Ark. Code Ann. § 14-16-105 (2026)
Sale of county property generally
- The county court of each county shall have power and jurisdiction to sell and cause to be conveyed any real estate or personal property belonging to the county and to appropriate the proceeds of the sale for the use of the county by proceeding in the manner set forth in this section.
-
-
When the county judge of a county shall consider it advisable and to the best interest of the county to sell and convey any real or personal property belonging to the county, he or she shall cause an order to be entered in the county court setting forth:
- A description of the property to be sold;
- The reason for the sale; and
- An order directing the county assessor to cause the property to be appraised at its fair market value and to certify his or her appraisal of the property to the county court within a time to be specified in the order.
- A certified copy of the order shall be delivered to the county assessor by the county clerk, and the county clerk shall certify the date of the delivery of the copy on the margin of the record where the order is recorded.
- An order and the procedures as used in this section shall not be required for any sale by the county of any materials separated, collected, recovered, or created by a recycling program authorized and operated by the county. However, the county judge shall maintain a record of the recyclable materials sold, whether they were sold at public or private sale, a description of the recyclables sold, the name of the purchaser, and the terms of the sale. All the proceeds of the sale shall be deposited with the county treasurer.
- An order and the procedures described in this section shall not be required for any conveyance by the county of a conservation easement as described in the Conservation Easement Act, § 15-20-401 et seq. However, this conveyance shall not be made unless authorized by a majority vote of the quorum court.
- If property is sold under § 14-16-106, the requirements of this section are not applicable.
-
When the county judge of a county shall consider it advisable and to the best interest of the county to sell and convey any real or personal property belonging to the county, he or she shall cause an order to be entered in the county court setting forth:
-
- Upon receipt of the certified copy of the order, the county assessor shall view the property described in the order and shall cause the property to be appraised at its fair market value.
- Within the time specified in the order, the assessor shall file with the county clerk his or her written certificate of appraisal of the property.
-
- If the appraised value of the property described in the order is less than five thousand dollars ($5,000), the property may thereafter be sold and conveyed by the county judge, either at public or private sale, by sealed bids or internet sale for not less than three-fourths (¾) of the appraised value as shown by the certificate of appraisal filed by the assessor.
-
- If the property will be sold by internet sale, the notice of sale shall be placed on the website of the internet vendor for no less than eight (8) consecutive days before the date of sale and shall contain a description of the property to be sold and the time of the sale.
- An additional notice may be posted on a county-owned or county-affiliated website, trade website, or business website for no less than eight (8) consecutive days before the date of sale.
-
- When the sale has been completed, the county court shall enter its order approving the sale.
-
The order shall set forth:
- The description of the property sold;
- The name of the purchaser;
- The terms of the sale;
- That the proceeds of the sale have been deposited with the county treasurer; and
- The fund or funds to which the proceeds were credited by the county treasurer.
-
-
- If the appraised value of the property to be sold exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000), the county judge may sell the property to the highest bidder, upon sealed bids received by the judge or by internet sale.
- The county judge shall not sell property under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section for less than three-fourths (¾) of the appraised value of the property as determined by the certificate of the assessor.
-
- Notice of the sale shall be published for two (2) consecutive weekly insertions in some newspaper published and having a general circulation in the county.
-
The notice shall specify:
- The description of the property to be sold;
- The time and place for submitting written bids; and
- The appraised value of the property to be sold.
- The notice shall be dated and signed by the judge.
- If the sale is conducted on the internet, the notice shall be placed on the internet under this section, and the invoice from the internet vendor or publisher shall be accompanied by a statement from the internet vendor or publisher that the sale was published and conducted on the internet.
- The judge shall have the right to reject any bids received by him or her under the notice.
-
- When the judge has accepted a bid for the property, the judge may sell and convey the property to the highest bidder.
- When the sale has been approved and completed, the county court shall enter an order approving the sale, which shall set forth the details of the sale as provided in subdivision (d)(3)(B) of this section.
