of the commission showed that the letter was disregarded for purpose of arriving at its decision, carrier was not entitled to complain that the commission erred in admitting the letter into evidence. Browning's Restaurant v. Kuykendall, 263 Ark. 374, 565 S.W.2d 33 (1978).

While a physician's opinion is not conclusive or binding on the commission, an administrative body like the commission is not granted leeway to arbitrarily disregard a witness's testimony. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

Workers' compensation claimant must prove a causal connection between the work-related accident and the later disabling injury, but it is not essential that the causal relationship between the accident and the disability be established by medical evidence, nor is it necessary that employment activities be the sole cause of a workers' injury in order to receive compensation benefits. Bates v. Frost Logging Co., 38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1992).

Commission is not bound by medical opinion, although it may not arbitrarily disregard the testimony of any witness. It is also entitled to examine the basis for a doctor's opinion, like that of any other expert, in deciding the weight to which that opinion is entitled. Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992).

This section does not require that the commission automatically reject a doctor's opinion as to permanent impairment merely because the doctor has used American Medical Association guides as a basis for opinion or because the doctor himself describes the bases for his opinion as “subjective”. Reeder v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 38 Ark. App. 248, 832 S.W.2d 505 (1992).

The Commission may not arbitrarily disregard a physician's opinion, especially when that opinion is based on objective and measurable findings. Foxx v. American Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115, 924 S.W.2d 814 (1996).

—Record.

The Workers' Compensation Commission can, and indeed, should, consult the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment when determining the existence and extent of permanent impairment, whether or not the relevant portions of the guides have been offered into evidence by either party. Polk County v. Jones, 74 Ark. App. 159, 47 S.W.3d 904 (2001).

—Subpoena for Witnesses.

It was prejudicial error for judge to refuse subpoenas at the request of claimant for witnesses. Chambers v. Jerry's Dep't Store, Inc., 269 Ark. 592, 599 S.W.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1980).

Evidence.

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission was not free to reject an employee's treating physician's opinion as to causation simply because it was based on the employee's history, absent a finding that the history given was inaccurate or not credible. Roberts v. Whirlpool, 102 Ark. App. 284, 284 S.W.3d 100 (2008).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in holding that an employee was entitled to implantation of a dorsal-column stimulator if additional testing and examination showed it to be necessary because the Commission failed to hold the employee to the statutory burden of proof under subdivision (c)(2) of this section by awarding additional medical care while simultaneously opining that the employee needed to return to the doctor for further evaluation before that care could be deemed reasonable and necessary. Sea Ark Marine, Inc. v. Pippinger, 2009 Ark. App. 223, 303 S.W.3d 102 (2009).

There was evidence that an employee told another employee and a doctor that the employee's back injury occurred over a weekend while bike riding, the employee had never stated to either the company doctor or the employee's own doctor that the source of the back injury was caused by repetitive job duties and/or by specific incident, and the Workers' Compensation Commission did not find the employee's testimony as to the work-related source of the back injury credible; therefore, the employee had not met her burden of proving a compensable work-related injury. Alecia Clark v. San Antonio Shoes, Inc. Commerce Indust. Ins. Co., 2009 Ark. App. 689 (2009).

Workers' compensation claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that impairment ratings to the left hand and elbow were associated with a work-related injury because the claimant failed to cite any medical authority for such a connection, instead presenting only the claimant's own testimony and subjective responses to active range-of-motion testing. Wilson v. Smurfit, 2009 Ark. App. 800, 373 S.W.3d 347 (2009).

Any determination of the existence or extent of physical impairment must be supported by objective and measurable physical findings pursuant to subdivision (c)(1)(B) of this section. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission is authorized to decide which portions of the medical evidence to credit and to translate this medical evidence into a finding of permanent impairment using the American Medical Association Guides. Dillard's, Inc. v. Johnson, 2010 Ark. App. 138, 374 S.W.3d 92 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's determination that an employee failed to show that his low back pain and surgery were caused by a 15-foot fall he had suffered at work five months earlier; he failed to complain of back pain for five months despite many visits to doctors and therapists, and was performing difficult tasks around his home and farm despite being advised against doing so. Howell v. Automated Conveyor Sys., 2010 Ark. App. 761 (2010).