-
-
-
- Any sale or conveyance of real or personal property belonging to any county not made under the terms of this section shall be null and void.
- The county fixed asset listing shall be amended to reflect all sales or conveyances made by the county under this section.
-
- Any taxpayer of the county may bring an action to cancel the sale and to recover possession of the property sold within two (2) years from the date a sale is consummated.
- This action for the use and benefit of the county is to be taken in the circuit court of the county in which the sale is made or in any county where personal property so sold may be found.
- In the event the property is recovered for the county in the action, the purchaser shall not be entitled to a refund of the consideration paid by him or her for the sale.
-
The procedures for sale and conveyance of county property set forth in this section shall not apply in these instances:
- When personal property of the county is traded in on new or used equipment and credit approximating the fair market price of the personal property is given to the county toward the purchase price of new equipment;
- When the sale of the personal property of the county involves the sale by the county of any materials separated, collected, recovered, or created by a recycling program authorized and operated by the county;
- When the county is conveying an easement, including, but not limited to, easements granted upon county lands for water improvements, sewer improvements, gas lines, electric lines, phone lines, utilities, railways, public roads, highways, and conservation easements as described in the Conservation Easement Act, § 15-20-401 et seq., for any of the purposes enumerated in the Conservation Easement Act, § 15-20-401 et seq., as the same may be amended from time to time;
- When the county is leasing county property, including, but not limited to, leasing county lands or property under §§ 14-16-108 — 14-16-110, or the Municipalities and Counties Industrial Development Revenue Bond Law, § 14-164-201 et seq.; or
- When a sale or disposal of property is conducted under another section of the Arkansas Code.
-
-
- County hospitals constructed or maintained in whole or part by taxes approved by the voters shall not be sold unless the sale is approved by the majority of electors voting on the issue at a general or special election. This subsection is applicable to county hospitals constructed before and after July 20, 1987.
- An election shall not be required for the sale of a county hospital that has been vacant or not used as a county hospital for more than one hundred twenty (120) days.
History. Acts 1945, No. 193, §§ 1-6; 1963, No. 213, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 17-304 — 17-309; Acts 1987, No. 448, § 1; 1993, No. 732, § 1; 1997, No. 1107, §§ 1, 2; 2001, No. 1050, §§ 1, 2; 2005, No. 1240, § 1; 2009, No. 410, §§ 3 — 5; 2011, No. 614, § 3; 2011, No. 1014, § 1; 2019, No. 212, § 1.
Amendments. The 2009 amendment substituted “two thousand dollars ($2,000)” for “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” in (d)(1); in (e), substituted “two thousand dollars ($2,000)” for “one thousand dollars ($1,000)” in (e)(1)(A)(i) and (e)(1)(B), inserted “including that the sale may be conducted on the Internet” in (e)(2)(B)(ii) and made a related change, and inserted (e)(2)(D); and in (g), inserted (g)(2) and redesignated the remaining text accordingly.
The 2011 amendment by No. 614 inserted “or by Internet sale” in (e)(1)(A)(i); inserted “the notice shall be placed on the Internet under this section, and” in (e)(2)(D); redesignated former (e)(4)(A) and (e)(4)(B)(i) as (e)(4)(A); deleted “he or she, as chair of the approval board, shall immediately call a meeting of the board, and the proposals to sell at the acceptable bid shall be submitted to the board for its approval” following “bid for the property” in (e)(4)(A); redesignated former (e)(4)(B)(ii) as (e)(4)(B); added (f)(1)(B) and redesignated former (f)(1)(B) as (f)(1)(C); and substituted “§§ 14-16-108 — 14-16-110” for “§ 14-16-108, § 14-16-109, § 14-16-110” in (f)(2)(D).
The 2011 amendment by No. 1014 substituted “as used” for “prescribed” in (b)(3); inserted “the Conservation Easement Act” in (b)(4); inserted (b)(5); inserted “by sealed bids or Internet sales” in (d)(1); and inserted present (d)(2) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly.