Because an employee failed to prove a permanent impairment under subdivision (c)(1)(B) of this section and § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i), and because the Workers' Compensation Commission could consider the conflicting medical evidence and give less weight to one opinion, there was substantial evidence to support the denial of the employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Pruitt v. Healthsouth Corp., 2011 Ark. App. 776 (2011).

Employee whose feet became infected, allegedly due to water run-off on his apron and shoes during his employment at a poultry plant, failed to carry his burden under subsection (c) of this section of proving that the infection and hospitalization was caused by exposure to water at work, as opposed to a continuation of a preexisting diabetic infection for which the employee had been hospitalized a month earlier. Serrano v. George's and Corckett Adjustment, 2011 Ark. App. 784 (2011).

In a workers' compensation case, a five-percent permanent-partial disability rating was supported by substantial evidence because there was reliance upon a medical report for objective findings to support the rating. The major cause of the rating was a compensable thoracic injury, which required surgical intervention. Walgreen Co. v. Goode, 2012 Ark. App. 196, 395 S.W.3d 398 (2012).

In a workers' compensation case, substantial evidence supported a four-percent impairment rating for a compensable right shoulder injury under § 11-9-522(g)(1)(A) based on the testimony of a treating physician; the Workers' Compensation Commission was not required to award an impairment rating recommended by the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (4th ed. 1993). Greene v. Cockram Concrete Co., 2012 Ark. App. 691 (2012).

Workers' Compensation Commission properly denied the claimant's claim for permanent partial impairment because she failed to establish through her own testimony or other means that either the annular tear or muscle spasms supported the existence of a permanent impairment causally related to her 2009 injury. O'Guinn v. Little River Mem'l Hosp., 2013 Ark. App. 593, 430 S.W.3d 150 (2013).

Worker had bilateral quadriceps tendon tears, a doctor assigned a disability rating of 35 and 32 percent to the right and left lower extremities respectively, and the Workers' Compensation Commission accepted the ratings and found that the worker had proven her compensable injuries to be the major cause of impairment; the Commission exercised its duty to assess the evidence to make a finding of permanent impairment, and substantial evidence supported this decision. Firestone Bldg. Prods. v. Hopson, 2013 Ark. App. 618, 430 S.W.3d 162 (2013).

Workers' Compensation Commission found a compensable injury, as the worker was directly advancing the company's interests at the time of the incident and the company benefitted from the work the worker performed, and it was clear that the Commission's decision to reverse was based on issues of credibility alone; because questions of credibility were the exclusive province of the Commission, the court was foreclosed from determining the weight and credibility to be accorded to the testimony, and the court affirmed. Hill v. Treadaway, 2014 Ark. App. 185, 433 S.W.3d 285 (2014).

—In General.

Evidence insufficient to find that claimant suffered compensable, work-related injury. Fordyce Lumber Co. v. Shelton, 206 Ark. 1134, 179 S.W.2d 464 (1944) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Pruitt v. Moon, 230 Ark. 986, 328 S.W.2d 71 (1959).

Evidence sufficient to find that claimant suffered compensable, work-related injury. Garrison Furn. Co. v. Butler, 206 Ark. 702, 177 S.W.2d 738 (1944); Kloss v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, 207 Ark. 115, 179 S.W.2d 172 (1944) (preceding cases decided under prior law); Frank Lyon Co. v. Scott, 215 Ark. 274, 220 S.W.2d 128 (1949); Tri-States Constr. Co. v. Worthen, 224 Ark. 418, 274 S.W.2d 352 (1955); Eddington v. City Elec. Co., 237 Ark. 804, 376 S.W.2d 550 (1964); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 255 Ark. 73, 498 S.W.2d 865 (1973).

On compensation claim by employee who was injured at work, claimant was entitled to have facts submitted to commission on any provision of law which would justify award in his favor. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951).

Whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the Workers' Compensation Commission is a matter of law. Boyd Excelsior Fuel Co. v. McKown, 226 Ark. 174, 288 S.W.2d 614 (1956).

On an appeal to the full commission presented solely on the transcript of the record made before the referee, it is the duty of the commission to make a finding according to the preponderance of the evidence and not merely whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding of the referee, and it may pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. Moss v. El Dorado Drilling Co., 237 Ark. 80, 371 S.W.2d 528 (1963); Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ark. 468, 374 S.W.2d 166 (1964); Arkansas Coal Co. v. Steele, 237 Ark. 727, 375 S.W.2d 673 (1964).

Commission has broad discretion with reference to admission of evidence. Potlatch Forests, Inc. v. Funk, 239 Ark. 330, 389 S.W.2d 237 (1965).

Even though evidence might support a contrary conclusion, there is no requirement that a finding by the commission be based on evidence which is mathematically or medically certain; thus, were evidence showed that claimant's infarction and bypass surgery could have been caused by events at work and commission found that it was, its findings would be affirmed. Kempner's & Dodson Ins. Co. v. Hall, 7 Ark. App. 181, 646 S.W.2d 31 (1983).

Decisions of the Workers' Compensation Commission must stand if supported by substantial evidence and, in determining sufficiency of evidence to sustain findings of the commission, testimony must be weighed in its strongest light in favor of the commission's findings. Central Maloney, Inc. v. York, 10 Ark. App. 254, 663 S.W.2d 196 (1984).

It is the duty of the commission to make a finding according to a preponderance of the evidence, and not whether there is any substantial evidence to support the ruling of the referee. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

The commission could reasonably infer from the evidence that, at the time of the plane crash, the decedent was performing one of the duties of his employment in inspecting farm crops while returning from a plane trip of a personal nature. While it was true that no one could be absolutely certain what the decedent was doing at the time of his death, absolute certainty is not required. Franklin Collier Farms v. Bullard, 33 Ark. App. 33, 800 S.W.2d 438 (1990).

The commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Franklin Collier Farms v. Bullard, 33 Ark. App. 33, 800 S.W.2d 438 (1990).

So long as the record contains objective and measurable findings to support the commission's ultimate determination, consideration of the claimant's testimony about her symptoms, including pain, and the effect of activity on those symptoms, is not prohibited by this section. Taco Bell v. Finley, 38 Ark. App. 11, 826 S.W.2d 313 (1992).

Law judge's opinion, adopted by the Workers' Compensation Commission, was not supported by substantial evidence. Willmon v. Allen Canning Co., 38 Ark. App. 105, 828 S.W.2d 868 (1992).

—Additional Evidence.

Request that the commission remand his case to the administrative law judge for the taking of additional evidence bearing on his total disability should have been granted. Haygood v. Belcher, 5 Ark. App. 127, 633 S.W.2d 391 (1982).

A case should only be remanded by the compensation commission if the newly discovered evidence is relevant, is not merely cumulative, would change the result, and was diligently discovered and produced by the movant. Johnson v. American Pulpwood Co., 38 Ark. App. 6, 826 S.W.2d 827 (1992).

The following are prerequisites for remand by the full commission on proffer to present newly discovered evidence: (1) The newly discovered evidence must be relevant; (2) it must not be cumulative; (3) it must change the result; and (4) the party seeking to introduce the evidence must be diligent. Quinn v. Webb Wheel Prods., 52 Ark. App. 208, 915 S.W.2d 740 (1996).

Substantial evidence supported Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that claimant acted diligently in obtaining the additional medical evidence and that claimant sustained a compensable injury; the December 2001 MRI report and the February 2002 operative report, both introduced at the second hearing, constituted sufficient evidence to uphold the findings. Hargis Transp. v. Chesser, 87 Ark. App. 301, 190 S.W.3d 309 (2004).