The 2019 amendment substituted “five thousand dollars ($5,000)” for “the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000)” in (d)(1) and (e)(1)(A); in (e)(1), deleted the former (e)(1)(A)(i) designation and deleted (e)(1)(A)(ii); deleted “and best” following “highest” in (e)(1)(A); in (e)(1)(B), substituted “The county judge shall not sell property under subdivision (e)(1)(A) of this section” for “The property, when it exceeds the appraised value of two thousand dollars ($2,000), shall not be sold”, and inserted “of the property”; deleted “including that the sale may be conducted on the Internet” following “bids” in (e)(2)(B)(ii); deleted “and if a majority of the board approves the sale” preceding “the judge may sell” in (e)(4)(A), and made stylistic changes.
Cross References. Arkansas Governmental Compliance Act, § 10-4-301 et seq.
Disposition of public use property, § 22-4-501.
Exercise of powers by county judge, § 14-14-1102.
Sale of county issued firearms to deputies, § 12-15-301.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
Survey of Legislation, 2005 Arkansas General Assembly, Local Government, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev. 373.
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
The right of a county court to order sale of county property for such a consideration as it deemed proper did not conflict with Ark. Const., Art. 12, § 5. Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. Pulaski County, 113 Ark. 439, 168 S.W. 848 (1914) (decision under prior law).
Purpose.
Purpose in providing procedure for sale of county property is to make public all dispositions of county property. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).
Applicability.
This section is superseded with respect to cases coming within the purview of § 14-164-201 et seq. relating to county industrial development revenue bonds. Dumas v. Jerry, 257 Ark. 1031, 521 S.W.2d 539 (1975).
County judge complied with the procedures set forth in § 14-16-106(c) when he sold a gravel crusher belonging to the county after he conferred with the county assessor and they agreed it was junk that should be sold for scrap. The general assembly did not intend for the provisions of this section for sales of county property generally to apply to sales or disposal of surplus property under § 14-16-106. Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey, 2013 Ark. 84 (2013).
Authority to Sell.
When agent for commissioner for sale of county property delivered the commissioner's deed to the purchaser without receiving the purchase price, he would be personally responsible to the county therefor. Jacks v. State, 44 Ark. 61 (1884) (decision under prior law).
When county court had authority to sell the property of the county, nothing short of fraud or grossly inadequate consideration as would amount to fraud would invalidate an order of the court in directing a conveyance. Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. Pulaski County, 113 Ark. 439, 168 S.W. 848 (1914) (decision under prior law).
The consideration for the sale of county property could have been something other than money, and the county court in exercising its power could have determined what was to the best interests of the county. Little Rock Chamber of Commerce v. Pulaski County, 113 Ark. 439, 168 S.W. 848 (1914); Washington County v. Lynn Shelton Post, 201 Ark. 301, 144 S.W.2d 20 (1940) (decisions under prior law).
Former similar statute conferred power upon the county court to sell and convey property of the county not held in trust for specific purposes. Washington County v. Lynn Shelton Post, 201 Ark. 301, 144 S.W.2d 20 (1940) (decision under prior law).
“New.”
The word “new,” as used in the second clause of subdivision (f)(2), means new to the county, although it may be second-hand equipment; although this interpretation renders two different meanings of the term within the same sentence, it is nevertheless a reasonable and proper interpretation of this section. Robinson v. Clark Contracting Co., 992 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1993).
Procedure for Sale.
There was no substantial compliance by the county court with procedure for sale of county auto where it merely orally requested an appraisement by county assessor without entering an order describing the property to be sold for delivery by clerk to the assessor. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).
Allowance of claim by county court for purchase of new truck by county less allowance for old truck did not constitute ratification where county court had not substantially complied with law in having old truck appraised. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).
A judge has no right to sell county property without complying with this section. Goodwin v. State, 235 Ark. 457, 360 S.W.2d 490 (1962).