—Burden of Proof.

Burden of proof is upon claimant to show that injury or death was the result of an accident incurred in and growing out of the course of employment. Pearson v. Faulkner Radio Serv. Co., 220 Ark. 368, 247 S.W.2d 964 (1952); Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979); Bates v. Frost Logging Co., 38 Ark. App. 36, 827 S.W.2d 664 (1992).

The Worker's Compensation Commission did not err in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in connection with the establishment by the employee of a causal connection between the false representation by the employee claimant on her employment application and the subsequent injury to the employee; there is no rule that an employer must prove a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the injury by clear and convincing evidence. Tahutini v. Tastybird Foods, 18 Ark. App. 82, 711 S.W.2d 173 (1986).

Acts 1986 (2nd Ex. Sess.), No. 10 which added the language of subdivision (c)(3) effected a procedural change and not a substantive change regarding the burden of proof. Rule of liberal construction as it existed prior to the 1986 amendment to this section was not a substitute for a claimant's burden of establishing an injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987).

Before the 1986 amendment to subsections (b) and (c), it was the rule that the Workers' Compensation Commission, in making a factual determination, was to give the claimant the benefit of the doubt. But this rule requiring the commission to resolve doubtful cases in favor of the claimant did not mean that a claimant did not have the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Fowler v. McHenry, 22 Ark. App. 196, 737 S.W.2d 663 (1987).

The party having the burden of proof on an issue must establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988).

The commission must weigh the evidence impartially and without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when determining whether a party has met the burden of proof on an issue. Wade v. Mr. C. Cavenaugh's, 25 Ark. App. 237, 756 S.W.2d 923 (1988), superseded, 298 Ark. 363, 768 S.W.2d 521 (1989).

In worker's compensation cases, the claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his claim is compensable. Stone v. Patel, 26 Ark. App. 54, 759 S.W.2d 579 (1988).

The characterization of claimant's injury affects the burden of proof. If claimant's condition is an “injury,” she has the burden of proving that it arose out of and in the course of her employment by a preponderance of the evidence; but if her condition is an “occupational disease,” a causal connection between the employment and the disease must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990).

The evidence is to be weighed impartially, without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. Gencorp Polymer Prods. v. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (1991).

—Credibility.

Where the commission in denying a workers' compensation claim laid much stress on the credibility of the claimant and there was evidence in the record upon which the commission could have either approved or denied the claim depending upon the credibility of the witnesses, there was substantial evidence to support its findings. Burnett v. St. Mary's Hosp., 255 Ark. 1023, 505 S.W.2d 24 (1974).

Under the evidence, it could not be argued that the commission refused to accept the judge's version without making a finding as to credibility. Dedmon v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 3 Ark. App. 108, 623 S.W.2d 207 (1981).

Where there was no dispute between the administrative law judge and the compensation commission as to any fact, but a disagreement over credibility, a due process of law issue was not presented. Penter v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 309 Ark. 487, 832 S.W.2d 215 (1992), US Supreme Court cert. denied, 506 U.S. 940, 113 S. Ct. 378, 121 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1992).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission erred in rejecting subjective evidence in determining that employee sustained no anatomical impairment as a result of his ankle injury as the injury was supported by objective findings which could not come under the employee's voluntary control. Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 97 Ark. App. 59, 244 S.W.3d 709 (2006).

There was no violation of a workers' compensation claimant's due process rights where it was within the Workers' Compensation Commission's province to reconcile conflicting evidence, determine the true facts, and translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony that it deemed worthy of belief. Wright v. Conway Freight, 2014 Ark. App. 451, 441 S.W.3d 45 (2014).

—Findings of Impairment.

Objective and measurable physical or mental findings are necessary to support a determination of physical impairment but they are not necessary to support a determination of wage loss disability. Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993); Arkansas Methodist Hosp. v. Adams, 43 Ark. App. 1, 858 S.W.2d 125 (1993).

Incapacity to earn wages can exist without physical or mental impairment. Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993).

If there is no requirement in subdivision (c)(1) that the award of temporary total disability must be supported by objective and measurable findings of physical impairment, then the absence of factual findings by the Commission on that point does not prevent the determination of the Commission, that employee suffered a compensable injury, from being affirmed. Arkansas Dep't of Health v. Williams, 43 Ark. App. 169, 863 S.W.2d 583 (1993).

The word “objective” in subdivision (c)(1) means based on observable phenomena or indicating a symptom or condition perceived as a sign of disease by someone other than the person afflicted. Harper v. Hi-Way Express, 51 Ark. App. 183, 912 S.W.2d 21 (1995).

As observations made by a doctor as a result of range of motion tests qualify as “objective physical findings,” the commission's refusal to consider positive straight leg raises to constitute objective physical findings was in error. Harper v. Hi-Way Express, 51 Ark. App. 183, 912 S.W.2d 21 (1995).

Although the claimant's complaints of pain and headaches were indications over which she had voluntary control and were not to be considered as objective findings, her intracranial bleeding, cranial nerve damage with loss of sense and smell, and the results of her CAT scan were objective findings as required by this section. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998).

Workers' Compensation Commission did not disagree with employer's finding that, using AMA's Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) the employee was entitled to a 24 percent impairment rating for a total shoulder arthroplasty and a 10 percent impairment rating for a distal clavicle arthroplasty, or that these ratings combined to produce an impairment rating of 32 percent, however, the employer had misinterpreted Table 27 of the AMA Guides as assigning impairment values only to the shoulder joint, when Table 27 instead assigned impairment values from arthroplasty of specific bones and joints to the entire upper extremity. Avaya (Lucent Techs.) v. Bryant, 82 Ark. App. 273, 105 S.W.3d 811 (2003).

Workers' Compensation Commission's decision affirming the administrative law judge's finding that an employee was entitled to permanent anatomical impairment was reversed and remanded where the Commission failed to make the specific findings of fact necessary for the reviewing court to carry out a meaningful review of issues relating to whether the employee's injury was the major cause of his impairment, the permanency of the employee's condition, the assessment of the medical evidence, and the employee's impairment rating. Excelsior Hotel v. Squires, 83 Ark. App. 26, 115 S.W.3d 823 (2003).

Reasonable minds might accept the evidence relied upon by the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission as adequate to support the conclusion that the employee suffered from a seizure disorder, entitling her to an additional 14-percent impairment rating, making the total rating 26 percent; the Commission, however, properly rejected a higher whole-person impairment rating of 39 percent. The Commission's decision concluded that the evidence did not demonstrate that the employee sustained any permanent impairment to either upper extremity as a result of her compensable neck injury and surgeries. Dillard's, Inc. v. Johnson, 2010 Ark. App. 138, 374 S.W.3d 92 (2010).

Substantial evidence supported the findings and conclusion of the Workers' Compensation Commission that the worker suffered a 40% permanent impairment to his wrist; the Commission interpreted pin-prick test results to reflect the partial wrist denervation mentioned in the surgical report and concluded that the rating corresponded with the median nerve distribution, and implicit in the Commission's decision was a finding that the claimant credibly testified that the doctor had manipulated his hand during the examination. Emergency Ambulance Servs. v. Pritchard, 2016 Ark. App. 366, 498 S.W.3d 774 (2016).

Substantial evidence supported the Workers' Compensation Commission's decision that a claimant was entitled to a 29% permanent impairment rating to the body as a whole for a brain injury because the severity of the claimant's skull fractures and the presence of pneumocephalus on the claimant's CT scan, coupled with the testimony of a clinical psychologist and a board-certified neurologist that the claimant suffered a brain injury, established that the claimant did, in fact, suffer a compensable injury to the brain. Multi-Craft Contrs., Inc. v. Yousey, 2018 Ark. 107, 542 S.W.3d 155 (2018).