Timeliness.
Steel manufacturer's counterclaims against a gas corporation, which challenged easements that were granted to the gas corporation by a county, were procedurally barred under § 14-16-105(f)(1)(A) because they were not brought within two years from the date the sales were consummated. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).
Void or Voidable Transactions.
Lease made contrary to former similar statute was held void for that and other reasons. State ex rel. Garland County v. Baxter, 50 Ark. 447, 8 S.W. 188 (1888) (decision under prior law).
County was not estopped to deny validity of sale of used truck owned by county in suit by taxpayer in behalf of county where procedure for appraisement of county property was not substantially complied with by the county court, since sale was void. State ex rel. Miller County v. Eason, 219 Ark. 36, 240 S.W.2d 36 (1951).
Car belonging to a county and sold to a dealer who, after expending money in repairs on it, resold it to the county, was properly excluded from lien on all other property purchased from the dealer, since this sale could have been found to be a part of an overall scheme to defraud the county with the dealer a part of that scheme. Goodwin v. State, 235 Ark. 457, 360 S.W.2d 490 (1962).
Where sale of county property was not contrary to provisions of this section, but was subject to attack for stifling of bidding, the sale was merely voidable, and equity could mold a remedy to fit the case. State ex rel. Peevy v. Cate, 236 Ark. 836, 371 S.W.2d 541 (1963).
Provision giving lessee of county property option to purchase was void, as was provision giving him right to any money received in any eminent domain proceeding, such provisions failing to comply with this section governing disposition of county property; however, with the two provisions stricken, the lease was valid. State ex rel. Peevy v. Cate, 236 Ark. 836, 371 S.W.2d 541 (1963).
Where taxpayer, before protesting sale of county property, allowed purchaser to expend over $28,000 for improvements, to sell a small parcel to others who built a home thereon, and to receive proceeds from condemnation proceedings, resale would not be decreed unless or until purchaser failed to pay the actual value of the property at time of sale, with interest and costs. State ex rel. Peevy v. Cate, 236 Ark. 836, 371 S.W.2d 541 (1963).
The Arkansas Constitution vests exclusive jurisdiction over county property in the county court so that a deed executed by the county judge purporting to convey a tract of county property was void from the outset, and two-year limitation in subsection (f) on bringing taxpayer's suits to cancel improperly made conveyances, being curative in nature, could not remedy such a defect. Maroney v. Universal Leasing Corp., 263 Ark. 8, 562 S.W.2d 77 (1978).
Summary judgment for gas company in its declaratory action was proper as the county's grant of a pipeline easement to manufacturer was null and void due to the county's failure to follow the appraisal, notice, and bidding procedures required in this section, and the exemptions set out in subdivision (f)(2) for conservation easements did not include the pipeline easement; further, the 2005 amendment to this section, which exempted all easements, could not be applied retroactively because the amendment changed prior law rather than merely clarifying it. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).
Judgment was properly awarded to a gas corporation in its action for a declaratory judgment that the grant of a pipeline easement by a county, so that a steel manufacturer could obtain gas from the interstate natural gas market, was null and void pursuant to § 14-16-105(f)(1)(A) where the conveyance was not made pursuant to the procedures of the statute. MacSteel Div. of Quanex v. Ark. Okla. Gas Corp., 363 Ark. 22, 210 S.W.3d 878 (2005).
Cited: Daniels v. City of Ft. Smith, 268 Ark. 157, 594 S.W.2d 238 (1980); Bell v. Crawford County, 287 Ark. 251, 697 S.W.2d 910 (1985); Dudley v. Little River County, 305 Ark. 102, 805 S.W.2d 645 (1991); Ark. Okla. Gas Corp. v. MacSteel Div. of Quanex, 370 Ark. 481, 262 S.W.3d 147 (2007); Searcy County Counsel for Ethical Gov't v. Hinchey, 2011 Ark. 533 (2011).