Workers' Compensation Commission's finding of a 37% impairment rating was affirmed; although a doctor opined that claimant's workplace injury was only 50% caused by the compensable injury, the claimant testified that he had remained quite physically active prior to the accident despite having polio, he had been able to move around with a right-leg brace and a crutch, but after the accident he was confined to a wheelchair or scooter. Ark. State Military Dep't v. Jackson, 2019 Ark. App. 92, 568 S.W.3d 811 (2019).

Workers' Compensation Commission’s decision to award an injured employee an 11% impairment rating to his body as a whole and 10% in wage-loss disability was supported by substantial evidence; the Commission considered all the evidence and testimony presented, the decision was supported by objective medical findings, and the Commission clearly stated that it found a neurologist's conclusions to be supported by the record and that his conclusions were entitled to more evidentiary weight than the opinions of various other doctors. Tempworks Mgmt. Servs. v. Jaynes, 2020 Ark. App. 70 (2020).

Hearing.

—Action to Reform Policy.

Action to reform workers' compensation insurance policy was properly brought in chancery court rather than before Workers' Compensation Commission. American Cas. Co. v. Hambleton, 233 Ark. 942, 349 S.W.2d 664 (1961).

—Apportionment of Liability.

The apportionment of liability between insurance carriers, where the combined effect of a previous and a subsequent injury causes a disability, is a factual determination to be made by the commission. Browning's Restaurant v. Kuykendall, 263 Ark. 374, 565 S.W.2d 33 (1978).

—Final Order.

Where law judge's opinion definitely stated that claimant failed to prove she was entitled to additional benefits, claimant's failure to question the decision within 30 days, either by petition for rehearing or appeal, allowed it to become final. Smith v. Servomation, 8 Ark. App. 274, 651 S.W.2d 118 (1983).

Order of administrative law judge became final after a period of 30 days as to the amount of compensation for claimant's attorney and as to the manner in which it was to be paid, and a reopening of the matter was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Gwin v. R.D. Hall Tank Co., 10 Ark. App. 12, 660 S.W.2d 947 (1983).

Decision of commission became final where no notice of appeal from that decision was filed within 30 days from receipt of the decision, but commission had authority to grant motion for reconsideration during that period. Morrison v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 11 Ark. App. 161, 668 S.W.2d 47 (1984).

—Findings.

Where commission made no finding on temporary partial disability, case would be remanded to the commission for a definite finding on that issue. Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Mitchell, 206 Ark. 854, 177 S.W.2d 920 (1944) (decision under prior law).

When the commission's findings as to the cause of disability are supported by substantial evidence they have the force and effect of a jury verdict. Foster v. Fort Smith Cotton Oil Co., 224 Ark. 394, 273 S.W.2d 529 (1954).

Under this section, the commission acts as a trier of the facts — i.e., a jury — in drawing the inferences and reaching the conclusions from the facts. The finding of the commission is entitled to the same force and effect as a jury verdict. Guynn's Estate v. Helena Hosp., 240 Ark. 56, 398 S.W.2d 526 (1966).

Where the decision of the commission found that the burden had not been met, on appeal the court only determined whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the commission. Lybrand v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 266 Ark. 946, 588 S.W.2d 449 (Ct. App. 1979).

It is error for the commission to confine its review to a single issue; it must review the record as a whole and make its own de novo review and specific findings of fact. White v. Air Sys., Inc., 33 Ark. App. 56, 800 S.W.2d 726 (1990).

When compensation is denied, the commission must make findings sufficient to justify that denial, and when the commission fails to make specific findings upon which it relies to support its decision, reversal and remand of the case is appropriate. White v. Air Sys., Inc., 33 Ark. App. 56, 800 S.W.2d 726 (1990).

After conducting a de novo review, the commission may adopt the administrative law judge's findings which are identical to those arrived at by the commission. ITT/Higbie Mfg. v. Gilliam, 34 Ark. App. 154, 807 S.W.2d 44 (1991).

Compensation commission must make sufficient factual findings to justify the decision made, and may satisfy this standard by adopting an opinion of the law judge which contains adequate findings. Willmon v. Allen Canning Co., 38 Ark. App. 105, 828 S.W.2d 868 (1992).

Observations made by a doctor as a result of range of motion tests qualify as “objective physical findings” under subdivision (c)(1). Keller v. L.A. Darling Fixtures, 40 Ark. App. 94, 845 S.W.2d 15 (1992), superseded by statute as stated in, Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock, 63 Ark. App. 118, 975 S.W.2d 857 (1998).

—Jurisdiction.

An Arkansas resident who entered into an employment contract with a corporation maintaining an office in Arkansas having control over the employment which was not at any fixed location came under this chapter, even though his injury occurred in another state in which all of his employment was performed. International Paper Co. v. Tidwell, 250 Ark. 623, 466 S.W.2d 488 (1971).

—Motion for Rehearing.

Absent a showing that the Workers' Compensation Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, or abused its discretion, a determination made by the commission not to reopen a case will not be disturbed. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 6 Ark. App. 171, 639 S.W.2d 748 (1982).

Where the claimant filed a petition for a rehearing of the denial of disability benefits on the ground that there had been newly discovered evidence, but it appeared that all of the evidence which the claimant alleged was newly discovered evidence was actually within the knowledge of the claimant before the case was submitted to and decided by the commission, the motion for a rehearing was properly denied. Walker v. J & J Pest Control, 6 Ark. App. 171, 639 S.W.2d 748 (1982).

—Oral Argument.

Subdivision (b)(6) of this section clearly allows for oral argument only when the commission deems it advisable. Bartlett v. Mead Containerboard, 47 Ark. App. 181, 888 S.W.2d 314 (1994).

Where claimant requested oral argument but failed to notify the commission as to why one was desired, the commission had no basis upon which to deem an oral argument advisable because no reason was given as to why the case could not be decided on the proof presented to the administrative law judge. Bartlett v. Mead Containerboard, 47 Ark. App. 181, 888 S.W.2d 314 (1994).

Investigation.

By reserving the issue of whether the employee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits, the commission simply declined to say that the employee failed to meet her burden of proof on this issue, and this constituted error on the part of the commission, as the workers' compensation statute states that the evidence shall be weighed impartially, and without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party. Gencorp Polymer Prods. v. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (1991).

The specific authority to investigate claims granted to the Commission by subdivision (b)(1) of this section carries also the authority to make such orders and impose such sanctions as are reasonably necessary to carry out that purpose. Harrington Constr. Co. v. Williams, 45 Ark. App. 126, 872 S.W.2d 426 (1994).

Notice.

Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that company was agent of employer designated to receive notice under this section. Whirlpool Corp. v. Kaelin, 19 Ark. App. 331, 720 S.W.2d 722 (1986).

“Physical Impairment”.

The reference to “physical impairment” in subdivision (c)(1) of this section refers to a determination of anatomical disability as opposed to a loss of a wage earning capacity under § 11-9-522(b). Arkansas Methodist Hosp. v. Adams, 43 Ark. App. 1, 858 S.W.2d 125 (1993).

The term “anatomical impairment” means the anatomical loss as reflected by the common usage of medical impairment ratings; wage-loss disability is something entirely different. Foxx v. American Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115, 924 S.W.2d 814 (1996).

Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission wrongfully denied employee permanent disability benefits where there were objective findings to support an impairment; spinal stenosis, or narrowing of the spine, was detected on a myelogram and CT scan, and such a finding clearly was not within the voluntary control of the patient. Pollard v. Meridian Aggregates, 88 Ark. App. 1, 193 S.W.3d 738 (2004).

Cited: Ward Furn. Mfg. Co. v. Reather, 234 Ark. 151, 350 S.W.2d 691 (1961); Tri State Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 254 Ark. 944, 497 S.W.2d 39 (1973); Ethridge v. Alexander Brown & Associates, 258 Ark. 444, 527 S.W.2d 591 (1975); Davis v. C & M Tractor Co., 4 Ark. App. 34, 627 S.W.2d 561 (1982); Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Kirby, 6 Ark. App. 198, 639 S.W.2d 529 (1982); Odom v. Tosco Corp., 12 Ark. App. 196, 672 S.W.2d 915 (1984); Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 1325 (8th Cir. 1985); Lambert v. Gerber Prods. Co., 14 Ark. App. 88, 684 S.W.2d 842 (1985); Marrable v. Southern LP Gas, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 1, 751 S.W.2d 15 (1988); Myles v. Paragould Sch. Dist., 28 Ark. App. 81, 770 S.W.2d 675 (1989); Driscoll v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 28 Ark. App. 352, 775 S.W.2d 84 (1989); Pinkston v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 30 Ark. App. 46, 782 S.W.2d 375 (1990); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. McGinnis, 37 Ark. App. 91, 824 S.W.2d 406 (1992); Crow v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 46 Ark. App. 295, 880 S.W.2d 320 (1994); St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996); Cook v. Recovery Corp., 322 Ark. 707, 911 S.W.2d 581 (1995); Hanson v. Amfuel, 54 Ark. App. 370, 925 S.W.2d 166 (1996); Dugan v. Jerry Sweetster, Inc., 54 Ark. App. 401, 928 S.W.2d 341 (1996); Duke v. Regis Hairstylists, 55 Ark. App. 327, 935 S.W.2d 600 (1996); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 55 Ark. App. 343, 934 S.W.2d 956 (1996); Weaver v. Whitaker Furn. Co., 55 Ark. App. 400, 935 S.W.2d 584 (1996); City of Blytheville v. McCormick, 56 Ark. App. 149, 939 S.W.2d 855 (1997); Johnson v. Democrat Printing & Lithograph, 57 Ark. App. 274, 944 S.W.2d 138 (1997); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997); Tillman v. Baldwin & Shell Constr., 58 Ark. App. 177, 948 S.W.2d 118 (1997); Morrilton Manor v. Brimmage, 58 Ark. App. 252, 952 S.W.2d 170 (1997); Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997); Hope Livestock Auction Co. v. Knighton, 62 Ark. App. 74, 966 S.W.2d 943 (1998); Second Injury Fund v. Furman, 62 Ark. App. 194, 972 S.W.2d 255 (1998); Shults v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 63 Ark. App. 171, 976 S.W.2d 399 (1998); Smith v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, 285 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2002); Marshall v. Madison County, 81 Ark. App. 57, 98 S.W.3d 452 (2003); Garcia v. A&M Roofing, 89 Ark. App. 251, 202 S.W.3d 532 (2005); Automated Conveyor Sys. v. Dooley, 360 Ark. 218, 200 S.W.3d 442 (2004); Teasley v. Hermann Cos., 92 Ark. App. 40, 211 S.W.3d 40 (2005); Rutherford v. Mid-Delta Cmty. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 317, 285 S.W.3d 248 (2008); Curt Bean Transp., Inc. v. Hill, 2009 Ark. App. 760, 348 S.W.3d 56 (2009); CNA Ins. Co. v. Ark. Children's Hosp., 2011 Ark. App. 671, 386 S.W.3d 631 (2011); St. Joseph's Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Redmond, 2012 Ark. App. 7, 388 S.W.3d 45 (2012); Davis v. Action Mech., 2012 Ark. App. 515 (2012); Lambert v. LQ Mgmt., L.L.C., 2013 Ark. 114, 426 S.W.3d 437 (2013); Hosey v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 2016 Ark. App. 189, 487 S.W.3d 837 (2016); J.M.E. v. Valley View Agri Sys., 2016 Ark. App. 531, 505 S.W.3d 211 (2016); Birtcher v. Mena Water Utils., 2017 Ark. App. 210, 518 S.W.3d 707 (2017).